Prior research supports the learnability of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition Alternative Model of Personality Disorders. However, researchers have yet to compare novice ratings on the AMPD’s Level of Personality Functioning Scale and the 25 pathological personality traits with expert ratings. Furthermore, the AMPD has yet to be examined with the idiographic Shedler-Westen Assessment Procedure. We compared the aggregated AMPD clinical profile of a group of psychology doctoral students who learned the AMPD to high levels (...) of reliability to that of an expert rater using the crucible of the classical case of “Madeline G.” Examination of AMPD and SWAP ratings of “Madeline G.” revealed excellent overall concordance but suggests that novice raters tend to perceive lower levels of personality impairment. (shrink)

The Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) literature tends to focus on bias as a problem that requires ex post solutions (e.g. fairness metrics), rather than addressing the underlying social and technical conditions that (re)produce it. In this article, we propose a complementary strategy that uses genealogy as a constructive, epistemic critique to explain algorithmic bias in terms of the conditions that enable it. We focus on XAI feature attributions (Shapley values) and counterfactual approaches as potential tools to gauge these conditions (...) and offer two main contributions. One is constructive: we develop a theoretical framework to classify these approaches according to their relevance for bias as evidence of social disparities. We draw on Pearl’s ladder of causation (Causality: models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, Causality, 2nd edn. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511803161) to order these XAI approaches concerning their ability to answer fairness-relevant questions and identify fairness-relevant solutions. The other contribution is critical: we evaluate these approaches in terms of their assumptions about the role of protected characteristics in discriminatory outcomes. We achieve this by building on Kohler-Hausmann’s (Northwest Univ Law Rev 113(5):1163–1227, 2019) constructivist theory of discrimination. We derive three recommendations for XAI practitioners to develop and AI policymakers to regulate tools that address algorithmic bias in its conditions and hence mitigate its future occurrence. (shrink)

This paper has two major goals: First, I argue that Catharine MacKinnon’s and Andrea Dworkin’s anti-pornography activism was an act of public reason and their arguments public reasons arguments. Thus, MacKinnon’s argument that pornography is best understood as a practice of sex discrimination is a public reason argument—and so can be defended as grounded in liberal political principles. Political liberalism, as I defend it, can support MacKinnon’s approach to pornography as embodied in a civil rights ordinance. By way of contrast, (...) I will take up another feminist position on pornography, Drucilla Cornell’s, that differs from, and in fact is quite critical of, the MacKinnon/Dworkin anti-pornography position. My primary aim here is to show that Cornell’s arguments fail—as they stand—as public reason arguments, and thus further highlight the crucial aspects of MacKinnon’s feminist approach that are compatible with public reason, and so with liberal political principles. This is not to say that one could not provide a public reason argument for a position like Cornell’s. However, as she offers it, her position is not compatible with the norms of public reason. Second, I show why the obscenity route to the regulation of pornographic material—the traditional liberal approach—is actually antithetical to the version of political liberalism I am interested in defending. The conclusion of these arguments is that contrary to the mainstream view, liberalism is hospitable to the arguments of MacKinnon and Dworkin, and so as liberals we have not only good reason to take their arguments very seriously, but even stronger their arguments flow from fundamental liberal political values. (shrink)

Commentators onEpode11 generally begin by comparing the opening couplet with Archilochus : κα⋯ μ' οὔτ' ἰ⋯μβων οὔτε τερπωλ⋯ων μ⋯λει, and sometimes also Catullus 68. 1–40. In both of these the poet explains that grief at the death of a loved one has expelled all desire to compose verses. According to the comparison, Horace, in 1–2, is stating that the onset of love has, similarly, so absorbed his attention that he cannot write verse. The translation will then run ‘Pettius, I have (...) no pleasure any longer in writing verse, smitten as I am with a heavy love’. (shrink)

Preface: A different kind of meditation -- Part I: Introductory -- A polemical clearing of the ground : Harris, Hitchens and Dawkins' lack of scruple : the unimpressive face of atheism -- Why we need to rethink religion -- Part II: The outside -- Shifting focus from the "outsider" to the "outside" -- Thought from the outside : Lawrence, Levinas and Derrida : at the firing line and into the unknown -- Thought from the outside : Abraham and Isaac : (...) hospitality, the messianic turn and the religious suspension of the ethical -- Balancing as we go : slave or noble, Abrahamic or Hellenic? -- Conclusion : "Driv[ing] on to the edge of the unknown and beyond". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy by Susan JamesRichard A. WatsonSusan James. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. vii + 318. Cloth, $35.00.Susan James shows how during the seventeenth century philosophers moved from the three souls of Aristotle and the tripartite soul of Thomas Aquinas in which passions and reasons compete for the attention of the will, (...) to a Cartesian view of man as a single soul in union with the body who wills under the influence of both passions and reasons, to a Hobbesian view that the soul is the body and that the bodily motions we call reasons and passions are desires; acts of will are merely the deciding desires in deterministic causal sequences of the material motions of the body that constitute desires. This sets up the contemporary view that, motions are caused by desires and beliefs, leaving behind the difficulties of integrating with one another Aristotelian souls, Thomistic faculties, and Cartesian mind and body. James conceives of this evolution as one of unification of mental and bodily powers, and of integration of the active and passive powers of the mind. This concourse also represents a development from theories meant to explain to theories calculated for control and finally to theories facilitating therapy. Aristotle and Thomas adapted their ontologies to perceived differences in powers and faculties, while Descartes and Hobbes worked toward an ideal of unity of science and nature. The Christian Descartes brought together all the substances and powers of nature under a single extended matter divided into parts by the single force of motion, but he excepted the human soul with its power of will to alter the course of nature. The atheist Hobbes simply dispensed with supernatural [End Page 168] mental substance and occult power of will in order to integrate the whole of nature (including sensing and reasoning) under a cause and effect sequence of moving material bodies in which the last desire in a sequence of human bodily motions is designated as an act of will.James intends her book “as a contribution to the reinstatement of the emotions within philosophy, to the… opinion that we need to take account of our emotional life if we are to understand… moral motivation and growth, the springs of action (rational and otherwise), and the nature of reasoning” (22). She agrees that the sharp division between ideas and passions or emotions is properly abolished to be replaced by the view that all ideas have an emotional component, and all passions an ideational component. This fits with the parallel development of the notion that all sensible perceptions are propositional, and the somewhat less widespread notion that all concepts have a sensible component.But did this development result in a view of passions and ideas, learning and knowing, thinking and action, that is more true to nature than Aristotelian ontology? It is very hard to answer this question, and despite her sympathies with the notion that all human thought is both conceptual and emotional, James does not try. The reason we don’t know lies under the surface of the movement from Aristotle to Hobbes (i.e., to Daniel Dennett) like a monster in the deep. The monster is the monotheistic God, the perfection and unity of which underlies the Western drive to a unitary view of nature including man. The possibility that this God could be a deceiver, and so all our sensations and ideas might not represent the real world, set up Cartesianism and modern hypothetico-deductive science. But lurking throughout James’ book is a more palpable dreadnought, a demoness, the woman Eve. The female is responsible for the Fall of Man, and thus the fear and suspicion of women that suffuses patriarchic Christianity, and is expressed openly by such philosophers as Malebranche. Bodily passions and emotions (particularly the concupiscent ones) are nasty, evil, irrational, overpowering; to wit, they are feminine. They are not to be trusted, and must be subdued. So while still driven by ideals of monotheism, Descartes and Hobbes do move beyond the dogmatic Christian association of the emotions with female treachery. Even so... (shrink)

The extent to which discourses surrounding the Good, the sacred, and (more problematically) the beautiful have preoccupied thinkers in continental philosophy and in poststructuralism is striking. What is equally striking, however, is the decisively ‘non-theological’ theoretical cast of this account of the Good. Attempts to “disengage” the account of trancendence at stake remain complicated. What is in question is an understanding that is profoundly ethical—and, I want to argue, against the fabric of theoretical modernity, profoundly historical in ways doubtless that (...) motivate much of ‘poststructuralist’ thought in this area. In what follows, I want to show how Emmanuel Levinas distinguishes the “divergence” of the Good within philosophy, and how Levinas’s philosophy betrays the effect of modernity and the detraditionalization of the ethical even in appealing to certain traditions for the intelligibility—if you will, the figure—of the ethical. (shrink)

The care of elderly people with dementia poses ethical problems in several respects. This paper considers the problems in relation to treatment, withdrawal of treatment (including nutrition and hydration) in terminal care, and consent to involvement in research. It is ultimately the responsibility of the physician to take the decision about whether or not to proceed with treatment, according to the best interests of the patient, but nurses, families and significant others can be involved in making the decision. When withdrawal (...) of treatment or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in the terminal stages of dementia are being considered it is necessary to take into account the nature of the treatment, whether or not it is extraordinary, and the goals of continued nutrition. In some circumstances it may be possible for them to be withdrawn. Only research which is aimed at evaluating treatment for dementia may involve subjects who are suffering from dementia.Soigner des personnes âgés souffrant de la démence pose plusieurs problèmes éthiques. Cet article considère les problèmes concernant le traitement, cessation de traitement (y inclus nutrition et hydration) dans la phase terminale, et consentement de participation dans les recherches. C'est ultimement la décision du docteur si oui ou non de continuer avec le traitement selon les meilleurs intérêts du malade, mais les infirmiers/ères, les familles et les personnes importantes autour du malade peuvent jouer un rôle dans les décisions. Si la cessation de traitement ou cessation de nutrition et hydration dans la phase terminale de démence est envisagée il est nécessaire de tenir compte de la nature du traitement, s'il est 'extraordinaire' ou non, et le but de nutrition si on continuait. Dans quelques circonstances il est possible de les discontinuer. Seuls les recherches qui ont pour but d'évaluer les traitements pour la démence peuvent utiliser des personnes souffrant de démence.Die Pflege von älteren Personen mit Demenz stellt einige ethische Probleme. Dieser Artikel betrachtet die Probleme in Beziehung auf die Pflege, Zurückziehung von Pflege (auch von Nahrung und Getrank) der Sterbenden und der Entscheidung, in der Forschung beteiligt zu sein. Der Arzt hat die schlussendliche Verantwortung über die Entscheidung ob mit der Pflege weitergefahren werden soll oder nicht nach dem besten Interesse der Patienten. Aber das Krankenpflegepersonal, die Familie und bedeutende Andere können auch an dieser Entscheidung teilnehmen. Wenn es sich um Zurückziehung der Pflege, oder Zurückziehung von Nahrung oder Getrank in der Sterbepflege von Personen mit Demenz handelt, is es nötig, das Wesen der Pflege und die Ziele einer fortfahrenden Nahrung zu kennen. In gewissen Fällen ist es möglich, diese zurück zu ziehen. Es sollen nur Patienten mit Demenz an Forschungen teilnehmen die über die Pflege der Demenz einschätzt. (shrink)

The care of elderly people with dementia poses ethical problems in several respects. This paper considers the problems in relation to treatment, withdrawal of treatment (including nutrition and hydration) in terminal care, and consent to involvement in research. It is ultimately the responsibility of the physician to take the decision about whether or not to proceed with treatment, according to the best interests of the patient, but nurses, families and significant others can be involved in making the decision. When withdrawal (...) of treatment or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration in the terminal stages of dementia are being considered it is necessary to take into account the nature of the treatment, whether or not it is extraordinary, and the goals of continued nutrition. In some circumstances it may be possible for them to be withdrawn. Only research which is aimed at evaluating treatment for dementia may involve subjects who are suffering from dementia. Soigner des personnes âgés souffrant de la démence pose plusieurs problèmes éthiques. Cet article considère les problèmes concernant le traitement, cessation de traitement (y inclus nutrition et hydration) dans la phase terminale, et consentement de participation dans les recherches. C'est ultimement la décision du docteur si oui ou non de continuer avec le traitement selon les meilleurs intérêts du malade, mais les infirmiers/ères, les familles et les personnes importantes autour du malade peuvent jouer un rôle dans les décisions. Si la cessation de traitement ou cessation de nutrition et hydration dans la phase terminale de démence est envisagée il est nécessaire de tenir compte de la nature du traitement, s'il est 'extraordinaire' ou non, et le but de nutrition si on continuait. Dans quelques circonstances il est possible de les discontinuer. Seuls les recherches qui ont pour but d'évaluer les traitements pour la démence peuvent utiliser des personnes souffrant de démence. Die Pflege von älteren Personen mit Demenz stellt einige ethische Probleme. Dieser Artikel betrachtet die Probleme in Beziehung auf die Pflege, Zurückziehung von Pflege (auch von Nahrung und Getrank) der Sterbenden und der Entscheidung, in der Forschung beteiligt zu sein. Der Arzt hat die schlussendliche Verantwortung über die Entscheidung ob mit der Pflege weitergefahren werden soll oder nicht nach dem besten Interesse der Patienten. Aber das Krankenpflegepersonal, die Familie und bedeutende Andere können auch an dieser Entscheidung teilnehmen. Wenn es sich um Zurückziehung der Pflege, oder Zurückziehung von Nahrung oder Getrank in der Sterbepflege von Personen mit Demenz handelt, is es nötig, das Wesen der Pflege und die Ziele einer fortfahrenden Nahrung zu kennen. In gewissen Fällen ist es möglich, diese zurück zu ziehen. Es sollen nur Patienten mit Demenz an Forschungen teilnehmen die über die Pflege der Demenz einschätzt. (shrink)

We posit that the weight a person assigns a moral principle is not stable between ideal, or un-contextual assessments and the weight the same moral principle is allocated when applied in a contextual dilemma. Second, we postulate that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior or judgment. Results indicate that the importance of moral principles is dynamic and that patterned moral behavior is a significant predictor of moral judgments.

We re-examine the construct of Moral Hypocrisy from the perspective of normative self-interest. Arguing that some degree of self-interest is culturally acceptable and indeed expected, we postulate that a pattern of behavior is more indicative of moral hypocrisy than a single action. Contrary to previous findings, our results indicate that a significant majority of subjects (N = 136) exhibited fair behavior, and that ideals of caring and fairness, when measured in context of the scenario, were predictive of those behaviors. Moreover, (...) measures of Individualism/Collectivism appear more predictive of self-interested behavior than out-of-context responses to moral ideals. Implications for research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

Mommsen is reputed to have said: ‘In spite of his beautiful style, Renan was a true scholar’. Books on the Symposium are rare, perhaps because it is thought that its beauty takes from its philosophical earnestness. Rosen’s work is all the more welcome for that reason, but he also manages to throw light on much else in Plato’s thought. He tries to show that the cliché about Plato’s style being an important part of his meaning is to be taken seriously. (...) Rosen goes through the prologue and the various speeches in the dialogue analysing them and showing their relationship to Platonic and a wide range of other philosophic thought. (shrink)

This book, like its predecessor, Imagining, is an exemplary study in phenomenology. Perhaps even more than its predecessor, however, Remembering provides the reader with insight into the contemporary status of phenomenological inquiry. And, perhaps even more pointedly, this work traces both the potentials as well as limitations of transcendental representation and phenomenological description. Casey's investigation of remembering reveals a domain which extends beyond representation, irrecuperable to epistemic adequation and the grasp of conceptual analysis and reduction. As in other areas central (...) to the research program Husserl hoped would provide an ultimate foundation for the sciences in general, remembering involves a domain which ruptures the schemata of classical phenomenological enquiry: subject and object, act and content, form and matter. (shrink)

Often we feel there is something odd about death, and especially about our own. This latter at least we often feel beyond our ken. Well, I think in a sense it may be; but in another, clearly is not. Among those who have felt this strangeness is Ramchandra Gandhi who, in an excellent recent work, The Availability of Religious Ideas , maintained – There is no difficulty in seeing that I cannot intelligibly conceive of my own death – the ceasing (...) to be, for good, of myself, my consciousness. I can conceive of temporary lapses into unconsciousness, always overcome by a return to consciousness. The difficulty is this: in asking myself the question 'What will it be like to be irreversibly unconscious?' , I want both to remain self-conscious and visualize actual loss of capacity for self-consciousness. This cannot be done. (shrink)

The on-going debate over religious eduction in schools takes a new turn, with Brenda Watson arguing that atheism is just as much a ‘faith position’ as theism.

In Think, Issue 7, Brendan Larvor took the Archbishop of Canterbury to task for suggesting that atheism and humanism should not be taught in schools alongside the major faiths. Here, Brenda Watson defends the Archbishop's position.

This article attempts to determine whether there exists a coherent, plausible, and ultimately compelling explication of what it is to act neutrally. I argue that there is – an account I label neutrality of volition, and according to which an actor acts non-neutrally where she either acts for the purpose of differentially helping or hindering a particular party in a given contest, or acts or in the belief that there is a substantial likelihood that her action will have this effect. (...) Along the way, I suggest that political philosophers concerned with whether justice requires that the state’s laws and policies be publicly justifiable, as well as legal commentators who note that oftentimes laws of general application have disparate impacts, would do well to cease framing their arguments in the language of neutrality. I conclude by arguing that debate over the proper interpretation of neutrality is not merely a matter of semantics. Having identified an account of neutrality that aligns with our ordinary understanding of the concept, and which is also internally consistent, we have access to a conceptual tool that we can use to make better sense of a wide array of actions in the political sphere and beyond, while also avoiding an unhelpful conflation of neutrality with distinct concepts such as fairness, public justifiability, anti-perfectionism, equal impact, and non-discrimination. (shrink)

Paul Kurtz's article ‘Morality is natural’ in THINK 15 was most stimulating. It left me, however, somewhat dissatisfied. Whilst he is clearly right that that there is a fund of moral wisdom that has been developed by humankind, I question whether distancing morality from religion is the important priority for us today.

Laurence Peddle's article ‘the Meaning and the Mystery of Life’ poses fascinating questions concerning the purpose or non-purpose of life and the interpretation of experience. My response questions his use of terms such as meaning, mystery and life-after-death, and his appeal to Hume on personal identity. Reason per se cannot take us all the way, nevertheless I enumerate reasons for caution in dismissing other people's self-understanding. The link between interpretation of experience and assumptions already held argues strongly for accepting the (...) limits to human knowledge, thus enabling an openness which avoids premature foreclosure whether atheistic or religious. (shrink)

This collection addresses whether ethicists, like authorities in other fields, can speak as experts in their subject matter. Though ethics consultation is a growing practice in medical contexts, there remain difficult questions about the role of ethicists in professional decision-making. Contributors examine the nature and plausibility of moral expertise, the relationship between character and expertise, the nature and limits of moral authority, how one might become a moral expert, and the trustworthiness of moral testimony. This volume engages with the growing (...) literature in these debates and offers new perspectives from both academics and practitioners. The readings will be of particular interest to bioethicists, clinicians, ethics committees, and students of social epistemology. These new essays promise to advance discussions in the professionalization and accreditation of ethics consultation. (shrink)