108 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Mark Schroeder [92]M. Schroeder [3]Marcin J. Schroeder [3]Michael Schroeder [3]
Marcin Schroeder [1]M. R. Schroeder [1]Mark P. Schroeder [1]M. J. Schroeder [1]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also
Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California
  1. Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   106 citations  
  2. Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment1.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
    This paper compares two alternative explanations of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge (i.e., the claim that whether an agent knows that p can depend on pragmatic factors). After reviewing the evidence for such pragmatic encroachment, we ask how it is best explained, assuming it obtains. Several authors have recently argued that the best explanation is provided by a particular account of belief, which we call pragmatic credal reductivism. On this view, what it is for an agent to believe a proposition is (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   49 citations  
  3.  3
    Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
    Like much in this book, the title and dust jacket illustration are clever. The first evokes Hume's remark in the Treatise that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.’ The second, which represents a cross between a dance-step and a clinch, links up with the title and anticipates an example used throughout the book to support its central claims: that Ronnie, unlike Bradley, has a reason to go to a party – namely, that there will (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   83 citations  
  4. Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.
    Philosophers have come to distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reasons for belief, intention, and other attitudes. Several theories about the nature of this distinction have been offered, by far the most prevalent of which is the idea that it is, at bottom, the distinction between what are known as ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons. This paper argues that the object-given/state-given theory vastly overgeneralizes on a small set of data points, and in particular that any adequate account of the distinction (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  6. Having Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.
    What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the "Factoring Account", you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have--which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   67 citations  
  7. Ought, Agents, and Actions.M. Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.
    According to a naïve view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, ‘ought’ often expresses a relation between agents and actions – the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naïve view that ‘ought’ always expresses this relation – on the contrary, adherents of the naïve view are happy to allow that ‘ought’ also has an epistemic sense, on which it means, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   32 citations  
  8.  74
    Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. Yet the semantic commitments of expressivism are still poorly understood and have not been (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  9. Value and the Right Kind of Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.
    Fitting Attitudes accounts of value analogize or equate being good with being desirable, on the premise that ‘desirable’ means not, ‘able to be desired’, as Mill has been accused of mistakenly assuming, but ‘ought to be desired’, or something similar. The appeal of this idea is visible in the critical reaction to Mill, which generally goes along with his equation of ‘good’ with ‘desirable’ and only balks at the second step, and it crosses broad boundaries in terms of philosophers’ other (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   40 citations  
  10. Holism, Weight, and Undercutting.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):328 - 344.
    Particularists in ethics emphasize that the normative is holistic, and invite us to infer with them that it therefore defies generalization. This has been supposed to present an obstacle to traditional moral theorizing, to have striking implications for moral epistemology and moral deliberation, and to rule out reductive theories of the normative, making it a bold and important thesis across the areas of normative theory, moral epistemology, moral psychology, and normative metaphysics. Though particularists emphasize the importance of the holism of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   41 citations  
  11. What Does It Take to "Have" a Reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.
    forthcoming in reisner and steglich-peterson, eds., Reasons for Belief If I believe, for no good reason, that P and I infer (correctly) from this that Q, I don’t think we want to say that I ‘have’ P as evidence for Q. Only things that I believe (or could believe) rationally, or perhaps, with justification, count as part of the evidence that I have. It seems to me that this is a good reason to include an epistemic acceptability constraint on evidence (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   38 citations  
  12. Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.
    Intentions matter. They have some kind of normative impact on our agency. Something goes wrong when an agent intends some end and fails to carry out the means she believes to be necessary for it, and something goes right when, intending the end, she adopts the means she thinks are required. This has even been claimed to be one of the only uncontroversial truths in ethical theory. But not only is there widespread disagreement about why this is so, there is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   44 citations  
  13. Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):257-309.
    This paper is a survey of recent ‘hybrid’ approaches to metaethics, according to which moral sentences, in some sense or other, express both beliefs and desires. I try to show what kinds of theoretical issues come up at the different choice points we encounter in developing such a view, to raise some problems and explain where they come from, and to begin to get a sense for what the payoff of such views can be, and what they will need to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  14. Stepping Beyond the Newtonian Paradigm in Biology. Towards an Integrable Model of Life: Accelerating Discovery in the Biological Foundations of Science.Plamen L. Simeonov, Edwin Brezina, Ron Cottam, Andreé C. Ehresmann, Arran Gare, Ted Goranson, Jaime Gomez‐Ramirez, Brian D. Josephson, Bruno Marchal, Koichiro Matsuno, Robert S. Root-­Bernstein, Otto E. Rössler, Stanley N. Salthe, Marcin Schroeder, Bill Seaman & Pridi Siregar - 2012 - In Plamen L. Simeonov, Leslie S. Smith & Andreé C. Ehresmann (eds.), Integral Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality. Springer. pp. 328-427.
    The INBIOSA project brings together a group of experts across many disciplines who believe that science requires a revolutionary transformative step in order to address many of the vexing challenges presented by the world. It is INBIOSA’s purpose to enable the focused collaboration of an interdisciplinary community of original thinkers. This paper sets out the case for support for this effort. The focus of the transformative research program proposal is biology-centric. We admit that biology to date has been more fact-oriented (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. The Scope of Instrumental Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
    Allow me to rehearse a familiar scenario. We all know that which ends you have has something to do with what you ought to do. If Ronnie is keen on dancing but Bradley can’t stand it, then the fact that there will be dancing at the party tonight affects what Ronnie and Bradley ought to do in different ways. In short, (HI) you ought, if you have the end, to take the means. But now trouble looms: what if you have (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   57 citations  
  16. Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
    Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  17.  17
    Being For.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Expressivism - the sophisticated contemporary incarnation of the noncognitivist research program of Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare - is no longer the province of metaethicists alone. Its comprehensive view about the nature of both normative language and normative thought has also recently been applied to many topics elsewhere in philosophy - including logic, probability, mental and linguistic content, knowledge, epistemic modals, belief, the a priori, and even quantifiers. [...] Expressivism, the book argues, is coherent and interesting, but false.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  18. How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):573-599.
    Expressivists have a problem with negation. The problem is that they have not, to date, been able to explain why ‘murdering is wrong’ and ‘murdering is not wrong’ are inconsistent sentences. In this paper, I explain the nature of the problem, and why the best efforts of Gibbard, Dreier, and Horgan and Timmons don’t solve it. Then I show how to diagnose where the problem comes from, and consequently how it is possible for expressivists to solve it. Expressivists should accept (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  19.  33
    Rational Stability Under Pragmatic Encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-18.
    It doesn’t seem possible to be a realist about the traditional Christian God while claiming to be able to reduce God talk in naturalistically acceptable terms. Reduction, in this case, seems obviously eliminativist. Many philosophers seem to think that the same is true of the normative—that reductive “realists” about the normative are not really realists about the normative at all, or at least, only in some attenuated sense. This paper takes on the challenge of articulating what it is that makes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   32 citations  
  21. 10. Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness (Pp. 632-637). [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Way, Gregg Strauss, Tim Willenken, Matthew Talbert, Angela M. Smith, James A. Montmarquet, Nicole Hassoun, Virginia Held & Nicholas Wolterstorff - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3).
  22. Noncognitivism in Ethics.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Routledge.
    According to noncognitivists, when we say that stealing is wrong, what we are doing is more like venting our feelings about stealing or encouraging one another not to steal, than like stating facts about morality. These ideas challenge the core not only of much thinking about morality and metaethics, but also of much philosophical thought about language and meaning. _Noncognitivism in Ethics_ is an outstanding introduction to these theories, ranging from their early history through the latest contemporary developments. Beginning with (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  23. Teleology, Agent‐Relative Value, and 'Good'.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):265-000.
    It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  24.  3
    Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):101-104.
    My project in Being For is both constructive and negative. The main aim of the book is to take the core ideas of meta-ethical expressivism as far as they can go, and to try to develop a version of expressivism that solves many of the more straightforward open problems that have faced the view without being squarely confronted. In doing so, I develop an expressivist framework that I call biforcated attitude semantics, which I claim has the minimal structural features required (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  25. Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.
    This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, manyof the other objections to the Humean Theoryof Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few objections to the Humean Theorydepend on whether we assume that Humeans are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   24 citations  
  26.  21
    When Beliefs Wrong.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (1):115-127.
    Most philosophers find it puzzling how beliefs could wrong, and this leads them to conclude that they do not. So there is much philosophical work to be done in sorting out whether I am right to say that they do, as well as how this could be so. But in this paper I will take for granted that beliefs can wrong, and ask instead when beliefs wrong. My answer will be that beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. This answer has (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. What Makes Reasons Sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.
    This paper addresses the question: ‘what makes reasons sufficient?’ and offers the answer, ‘being at least as weighty as the reasons for the alternatives’. The paper starts by introducing some of the reasons why sufficiency has seemed difficult to understand, particularly in epistemology, and some circumstantial evidence that this has contributed to more general problems in the epistemological literature. It then introduces the positive account of sufficiency, and explains how this captures sufficiency in both the practical and epistemic domains. Finally, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  28. Reversibility or Disagreement.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):43-84.
    The phenomenon of disagreement has recently been brought into focus by the debate between contextualists and relativist invariantists about epistemic expressions such as ‘might’, ‘probably’, indicative conditionals, and the deontic ‘ought’. Against the orthodox contextualist view, it has been argued that an invariantist account can better explain apparent disagreements across contexts by appeal to the incompatibility of the propositions expressed in those contexts. This paper introduces an important and underappreciated phenomenon associated with epistemic expressions — a phenomenon that we call (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  29. Tempered Expressivism.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    The basic idea of expressivism is that for some sentences ‘P’, believing that P is not just a matter of having an ordinary descriptive belief. This is a way of capturing the idea that the meaning of some sentences either exceeds their factual/descriptive content or doesn’t consist in any particular factual/descriptive content at all, even in context. The paradigmatic application for expressivism is within metaethics, and holds that believing that stealing is wrong involves having some kind of desire-like attitude, with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  30. What is the Frege-Geach Problem?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.
    In the 1960s, Peter Geach and John Searle independently posed an important objection to the wide class of 'noncognitivist' metaethical views that had at that time been dominant and widely defended for a quarter of a century. The problems raised by that objection have come to be known in the literature as the Frege-Geach Problem, because of Geach's attribution of the objection to Frege's distinction between content and assertoric force, and the problem has since occupied a great deal of the (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  31. Expression for Expressivists.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):86–116.
    Expressivism’s central idea is that normative sentences bear the same relation to non-cognitive attitudes that ordinary descriptive sentences bear to beliefs: the expression relation. Allan Gibbard teIls us that “that words express judgments will be accepted by almost everyone” - the distinctive contribution of expressivism, his claim goes, is only a view about what kind of judgments words express. But not every account of the expression relation is equally suitable for the expressivist’s purposes. In fact, what I argue in this (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  32. Instrumental Mythology.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  33.  11
    Willing Belief.Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    _ Source: _Page Count 22 In _Unbelievable Errors_, Bart Streumer offers resourceful arguments against each of non-reductive realism, reductive realism, and non-cognitivism, in order to motivate his version of the normative error theory, according to which normative predicates ascribe properties that do not exist. In this contribution, I argue that none of the steps of this master argument succeed, and that Streumer’s arguments leave puzzles about what it means to ascribe a property at all.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  6
    Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):1-41.
    According to a naive view sometimes apparent in the writings of moral philosophers, 'ought' often expresses a relation between agents and actions—the relation that obtains between an agent and an action when that action is what that agent ought to do. It is not part of this naive view that 'ought' always expresses this relation—adherents of the naive view are happy to allow that 'ought' also has an evaluative sense, on which it means, roughly, that were things ideal, some proposition (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  35. Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy. [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):463-474.
    Reply to Shafer-Landau, Mcpherson, and Dancy Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9659-0 Authors Mark Schroeder, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  36. The Hypothetical Imperative?Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):357 – 372.
    According to the standard view, Kant held that hypothetical imperatives are universally binding edicts with disjunctive objects: take-the-means-or-don't-have-the-end. But Kant thought otherwise. He held that they are edicts binding only on some - those who have an end.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   13 citations  
  37. Reasons and Agent-Neutrality.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):279-306.
    This paper considers the connection between the three-place relation, R is a reason for X to do A and the two-place relation, R is a reason to do A. I consider three views on which the former is to be analyzed in terms of the latter. I argue that these views are widely held, and explain the role that they play in motivating interesting substantive ethical theories. But I reject them in favor of a more obvious analysis, which goes the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  38. Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce?Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):409-430.
    Nondescriptivist views in many areas of philosophy have long been associated with the commitment that in contrast to other domains of discourse, there are no propositions in their particular domain. For example, the ‘no truth conditions’ theory of conditionals1 is understood as the view that conditionals don’t express propositions, noncognitivist expressivism in metaethics is understood as advocating the view that there are not really moral propositions,2 and expressivism about epistemic modals is thought of as the view that there is no (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  39. Cudworth and Normative Explanations.Mark Schroeder - 2006 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3).
    Moral theories usually aspire to be explanatory – to tell us why something is wrong, why it is good, or why you ought to do it. So it is worth knowing how moral explanations differ, if they do, from explanations of other things. This paper uncovers a common unarticulated theory about how normative explanations must work – that they must follow what I call the Standard Model. Though the Standard Model Theory has many implications, in this paper I focus primarily (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  40. Supervenience Arguments Under Relaxed Assumptions.Johannes Schmitt & Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):133 - 160.
    When it comes to evaluating reductive hypotheses in metaphysics, supervenience arguments are the tools of the trade. Jaegwon Kim and Frank Jackson have argued, respectively, that strong and global supervenience are sufficient for reduction, and others have argued that supervenience theses stand in need of the kind of explanation that reductive hypotheses are particularly suited to provide. Simon Blackburn's arguments about what he claims are the specifically problematic features of the supervenience of the moral on the natural have also been (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  41. How to Be an Expressivist About Truth.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 282--298.
    In this paper I explore why one might hope to, and how to begin to, develop an expressivist account of truth – that is, a semantics for ‘true’ and ‘false’ within an expressivist framework. I do so for a few reasons: because certain features of deflationism seem to me to require some sort of nondescriptivist semantics, because of all nondescriptivist semantic frameworks which are capable of yielding definite predictions rather than consisting merely of hand-waving, expressivism is that with which I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  42.  79
    Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  43. 10. Evan Selinger and Robert Crease, Eds., The Philosophy of Expertise Evan Selinger and Robert Crease, Eds., The Philosophy of Expertise (Pp. 377-381). [REVIEW]Philip Pettit, David Lefkowitz, Steven Wall, Mark Schroeder, Paula Casal & Rosalind Hursthouse - 2007 - In Laurie DiMauro (ed.), Ethics. Greenhaven Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  44.  41
    Getting Perspective on Objective Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):289-319.
    This article considers two important problems for the idea that what we ought to do is determined by the balance of competing reasons. The problems are distinct, but the object of the article is to explore how they admit of a single solution. It is a consequence of this solution that objective reasons—facts that count in favor—are in an important sense less objective than they have consistently been assumed to be. This raises but does not answer the question as to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Buck-Passers' Negative Thesis.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):341-347.
    Buck-passers about value accept two theses about value, a negative thesis and a positive. The negative thesis is that the fact that something is valuable is not itself a reason to promote or appreciate it. The positive thesis is that the fact that something is valuable consists in the fact that there are other reasons to promote or appreciate it. Buck-passers suppose that the negative thesis follows from the positive one, and sometimes insist on it as if it is the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  46.  30
    Explaining the Reasons We Share: Explanation and Expression in Ethics, Volume 1.Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents over a decade of work by Mark Schroeder, one of the leading figures in contemporary metaethics. One new and ten previously published papers weave together treatments of reasons, reduction, supervenience, instrumental rationality, and legislation, to explore the nature and limits of moral explanation.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47. How Does the Good Appear To Us?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Social Theory and Practice 34 (1):119-130.
    This is a rough draft of a critical notice of Sergio Tenenbaum’s book, Appearances of the Good, for Social Theory and Practice.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  48.  71
    State-Given Reasons: Prevalent, If Not Ubiquitous.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):128-140.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  49.  66
    Scope for Rational Autonomy.Mark Schroeder - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):297-310.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  50. Not so Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality.Mark Schroeder - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):348–356.
    Douglas Portmore has recently argued in this journal for a "promising result" – that combining teleological ethics with "evaluator relativism" about the good allows an ethical theory to account for deontological intuitions while "accommodat[ing] the compelling idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available state of affairs." I show that this result is false. It follows from the indexical semantics of evaluator relativism that Portmore's compelling idea is false. I also try to explain what might have (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 108