The continuing philosophical interest in the famous 'Protocol Sentence Debate' in the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists is, to a large measure, due to the focus on the epistemological issues in the dispute, and the neglect of differences among the leading players in their philosophical views of logic and language. In _Protocols, Truth and Convention_, the current understanding of the debate is advanced by developing the contemporaneous views of logic and language held by the principal disputants. Rudolf Carnap and Moritz (...) Schlick. It is argued - largely on the basis of unpublished manuscripts and correspondence - that, despite apparent differences in their respective conceptions of language, there are nonetheless striking similarities, particularly with respect to the conventionality of language. Nonetheless, one key issue - concerning the _syntacticism_ inherent in Carnap's early Thirties' philosophy - separates the two viewpoints in the clash over protocols. Finally, it is argued that Carnap's syntacticism is untenable, a conclusion that Carnap himself finally reached in the closing exchanges of the protocol sentence controversy. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to undermine Paul Feyerabend's claim, which is crucial to the success of his analysis of Positivism, that the Pragmatic Theory of Observation was first developed by Rudolf Carnap in his early discussions of protocol sentences. Rather, it will be argued that Carnap's conception of protocols was founded on considerations drawn from his conception of language so that Carnap's reasons for endorsing certain aspects of the Pragmatic Theory are nothing like Feyerabend's. Moreover, Carnap never approved (...) the final conclusion of the Pragmatic Theory, that observational reports are distinguished by their causes. These historical conclusions provide the basis for arguing that, despite Feyerabend's critique, Carnap's later views (in "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts") clearly countenance theoretical influences on observational statements. (shrink)

Uebel has recently claimed that, contrary to popular opinion, none of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists were proponents of epistemological foundationalism. According to the considerations of the current discussion, however, Uebel's conclusion is erroneous, especially with respect to the work of Moritz Schlick. The chief reason Uebel offers to support his conclusion is that current attempts to portray Schlick's epistemology as foundationalist fail to overcome its ‘ultimate incoherence’. In contrast, it is argued that current interpretations, based (...) on the unpublished as well as the published record, provide understandings of Schlick's foundationalist epistemology as not only coherent, but plausible. In closing, Uebel's own treatment of Schlick's work, which purports to show that the most feasible candidates for foundational statements are ‘meaning-theoretic’ clarifications of the content of expressions, itself fails to accurately represent Schlick's own characterizations, and pictures Schlick's epistemology as a confused mix of epistemic and semantic insights. (shrink)

One important achievement Rudolf Carnap claimed for his book, The Logical Syntax of Language, was that it effected a synthesis of two seemingly antithetical philosophies of mathematics, logicism and formalism. Reconciling these widely divergent conceptions had been a goal of Carnap’s for several years. But in the years in which Carnap’s synthesis evolved, important intellectual developments influenced the direction of his efforts and, ultimately, the final outcome. These developments were, first of all, the epoch-making theorems proved by Kurt Gödel, which (...) required the abandonment of several theses central to the aims of logicism and formalism. Of far greater significance, in the present context, are the changes in Carnap’s own philosophical outlook, brought about not only by Gödel’s theorems but concurrent discussions within the Vienna Circle as well as his own researches. Consequently, the exact sense in which Carnap attempted the synthesis of logicism and formalism in the Logical Syntax requires careful examination. In what follows below, the evolution of Carnap’s synthesis will be traced, from the first reconciliation he proposed , through the synthesis that appeared with the publication of The Logical Syntax of Language. The aim is to determine which modifications of Carnap’s synthesis were required by Gödel’s theorems, and which were motivated by changes in his own thinking. Although the characteristic theses of both logicism and formalism required profound modifications because of Gödel’s theorems, the philosophical impulses that originally fueled their programs retained much of their former virulence. But the changes in Carnap’s thought that ocurred in the years he was developing his synthesis especially affected his appreciation of the philosophical motivations underwriting the logicist approach, so that much of the philosophical insight that inspired it is lost, and Carnap’s combination of logicism and formalism is a putative synthesis at best. (shrink)

Marburg Neo-Kantianism has attracted substantial interest among contemporary philosophers drawn by its founding idea that the success of advanced theoretical science is a given fact and it is the task of philosophical inquiry to ground the objectivity of scientific achievement in its a priori sources (Cohen and Natorp 1906, p. i). The Marburg thinkers realized that recent advances and developments in the mathematical sciences had changed the character of Kant’s transcendental project, demanding new methods and approaches to establish the objectivity (...) of the latest insights into physical reality. Hermann Cohen, one of the founders of the Marburg School, attempted to base the objectivity of science on the concepts of .. (shrink)

Rudolf Carnap's 'Principle of Tolerance' was undoubtedly one of the most infl uential precepts in 20th Century philosophy. Introduced in The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap's Principle suffered from ambiguities which aroused important philosophical questions from Moritz Schlick and Alberto Coffa. Specifi cally, their questions arise from the application of the Principle to the matter of including extra-logical transformation rules in the defi nition of a language, which Carnap regarded as an important difference between his own conventionalist philosophy of logic (...) and the 'absolutist' conception of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Yet both Schlick and Coffa suggested that applying the Tolerance precept to this matter exceeds the limits of its legitimate deployment. Upon considering their objections, as well as the criticism of Wittgenstein which evoked them, it is argued that the philosophical signifi cance of the Principle of Tolerance requires its strict limitation to matters pertaining to the determination of meaning. (shrink)

The article “Is Google Making Us Stupid?” in last Summer’s Atlantic Monthly, raised a number of provocative, and indeed worrisome, questions about computer usage and cognitive development. For instance, persons with considerable experience of reading for the sake of pleasure report that, after a couple of years using computers a great deal, they have experienced a loss of interest in pleasure-reading, even feeling impatient when written sources do not supply the information they seek quickly and conveniently. One suggestion is that (...) these effects are somehow related to the mathematical basis of computing provided in the work of Alan Turing. Since, however, Turing's work is based on earlier work by Kurt Gödel, the question may be referred to Gödel's results and it is argued that the mathematical architecture underlying computer operation and applications in no way limits the creativity or even the cognitive activity of its users. (shrink)

The most influential critique of the Logical Positivists’ analysis of scientific observation was posed by Paul Feyerabend in his classic essay, “Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism”. Feyerabend countered the later Positivist conception with his so-called ‘Pragmatic Theory of Observation’ which was founded on two ideas. The first is that observation reports are ‘theory-laden’, in the sense that they are always interpreted in the light of the best current theory and are subject to reinterpretation when one theory succeeds another. Feyerabend traced the (...) development of this idea in the early writings of the Positivists, especially Rudolf Carnap, in the classic discussion of protocol sentences. In that context, Feyerabend finds that the theory-ladenness of observation leads inexorably to the second idea of the Pragmatic Theory, that what counts as an observation report does not depend on either its empirical content or its logical form, but on its causal or pragmatic features. (shrink)

Coffa’s book attempts to unify the most important intellectual developments in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries by grouping them together as “The Semantic Tradition”, identifying their focus on issues in the philosophy of language and logic, and extolling their implications for epistemological issues. Coffa’s interpretations of the intellectual episodes he recounts are strikingly original and, though many will dissent, none will deny the care with which he argues or the scholarly erudition on which he rests his case.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

The Vienna Circle’s debate about the linguistic form and epistemological import of scientific data statements—cor protocol sentence debate —has long been viewed as a prime example of neopositivist folly. Thomas Oberdan’s study is explicitly revisionist: “the lessons that have been drawn from the controversy are of questionable value since they are founded on shallow conceptions of the opinions and viewpoints that figured decisively in the ensuing clash.” Rightly deploring this fact “since many of the issues addressed [in that (...) debate] appear at the forefront of philosophical discussions today” , Oberdan provides an analysis of the PSD that succeeds in bringing alive issues of lasting interest. (shrink)

While this Journal is not the place for an extended discussion of the exegeticalpoints raised by Thomas Oberdan’s ‘The Vienna Circle’s ‘‘Anti-Foundation-alism’’’ [1998], some brief remarks are required to correct his misunderstand-ing of my position on the relevant issues, to stress the highly controversialstatus of his own interpretation and to counter his portrayal of the dialectics ofthe debate.

The newly updated Right and Wrong 2nd Edition is an accessible introduction to the major traditions in western philosophical ethics, written in a lively and engaging style. It is designed for entry-level ethics courses and includes real-life ethical scenarios chosen to appeal directly to students. Greatly expanded and improved, this successful text introduces students to the major ethical traditions, and provides a simple methodology for resolving ethical dilemmas Treats teleological and deontological approaches to ethics as the two most important traditions, (...) but now includes chapters on virtue ethics and the ethics of care The very accessible writing style speaks directly to students’ own experience Draws examples from three types of real-life ethical scenarios submitted by students: academic dishonesty, partying, and personal relationships Provides a concise treatment of this notoriously complex subject, perfect for entry-level ethics and applied ethics courses. (shrink)

When making decisions, humans can observe many kinds of information about others' activities, but their effects on performance are not well understood. We investigated social learning strategies using a simple problem-solving task in which participants search a complex space, and each can view and imitate others' solutions. Results showed that participants combined multiple sources of information to guide learning, including payoffs of peers' solutions, popularity of solution elements among peers, similarity of peers' solutions to their own, and relative payoffs from (...) individual exploration. Furthermore, performance was positively associated with imitation rates at both the individual and group levels. When peers' payoffs were hidden, popularity and similarity biases reversed, participants searched more broadly and randomly, and both quality and equity of exploration suffered. We conclude that when peers' solutions can be effectively compared, imitation does not simply permit scrounging, but it can also facilitate propagation of good solutions for further cumulative exploration. (shrink)

Big Ideas for Little Kids includes everything a teacher, a parent, or a college student needs to teach philosophy to elementary school children from picture books. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book explains why it is important to allow young children access to philosophy during primary-school education. Wartenberg also gives advice on how to construct a "learner-centered" classroom, in which children discuss philosophical issues with one another as they respond to open-ended questions by saying whether they agree (...) or disagree with what others have said. (shrink)

v. 1. Editorial introduction -- v. 2. The English and Latin texts (i) -- v. 3. The English and Latin texts (ii).

Some theories of goodness are descriptively rich: they have much to say about what makes things good. Neo-Aristotelian accounts, for instance, detail the various features that make a human being, a dog, a bee good relative to facts about those forms of life. Famously, such theories of relative goodness tend to be comparatively poor: they have little or nothing to say about what makes one kind of being better than another kind. Other theories of goodness—those that take there to be (...) absolute goodness—are comparatively rich: they offer grounds for judging some types of things better than others because they have more absolute goodness. Moorean accounts, for example, can tell us that humans and human experiences are superior to bees and blades of grass. But such theories tend to be descriptively poor: they struggle to tell us in virtue of what this is so. In this essay we motivate and flesh out a view that splits the difference between accounts of goodness as relative and accounts of goodness as absolute. Such a view holds promise only if the mechanics of this kind of metaphysics of goodness can be worked out. Here we present a view on which the paradigm for absolute goodness is God and the paradigm for each kind of relative goodness is a divine idea. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held in Apr. 2008 in Washington, D.C.

Father Williams explains how the conscience is formed through our training and experiences and informed by the Holy Spirit, making it an essential tool for daily living. He uses familiar and surprising characters to illustrate the positive choices conscience can direct--and the disaster that results when a conscience is undeveloped or ignored. Questions he tackles include "Is it more important to be smart or good?""Is there a morally right thing to do in every situation?" and "Is the Christian moral life (...) an exciting adventure, or a necessary burden?" Rich, provocative, and practical for everyday decision making, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG is a must-read for all who hunger for personal holiness. (shrink)

It is somewhat misleading to think of the Franciscans as forming a “school” in ethics, since there was a fair bit of diversity among Franciscans. Nonetheless, one can identify certain characteristic tendencies of Franciscan moral thought, and certain “celebrity” Franciscans whose views in ethics and moral psychology are particularly noteworthy. I shall first offer an overview of the general character of Franciscan moral thought in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries and then turn to a more detailed examination of (...) the thought of John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308) and William Ockham (c. 1288-1347) on three central matters of debate: the nature of the virtues, the relationship between intellect and will, and the relationship between moral requirements and the divine will. (shrink)

In this book Thomas Wren uncovers and assesses the largely hidden philosophical assumptions about human motivation that have shaped contemporary psychological ...

THE NATURE OF ART is a collection of 29 seminal, historically-organized readings that are focused on a basic philosophical question: What is Art? Including writings from the Western tradition'both Continental and Analytic traditions'as well as non-Western, minority, and feminist writings, this volume provides students with a rich set of resources to explore this matter both broadly and deeply. Introductions to each reading situate the selection amidst each respective thinker's body of work and the greater philosophical context in which the remarks (...) arose. Reading questions accompany each selection, drawing students' attention to key points to be encountered. Hailed by reviewers and adopters for its clarity and rigor, Wartenberg's THE NATURE OF ART offers a lively and engaging introduction to the philosophy of art. (shrink)

For courses in Business Ethics A fresh approach to the assumptions that underlie business practices Two recent events — the 2008 economic meltdown and the ongoing concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of a very small percentage of the population — have led many people to question a number of basic assumptions about business, corporations, and the workings of contemporary free-market capitalism in a global economy. Written as a dialogue between Socrates and a hypothetical contemporary CEO,Socrates Comes to (...) Wall Street leads students to think critically about perspectives and practices that are taken as “givens” in most American business schools and corporations. Employing this original and provocative approach, author Thomas White seeks to encourage the next generation of business leaders to be more astute about the implications of their actions, and to act more prudently and more fairly than we have seen in the recent past. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt is associated with a strong distinction between guilt and responsibility: Whereas she insists that guilt is strictly personal, she advances a vicarious notion of collective political responsibility without guilt. Yet Arendt also proposes a political concept of forgiveness—which yields the critical question: Does a political concept of forgiveness not presuppose a political concept of guilt? Arendtian forgiveness addresses what Arendt terms trespassing. Scrutinizing her notion of trespassing and how it is situated within her theory of political action, I (...) ponder whether Arendt, in effect, offers a political concept of guilt. I argue that while trespassing is clearly a political notion, it cannot be labelled guilt. Rather, trespassing refers to a purely causal responsibility without blame, and to a social-ontological condition of non-sovereignty and fallibility inherent in political interaction. The non-blameworthiness of trespassing implies that Arendt’s oft-cited concept of forgiveness resembles what is usually categorized as excuse. (shrink)