Results for 'Shared Intention'

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  1. Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in (...)
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  2. Shared Intentions, Public Reason, and Political Autonomy.Blain Neufeld - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):776-804.
    John Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing on an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained (...)
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  3. Shared Intention.Michael Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
  4. Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations.Facundo M. Alonso - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):444-475.
    Shared agency is of central importance in our lives in many ways. We enjoy engaging in certain joint activities with others. We also engage in joint activities to achieve complex goals. Current approaches propose that we understand shared agency in terms of the more basic phenomenon of shared intention. However, they have presented two antagonistic views about the nature of this phenomenon. Some have argued that shared intention should be understood as being primarily a (...)
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  5. Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge.Olivier Roy & Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - Synthese (5):4523-4541.
    We study shared intentions in what we call “loose groups”. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is, a condition on what the group members know (...)
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  6. Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  7. Understanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of (...)
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  8. Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency (...)
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  9. Shared Intention is Not Joint Commitment.Matthew Kopec & Seumas Miller - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (2):179-189.
    Margaret Gilbert has long defended the view that, roughly speaking, agents share the intention to perform an action if and only if they jointly commit to performing that action. This view has proven both influential and controversial. While some authors have raised concerns over the joint commitment view of shared intention, including at times offering purported counterexamples to certain aspects of the view, straightforward counterexamples to the view as a whole have yet to appear in the literature. (...)
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  10.  9
    Emergent Shared Intentions Support Coordination During Collective Musical Improvisations.Louise Goupil, Thomas Wolf, Pierre Saint-Germier, Jean-Julien Aucouturier & Clément Canonne - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (1):e12932.
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  11. Reductive Views of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Routledge.
    This is a survey article on reductive views of shared intention.
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  12. Shared Agency Without Shared Intention.Samuel Asarnow - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):665-688.
    The leading reductive approaches to shared agency model that phenomenon in terms of complexes of individual intentions, understood as plan-laden commitments. Yet not all agents have such intentions, and non-planning agents such as small children and some non-human animals are clearly capable of sophisticated social interactions. But just how robust are their social capacities? Are non-planning agents capable of shared agency? Existing theories of shared agency have little to say about these important questions. I address this lacuna (...)
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  13.  19
    Shared Intention.E. Bratman Michael - 1994 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 104.
  14.  79
    Shared Intention and Reasons for Action.Caroline T. Arruda - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (6):596-623.
    Most theories of intentional action agree that if acting for a reason is a necessary condition for the action in question to be an intentional action, the reason need not genuinely justify it. The same should hold for shared intentional action, toward which philosophers of action have recently turned their attention. I argue that some of the necessary conditions proposed for shared intention turn out to require that we deny this claim. They entail that shared (...) is possible only if the participating agents form their intentions on the grounds of genuinely rational considerations. Thus, they “over-rationalize,” as I call it, shared intention. (shrink)
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  15.  57
    Shared Intentions and Shared Responsibility.Brook Jenkins Sadler - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):115–144.
  16.  81
    Making Our Ends Meet: Shared Intention, Goal Adoption and the Third-Person Perspective.Luca Tummolini - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):75-98.
    Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing others’ and ones’ own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that another agent’s achieve (...)
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  17.  16
    Shared Intention and Cooperation with Evil.Adam D. Bailey - 2018 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):669-700.
    In a recent essay, Charles F. Capps takes issue with a permissive interpretation of St. Alphonsus Liguori’s influential understanding of cooperation with evil, and develops a more stringent interpretation. In response, I argue that Capps relies on a particular conception of what it is for a cooperator to share a wrongdoer’s bad intention, that this conception of intention sharing is not plausible because it is overly inclusive, and, that on account of this over-inclusiveness, it yields mistaken moral judgments. (...)
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  18.  94
    Two Approaches to Shared Intention: An Essay in the Philosophy of Social Phenomena.Margaret Gilbert - 2008 - Analyse & Kritik 30 (2):483-514.
    Drawing on earlier work of the author that is both clarified and amplified here, this article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In short, what is it for people to share an intention? It argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...)
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  19.  18
    Shared Intention and Cooperation with Evil in Advance.Adam D. Bailey - forthcoming - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly.
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  20.  16
    Shared Intentions Without a Self.Michael Lewis - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):707-708.
    Shared knowledge of intentionality as well as shared knowledge of anything depends on the organism's understanding of itself, others, and the possible relations between self and other. This understanding involves mental representations of me, which emerges in the second half of the second year in the human infant, and it is this ability that gives rise to humanlike social understanding and complex self-conscious emotions.
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  21. A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention.Facundo M. Alonso - 2016 - Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I (...)
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  22.  23
    Cooperation: With or Without Shared Intentions.Jules Salomone-Sehr - 2021 - Ethics 132 (2):414-444.
    This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to J are neither necessary nor sufficient for J to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, in turn, lead (...)
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  23. Team Reasoning and Shared Intention.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2014 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. pp. 279-295.
  24.  20
    Bratman on Shared Intention.Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - SATS 19 (2):161-181.
    In work that spans almost four decades, Michael Bratman has developed a rich account of human agency. At the centre of this account lies an understanding of intentions as individual planning states. A significant strand in this enterprise has been his work on shared agency, culminating in his 2014 monograph, which aims to extend his account of individual agency to cover cases of what he calls “modest sociality”, i.e. simple cases of acting together. Central to this endeavour is Bratman’s (...)
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  25.  53
    Joint Action Without Shared Intention.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
  26. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Shared Intentions and Collective Responsibility.Peter A. French (ed.) - 2006 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This volume of _Midwest Studies_ focuses on the currently hot topic in ethics and action theory of shared intentions and relates it to issues in collective responsibility. Each of the essays in the volume is by an internationally known scholar who has published seminal pieces on various aspects of the concepts of shared intention and collective responsibility. Features all new essays that expand the discussion and invite those interested in the topic to examine a variety of ways (...)
     
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  27. Leader Humility and Knowledge Sharing Intention: A Serial Mediation Model.Diep T. N. Nguyen, Stephen T. T. Teo, Beni Halvorsen & Warren Staples - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    PurposeThis paper examines the influence of leader humility on knowledge sharing intention. Drawing on social exchange theory, we test the direct and indirect mechanisms to explain the influence leader humility has on knowledge sharing intention.Design/Methodology/ApproachA two-wave, time-lagged field study was conducted. We surveyed 252 professional employees from Australia.FindingsResults show a significant direct, positive association between leader humility and knowledge sharing intention. While leader humility had a direct, positive association with affective trust in supervisor and work engagement, it (...)
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  28. Predicting College Students’ Bike-Sharing Intentions Based on the Theory of Planned Behavior.Xiaofang Chen - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Shared bicycles are sustainable and effective transportation tools in college campuses. Accordingly, this study aimed to assess the behavioral intention of college students toward bike-sharing as an environmentally friendly and social mode of travel. It applied the Theory of Planned Behavior framework to a bike-sharing context and explored the impact of perceived benefits and government policy on college students’ bike-sharing usage. A survey of 934 college students was conducted in Zhejiang province to test the proposed model, and 782 (...)
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  29.  33
    Lack of Motivation to Share Intentions: Primary Deficit in Autism?Eline Verbeke, Wilfried Peeters, Inneke Kerkhof, Patricia Bijttebier, Jean Steyaert & Johan Wagemans - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):718-719.
    We review evidence regarding Tomasello et al.'s proposal that individuals with autism understand intentions but fail socially because of a lack of motivation to share intentions. We argue that they are often motivated to understand others but fail because they lack the perceptual integration skills that are needed to apply their basically intact theory of mind skills in complex social situations.
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  30.  43
    Joint Action : Shared Intentions and Collective Goals.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  31.  34
    Minimalism and Maximalism in the Study of Shared Intentional Action.Matti Heinonen - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (2):168-188.
    I distinguish two kinds of contribution that have been made by recent minimalist accounts of joint action in philosophy and cognitive science relative to established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “complementarists” seek to analyze a functionally different kind of joint action from the kind of joint action that is analyzed by established philosophical accounts of shared intentional action. The “constitutionalists” seek to expose mechanisms that make performing joint actions possible, without taking a definite stance on which (...)
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  32.  11
    Impact of Workplace Spirituality on Knowledge Sharing Intention: A Conceptual Framework.Chitra Khari & Shuchi Sinha - 2017 - Journal of Human Values 23 (1):27-39.
    Knowledge forms a crucial source for gaining competitive advantage and its sharing a dominant challenge facing several organizations. In this paper we propose a positive role of workplace spirituality on knowledge sharing intention by employing the theory of decomposed planned behaviour. We argue that WPS with its focus on inner spirit, meaningful work, sense of interconnectedness and alignment with organizational values and mission positively strengthens an individual’s knowledge sharing attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural controls by affecting the underlying (...)
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  33.  13
    Toward a Construction-Based Account of Shared Intentions in Social Cognition.F. Dominey Peter - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):696-696.
    This commentary analyzes the target article to determine whether shared-intention development could be implemented and tested in robotic systems. The analysis indicates that such an implementation should be feasible and will likely rely on a construction-based approach similar to that employed in the construction grammar framework.
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  34.  13
    Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Sean Bowden - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended (...)
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  35.  12
    Joint Action and the Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account.Sean Bowden - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):440-462.
    After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called ‘standard accounts’ of shared intentions, this paper will develop a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework to be advanced hinges on a notion of ‘expression’, as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed—that is, manifested, grasped, shaped and clarified—throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviours that accompany joint action. This claim will be defended (...)
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  36. How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...), these accounts fail to resolve what seems problematic in the notion of shared intention. It then offers an account in which the problem of shared intention is resolved, because intention can indeed be literally shared. This account is derived from Margaret Gilbert's notion of a "pool of wills," to which it applies Searle's definition of intention. (shrink)
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  37.  28
    Implicit Coordination: Acting Quasi-Jointly on Implicit Shared Intentions.Luke Roelofs & Judith Martens - 2018 - Journal of Social Ontology 4 (2):93-120.
    We identify a social phenomenon in which large numbers of people seem to work towards a shared goal without explicitly trying to do so. We argue that this phenomenon – implicit coordination – is best understood as a form of joint agency differing from the forms most commonly discussed in the literature in the same way that individual actions driven by “explicit” intentions differ from individual actions driven by “implicit” intentions. More precisely, implicit coordination is both analogous to wholly (...)
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    Why Do Individuals with Autism Lack the Motivation or Capacity to Share Intentions?Tony Charman - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):695-696.
    Tomasello et al. highlight how in combination cognitive impairments and affective impairments help explain why individuals with autism do not enter fully into human culture. We query whether the motivational component is a later development in human ontogeny and whether the cognitive level of intention reading is intact in autism. A key question is what neuropsychological impairments underlie this cognitive–affective impairment.
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  39. Intentions and Cooperative Activity: Explaining Cooperation in Light of Bratman's Notion of Shared Intention.Irene Boragno Gil - 2012 - Res Publica. Murcia 27:87-98.
  40.  15
    How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally (...), these accounts fail to resolve what seems problematic in the notion of shared intention. It then offers an account in which the problem of shared intention is resolved, because intention can indeed be literally shared. This account is derived from Margaret Gilbert’s notion of a “pool of wills,” to which it applies Searle’s definition of intention. (shrink)
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  41.  10
    Using Shared Knowledge to Determine Ironic Intent; a Conversational Response Paradigm.Maria Katarzyna Zajaczkowska, Kirsten Abbot-Smith & Christina S. Kim - forthcoming - Journal of Child Language.
    Mentalising has long been suggested to play an important role in irony interpretation. We hypothesised that another important cognitive underpinning of irony interpretation is likely to be childen’s capacity for mental set switching – the ability to switch flexibly between different approaches to the same task. We experimentally manipulated mentalising and set switching to investigate their effects on the ability of 7-year-olds to determine if an utterance is intended ironically or literally. The component of mentalising examined was whether the speaker (...)
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  42.  30
    Actual and Perceived Sharing of Ethical Reasoning and Moral Intent Among in-Group and Out-Group Members.Neil A. Granitz & James C. Ward - 2001 - Journal of Business Ethics 33 (4):299 - 322.
    Despite an extensive amount of research studying the influence of significant others on an individual's ethical behavior, researchers have not examined this variable in the context of organizational group boundaries. This study tests actual and perceptual sharing and variation in ethical reasoning and moral intent within and across functional groups in an organization. Integrating theory on ethical behavior, group dynamics, and culture, it is proposed that organizational structure affects cognitive structure. Departmental boundaries create stronger social ties within the group as (...)
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  43.  18
    The Shared Cognitive Intent of Science and Theatre.Eli Rozik - 2012 - The European Legacy 17 (5):659 - 673.
    Science and theatre are generally thought to share no common cognitive ground for the simple reason that the former appeals to the intellect, whereas the latter appeals to the emotions. Contrary to this view, I claim that like scientific texts, theatrical texts evince a cognitive intent and that, despite obvious differences, both types show similarities on three cognitive levels: (a) the use of equivalent systems of representation and communication; (b) the operation of a mode of thinking; and (c) the embodiment (...)
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  44.  6
    Sharing Emotions Contributes to Regulating Collaborative Intentions in Group Problem-Solving.Sunny Avry, Gaëlle Molinari, Mireille Bétrancourt & Guillaume Chanel - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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    Intentional Cooperation and Acting as Part of a Single Body.Olle Blomberg - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):264-284.
    According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action (...)
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  46. Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael E. Bratman - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications (...)
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  47. Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.
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  48. Shared Agency.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sometimes individuals act together, and sometimes each acts on his or her own. It's a distinction that often matters to us. Undertaking a difficult task collectively can be comforting, even if only for the solidarity it may engender. Or, to take a very different case, the realization (or delusion) that the many bits of rudeness one has been suffering of late are part of a concerted effort can be of significance in identifying what one is up against: the accumulation of (...)
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  49.  29
    Further Understanding Factors That Explain Freshman Business Students’ Academic Integrity Intention and Behavior: Plagiarism and Sharing Homework.Timothy Paul Cronan, Jeffrey K. Mullins & David E. Douglas - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 147 (1):197-220.
    Academic integrity violations on college campuses continue to be a significant concern that draws public attention. Even though AI has been the subject of numerous studies offering explanations and recommendations, academic dishonesty persists. Consequently, this has rekindled interest in understanding AI behavior and its influencers. This paper focuses on the AI violations of plagiarism and sharing homework for freshman business students, examining the factors that influence a student’s intention to plagiarize or share homework with others. Using a sample of (...)
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  50. Self-Evaluation in Intention: Individual and Shared.Lilian O'Brien - 2011 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Hans-Bernhard Schmid & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer Verlag.
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