According to axiological retributivism, people can deserve what is bad for them and an outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby have intrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal with comparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents. Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels a well-known problem in (...) population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiological retributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if a deserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither better nor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a set of very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing the paradox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, though perhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism. (shrink)

Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any (...) coherent moral framework. I propose an impersonal population axiology to underpin the asymmetries, which sidesteps the problematic issue of whether or not people can be harmed or benefited by creation or non-creation. This axiology yields perfect asymmetry from a deliberative perspective, in terms of expected value. The axiology also yields substantial asymmetry for large and realistic populations in terms of their actual value, beyond deliberative relevance. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently wondered whether the value impact of the existence of God on the world would be positive, negative, or neutral. Thus far discussions have distinguished between the value God's impact would have overall, in certain respects, and/or for particular individuals. A commonality amongst the various positions that have been taken up is to focus on the goods and drawbacks associated with both theism and atheism. Goods associated with atheism include things like privacy, independence, and autonomy. I argue that (...) it is better overall and for everyone to prefer a hidden God to no God. This is because it is possible to experience many of the goods attributed to atheism if God is hidden even if they do not really obtain, while also gaining many of the additional goods connected to theism. This amounts to a new solution to the problem of divine hiddenness: God might hide in order to increase or maximize the axiological value of the world. (shrink)

According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook View.

In “Weighing Lives” (2004) John Broome criticizes a view common to many population axiologists. On that view, population increases with extra people leading decent lives are axiologically neutral: they make the world neither better nor worse, ceteris paribus. Broome argues that this intuition, however, attractive, cannot be sustained, for several independent reasons. I respond to his criticisms and suggest that the neutrality intuition, if correctly interpreted, can after all be defended.On the version I defend,the world with added extra people (...) at wellbeing levels within the neutrality range is incommensurable in value with the world in which these peaople are absent. (shrink)

Planetary protection is not just a matter of science. It is also a matter of value. This is so independently of whether we only include the protection of science or if we also include other goals. Excluding other values than the protection of science is thus a value statement, not a scientific statement and it does not make planetary protection value neutral. It just makes the axiological basis (that is, the value basis) for planetary protection more limited in a (...) way that is inconsistent with the axiological grounds for back contamination, ethically questionable and strategically unwise. However we look at it, we cannot get away from the conclusion that the axiological dimension of planetary protection is a task that needs to involve experts on value theory as well as experts from a range of different sciences and also include opinions from outside the academic community. (shrink)

Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made (...) possible by a fourth category of absolute value in addition to goodness, badness, and neutrality. (shrink)

Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that, as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one toward choosing the option preferred by the Total View and critical-level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.

The article deals with the problem of the so-called “axiological neutrality” which characterizes modern science. Starting from a psychological conception of intrinsic value as that which is perceived worth being pursued, the author first shows that science can study values only indirectly. There are two senses in which science must remain axiologically neutral: on the one hand, it must avoid all ontological evaluation of its objects (ontological neutrality); on the other hand, it must keep separate the evaluation (...) of its results from the question of justifying them (epistemological neutrality). Nevertheless, values intervene in the scientific research, principally in the form of epistemic values (coherence, simplicity, rationality). At the end the author shows that the ethical and political context determines the framework in which values are assigned. (shrink)

Although the notion of physician value neutrality in medicine may be traced back to the writings of Sir William Osler, it is relatively new to medicine and medical ethics. We argue in this paper that how physician value neutrality has been cashed out is often obscure and its defense not persuasive. In addition, we argue that the social/political implementation of neutrality, Political Liberalism, fails, and thus, PVN's case is weakened, for PVN's justification relies largely on the reasoning (...) undergirding PL. For these reasons, we conclude that PVN has no philosophical or ethical warrant and thus should be abandoned. We suggest that the physician present to her patients some type of statement or creed that would give them an idea of where she stands on important axiological issues and how these stands are cashed out clinically. (shrink)

The intuition of neutrality, as discussed by John Broome, says that the addition of people does not, by itself, produce or subtract value from the world. Such intuition allows us to disregard the effects of climate change policy onto the size of populations, effectively allowing us to make policy recommendations. Broome has argued that the intuition has to go. Orsi responds by urging a normative (rather than Broome's axiological) interpretation of neutrality in terms of an exclusionary permission (...) to disregard the value of adding lives. He explores justifications and limits of such permission by referring to the prospect of human extinction. (shrink)

This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. (...) On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, we should move away from propounding a theory of action, and instead focus on a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational, towards a co-actional, model of action. (shrink)

Cet article défend la thèse suivant laquelle le républicanisme de Machiavel doit être pensé dans le cadre théorique des tumulti, c’est-à-dire des conflits entre les grands — qui veulent dominer— et le peuple — qui veut être libre. Cela signifie d’abord que le républicanisme de Machiavel ne présuppose aucune conception compréhensive de la liberté politique ni de quelque vision du bien que ce soit. La valeur normative de la thèse du conflit tient en ce que les dissensions entre les groupes (...) sociaux sont garants de la liberté politique et de la neutralité axiologique des institutions qui favoriseront cette liberté. Cela signifie ensuite, mais il s’agit en réalité de la même affirmation, que la pensée politique de Machiavel ne doit pas être interprétée en fonction des paramètres de l’humanisme civique, qui est une forme de néo-aristotélisme sur le plan politique et éthique et dont on associe trop souvent et trop facilement les thèses au républicanisme sous prétexte qu’il en est une des origines.This article defends the claim that Machiavelli’s republicanism should be approached via the theoretical framework of tumulti, that is, the conflicts among the powerful “who want to dominate” and the people “who wants to be free”. It means that Machiavelli’s republicanism presupposes neither a comprehensive conception of political freedom, nor any vision of what the good is. The normative value of the conflict thesis lies in the fact that social dissent between the social groups secures the political freedom and the axiological neutrality of the institutions that promote this freedom. It means therefore — and it is in reality the same assertion — that Machiavelli’s political thought should not be interpreted as related to some form of civic humanism, that is, a neo-Aristotelian conception of ethics and politics, and which we too easily associate with republicanism. (shrink)

Sociology was born as an attempt to delimit an object of investigation offered by society as a social reality. The ambition was that of "treating the social facts as things" (Durkheim) or of understanding and explaining the social relations by respecting an "axiological neutrality" (Max Weber). Today, however, we are in the presence of a new kind of sociologists, and they are by no means the less popular ones, who are not trying to avoid assessments in their analysis (...) of the present social world. I have in mind especially two sociologists, Ulrich Beck (Munich) and David Held (London). I will discuss in particular the view of sociology presented in a recent book of Ulrich Beck ( Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitalter , 2002, translated into French under the title Pouvoir et contre-pouvoir à l'ère de la mondialisation , 2003), and I will show some analogies between Beck and Held. Finally, I will try to identify the points that make the present sociological epistemology different from that of the great founders of this science. (shrink)

The analysis of narrative processes and metaphorical language are the topics generally focused on by business ethics researchers interested in the work of Paul Ricœur. Yet his work on political questions also applies to the ethical issues associated with organizations. Ricœur’s ethical enterprise can be expressed as a triad composed of teleological, deontological, and sapiential levels, associating ostensibly opposing positions of Aristotelian and Kantian origin. In this study, I examine politics, economics, and ethics in their dialectic relation as established by (...) Ricœur. Against a vertical, mechanistic, and axiologically neutral vision of management, he opposes the two conceptual pairs of conviction/imagination and ideology/utopia as well as a superior definition of justice associating reciprocal indebtedness and mutual disinterestedness. Through this analysis, it becomes clear that the vertical, hierarchical nature of politics tends to undermine the horizontal interactions necessary to procure just institutions in society. And any business ethic that does not acknowledge political tensions will be mute. What is needed instead is practical wisdom that is developed through interaction, and often through conflict, involving all the different players. (shrink)

The main claim of this study is that, contrary to Latour’s view about the need to leave aside epistemology to deal with anything valuable about science, Mario Bunge has consistently built up a detailed and thorough epistemology. The argumentative strategy will be to show that (a) it is not true that we have never been modern (b) epistemology is here to stay, and (c) Mario Bunge endorses a strong scientific realism, a brand of materialism, systemism and emergentism, including a moral (...) dimension (there are objective values like, truth, peace and justice that deserve to be respected). Then, Bunge’s realism rejects axiological neutrality making scientists responsible for their actions. Bunge has always been modern and keeps enriching his own views. (shrink)

Compulsive smartphone users’ psyches, today, are increasingly directed away from their bodies and onto their devices. This phenomenon has now entered our global vocabulary as “smartphone zombies,” or what I will call “iZombies.” Given the importance of mind to virtually all conceptions of human identity, these compulsive users could thus be productively understood as a kind of human-machine hybrid entity, the cyborg. Assuming for the sake of argument that this hybridization is at worst axiologically neutral, I will construct a kind (...) of phenomenological psychological profile of the type of cyborg which engages in these patterns of behavior. I follow Judith Butler in seeing this identity as the result of performance practices, which as such can be modified or replaced using other performances. Pursing one such alternative, I compose a dancing critique that “reverse engineers” the choreographies implied by these cyborgs’ survival practices. The upshot of this critique is that their movement patterns do indeed align closely to those of horror cinema’s zombies. I therefore conclude by suggesting a few possible choreographic imperatives to facilitate more enabling ways of being for iZombie cyborgs today. (shrink)

In the following paper the author presents and analyses J. Maritain’s social theory. The French Thomist attempted to associate the principle of common good (that plays the main role in the Christian social thought) with democracy. Maritain claims that only democracy can be regarded as an acceptable form of government, i.e. the one that satisfies rational and moral requirements (which, according to the Thomists, are the same). Such a statement put forward by the Thomist philosopher emphasises the necessity of asking (...) a number of questions of the human nature, human dignity and human autonomy; it also demonstrate how to introduce the ethical values into the realm of democratic politics, which in its turn is described as axiologically neutral by contemporary political theories. J. Maritain’s views on those issues were taken into consideration by Catholic intellectuals and were announced before the Second Vatican Council. Regarding the time they were widely opened to the contemporary ideas. Consequently, they contributed to the significant development of the current attitude of the Catholic Church to the present political and social problems. (shrink)

The aesthetic experience, In husserl's language, Brackets or suspends the natural standpoint. Consciousness perceives the work of art not as an object of the factual world, But as a man-Made artifact to be enjoyed just for certain immediately experienced qualities. The work of art is neither a real physical entity nor a real psychical entity, But a purely intentional object, For which the physical object serves as a substratum. The critic must recreate the purely intentional object by completing the schema (...) of the work and by actualizing its merely potential elements. He must experience the ensemble of axiologically neutral qualities, Aesthetic qualities, And aesthetic values as an harmonious whole. A full concretion of the work is the aesthetic object-The object the critic describes and judges. By metaphorical or partly metaphorical language-Never completely adequate-He tries to convey to his readers the experience of its qualities and values. (shrink)

Partout des appels formels invoquant la démocratie sont lancés : la démocratie comme première condition requise pour une gouvernance politique respectueuse des intérêts des citoyens et des équilibres de l’environnement. En même temps, une multitude d’indices convergents configurent une gestion de la res publica par une caste oligarchique politico-économique dont la propension à gérer les ressources environnementales se caractérise par l’absence de prise en compte du bien commun sur la base d’intérêts particuliers sans tenir compte des équilibres biosphériques (Bergandi, 2014 (...) : 63-81). Quel est le rôle des sciences et des scientifiques dans un tel contexte? Ou plus précisément, quel est le rôle des sciences et des scientifiques dans des questions à l’interface entre science et société, générant des controverses socio-scientifiques? Jusqu’à quel point les sciences peuvent-elles encore effectivement incarner l’idéal de la neutralité axiologique, durablement implanté par le positivisme à partir du XIXe siècle à la fois dans l’éthique scientifique et dans l’inconscient des scientifiques, telle une constante, apparemment inéliminable, de la science? Est-il possible de trouver un juste équilibre (épistémique et éthique) entre objectivité scientifique d’un côté, engagement moral et politique de l’autre? L’idée de « sciences impliquées » est-elle une forme de pensée oxymorique cachant un non-sens épistémologique? Ou bien, exprime-t-elle un besoin, une nécessité à la fois épistémique, éthique et politique qui nous permettrait de mieux cerner les innombrables et complexes enchevêtrements entre les sciences contemporaines et la société?[. (shrink)

L’humanité est devenue facteur d’évolution au niveau planétaire. En complexifiant toujours plus les modalités de ses relations avec l’environnement, elle pense trouver dans la science l’outil principal de son développement et en définitive de sa survie. La science, en effet, est un système d’acquisition de connaissances qui génère une interprétation systématique et rationnelle du monde naturel ethumain, jamais définitive et en renouvellement continu. En tant qu’explication rationnelle des phénomènes naturels et sociaux, elle nous permet de raffiner sans cesse la compréhension (...) de notre place et notre rôle dans le monde. Au vu des enjeux inhérents à l’exploitation des acquis scientifiques et de leurs conséquences sur la vie des populations humaines et sur les équilibres biosphériques, continuer à imaginer que les scientifiques vivent isolés dans une sorte de tour d’ivoire de la connaissance, éloignée de l’agitationde la πόλις, signifie ignorer que la responsabilité sociale est consubstantielle à l’activité de la science. Un scientifique ne vit pas dans un vacuum social, il est porteur de valeurs sociales dans la sphère scientifique. En même temps, il véhicule dans la sphère sociale des valeurs qui découlent de son activité. Si, d’une part, son rôle est celui de développer des connaissances qui soient à la fin du processus d’enquête scientifique exemptes de la marque de la subjectivité, d’autre part, pendant ce processus les valeurs s’affrontent en laissant le dernier mot aux tests expérimentaux et observationnels propres à la méthode scientifique. En dernière analyse, ce sera la réalité phénoménologique qui tranchera vis-à-vis des multiples modèles et constructions épistémiques, plus ou moins imprégnés de valeurs, soumis par l’ensemble de la communauté scientifique. La Conférence générale de l’Organisation des Nations-Unies pour l’éducation, la science et la culture (UNESCO), réunie à Paris en 1974, a adopté la Recommandation concernant la condition des chercheurs scientifiques, où ont été définis normes et principes pouvant servir de guide pour optimiser l’activité de recherche et les conditions de sa mise en place. Au vu de la complexité toujours croissante des relations entre la science et la société, la Commission nationale française pour l’UNESCO (CNFU) a été consultée sur la mise à jour de la Recommandation en focalisant son attention sur la question de la responsabilité morale des scientifiques dans l’exercice de leur profession. (shrink)

Given the deep disagreement surrounding population axiology, one should remain uncertain about which theory is best. However, this uncertainty need not leave one neutral about which acts are better or worse. We show that as the number of lives at stake grows, the Expected Moral Value approach to axiological uncertainty systematically pushes one towards choosing the option preferred by the Total and Critical Level views, even if one’s credence in those theories is low.

In traditional consequentialism the good is position-neutral. A single evaluative ranking of states of affairs is correct for everyone, everywhere regardless of their positions. Recently, position-relative forms of consequentialism have been developed. These allow for the correct rankings of states to depend on connections that hold between the state being evaluated and the position of the evaluator. For example, perhaps being an agent who acts in a certain state requires me to rank that state differently from someone else who lacks (...) this connection. In this chapter several different kinds of position-relative rankings related to agents, times, physical locations, and possible worlds are explored. Arguments for and against adopting a position-relative axiology are examined, and it is suggested that position-relative consequentialism is a promising moral theory that has been underestimated. (shrink)

Are things good because we desire them or do we desire them because they are good? Theories that countenance only desire-dependent values are idealist, those that countenance desire-independent values are realist. A value can be either subject-relative or subject-neutral. Subjectivism countenances only subject-relative and desire-dependent values. Subject-neutral idealism countenances at least some subject-neutral values. Realism repudiates the dependence of value on actual desires, but endorses an important relation between value and the fittingness of desires. Normative realism takes normative facts about (...) the fittingness of desires to ground the value facts, while axiological realism takes value facts to ground facts about fittingness. An important variant of axiological realism, namely representational realism, holds that desires are appearances of value, and that the fittingness of a desire is simply a matter of accurate representation. (shrink)

Separability is roughly the principle that, in comparing the value of two outcomes, one can ignore any people whose existence and welfare are unaffected. Separability is both antecedently plausible, at least as a principle of beneficence, and surprisingly powerful; it is the key to some of the best positive arguments in population ethics. This chapter surveys the motivations for and consequences of separability. In particular, it presents an ‘additivity theorem’ which explains how separability leads to total utilitarianism and closely related (...) axiological views. It then examines systematically how this family of views can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by incorporating lexicality, a critical level, or a neutral range. (shrink)

What moral reasons, if any, do we have to ensure the long-term survival of humanity? This article contrastively explores two answers to this question: according to the first, we should ensure the survival of humanity because we have reason to maximize the number of happy lives that are ever lived, all else equal. According to the second, seeking to sustain humanity into the future is the appropriate response to the final value of humanity itself. Along the way, the article discusses (...) various issues in population axiology, particularly the so-called Intuition of Neutrality and John Broome’s ‘greediness objection’ to this intuition. (shrink)

The need to study the concept of “politeness” from the point of view of its linguistic and cultural nature is caused by the desire to study the national identity of speech etiquette in different cultural spaces and conditions. The aim of the work was to form an idea about the specifics of the implementation and understanding of the concept of “politeness” in the Uzbek information field. In this study, the following methods were used: contextual, conceptual, communicative, linguocultural, analytical-synthetic, and comparative. (...) This study is focused on the study of key lexical meanings (stylistically neutral and marked, basic and additional) that are within the functional-semantic field of the concept “politeness.” With the help of contextual study of different variants of the use of the lexeme, the meanings were distributed in the conceptual structure (core, near and far periphery). Also, the key etiquette formulas representing the originality and national-specific features of the Uzbek linguocultural tradition were considered. The importance of politeness in the information space of Uzbekistan is assessed, including with the help of both positive and negative associations, that is, from an axiological point of view. Speech etiquette and linguistic formulas were considered from the point of view of the influence of social, cultural, and political values of the Uzbek people. In the process of analyzing the lexical layer, the boundaries of the functional-semantic field of the concept “politeness” were determined: from the principles of communication and a set of rules of etiquette to the strategy of obtaining benefits from communication and insincere attitude. In the future, this work can be used for comparative analysis of the conceptual structure of politeness with models presented in other close and distant languages, comparison of speech etiquette and linguistic formulas in different national cultures. (shrink)

Science is an activity of the human intellect and as such has ethical implications that should be reviewed and taken into account. Although science and ethics have conventionally been considered different, it is herewith proposed that they are essentially similar. The proposal set henceforth is to create a new ethics rooted in science: scientific ethics. Science has firm axiological foundations and searches for truth and knowledge. Hence, science cannot be value neutral. Looking at standard scientific principles, it is possible (...) to construct a scientific ethic, which can be applied to all sciences. These intellectual standards include the search for truth, human dignity and respect for life. Through these it is thence achievable to draft a foundation of a ethics based purely on science and applicable beyond the confines of science. A few applications of these will be presented. Scientific ethics can have vast applications in other fields even in non scientific ones. (shrink)

Despite the fact that Husserl did not write a book on aesthetics, it is widely accepted that a Husserlian aesthetics can be developed from his writings. In this article, I describe and analyze a feature of Husserlian aesthetics which I call the “radical individuality of the aesthetic object.” This radical individuality stems from Husserl’s interpretation of aesthetic consciousness in terms of the neutrality modification. I make the case for a radical reading of the neutrality modification by contrasting it (...) with the inactuality modification and the notion of foundation and I argue that the neutrality modification must be kept distinct from these concepts. I further describe the concept of the radical individuality of the aesthetic object by reference to Ingarden’s notion of the aesthetic object as monosubjective. The thesis of the radical individuality of the aesthetic object prima facie leads Husserlian aesthetics close to axiological relativism expressed in the adage that de gustibus non est disputandum. I explain that despite such proximity, Husserlian aesthetics does not entail an axiological relativism and does not preclude discussions concerning aesthetic values. On the contrary, Husserlian aesthetics ultimately shows that such discussions are necessary for keeping the possibility of aesthetic perception itself alive, and thereby encourages such discussions. I conclude with a practical demonstration of the results of my Husserlian analyses by critically engaging some aspects of Proust’s theory of art in À la recherche du temps perdu. (shrink)

It can be argued that the notion of the \'axiological polytheism\' is a key concept which characterizes liberal society (democracy) in late modernity. We can observe its significant presence in I. Berlin\'s concept of two liberties, and in J. Rawls\'s concept of the social contract under the veil of ignorance, to recall some crucial examples where state neutrality is developed and defended. I have earlier proposed that in spite of the acceptance of the \'value polytheism\' premise, it can (...) be still claimed that on the ground of the \'autopoiesis\' mechanism a political community as a body can legitimately prefer a comprehensive model of citizenship in order to keep the system on track. This is supported by the \'social distribution of knowledge\' argument. In my paper I try to develop this argument and to examine some obstacles it can face when possible implementation in the fabric of social and political institutions is concerned. In particular I consider some problems which are posed by the uncontrolled professional activity of some types of experts which in consequence (may) influence decisions of those who are equipped with discretionary power (like civil servants and the state apparatus); and by that token they actually may lead to shift of the whole system with regard to the above mentioned premise which seems to be constitutive of the liberal democracy. In other words, do experts qua experts possess the privileged position among other fellow-citizens as far an access to the government procedures are concerned and do they change the power system by their backstage influence and through turning the democratic system into grotesque show and manipulative facade. (shrink)

Legitimisation and Proximisation Values in the Discourse of Historic Change This methodological-critical paper belongs to the field of pragmaticcognitive discourse analysis. It develops Cap's STA model of legitimisation and investigates various mechanisms legitimising the speaker's actions in political discourse of historic change. Proximisation as the salient feature of the model adds significantly to effectiveness of the speaker's continual attempt to convince the addressee of the rightness of political steps taken. It is a powerful and coercive tool "alerting the addressee [to] (...) the proximity or imminence of phenomena which can be a ‘threat’ to the addressee" located in the deictic centre of a given event or a chain of events. The STA model accounts for the application of a three-dimensional pattern of the phenomenon in question, i.e. spatial, temporal, and axiological proximisation. However, the division does not exhaust the notion's potential, since properties of the dimensions mentioned enable us to classify them according to an extended taxonomic system in which they possess positive, negative, and neutral values. Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyse the interplay between a number of legitimisation strategies, present the positive/negative/neutral classification of proximisation, and comment on the nature of the interaction between and potency of the three dimensions and values. These can coexist within the body of one text, as well as within the body of one paragraph and their complementary character strengthens the overall goal of legitimisation providing various stimuli for the addressee to accept the speaker's stance, his decisions and actions, to comply with them, and to undertake actions intended by the speaker. (shrink)

The biologic value of every function in the organism depends on its contribution to the totality of homeostatic activity of the organism. On the table of values determined by such anatomic and physiological characteristic different cultures impose their own normative valorisation, which can be in conflict with the biological facts. The point is a culturalisation of the harmony of living functions which is subject of a following rule: functions which are in a small distance of their biological aim are neglected (...) and put into a state of cultural neutrality, like e.g. respiration which has never been valuated in categories of Good and Evil. On the other hand, functions separated by a longer causal chain from their biological aim are subject of intensive normative valuations. Such is the situation with the sex. Culturalisation of a function is never a valuation performed in an isolation, but consists always in the introduction of a function into an axiological coordinate system of a given culture. The cultural normatives assume at least a polarity of valuations, e.g. the sex, situated in some cultures at the pole of the „sacrum” was subject of its positive sublimation, and in other cultures has had a negative valuation. The sexual drive damped by the culture finds its expression not in a „revolt of biology against. culture”, but in a definite subcultural heterodoxy within given culture. In such a case it leads to a reversal of the plus and minus signs which have been established in an authoritarian way, or to connections of things which, according to the cultural directives, should be considered incompatible. (shrink)

The current Covid-19 pandemic is illustrative of both the need of more experts and of the difficulties that can arise in the face of their decisions. This happens, we argue, because experts usually interact with society through a strongly naturalistic framework, which often places experts’ epistemic authority (understood as neutrality and objectivity) at the centre, sometimes at the expenses of other pluralistic values (such as axiological ones) that people (often non-experts) cherish. In this paper, we argue that we (...) need to supplement such a strong naturalistic framework used to promote epistemic authority with a number of virtues -both intellectual and ethical- which include i. intellectual humility, ii. courage, iii. wisdom and cares, as well as iv. relational autonomy. To illustrate this claim, we discuss these ideas in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and analyse a set of real-life examples where important decisions have been delegated to experts merely based on their epistemic authority. We use the illustrative failures described in the case studies above-mentioned to call for a revision of current understandings of expertise (merely based on epistemic soundness). Specifically, we argue that in social contexts we increasingly need “experts in action”; that is, people with certified specialist knowledge, who can however translate it into practical suggestions, decisions, and/or public policies that are ethically more balanced and that ultimately lead to fairer, more inclusive, and more representative decisions. (shrink)

The theory of evolution of complex and comprising of human systems and algorithm for its constructing are the synthesis of evolutionary epistemology, philosophical anthropology and concrete scientific empirical basis in modern (transdisciplinary) science. «Trans-disciplinary» in the context is interpreted as a completely new epistemological situation, which is fraught with the initiation of a civilizational crisis. Philosophy and ideology of technogenic civilization is based on the possibility of unambiguous demarcation of public value and descriptive scientific discourses (1), and the object and (...) subject of the cognitive process (2). Both of these attributes are no longer valid. For mass, everyday consciousness and institutional philosophical tradition it is intuitively obvious that having the ability to control the evolutionary process, Homo sapiens came close to the borders of their own biological and cultural identity. The spontaneous coevolutionary process of interaction between the «subject» (rational living organisms) and the «object» (material world), is the teleological trend of the movement towards the complete rationalization of the World as It Is, its merger with the World of Due. The stratification of the global evolutionary process into selective and semantic (teleological) coevolutionary and therefore ontologically inseparable components follows. With the entry of anthropogenic civilization into the stage of the information society, firsty, the post-academic phase of the historical evolution of scientific rationality began, the attributes of which are the specific methodology of scientific knowledge, scientific ethos and ontology. Bioethics as a phenomenon of intellectual culture represents a natural philosophical core of modern post- academic (human-dimensional) science, in which the ethical neutrality of scientific theory principle is inapplicable, and elements of public-axiological and scientific-descriptive discourses are integrated into a single logic construction. As result, hermeneutics precedes epistemology not only methodologically, but also meaningfully, and natural philosophy is regaining the status of the backbone of the theory of evolution – in an explicit form. (shrink)

The central question of this conference is whether the media can contribute to high quality social dialogue. The prospects for resolving that question positively in the “sound and fury” depend on recovering the idea of truth. At present the news media are lurching along from one crisis to another with an empty centre. We need to articulate a believable concept of truth as communication's master principle. As the norm of healing is to medicine, justice to politics, critical thinking to education, (...) craftsmanship to engineering, and stewardship to business, so truth-telling is the news profession's occupational norm. Truth-telling is the ethical framework that fundamentally reorders the media's professional culture and enables them to enrich social dialogue rather than undermine it.Historically the mainstream press has defined itself in terms of an objectivist worldview. Centred on human rationality and armed with the scientific method, the facts in news have been said to mirror reality. The aim has been true and incontrovertible accounts of a domain separate from human consciousness. In Bertrand Russell's formula, “truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact” . In the received view, truth is defined in elementary epistemological terms as accurate representation. News corresponds to context-free neutral algorithms, and ethics is equated with impartiality.The attacks on this misguided view of human knowledge had already originated in Giambattista Vico's fantasia and Wilhelm Dilthey's verstehen in the counter-Enlightenment of the 18th century. They have continued with hermeneutics, critical theory in the Frankfurt School, American pragmatism, Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, Gramsci, and in their own way, Lyotard's denial of master narratives and Derrida's sliding signifiers; until the anti-foundationalism of our own day indicates a crisis in correspondence views of truth. Institutional structures remain Enlightenment-driven, but in principle the tide has turned currently toward restricting objectivism to the territory of mathematics, physics, and the natural sciences. In reporting, objectivity has become increasingly controversial as the working press' professional standard, though it will remain entrenched in our ordinary practices of news production and dissemination until an alternative mission for the press is convincingly formulated.The demise of correspondence views of truth has created a predicament for the notion of truth altogether. However, instead of appealing to coherence versions or abandoning the concept, truth needs to be relocated in the moral sphere. Truth is a problem of axiology rather than epistemology. With the dominant scheme no longer tenable, truth should become the province of ethicists who can reconstruct it as the news media's contribution to social dialogue.When truth is articulated in terms of a moral framework, we can mold its richly textured meaning around the Hebrew emeth , the Greek aletheia . In Serbo-Croatian the true is justified as with plumbline in carpentry. In the powerful wheel imagery of the Buddhist tradition, truth is the immovable axle. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa presumes that sufferings from apartheid can be healed through truthful testimony. In Ghandhi's “satyagrapha,” the power of truth through the human spirit eventually wins over force . Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Ethics contends correctly that a truthful account lays hold of the context, motives, and presuppositions involved .Telling the truth depends on the quality of discernment so that penultimates do not gain ultimacy. Truth means, in other words, to strike gold, to get at “the core, the essence, the nub, the heart of the matter” . For Henry David Thoreau – though addressing a different issue – when we are truthful, we attempt to “drive life into a corner and¼if it proves to be mean, why then to get the genuine meanness out of it and publish its meanness to the world; or if it were sublime, to know it by personal experience and be able to give a true account of the encounter” . For the former secretary general of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, “the most dangerous of all moral dilemmas is when we are obliged to conceal truth in order to help the truth be victorious” . In the Talmud, the liar's punishment is that no one believes him.Augustine , professor of rhetoric at Milan and later Bishop of Hippo, illustrates a non-correspondence view of truth. His rhetorical theory is a major contribution to the philosophy of communication, contradicting the highly secular and linear view of the ancient Greeks. As with Aristotle, rhetoric entails reasoned judgement for Augustine; however, he “break[s] away from Graeco-Roman rhetoric, moving instead toward ¼rhetoric as aletheiac act” . Rhetoric for him is not knowledge-producing or opinion-producing but truth-producing . The Epistolae Doctrina Christiana scourges the value-neutral, technical language of “word merchants” without wisdom.Truth is not fundamentally a prescriptive statement. The aletheiac act in Augustine “tends to be more relational than propositional, a dialogically interpersonal, sacramentally charitable act rather than a statement¼taking into account and being motivated by [the cardinal virtues] faith, hope, and charity” . The truth for him does not merely make things clear, but motivates us to belief and action. In truthful communication for Augustine, “it is not enough to seek to move men's minds, merely for the sake of power; instead, the power to move is to be used to lead men to truth”. (shrink)

Economic Theory normally assumes the so-called homo economicus, a consequential model of rationality. We highlight the main features of this model in opposition to deontology: axiological homogeneity, maximization and agent neutrality. Amartya Sen’s criticism of standard consequentialism copes to those features, and includes commitment and duty in the economic rationality. We analyze his concept of preference to ascertain how far economic rationality can thus go in the direction of deontology. We conclude that, though diminished, the difference between them (...) still remains. (shrink)

This paper has two main purposes, the first is to develop a criticism on the notion of modernity, or Western rationalism, presented in contemporary theories of modernity, characterized by the idea of autonomy and self-sufficiency of reason regarding the foundation of a binding notion of social normativity. The study criticizes the main perception of these theories of modernity, namely, the proposition that profane and secularized rationalism, marked by an impartial, neutral, formal and impersonal perspective in axiological-methodological terms, is enough (...) to ensure this same epistemological-moral Universalism without religion and metaphysics. The second purpose consists in arguing in favor of a political and religious Universalism that points to the incapacity of this purist and independent notion of reason in generating and sustaining, without foundation and application based on metaphysics and religion, a universal content of Human Rights. The work is grounded on bibliographical analysis of contemporary theories of modernity, from a criticism to their central presumption, which is the autonomy, self-referentiality and self-subsistence of reason relatively to religion and metaphysics, proposing, as a conclusion, the correlation of reason and religion-metaphysics as the path and the content of epistemological-moral Universalism. (shrink)

Introduction. The emerging paradigm of socio- cultural development of the Russian Federation’s local communities is conditioned by the trans- formation of production and economic practices based on the concept of a multi-layered economy and multifunctionality emerging under the pressure of globalization on the development of localities. The desire to preserve and maintain socio-cultural traditions, customs, and values is an axiological guideline for developing local communities. The growing social vulnerability of communities creates certain conditions for losing identity, ability for self-identification, (...) and leads to the destruction of socio-cultural identity. The purpose of the study. The article analyzes the problem of socio-cultural evolution when modern- izing production and economic activity generating factors causing the transformation of culture and sociality of local communities, thus determining the processes of integration and disintegration of socioculture. Methods. Sociocultural analysis provides an op- portunity to reveal the main directions of sociocul- tural development of local communities, to explain the essence of interaction, mutual influence and unification of local communities into an interactive socio-cultural space with compatible formations and components. Scientific novelty of the research. The author dis- plays the models of culture and sociality transfor- mation reflecting the processes of modification of the local communities’ lifestyle that determine the transition from the paradigm of sustainable tradi- tional socio-cultural development to the paradigm of innovative transformations. Results. The problem of sociocultural integration and disintegration is associated with globalization processes that generate contradictions of globality and locality. The processes of integration/disin- tegration of the local communities’ sociocultural development are conditioned by the culture and sociality evolution of the constructing model of socio-cultural behavior. The pressure of globaliza- tion plunges the socio-cultural space into a state of diffusion, instability. Historically established traditions, norms, values are transformed into intermediate forms that help to adapt to new living conditions, neutralize the negative consequences of modernization. Territorial sociocultural formations are being formed, within the framework of which attempts are being made to preserve the tradition- al socio-cultural environment. Conclusions. The dynamics of sociocultural pro- cesses determines the emergence of multidirec- tional poles of sociocultural life: from the desire to preserve the traditional socio-cultural environment, to the full acceptance of the meaningful qualities of liberal socio-culture, which destroys the sociocul- tural identity of local communities. (shrink)

Having taken note of, and critically analyzed, Professor Maduabuchi Dukor’s epochal work entitled“Theistic Humanism of African philosophy-the great debate on substance and method of philosophy”(2010), I am much encouraged and rationally convinced that he has succeeded in building the core critical and essential foundational pillars of what can safely pass for professional African philosophy, though much remains to be done by way of further research from other scholars. Based upon that conviction and the great prospects that the African philosophy project (...) breakthrough holds for every African philosopher in the global village, I am also motivated to take a closer look at, and carry out a critical exposition of the concept of justice in the context of African cultural values, using the propositions of what he calls the canons of cultural values that are native to African philosophy. These cultural values define African identity and delineateAfrica’s contributions to the advancement of the global ideas of justice, axiology, gender and globalization. The essence and methodology of this article, therefore, will lift the relevant thematic thrusts and arguments made by the erudite Professor of African philosophy to“properly locate African philosophy in the context of globalism, cosmopolitanism, science and what it could contribute to emerging global culture”(Dukor,2010:p.ix). The central point of this critical exposition is that his theistic inspired cultural humanism has enhanced the global understanding of not only justice but feminist rights and the urgent needs for African philosophy to make its contributions towards the emancipation of and empowerment of women both in the continent and globally. The feminist search for justice, according to Dukor, is“the current global pool where the African is needed urgently to intervene”, since“feminism and women liberation has truncated the equilibrium and balance of relations between man and woman. African contribution to this class struggle between man and woman is a neutral one that absorbs the man and woman to their respective natural places in the nature’s womb”. Women’s search for global justice and the struggle to have their human rights recognized as a part of mankind’s gender balancing process would be philosophically enriched by Professor Dukor’s cultural value propositions and canons of justice. (shrink)

The theses of this paper are that: 1. the attempt to found absolute norms on rationality presupposes the availability of a single universal absolute conception of rationality, but no such conception is available; and 2. any conception of rationality which might be available for justifying one's ultimate normative commitments is itself evaluative. “Rationality” itself is a value-laden concept, as are all its philosophical sub-divisions—logic, ethics, aesthetics, axiology, etc. Choosing ultimate value principles under conditions of freedom, enlightenment, and impartiality presupposes that (...) one positively values such things. Rationality is an inescapably evaluative concept, not a value neutral concept. (shrink)

The article presents a systematic and detailed account of scholarly developments on the problem of studying the process of nation-building and the role of history, memory, language and culture in reflecting this process. The research reveals that according to the premordialist approach, nations are not formed instantaneously, by the relevant political will or by coincidence of circumstances; the process of creating and consolidating a nation is a long and meaningful one, full of historical events and national cultural tokens. The primordialist (...) concepts are considered unanimous in their recognition of the exceptional significance of psychological factors in the creation of a nation. The creation of a nation involves a sophisticated set of linguistic, religious, ethnic, territorial and myth-household factors that determine the formation of a corresponding type of sociality. The framework of the analytics of the phenomenon of a nation includes not only psychological, but also social, cultural, political, ethical, moral and axiological aspects. The new system-building concepts such as solidarity, habitus, plebiscite were added to the discussion of nation. In view of that, it is impossible to carry out the reduction of the phenomenon of a nation to a particular problem field and to localize it to invariant indicators. The formation and optimization of the capitalistic type of social system generates new factors in the interpretation and consolidation of a nation. The reasons for a political defeat in the development of a nation can be referedr to either conscious manipulative techniques, or spontaneous miscalculations. Elaborating the alternative versions of history is nothing but unjustified politicization, implementation of imperial and colonial ambitions, overcoming which is a necessary prerequisite for successful nation-building. The establishment and offsetting of such manipulative influence facilitate the stabilization of the social situation and the resolution of conflicts, and, consequently, contribute to national development. The key point is to establish a nation within the framework of the international and state policy, especially by distinguishing the consolidating and disintegrating influences of state and international politicies on nation-building. The policy of uniting the nation can become effective when the important reforms do not deepen the fragmentation of the nation, but rather neutralize it. (shrink)

According to the philosophical tradition, translation is successful when one has substituted words and sentences from one language with those from another by cross-linguistic synonymy. Moreover, according to the orthodox view, the meaning of expressions and sentences of languages are determined by their basic or systematic role in a language. This makes translating normative and evaluative discourse puzzling for two reasons. First, as languages are syntactically and semantically different because of their peculiar cultural and historical influences, and as values and (...) norms differ across cultures, it is unlikely that languages will have synonymous evaluative and normative expressions. If translation is only successful by cross-linguistic synonymy, it would seem that we will not be able to translate the value theoretic claims of persons from radically different cultures. But it is with such persons that dialogue on evaluative matters is imperative, to resolve ethical and axiological differences that could be the root of conflict. Second, as the orthodox account of meaning renders it linguistically relative, it is unlikely that expressions across languages will be cross-linguistically synonymous. Thus, on the Orthodox account of translation, translation is indeterminate (as W.V.O. Quine has argued) or impossible (as Jacques Derrida has argued). In this dissertation I argue for a novel theory of meaning and translation based on innovations in the translation studies literature and my prior work in cross cultural research, which I call Text-Type Semantics or TTS. TTS explains how translation is successful while affirming radical cultural and linguistic diversity. It treats disciplinary concerns as the neutral criteria to calibrate translation. On the basis of TTS I argue that we need what I call the “Quasi-Indexical” account of thick and thin concepts (or QI) to translate normative and evaluative discourse. I argue that QI and TTS succeed where competing accounts in the moral semantics literature (such as Non-Analytic Naturalism and Expressivism) fail. The argument also shows that the relativization of truth (in philosophy and beyond) to languages and cultures is mistaken. (shrink)

Values are incommensurable when they cannot be measured on a single cardinal scale. Many philosophers suggest that incommensurability can help us solve the problems of population ethics. I agree. But some philosophers claim that populations bear incommensurable values merely because they contain different numbers of people, perhaps within some range. I argue that mere differences in how many people exist, even within some range, do not suffice for incommensurability. I argue that the intuitive neutrality of creating happy people is (...) better captured by a version of average utilitarianism. But this view is problematic. So I suggest a version of total utilitarianism that avoids the repugnant conclusion by appealing to incommensurable dimensions of wellbeing. (shrink)

La tradition sociologique n’est pas riche en modèles permettant de faire de la question des valeurs un objet d’investigation spécifiquement sociologique, c’est-à-dire traité de façon non pas normative mais descriptive, non pas seulement théorique, mais aussi empirique, et non pas abstraite mais pragmatique, à partir des actions en situation concrète. Cet article tente d’expliciter les obstacles conceptuels et méthodologiques que rencontre un tel projet, notamment dans la sociologie française contemporaine : difficultés à renoncer à la normativité et à l’essentialisme, à (...) distinguer entre faits et valeurs, et à passer de l’ontologie à la pragmatique, du théorique à l’empirique et du quantitatif au qualitatif, de façon à aborder cet objet avec des méthodes appropriées à sa spécificité.The sociological tradition hardly offers models addressing the issue of values in a proper, specific way : that is, not normative but descriptive, not only theoretical but also empirical, and not abstract but pragmatic, dealing with actions happening in real situations. This paper aims to explicate the conceptual and methodological obstacles to such a project, particularly in French contemporary sociology : difficulty to let aside normativity and essentialism, to distinguish between facts and values, to shift from ontology to pragmatism, from theory to actual surveys and from quantitative to qualitative methods. Such are the conditions allowing to address the issue of values according to its specificity. (shrink)

The paper begins with a more carefully stated version of ontologically neutral (ON) logic, originally introduced in (Hailperin, 1997). A non-infinitistic semantics which includes a definition of potential infinite validity follows. It is shown, without appeal to the actual infinite, that this notion provides a necessary and sufficient condition for provability in ON logic.

There has been increasing interest among contemporary philosophers in nontheistic forms of ontological idealism, in contrast to the canonical theistic idealism of Berkeley. Given the ontological role that God plays in Berkeley’s metaphysics, it’s natural to think that questions of the value-impact of God will be greater in an idealistic context. Thus, it seems fruitful to ask: What does God add to (or detract from) an idealist world? This paper assesses the benefits and costs that come from moving to an (...) idealism which is not (essentially) theistic. I explicate various dimensions along which theistic and nontheistic idealisms differ. Most of these metaphysical differences are surprisingly value-neutral. The one respect in which God’s (in)existence makes a distinctive value-impact within an idealistic context is in the intelligibility of reality. This is a variant of what Lougheed (2020) calls the Complete Understanding Argument. But the argument takes on a new significance within the idealistic context. Here, the inability to fully comprehend God doesn’t merely pose a challenge for understanding the God-part of reality, or the occasions on which God interferes with the naturalistic causal order. It presents a challenge to understanding the very nature of reality, itself. Finally, I consider what sort of value difference this is, distinguishing between two sorts of value that God’s existence might confer: value for a world (including its inhabitants) and value for a theory. (shrink)