This paper aims to map out the links between style and science. Two moments mark the migration of style from the discursive field of the arts to that of the history and philosophy of science: the first occurred in the German-speaking world during the first decades of the twentieth century; the second appeared in an Anglo-American context between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, when the category of style became involved in the so-called “pluralist turn” in the history (...) and philosophy of science. Taking this framework as its point of departure, the paper uncovers neglected contributions to the epistemology of style in order to foreground the concept of style as both a vector of inclusion (highlighting the plurality, historicity, and locality of scientific ways of knowing) and of exclusion (by generalizing the most correct ways of doing science and side-lining alternative ways of knowing). (shrink)

As data-intensive and computational science become increasingly established as the dominant mode of conducting scientific research, visualisations of data and of the outcomes of science become increasingly prominent in mediating knowledge in the scientific arena. This position piece advocates that more attention should be paid to the epistemological role of visualisations beyond their being a cognitive aid to understanding, but as playing a crucial role in the formation of evidence for scientific claims. The new generation of computational and informational visualisations (...) and imaging techniques challenges the philosophy of science to re-think its position on three key distinctions: the qualitative/quantitative distinction, the subjective/objective distinction, and the causal/non-causal distinction. (shrink)

This paper analyzes selected issues related to the philosophy of the Krakow physicist Andrzej Fuliński. Since the 1970s, Fuliński has been strongly associated with the interdisciplinary milieu gathered around Heller and Życiński. His activity can therefore be considered within the context of the broader phenomenon known as the Krakow School of Philosophy in Science, which was founded by Heller and Życiński. This paper proposes the thesis that Fuliński’s style of philosophy is connected with the concept of (...) class='Hi'>philosophy in science and tries to justify the thesis that Fuliński, due to his cooperation with the interdisciplinary milieu in Krakow and the specificity of his philosophical works, deserves to be regarded as a representative of the Krakow School of Philosophy in Science. (shrink)

Feminist philosophers of biology bring the tools of feminist theory, and in particular the tools of feminist philosophy of science, to investigations of the life sciences. While the critical examination of the categories of sex and gender (which will be explained below) takes a central place, the methods, ontological assumptions, and foundational concepts of biology more generally have also enjoyed considerable feminist scrutiny. Through such investigations, feminist philosophers of biology reveal the extent to which the theory and practice of (...) particular scientific disciplines and research programs (and, indeed, their philosophical study) are intertwined with both value judgments and social hierarchies. (shrink)

The general aim is to present and clarify the notion of grounding, and promote its application to different debates in the philosophy of science. Along the way, I digress about a few specific questions regarding the metaphysics of grounding. As a result, my title ‘Grounding in the Philosophy of Science' is deceiving in at least two ways. First, it suggests a level of argumentative unity that is typical of monographs, when the present dissertation lumps together a series of (...) almost independent arguments. Secondly, it implies a restriction of field to the philosophy of science, when much of the content extends far beyond these confines. (shrink)

This volume includes recent contributions to the philosophy of science from a historical point of view and of the highest topicality: the range of the topics covers all fields in the philosophy of the science provided by authors from around the world focusing on ancient, modern and contemporary periods in the development of the science philosophy. This proceedings is for the scientific community and students at graduate level as well as postdocs in this interdisciplinary field of research.

Four strands of research in the philosophy of technology have made important contributions to environmental philosophy. First, critical theory of technology emphasizes the environmentally exploitative tendencies of capitalist technological innovation. Second, phenomenologyhas examined how technologies shapeperception and orientation to the world with implications for our treatment of and regard for nature. Third, concurrent with the environmental movement itself, an empirical turn in philosophy of technology resulting in philosophers focusing their attention on particular tools and techniques. Empirical studies (...) have emphasized environmentally significant technologies. Finally, work inspired by philosophy of science has adopted scientific reasoning and methods in environmental policy with tools such as risk analysis and environmental impact assessment. These four strands of work have often merged with the work of sociologists, geographers, and political theorists interested in the connections between science and democracy. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This article is a mutual introduction of the science of well-being to philosophy of science and an explanation of how the two disciplines can benefit each other. In the process, I argue that the science of well-being is not helpfully viewed as a social or a natural, but rather as a mixed, science. Hence, its methodology will have to attend to its specific features. I discuss two of its methodological problems: justifying the role of values, and validating measures. I (...) suggest that tackling them calls for developing mid-level rather than high theories of well-being. (shrink)

Kuhn closed the Introduction to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions with what was clearly intended as a rhetorical question: How could history of science fail to be a source of phenomena to which theories about knowledge may legitimately be asked to apply? (Kuhn 1970, 9) This paper argues that there is a more fruitful way of conceiving the relationship between a historical and philosophical study of science, which is dubbed the 'phylogenetic' approach. I sketch an example of this approach, and (...) take a first pass at an abstract characterization of the method. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science by Matias SlavovKrisztián PeteMatias Slavov. Hume’s Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of Physical Science. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. Pp. 216. Hardcover. ISBN 9781350087866, £95.Although the relationship between Hume and Newton is a recurring theme in the Hume literature, Matias Slavov’s book does not seek to contribute to the debate between the traditional (Hume imitated Newton’s natural (...) class='Hi'>philosophy) and the critical (Hume intended his “science of Man” as the foundation of all other sciences) approaches regarding the nature of this relation. The book is intended to be a summary of Hume’s natural philosophy—or rather an aggregation of his comments on natural philosophical topics—pursued by exploring and analysing themes and issues that were prominent in the natural philosophy of the early modern period. In this respect it is a pioneering undertaking.Of course, Slavov does not claim in his book that Hume is a natural philosopher. “[F]irst and foremost... [h]e is not; for his main objective is to establish a new science of human nature” (1). But Slavov does claim that Hume’s natural philosophical views can be understood and valued in themselves and in the philosophical-scientific context of his time as well. The book is not a discussion of the natural philosophical dimensions of the “science of human nature,” but rather, of the natural philosophical views which are reconcilable with his main objective. In this respect, the book is not a methodological approach to Hume’s supposed natural philosophy, but a synthesis of certain elements of Hume’s philosophy that can feature in a consistent natural philosophy. Although his arguments are generally indirect and are more about what Hume seems to be committed to and what follows from his epistemological position rather than his actual positions, Slavov’s conclusions seem mostly convincing.Thus, Slavov’s point is not that the empiricist method is compatible in every detail with Newtonian mechanics, but rather that Hume seems to be committed more to a Cartesian natural philosophy. Slavov does not write about the possibility and significance of applying natural philosophical methods to moral philosophy; rather, he wants to build a complete philosophy of nature around some of Hume’s basic ideas to “fill the gap for a book on Hume’s relation to natural philosophy and philosophy of physical science” (2).The book has two “equally important aims” (ix): to shed more light onto Hume’s relationship to natural philosophy, and to demonstrate that physics and philosophy have overlapping domains. Hume was hardly concerned with physics, so Slavov’s strategy of defining natural philosophy as an overlap between physics and philosophy (chapter 1) does, to some extent, explain the lack of textual evidence in this area. The definition of natural philosophy chosen by Slavov is also intended to ensure [End Page 170] that these two goals are intertwined, since according to Slavov’s definition, natural philosophy is “a grey area between philosophy and physics” (12).Personally, I do not feel comfortable with this definition because it is not informative enough; it says that natural philosophy is more than modern physics (mathematized natural science), but it is not quite philosophy. While the first implication is very agreeable, and a number of scholars have addressed the issue, to assess the second implication, we would need to know exactly what philosophy is in this context. Perhaps the best candidate is metaphysics, even if Slavov keeps the reader somewhat in the dark on this point, despite the fact that chapter 2 is intended to establish precisely that point. Yet, the metaphysics of this period was usually (with the possible exception of Spinoza) used to support natural scientific explanations. I believe that natural philosophy is more than a “grey area” (9, 12, 22), or a contact zone; it is a complex enterprise that evolved in different forms with different emphases: Cartesian mechanics still sought to understand nature, pursuing the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge, albeit rejecting Aristotelian methods, while empiricists increasingly envisaged a more instrumentalist role for natural explanations. Newton himself was caught between the two.In this context it is intriguing whether Hume carries forward Berkeley... (shrink)

After delineating the distinguishing features of pragmatism, and noting the resources that pragmatists have available to respond effectively as pragmatists to the two major objections to pragmatism, I examine and critically evaluate the various proposals that pragmatists have offered as a solution to the problem of induction, followed by a discussion of the pragmatic positions on the status of theoretical entities. Thereafter I discuss the pragmatic posture toward the nature of explanation in science. I conclude that pragmatism has (a) a (...) generally compelling solution to Hume's problem of induction; (b) no specific position on the status of theoretical entities, although something like the non-realism of the sort developed by van Fraassen seems a defensible candidate for most pragmatists in general, even though there are non-trivial objections to van Fraassen's position; and (c) central to the pragmatic conception of scientific explanation is the abandonment of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for sentences to provide adequate explanations, and a drift in the direction of a contextualist account of explanation. (shrink)

The relationship between machine learning and the philosophy of science can be classed as a dynamic interaction: a mutually beneficial connection between two autonomous fields that changes direction over time. I discuss the nature of this interaction and give a case study highlighting interactions between research on Bayesian networks in machine learning and research on causality and probability in the philosophy of science.

The paper intends to identify some particular basic assumptions, approaches and means of proceeding, which are spontaneously shared by philosophers, sociologists and historians of science, besides the common interchange of meta-notions describing science. To this end, the specific subject matter, scope, meta-cognitive goals and methodological background of each of the three domains of science study is first outlined. Only two shared proceedings are further discussed in details: the objective attitude, called 'playing a stranger', and the historiographers' involvement in demarcational problem (...) resolution. A far-reaching prospect is finally suggested for philosophers and historiographers: methodological partnership, leading towards the elaboration of an impending integral metatheory of science. (shrink)

This text deals with a number of topics in philosophy, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. It includes essays on the laws of nature, biological aspects of the philosophy of mind, and the social aspects of rationality.

This fourth volume of the Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective” deals with new challenges in this field. In this regard, it seeks to broaden the scope of the philosophy of science in two directions. On the one hand, ...

The paper presents Husserl’s conception of the relation between science and the living world, i.e. the world of everyday experience and communication. In Husserl view, science, or, more precisely, its basic aprioric structure is founded on the primal, essential core of the living world from which it obtains its sense. Science modifies, idealizes, and mathematizes the primal aprioric Lebenswelt. Due to those operations scientific theories can represent empirical reality.

This public lecture commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh provides a brief history of philosophical activity in Greece from ancient to modern times. The lecture culminates in an exploration of the Center's fruitful interactions with Greece's contemporary philosophical community.

The essays in this collection have been written for Gerd Buchdahl, by colleagues, students and friends, and are self-standing pieces of original research which have as their main concern the metaphysics and philosophy of science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They focus on issues about the development of philosophical and scientific thought which are raised by or in the work of such as Bernoulli, Descartes, Galileo, Kant, Leibniz, Maclaurin, Priestly, Schelling, Vico. Apart from the initial bio-bibliographical piece and (...) those by Robert Butts and Michael Power, they do not discuss Buchdahl or his ideas in any systematic, lengthy, or detailed way. But they are collected under a title which alludes to the book, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins, Descartes to Kant (1969), which is central in the corpus of his work, and deal with the period and some of the topics with which that book deals. (shrink)

It has been shown that the concept of ad hocness is ambiguous when applied to natural science. Here, it is established that a similar ambiguity is present also when the concept is applied in a philosophical debate. Neil Tennant’s proposal for solving Fitch’s paradox has been accused for being ad hoc several times, and he has presented several defenses. In this paper, it is established that ad hocness is never defined, although each author uses different notions of the concept. And (...) we see that no reason to adopt a certain notion is offered. (shrink)

: This essay considers the place of mechanisms in ancient theories of science. It might seem therefore to promise a meager discussion, since the importance of mechanisms in contemporary scientific explanation is the product of a revolution in scientific thinking connected with the late Renaissance and its mechanization of nature. Indeed the conception of astronomy as devoted merely to "saving the appearances" without reference to the physics of planetary motion might seem an instance of ancient science vigorously rejecting mechanisms. This (...) fact should suggest to us that there is no simple truth about the role of mechanisms in science that is not relative to a particular strategy or historical moment in the development of a scientific tradition. It should also remind us of a parallel question concerning scientific theory, the question now expressed in the issue of realism and instrumentalism. A discussion of Aristotle's views on scientific explanation in the Posterior Analytics, and particularly his concept of what is prior and better known by nature, shows the ways in which Aristotle resists a crude choice between realism and instrumentalism. Early modern theories of science were committed to realism, and the notion of mechanisms was important to that commitment. Part of the force of mechanisms was that they were thought to reveal the activities by which phenomena are truly brought into being. In this way they often served early philosophers of science by promising a realistic science, able to discover the actual mechanisms by which phenomena were brought about in a universe increasingly viewed as mechanistic. Mechanisms, then, are of critical importance if one is a realist, but of considerably less importance if one is an instrumentalist. Since Aristotle, at least, was neither a realist nor an instrumentalist, his view might be thought to be typically Aristotelian: in some ways they're important, in some not. A glance at some contemporary instances suggests similarly that there can be no general view from a theoretical perspective of the status of mechanisms. Their place is dependent on specific features of specific projects of scientific research and explanation. (shrink)

. This essay considers the place of mechanisms in ancient theories of science. It might seem therefore to promise a meager discussion, since the importance of mechanisms in contemporary scientific explanation is the product of a revolution in scientific thinking connected with the late Renaissance and its mechanization of nature. Indeed the conception of astronomy as devoted merely to “saving the appearances” without reference to the physics of planetary motion might seem an instance of ancient science vigorously rejecting mechanisms. This (...) fact should suggest to us that there is no simple truth about the role of mechanisms in science that is not relative to a particular strategy or historical moment in the development of a scientific tradition. It should also remind us of a parallel question concerning scientific theory, the question now expressed in the issue of realism and instrumentalism. A discussion of Aristotle's views on scientific explanation in the Posterior Analytics, and particularly his concept of what is prior and better known by nature, shows the ways in which Aristotle resists a crude choice between realism and instrumentalism. Early modern theories of science were committed to realism, and the notion of mechanisms was important to that commitment. Part of the force of mechanisms was that they were thought to reveal the activities by which phenomena are truly brought into being. In this way they often served early philosophers of science by promising a realistic science, able to discover the actual mechanisms by which phenomena were brought about in a universe increasingly viewed as mechanistic. Mechanisms, then, are of critical importance if one is a realist, but of considerably less importance if one is an instrumentalist. Since Aristotle, at least, was neither a realist nor an instrumentalist, his view might be thought to be typically Aristotelian: in some ways they're important, in some not. A glance at some contemporary instances suggests similarly that there can be no general view from a theoretical perspective of the status of mechanisms. Their place is dependent on specific features of specific projects of scientific research and explanation. (shrink)

How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as being characterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in 'objective science', Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in (...) terms of a cycle of variations on the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities (and changing them by Bayesian conditionalization). In doing so, they integrate Bayesian inference—the leading theory of rationality in social science—with the practice of 21st century science. Bayesian Philosophy of Science thereby shows how modeling such attitudes improves our understanding of causes, explanations, confirming evidence, and scientific models in general. It combines a scientifically minded and mathematically sophisticated approach with conceptual analysis and attention to methodological problems of modern science, especially in statistical inference, and is therefore a valuable resource for philosophers and scientific practitioners. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science is a mid-level text for students with some grounding in philosophy. It introduces the questions that drive enquiry in the philosophy of science, and aims to educate readers in the main positions, problems and arguments in the field today. Alex Rosenberg is certainly well qualified to write such an introduction. His works cover a large area of the philosophy of natural and social sciences. In addition, the author of the argument that the ‘queen (...) of the social sciences’, economics, is not a science at all, can be counted on to show how the philosophy of science can be relevant to the understanding of the status of scientific knowledge and can provide a critical assessment of practitioners’ view of their field. (shrink)

With the subtitle, "A consideration of some aspects of An Essay concerning Human Understanding," this book concentrates on Locke’s doctrine of natural or scientific laws and our knowledge of them. By dealing with a limited theme, Woolhouse feels that he is able to provide a treatment lengthier than usual of central topics of Locke’s thought. The topics selected are: "trifling" and "instructive" propositions; "certain knowledge" and "probable opinion"; the notion of an "idea"; simple and complex ideas; the distinction between modes (...) and substances; the notions of Substance, and of real and nominal essences. In elaborating these topics, Woolhouse tries to pay great attention to the actual text of the Essay and to the adequacy or inadequacy of its interpretation by recent commentators. In addition, he has "tried to explain and evaluate Locke’s thought in terms of the positions, views, and interests of twentieth-century philosophy." The book is based on Woolhouse’s Ph.D. thesis at Cambridge in 1968 entitled, ‘Natural necessity in Locke’s Essay and some recent philosophy'. It includes an eight page bibliography of works referred to and a ten page index.—D. R. P. (shrink)

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This is the only English edition of a set of lectures which constitute an earlier and significantly different version of Hegel's classic Philosophy of Right, one of the most influential works in Western political theory. They are essential for a full understanding of Hegel's key concepts of civil society, objective spirit, and recognition.

Feminist philosophy of science appears to present problems for the ideal of value-free science. These difficulties also challenge a traditional understanding of the objectivity of science. However, feminist philosophers of science have good reasons for desiring to retain some concept of objectivity. The present essay considers several recent and influential feminist approaches to the role of social and political values in science, with particular focus on feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint theory. The similarities and difference, as well as the (...) strengths and weaknesses of these approaches are explored. The essay concludes with suggestions for future research in the area of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Review of: John Losee, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. 258 pages.

Summary An introductory article, giving first a short historical exposition of philosophical thinking in Russia and Czechoslovakia. Second, basic trends in the Philosophy of Science in Russia and Poland are dealt with, followed by a briefer consideration of similar trends in other East European countries. A special article on Czechoslovakia will be published later. Some original philosophical contributions, especially of Polish philosophers, are mentioned. Supplemented with selected bibliography.

Rein Vihalemm's philosophy of science left two prominent philosophical legacies: a methodological distinction of scientific disciplines and the practical realist philosophy of science. The diverse perspectives in this book explore some of the ideas that have sprung from Vihalemm's philosophy of science, and the applications of these approaches.

En 1956, l' Academie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences couronnait, a Bruxeiles, 1'etude de M. Yolton, intitulee The Phi­ losophy o/Science 0/ Arthur S. Eddington, etude dont le present ouvrage est la reprise. Pourquoi la personne, 1'oeuvre et les idees de l'illustre physicien anglais avaient-elles ete designees a l'atten­ tion des candidats a ce Prix? Quels enseignements l'Academie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences en attendait-eile? N'esperait-elle pas que le rapport de la recherche philosophique a la recherche scientifique pourrait en etre (...) eclaire? M. Yolton offre a l'un des membres de son jury l'occasion de s'en expliquer a cet endroit. Je m'en vais donc le faire pour ce qui me concerne personnellement, conformement aux vues que je defends moi-meme depuis assez longtemps. La vision du monde et de l'homme, du philosophe et celle du savant s'accordent-elles ou s'opposent-elles? Pour ma part, je ne mets pas en doute qu'il existe entre la science et la philosophie une relation qu'il importe de mettre en evidence, mais j'insiste en meme temps sur le fait que cette relation est ambivalente. A la fois, elles les unit, elle les separe. Elle les fait tour a tour se rapprocher et s'eloigner 1'une de l'autre. La science et la philoso­ phie sont necessaires l'une a 1'autre, mais cette necessite est par­ fois ceile de leur alliance et parfois celle de leur antagonisme. (shrink)

By applying research in artificial intelligence to problems in the philosophy of science, Paul Thagard develops an exciting new approach to the study of scientific reasoning. This approach uses computational ideas to shed light on how scientific theories are discovered, evaluated, and used in explanations. Thagard describes a detailed computational model of problem solving and discovery that provides a conceptually rich yet rigorous alternative to accounts of scientific knowledge based on formal logic, and he uses it to illuminate such (...) topics as the nature of concepts, hypothesis formation, analogy, and theory justification. (shrink)

Feminist philosophy of science has led to improvements in the practices and products of scientific knowledge-making, and in this way it exemplifies socially relevant philosophy of science. It has also yielded important insights and original research questions for philosophy. Feminist scholarship on science thus presents a worthy thought-model for considering how we might build a more socially relevant philosophy of science—the question posed by the editors of this special issue. In this analysis of the history, contributions, (...) and challenges faced by feminist philosophy of science, I argue that engaged case study work and interdisciplinarity have been central to the success of feminist philosophy of science in producing socially relevant scholarship, and that its future lies in the continued development of robust and dynamic philosophical frameworks for modeling social values in science. Feminist philosophers of science, however, have often encountered marginalization and persistent misunderstandings, challenges that must be addressed within the institutional and intellectual culture of American philosophy. (shrink)

In arguing a "role for history," Kuhn was proposing a naturalized philosophy of science. That, I argue, is the only viable approach to the philosophy of science. I begin by exhibiting the main general objections to a naturalistic approach. These objections, I suggest, are equally powerful against nonnaturalistic accounts. I review the failure of two nonnaturalistic approaches, methodological foundationism (Carnap, Reichenbach, and Popper) and metamethodology (Lakatos and Laudan). The correct response, I suggest, is to adopt an "evolutionary perspective." (...) This perspective is defended against one recent critic (Putnam). To argue the plausibility of a naturalistic approach, I next sketch a naturalistic account of theories and of theory choice. This account is then illustrated by the recent revolution in geology. In conclusion I return to Kuhn's question about the role of history in developing a naturalistic theory of science. (shrink)

Citation metrics are statistical measures of scientific output that draw on citation indexes. They purport to capture the impact of scientific articles and the journals in which they appear. As evaluative tools they are mostly used in the natural sciences, but they are also acquiring an important role in the humanities. While the strengths and weaknesses of citation metrics are extensively debated in a variety of fields, they have only recently started attracting attention in the philosophy of science. This (...) paper takes a further step in this direction and presents an analysis of citation metrics from the perspective of a Kuhnian model for the development of science. To do so, it assesses the argument made against the use of citation metrics for scientific research by Gillies (2008). According to Gillies, citations metrics tend to over-protect normal science at the expenses of revolutionary science–in other words, reinforce the status quo rather than supporting innovations and breakthroughs. Unlike Gillies, this paper focuses on the context of normal science and shows that citation metrics can in fact arbitrarily hinder its development when they do not take field-specific differences into account. In light of this, the paper cautions against their use for evaluative purposes. To argue for this conclusion, the paper shows that citation metrics fail to “carve science at its joints” and thus cannot be relied upon as indicators of scientific quality that can support the development of normal science. (shrink)

Philosophy of Science: A Unified Approach combines a general introduction to philosophy of science with an integrated survey of all its important subfields. As the book’s subtitle suggests, this excellent overview is guided methodologically by "a unified approach" to philosophy of science: behind the diversity of scientific fields one can recognize a methodological unity of the sciences. This unity is worked out in this book, revealing all the while important differences between subject areas. Structurally, this comprehensive book (...) offers a two-part approach, which makes it an excellent introduction for students new to the field and a useful resource for more advanced students. Each chapter is divided into two sections. The first section assumes no foreknowledge of the subject introduced, and the second section builds upon the first by bringing into the conversation more advanced, complementary topics. Definitions, key propositions, examples and figures overview all of the core material. At the end of every chapter there are selected readings and exercises . The book also includes a comprehensive bibliography and an index. (shrink)

We examine the sub-field of philosophy of science using a new method developed in information science, Referenced Publication Years Spectroscopy (RPYS). RPYS allows us to identify peak years in citations in a field, which promises to help scholars identify the key contributions to a field, and revolutionary discoveries in a field. We discovered that philosophy of science, a sub-field in the humanities, differs significantly from other fields examined with this method. Books play a more important role in (...) class='Hi'>philosophy of science than in the sciences. Further, Einstein’s famous 1905 papers created a citation peak in the philosophy of science literature. But rather than being a contribution to the philosophy of science, their importance lies in the fact that they are revolutionary contributions to physics with important implications for philosophy of science. (shrink)

I outline the theoretical framework of, and three research programs within American speculative philosophy of science during the period 1900-1931. One program applies verificationism to research in psychology, one investigates the methodology of research programs, and one analyses scientific explanation and other scientific concepts. The primary sources for my outline are works by Morris Raphael Cohen, Grace Andrus de Laguna, Theodore de Laguna, Edgar Arthur Singer Jr., Harold Robert Smart, and Marie Collins Swabey. I also use my outline to (...) provide a partial comparison of American speculative philosophy of science and 1930s logical positivism. My comparison suggests that logical positivism was a proposal for substantially narrowing down and winding back American philosophy of science and was based on positions that were already problematized in the American context. -/- . (shrink)

In recent years, philosophy of science has witnessed a significant increase in attention directed toward the field’s social relevance. This is demonstrated by the formation of societies with related agendas, the organization of research symposia, and an uptick in work on topics of immediate public interest. The collection of papers that follows results from one such event: a 3-day colloquium on the subject of socially engaged philosophy of science (SEPOS) held at the University of Cincinnati in October 2012. (...) In this introduction, we first survey the recent history of philosophy of science’s social involvement (or lack thereof) and contrast this with the much greater social involvement of the sciences themselves. Next, we argue that the field of philosophy of science bears a special responsibility to contribute to public welfare. We then introduce as a term of art “SEPOS” and articulate what we take to be distinctive about social engagement, with reference to the articles in this collection as exemplars. Finally, we survey the current state of social engagement in philosophy of science and suggest some practical steps for individuals and institutions to support this trajectory. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the underdeveloped field of experimental philosophy of science. We examine variability in the philosophical views of scientists. Using data from Toolbox Dialogue Initiative, we analyze scientists’ responses to prompts on philosophical issues (methodology, confirmation, values, reality, reductionism, and motivation for scientific research) to assess variance in the philosophical views of physical scientists, life scientists, and social and behavioral scientists. We find six prompts about which differences arose, with several more that look promising for future research. (...) We then evaluate the difference between the natural and social sciences and the challenge of interdisciplinary integration across scientific branches. (shrink)

In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philosophy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of current philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contribution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and (...) physics. (shrink)

The development of science has been a distinctive feature of human history in recent times, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In light of the problems that define the philosophy of science today, James Fetzer provides a foundation for inquiry into the nature of science, the history of science, and the relationship between the two. In Philosophy of Science, Fetzer investigates the aim and methods of empirical science and examines the importance of methodological commitments to the study (...) of science and the significance of interpretations of probability for understanding laws of nature and scientific explanations. This book offers a welcome framework for investigating the most recent work and the most promising solutions to the central problems that arise within this discipline. The result is a timely introduction to an increasingly important field. -- Publisher description. (shrink)

This paper presents a survey of the philosophy of science in Estonia. Topics covered include the historical background (science at the 17th century Academia Gustaviana, in the 19th century, during the Soviet period) and an overview of the current situation and main areas of research (the problem of demarcation, a critique of the traditional understandings of science, φ-science, classical and non-classical science, the philosophy of chemistry, the problem of induction, the sociology of scientific knowledge, semiotics as a methodology).