Heidegger tries to explain our emotional life applying three schemes: causal explanation, mental internalisation of emotions and metaphorical expression. None of the three schemes explains emotion though. Either because the causal nexus does not always occur or because objects and people in the external world are carriers of emotional agents or because language is already on a metaphorical level. Moreover, how is it possible that there are presently emotions constituting our life without our being aware of their existence? From (...) the analysis of boredom in its three varieties (“bored by X”, “get oneself bored”, and “it is boring”) we will get to the depth where emotions lie, trying to rouse them and to keep them awake. Although it surfaces with the force and energy of the present, every emotion has its past and future constitution. How can we understand the future of a present emotion along with its past? (shrink)

Our aim is to examine why trust can be considered a second-order emotion and how the way in which trust plays out differently in aesthetic and ordinary contexts can provide another mode of investigating second-order emotions. Our thesis is developed in three sections and a conclusion.In the first section, we perform an example analysis to show why narratives are important for our emotions. In the second section, we examine how trust can be considered a (...) second-order emotion and establish criteria for identifying it as a second-order emotion. In the third section, we present one of the aims of trust, i.e. sharing knowledge between agents, when a testimony-giver shares knowledge in an epistemic trust process with others. We show how the relationship construction between persons thanks to trust, a second-order emotion that represents emotional ties between agents to achieve a first-order emotion. (shrink)

This article praises the development of second order cybernetics by von Foerster, Maturana, and Varela as an important step in deepening our understanding of the bio-psychological foundation of the dynamics of information, cognition, and communication. Luhmann's development of the theory into the realm of social communication is seen as a necessary and important move. The triple autopoietic differentiation between biological, psychological, and social-communicative autopoiesis and the introduction of a technical concept of meaning is central. Finally, the paper shows (...) that second order cybernetics lacks explicit and ontological concepts of emotion, meaning, and a concept of signs. C. S. Peirce's theory is introduced for this purpose. It is then shown, through Varela's development of Spencer Brown's ‘Laws of Form’ from a dual to a dynamic triadic categorical structure, that both theories are triadic and second order, and therefore can be fruitfully fused to a Cybersemiotics. (shrink)

This article analyzes the role of emotions in social interaction and their effects on social structuration and the emergence of micro-social order. It argues that facial expressions of emotion are key in generating robust patterns of social interaction. First, the article shows that actors' encoding of facial expressions combines hardwired physiological principles on the one hand and socially learned aspects on the other hand, leading to fine-grained and socially differentiated dialects of expression. Second, it is argued that (...) decoding facial expression is contingent upon this combination so that reciprocal attributions of emotional states, situational interpretations, and action tendencies are more effective within rather than across social units. Third, this conjunction affects the conditions for emotional contagion, which is argued to be more effective within social units exhibiting similar encoding and decoding characteristics, and thus aligns emotions and action tendencies in a coherent, yet socially differentiated way. (shrink)

There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic harmony.

I argue that one’s responsibility for one’s emotions has a two-fold structure: one bears direct responsibility for emotions insofar as they are the upshot of first-order evaluative judgements concerning reasons of fit; and one bears derivative responsibility for them insofar as they are consequences of activities of emotional self-regulation, which can reflect one’s take on second-order reasons concerning the strategic, prudential, or moral desirability of undergoing a particular emotion in a particular context.

The paper is concerned with the metaphysics of emotion. It defends the claim that all emotional states, whether dormant or active, are dispositional, arguing against the prevailing view that dispositional emotional states are dispositions to go into actual emotional states. A clear distinction may be made between first-order and second-order emotional dispositions, where second-order emotional dispositions are dispositions of emotional sensitivity and first-order emotional dispositions are the emotional states themselves. Active emotional states are (...) treated as dispositional emotional states in the process of being manifested, not as different states altogether. Describing active states as occurrent states is misleading as it suggests an exclusive distinction between active/occurrent and dispositional, which is what is being questioned. The idea that dispositional states have no subjectivity is challenged, as is the argument that being flooded with a feeling as a result of an encounter with a frightening or aggravating situation cannot be the manifestation of a disposition. (shrink)

Highly divergent accounts exist of the nature of emotional feelings. Following Lambie and Marcel (2002), that divergence is traced back to actual differences in experience that result from variations in the involvement and direction of attention during emotions. The dimensions of variation include first versus second order experience, world- versus self-focus, appraisal or action-readiness focus, and attention mode (synthetic-analytic, immersed-detached). It is argued that the most characteristic form during actual emotional events consists of the more or less immersed (...) and synthetic perception of an emotionally meaningful world or of oneself as emotionally meaningful. Meaning consists of perceived qualities that represent appraisal and action readiness. Although information from one's body is central for all emotion experience, it is not central in all emotion experience. Feeling of the body in a particular state represents detached analytic self-focused awareness only.Emotion experience not only represents a perspective on emotional reactions but also contributes to the constitution of those reactions, notably with respect to attention shifts, action initiation and action guidance, and emotion regulation. It is a major factor in constituting a representation of “self” and in establishing social coherence. (shrink)

It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and (...) argue that philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to non-axiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I explore how emotions operate under conditions of injustice. Specifically, my interest is in how one should deploy their emotions in order to combat patriarchally informed, affective ways of making sense of and responding to the social world. My dissertation consists of the following three papers. In the first paper, “Vindictive Anger,” I argue for two claims. First, that anger is not necessarily made morally worse whenever and to the extent that it involves a desire for (...) payback. Second, that in certain cases, anger’s retributive component is precisely what moralizes the emotion. Victims of sexual violence, I argue, paradigmatically deploy their anger as a way of getting their transgressor or, in some cases, the broader moral community, to more fully understand, through affect, the wrongness of their action. One can see this occur in the anger expressed by Chanel Miller in her victim’s impact statement, read aloud during the case of People v. Turner. When anger functions in this way, I propose, it serves to moralize the emotion. In the second paper, titled “Feminism and Suspect Femininity,” I ask how feminists should feel towards women who conform to suspect norms of appearance, and of hyper-femininity in particular. I present a novel type of empathy – proleptic empathy – which avoids treating women as either pitiful victims or as accomplices deserving of harsh moral criticism. Proleptic empathy requires switching back and forth between two types of imaginings: on the one hand, simulating what it is like to be in the woman’s shoes on the assumption that her suspect behavior stems from her will. On the other, simulating what it is like to be in the woman’s shoes on the assumption that her suspect behavior stems from external cultural influences. In the third paper, “Transitional Moral Contexts,” I address how one should feel towards the perpetrators who figure in the cases that have gone by the language of ‘grey rape’ or ‘bad sex’. These cases are ones that are rife with disagreement, especially amongst members of the moral community, who even disagree over whether they ought to count as cases of ‘sexual assault’ or ‘rape’. My suggestion is that the reason we have such difficulty adjudicating individuals’ responsibility for cases of bad sex is because these are instances of transitional moral contexts where what it is to act morally is in the process of being actively negotiated by the moral community. With this analysis in place, I present reasons for and against deploying shame against those who falter in these cases. (shrink)

Schadenfreude is the emotion we experience when we obtain pleasure from others’ misfortunes. Typically, we are not proud of it and admit experiencing it only sheepishly or apologetically. Philosophers typically view it, and the disposition to experience it, as moral failings. Two recent defenders of Schadenfreude, however, argue that it is morally permissible because it stems from judgments about the just deserts of those who suffer misfortunes. I also defend Schadenfreude, but on different grounds that overcome two deficiencies of (...) those recent defenses. First, my defense accounts for the wide range of circumstances in which we experience Schadenfreude. Those circumstances often involve feelings and judgments that are less noble and admirable than judgments regarding just deserts. Second, it accounts for the sheepish or apologetic feelings that commonly accompany Schadenfreude. The two recent defenses can account for those feelings only by holding that they are mistaken or misguided. In opposition to those who view Schadenfreude as a moral failing, I argue that it is morally permissible unless it is part of a causal chain that produces an immoral act. The moral permissibility of the emotion is necessary in order for individuals to have the emotional freedom that, in turn, is necessary for their well-being. Schadenfreude’s moral status is similar to a sexual fetish’s. Like a fetish, experiencing Schadenfreude is not immoral in itself, but sharing and discussing it with others is immoral in many contexts. (shrink)

Truth is not only a semantic notion, because it can involve our whole being, both intellectual and emotional. The emotional character of the truth determines its relevance for us. In this paper I will first discuss Ronald de Sousa’s theory of emotional truth and the idea of the appropriateness of emotions in relation to judgment. Secondly, I will deal with Meinong’s conception that emotions have both an evaluative and a cognitive character, allow us to know what the world is like, (...) and consequently are related to truth. Truth then turns out to be a value. If something is valuable to me, it stirs an emotion. That is why truth is capable of attracting feelings. Emotional truth is that truth which attracts a justified knowledge-feeling. This is the basis on which we might develop an aesthetics of concepts whereby theories, in order to be established, need not only to be regarded as true but to produce an emotional involvement of the subjects. (shrink)

Although the study of emotion regulation constitutes a thriving research field, there is still an ongoing debate about the very notion of emotion regulation. According to a popular approach, regulation is a second-order process which is different from (and modifies) emotion. This view has been challenged by the fact that emotion regulates itself through different feedback loops. Emotional feedback suggests that regulation may be a form of control (as defined in control theory). In this (...) paper, I argue that none of these characterizations captures all the intended applications of the notion and propose instead to identify regulation with modulation. In neuroscience, modulation is the process of changing the shape of an input-output relation. This is a notion that can be applied to the different regulatory strategies proposed in the literature and which is compatible both with second-order and feedback regulation. (shrink)

Studies investigating the COVID-19 pandemic from a psychological point of view have mostly focused on psychological distress. This study adopts the framework of existential positive psychology, a second wave of positive psychology that emphasizes the importance of effective coping with the negative aspects of living in order to achieve greater wellbeing. Trait emotional intelligence (trait EI) can be crucial in this context as it refers to emotion-related personality dispositions concerning the understanding and regulation of one’s emotions and (...) those of others. The present study investigated the relationship between trait EI and both wellbeing and psychological distress (i.e., depression, anxiety, and stress), while exploring the mediating role of meaning-centered coping (proactive transformative strategies based on meaning in life) and maladaptive coping (i.e., behavioral disengagement and self-blame) during the first few months of the COVID-19 pandemic. A sample of 326 Lebanese adults completed measures of trait EI, wellbeing, psychological distress, coping, and meaning-centered coping. Results showed a strong positive correlation between trait EI and meaning-centered coping. Trait EI also correlated positively with wellbeing and negatively with psychological distress. Structural equation modeling showed that meaning-centered coping partially mediated the relationship between trait EI and wellbeing. Maladaptive coping fully mediated the relationship between trait EI and psychological distress. Findings indicate that trait EI is positively related to dealing with a stressful situation such as the pandemic in positive ways at both the cognitive level, by reformulating the situation to see something valuable in it, and behavioral level, by being proactive about it. Trait EI was positively linked to seeing the situation as an opportunity for personal growth, finding personal meaning in this situation, maintaining an attitude of hope and courage, and acting more responsibly with one’s self and others during the current crisis. In turn, this coping formula was related to lower psychological distress and improved mental health. These results are consistent with the existential positive psychology framework and can inform implementation programs and policies aiming at raising awareness and promoting healthy and successful coping during the pandemic. (shrink)

Mixed or ambivalent emotions have long intrigued philosophers. I dissect various putative cases of emotional ambivalence and conclude that the alleged 'psychological problem' surrounding them admits of a solution. That problem has, however, often been conflated with 'moral problem' - of how one should react morally to such ambivalence — which remains active even after the psychological one has been solved. I discuss how the moral problem hits hardest at virtue ethics, old and new. I distinguish between particularist and generalist (...) (Aristotelian) virtue ethics, and pay special attention to the latter. After discussing critically previous attempts at an Aristotelian solution of the 'moral problem' by McDowell, Stark and Carr, I pay special attention to the role of phronesis as a second-order meta-emotion and mediator, and consider how that may offer a way out of the impasse. I finally present some concluding remarks about the idea of a constructive dividedness of mind. (shrink)

The recent philosophical literature on emotional action is divided between Humeans, who think that emotional action, for all its peculiarities, can in fact be explained along Humean lines, that is, with belief–desire pairs; and emotionists, who think that emotional actions can only be explained by appealing to emotions and some of their special features. After reviewing this philosophical discussion, I will argue, first, that none of the philosophical accounts of emotional action analysed, whether Humean or emotionist, is satisfactory enough. (...) class='Hi'>Second, I will argue that this philosophical debate has reached a stalemate, which does not allow further progress and which has not been able to provide us with a compelling account of such emotional actions where it is not obvious which is the goal involved. Third, I will argue that in order to overcome this stalemate, we need to approach emotional action in a radically different way. Drawing on ideas from some psychologists, I will suggest that the relevant philosophical issue should be whether emotional action is, or is not, goal-directed. Finally, I will suggest how emotional actions, particularly the most puzzling ones, can be accounted for according to this new approach. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.1 (2004) 53-64 [Access article in PDF] Emotion and Creativity Mike Radford Introduction Creativity may be seen as a complex process of informational processing within a given framework, or, as Margaret Boden has termed it, "conceptual space." 1 It is in the context of such frameworks that the process of managing information makes sense. The framework offers the possibilities within which information can (...) be combined and separated, grouped and regrouped,and may be seen to define the boundaries of that which makes sense both within the space and at its parameters. Boden suggests that we can, by playing around with the variables within a "conceptual space," be creative. We can generate multiple possibilities in terms of meaningful articulations.We can also aspire to a more fundamental level of creative thought oraction by engaging in the high-risk process of challenging the very rules that support the coherence of the space itself. In other words we can think, hypothesize or "play" at the boundaries of sense. Such explorations might result in changing those boundaries, thus transforming the conceptual space. Such changes might be minor but at other times dramatic, constituting major transitions in human thought and expression. This account seems to explain both the gradual process of creative development in the arts and sciences as well as the dramatic transformations that we observe in the history of intellectual and cultural development. Some conceptual spaces may be clearly defined with relatively closely controlled parameters. Others might be more open, more accommodating both within and at their boundariesA number of questions arise in the context, two of which are of particularinterest. First, how do novel combinations or reorganizations of information within the conceptual space come to be made and how they are recognized as sensible and of value within the system? Second and more fundamentally, how are new and original articulations that stand at the parameters or boundaries of the sense-making system constructed? How are we guided [End Page 53] when we seek to make sense at its very boundaries? It may be that few are called to such profound levels of creative articulation but for the rest of us, how do we recognize these creative articulations when they are made? How do we make sense of an activity, a new scientific theory, or work of art when it challenges the very principles that govern its sense in the first place?It is important to give full cognizance to the complexity of the information-processing task being performed and it is highly doubtful if all elements, all items of information, and the relationships between them, are before the conscious mind of the individual creative intelligence at any one time. There may be a sense of consonance or harmony within this system that enables us to recognize its sense or coherence. In this way much of the information contained within it is simply not noticed. Only when some item of information or process is out of place, dissonant with the organization, do we perceive difficulties. All systems contain dissonances either obvious or manufactured. In science for example there are items of evidence that do not fit within the theoretical frameworks or the paradigms that it has to offer. There are also substantial areas of human experience that might seem to fall outside the paradigm altogether. For many years scientists have been able to predict the exact day, time, and locality within which we may observe an eclipse of the sun. What they have been unable to do, even within a few hours of the event, is predict whether the weather conditions will be such that we can actually observe it. In time it may be that there is the development of a new paradigm that promises accuracy in weather predictions or newly discovered evidence that warrants a review of particular theories within a paradigm.Sometimes it may seem that there is a perversity in human intelligence, particularly in the arts, that seeks out or deliberately manufactures such dissonances in order to challenge us in the way that we are thinking, to shake complacency... (shrink)

For cognitivist accounts of aesthetic appreciation, appreciation requires an agent (1) to perceptually respond to the relevant aesthetic features of an object o on good evidential grounds, (2) to have an autonomous grasp of the reasons that make the claim about the aesthetic features of o true by pointing out the connection between non-aesthetic features and the aesthetic features of o, (3) to be able to provide an explanation of why those features contribute to the overall aesthetic value of o. (...) In this framework, aesthetic emotions have traditionally been confined to the level of aesthetic perception (1) and dismissed from the process of reason-giving (2, 3). I argue that this dismissal is due, firstly, to a questionable perceptual reading of the connection between emotional experience and value, and, secondly, to a narrow focus on the basic emotions. My argument will reveal that the non-standard or ‘intellectual’ emotions, the emotions which are in fact most important to appreciation, can play a significant epistemic role in our appreciative practices. They can do this because they (a) help us to deliberately focus our attention and (b) place the appreciator in a state of second-order awareness of their mental states. I conclude the paper by showing how these two epistemic tools (a, b) can help the appreciator to meet the explanatory/justificatory conditions (2) and (3). (shrink)

Many believe that values are crucially dependent on emotions. This paper focuses on epistemic aspects of the putative link between emotions and value by asking two related questions. First, how exactly are emotions supposed to latch onto or track values? And second, how well suited are emotions to detecting or learning about values? To answer the first question, the paper develops the heuristics-model of emotions. This approach models emotions as sui generis heuristics of value. The empirical plausibility of the (...) heuristics-model is demonstrated using evidence from experimental psychology, evolutionary anthropology and neuroscience. The model is used then to answer the second question. If emotions are indeed heuristics of value, then it follows that emotions can be an important and useful source of information about value. However, emotions will not be epistemically superior in the sense of being the highest court of appeal for the justification of axiological beliefs (the latter view is referred to as the Epistemic Dependence Thesis, or EDT for short). The paper applies the heuristics-model to celebrated cases from the philosophy of emotions literature arguing that while the heuristics-model offers a good explanation of typical patterns of emotional reactions in such cases, advocates of EDT will have a hard time accounting for these patterns. The paper also shows that the conclusions drawn from special cases generalize. The paper ends by arguing that skepticism about the metaethical significance of emotions is compatible with a commitment to the importance of emotions in first-order normative ethics. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo propone definir la integridad moral a partir de la autorreflexión, la meta emoción y la identidad. Se parte de la autorreflexión de H. Frankfurt y se amplía su evaluación de los deseos mediante los conceptos de autorreflexión débil y fuerte de C. Taylor. Si bien las emociones tienen relevancia en la motivación, lo que cuenta para evaluar la reflexividad de alguien son sus acciones. Se plantea que las emociones, aun sin cristalizar en acción, son relevantes para determinar (...) la identidad moral. Así mismo, se presentan las metaemociones como un tipo de deseo de segundo orden que no se enlaza necesariamente a la volición, pero que tiene potencial similar a las voliciones de segundo orden. Se propone considerar a las emociones morales, según las define C. Korsgaard, como equivalentes a las metaemociones que, junto con las razones, determinan la integridad moral. ABSTRACT The purpose of the article is to define moral integrity on the basis of self-reflection, meta-emotion, and identity. Starting out from H. Frankfurt’s notion of self-reflection, the article expands his assessment of desires with the help of C. Taylor‘s concepts of strong and weak self-reflection. While it is true that emotions are relevant for motivation, it is an individual’s actions that count when assessing reflexivity. The article suggests that emotions, even when they have not materialized into actions, are relevant in determining moral identity. Likewise, it discusses meta-emotions as a type of second-order desire that is not necessarily linked to volition, but whose potential is similar to that of second-order volitions. It suggests that moral emotions, according to C. Korsgaard, be considered equivalent to meta-emotions, which, together with reasons, determine moral integrity. (shrink)

Rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental. Therefore it is important to understand the sort of rationality at issue here. It is often assumed that rationality just is instrumental rationality, but this leaves us with too thin a notion of desire: Desires centrally involve the notion of things mattering or being significant, for their objects must normally be worth pursuing to the subject. Such significance is simply unintelligible in terms of instrumental rationality. Consequently, understanding significance and its rational connections (...) to desire and action is essential to understanding rationality as a constitutive ideal. In particular, it is a crucial step in vindicating the idea of animal thought. ;I argue that significance, as well as desire, must be understood in part in terms of the emotions. Many prominent theories of emotions illegitimately conceive of significance as conceptually prior to the capacity for having emotions, in that things can be significant to a creature that does not have any emotions at all. In contrast, I argue first that a creature must have the capacity for emotions in order to be a subject of significance because to be significant is in part to be a suitable object of emotions generally. Second, emotions are essentially feelings not because they "involve" bodily sensations but because they are a distinctive kind of awareness of the significance of the world to the subject; particular occurrent emotions therefore presuppose that things are already significant to the subject. Consequently, emotions and significance form a conceptual package, with neither being prior to the other: Significance and the emotions emerge together in a pattern of instrumental and non-instrumental rationality that can be articulated in terms of their interconnected explanatory roles. ;Being a subject of beliefs and desires therefore requires more than simply rationally mediated goal-directedness, as Dennett believes. Rather, it requires being open, through the emotions, to the significance of the world and to the reasons that significance provides for action. This conclusion is shown to have important ramifications for our understanding both of a minimal sense of agency and of what it is to be a person. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and EmotionJason IngramPolitical Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion by Marlene K. Sokolon. De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006. Pp. ix + 217. $38.00, cloth.In this book Marlene Sokolon develops Aristotle's theme that virtue, both individual and social, consists of a harmonious interplay of reason and emotion. The nine chapters of Political Emotions: Aristotle (...) and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion argue for the continued relevance of Aristotle's work. The first chapter uses the metaphor of a symphony to outline Aristotle's view of emotions as necessary to the proper exercise of reason in a good society. Reason should not master emotion, Sokolon explains, but, rather, should function like a parent to train good emotional responses. Emotions are inherently political and can enrich or endanger a political order depending on how they are modulated. The second chapter assesses Aristotle's fit with current research into emotion by discussing areas where his conclusions are consistent with contemporary findings. Emotions are not reducible either to thought or to physiological reactions, they have a social component, and they involve judgments as well as perceptions. Chapters 3 through 9 consider particular emotions, following Aristotle's Rhetoric to illustrate their political and rhetorical components. Emotions have a Janus face, in that they can present a beneficial or a baneful aspect. The final chapter and conclusion connect Aristotle's account to recent work in political science, suggesting lines of future research. Aristotle's narrative provides [End Page 92] topics for understanding how reason can transform emotions, as well as how emotions can distort or improve deliberation.The book is not about rhetoric, though Sokolon weaves rhetoric's capacity to shape judgment and perception, thereby altering emotions and their intensity, into her discussion of each emotion. She explains that persuasive speech can "turn" emotional judgments and draws a parallel between rhetoric's capacity to induce audiences to adopt emotions and reason's ability to persuade individual emotional response (20). Emotions such as anger, love, fear, and even shame have roles to play in a good society. For example, anger against tyranny can provide a valuable spur to change, while well-grounded fear can motivate effective self-defense. Sokolon begins her account by discussing anger's possible merit in political decision making and ends by considering how emotions such as anger can motivate attempts to overthrow tyranny. Aristotle thus redeems seemingly negative emotions in the process of explaining their political value. Because they are potentially so powerful and because they shape perception and judgment, emotions pose threats. Love in the form of civic friendship provides an essential foundation for community stability, but excessive love can corrupt judgment by fostering improper partiality. Therefore Aristotle considers emotions such as love and hate to be limited goods. The idea that a moderate amount of hate can be good for a just society seems to strike a jarring note today, given hatred's propensity to breed bigotry, but Aristotle has in mind hatred of flatterers and the unjust.Emotions are "Janus-like" in that they can be helpful or harmful depending on how they are activated and habituated. Sokolon reiterates the idea that a good society will cultivate habits to modulate emotional response based on reason to explain each emotion's dangerous and productive potential. For example, excessive fear can corrupt deliberation, and excessive confidence can lead to disaster. A "middle" between extremes can habituate individuals to desire justice and motivate appropriate action: without appropriate confidence soldiers will not fight, and without appropriate fear citizens will not provide sufficient means of defense. However, the formal notion that we should search out a virtuous mean for each emotion based on our character and context typically lacks substantive content; the extent to which Aristotle's work might help contemporary audiences to sustain such virtue remains mostly implicit. What counts as proper emotional habituation will be radically contingent, and the book's aim is not to describe contemporary political regimes or to offer interventions. Nonetheless Sokolon sprinkles brief discussion of keystone speeches by [End Page 93] leaders such as Susan B. Anthony, Winston Churchill, Frederick Douglass... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Second Harvest: Further Reflections on the Promise of the Thomistic PsychologyGiuseppe Butera (bio)Keywordsmethod, emotion, developmental psychology, rationalism, holismSamuel Johnson was once accosted by a lady demanding to know why he had defined “pastern” as “the knee of a horse.” Seeing perhaps that escape was impossible, the great man simply confessed, “Ignorance, madam, pure ignorance” (Fadiman 1985, 312). In preparing to write my response to the gracious and (...) stimulating commentaries of Eugene DeRobertis and Christopher Megone, I came gradually to feel how apposite such a reply would be to some of their own critical observations and remarks. Although I had known from the start that the work of bringing Aquinas’s philosophical psychology (APP) into dialogue with modern psychology would be difficult, it was only in reflecting on their commentaries that I came to appreciate just how difficult it would be and how far short of the mark my own first attempt had fallen. But there was also much in their commentaries to encourage me in this work. For their penetrating observations and criticisms, as well as their supportive comments, I am truly grateful.Rather than responding to their critical remarks one at a time and in the order in which they appear in their respective commentaries, I would like to treat them thematically. Taken together, DeRobertis and Megone seem to have three major concerns, each of which will be treated separately in the following sections. Very briefly, these concerns have to do with: (1) Claims I make about the difference between the methods of inquiry employed by philosophy and psychology; (2) the absence of a discussion of the importance of developmental psychology for an adequate philosophical understanding of judgment (of both the rational and the cogitative kinds) and its relation to emotion; and (3) a subtle rationalist/cognitivist tendency in my treatment of Aquinas’s understanding of human rationality that comes dangerously close to muting, almost to the point of denying, its decidedly un-Cartesian embodiment.On MethodAlthough I did not undertake to argue for the legitimacy of philosophical inquiry into matters nowadays viewed by many to be the exclusive domain of the sciences—among which psychology is often numbered—I did make a few passing comments in that direction. Unfortunately, in the process of doing so, I ended up reducing the variegated field of psychology, with its wide range of explanatory stances and research methodologies,1 to the highly restrictive quantitative methodology [End Page 377] employed by the hard sciences.2 There is no question in my mind that DeRobertis would be right to call my “characterization of psychology as a strictly quantitative science” “damning” (DeRobertis 2010, 370) were I unwilling to disavow it.Admitting DeRobertis’ point that psychology is not limited to using a strictly quantitative research methodology is not, however, to deny that there is a real difference between the approaches taken by philosophy and modern psychology in their separate attempts to understand the human psyche. Although it is no simple task to say in what this difference consists, some indication of its nature may be grasped by answering questions in Megone’s commentary that invite a careful examination of “the linked roles of reason and experience in both science and philosophy” (Megone 2010, 374).Although Megone asks three distinct questions, the answers to the first two may be subsumed under the answer to the third, which asks how the “interaction of the two different modes of inquiry [employed by APP and CT]” may “be explained, given their different methods” (Megone 2010, 374). How, in other words, is it possible for cognitive therapy (CT) to be queried by APP, and vice versa, given their methodological differences? To answer this question, we must clarify what it is about modern psychology that makes it different from philosophical psychology (the first question); we must also say something about the “linked roles of reason and experience in both science and philosophy” (the second question).Generally speaking, philosophical psychology, at least as it is found in the writings of Aristotle, Aquinas, and other philosophical realists, differs from modern psychology not so much in the kinds of questions it asks as in the kinds of answers it seeks... (shrink)

The objective of this doctoral dissertation is to interpret the explanation of akrasia that the Dutch philosopher Benedictus Spinoza (1632-1677) gives in his work The Ethics. One is said to act acratically when one intentionally performs an action that one judges to be worse than another action which one believes one might perform instead. In order to interpret Spinoza’s explanation of akrasia, a large part of this dissertation investigates Spinoza’s theory of emotion. The first chapter is introductory and (...) outlines Spinoza’s categorisation of mental states and his conception of the relation between the mind and the body. The second chapter deals with Spinoza’s epistemology and the relation between cognitive mental states and states of the brain. The third chapter argues that Spinoza holds that emotions are non-cognitive mental states that are caused by cognitive mental states. The fourth chapter interprets Spinoza’s discussion of the emotions of Joy and Sadness insofar as they are mental states. The fifth chapter suggests that when Spinoza says that the power of our body is increased or decreased when we are joyful or sad, he means that when we are joyful or sad then, at the same time, our heart and perhaps the organs of our digestive system are affected in such a way that our bodily health is increased or decreased. The sixth chapter points to three problems that concern Spinoza’s definitions of the psychophysical states of pleasure, pain, cheerfulness and melancholy, and offers slightly altered definitions of these states. The seventh chapter interprets the various aspects of Spinoza’s conception of the emotion of Desire, both insofar as it is a state of the mind and insofar it is a state of the body, as well as the relation between the emotion of Desire and man’s striving for self-preservation. The eighth chapter discusses what Spinoza writes on the strength of emotions and the way in which we make value judgments in order to finally interpret why it is, according to Spinoza, that ‘we so often see the better for ourselves but follow the worse’. (shrink)

Two putative functions of emotion experience ? its roles in intentional action and in social understanding ? were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, (...) they were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person?s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that ?simulation? is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience. (shrink)

As we learn more about the human brain, novel biotechnological means to modulate human behaviour and emotional dispositions become possible. These technologies could be used to enhance our morality. Moral bioenhancement, an instance of human enhancement, alters a person’s dispositions, emotions or behaviour in order to make that person more moral. I will argue that moral bioenhancement could be carried out in three different ways. The first strategy, well known from science fiction, is behavioural enhancement. The second strategy, (...) favoured by prominent defenders of moral bioenhancement, is emotional enhancement. The third strategy is the enhancement of moral dispositions, such as empathy and inequity aversion. I will argue that we ought to implement a combination of the second and third strategies. Furthermore, I will argue that the usual arguments against other instances of human enhancement do not apply to moral bioenhancement, or apply only to the first strategy, behavioural enhancement. (shrink)

Initial evaluation structures (IESs) currently proposed as the earliest detectors of affective stimuli (e.g., amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, or insula) are high-order structures (a) whose response latency cannot account for the first visual cortex emotion-related response (~80 ms), and (b) lack the necessary infrastructure to locally analyze the visual features that define emotional stimuli. Several thalamic structures accomplish both criteria. The lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), a first-order thalamic nucleus that actively processes visual information, with the complement of the (...) thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) are proposed as core IESs. This LGN–TRN tandem could be supported by the pulvinar, a second-order thalamic structure, and by other extrathalamic nuclei. The visual thalamus, scarcely explored in affective neurosciences, seems crucial in early emotional evaluation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes”Cristiano Castelfranchi (bio) and Maria Miceli (bio)Keywordsgrief, suffering, attachment, agent architectureThis paper is significant in many respects: its approach (the design-based analysis); its proposed architecture; its description of grief; and its self-control/perturbance theory. We would offer some remarks on each of these aspects.AI: Back to the FutureAfter some years of crisis, AI seems now to have recovered its original challenging attitude (...) and its identity. In particular all the original ambitions of AI have been renewed under the label of “autonomous agents” (see, for example, Russell and Norvig 1995; Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). This paper and its authors are good representatives of this challenging attitude. Of course, the AI appearing at century’s end is different from, say, the AI of the 1980s. AI systems and models are now conceived for reasoning and acting in open unpredictable worlds, with limited and uncertain knowledge, in real time, with bounded (both cognitive and material) resources, with hybrid architectures, interfering—either co-operatively or competitively—with other systems. The new password for the AI of the 1990s is interaction (Bobrow 1991): interaction with an evolving environment; among several, distributed and heterogeneous artificial systems in a network; with human users; and among humans through computers.This renewed AI, however different though it is in some ways, can be understood as returning to its original aim of modeling “intelligence”: not only static and isolated sub-functions of intelligence but the integrated and pragmatic functioning of autonomous agent architectures as against algorithms. Our renewed AI, based on architectures, can again have important exchanges with other (psychological and social) sciences. This paper is a good example of the fruitful cross-fertilization of ideas which may result from such exchanges. It was indeed just this which originally gave rise to cognitive science.The ArchitectureThe proposed architecture, although quite speculative, and—as the authors themselves emphasize—very much a first sketch, is directly relevant to this new AI. In fact, recent research efforts in the agent-architecture domain are focused exactly on the problem of “goal dynamics” [End Page 129] or “motive processing,” which is the core of this architecture, and on the problem of integrating reactivity and deliberation. Compared with current AI architectures (for example, BDI systems) it is important to note that this “motive-processing” architecture is not yet formalized or implemented to the same extent. On the other hand, it is more interesting from a psychological point of view, and is already able to give us some important insights into human emotions, in particular those emotions (like grief) that involve all or total loss of control of management processes.The Report-Based Analysis of GriefThe report-based description of grief provides a persuasive and rich basis for both modeling and discussing the model. The relevant features of this emotion are well characterized with reference to the self-control problem and motive-processing (though, as we shall see, to use grief as an example of those emotions that involve all or total loss of control of thought processes may provide a partially distorted view of grief itself). In particular, we would stress the relevance of the “intrusive” character of grief-related contents; the rejection of certain beliefs due to the psychic pain they cause; the coping strategies people describe; and the second order motivations related to the control of the emotional state. We believe that psychological models especially of these aspects are usually less specific and explanatory.Let us now try to synthesize some criticisms one could advance of this analysis. We will first address two core notions of the model—perturbance and self-control—and then consider more specifically the treatment of grief.PerturbanceThis notion is potentially very interesting, unless it is reduced to an information processing perspective (e.g., perturbance of attentive processes). An information processing perspective is much more limited than a motive-processing one—at least in the limitative sense of the term, as it is generally used in the psychology of cognitive processes—and is in our view insufficient for understanding human emotions and their role. This limiting interpretation of perturbance fails... (shrink)

According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any (...) phenomenal character). In this paper, I argue that the old feeling theory is in reality only a pair of modifications removed from a highly plausible account of the nature of emotion that retains the essential connection between emotion and feeling. These modifications are, moreover, motivated by recent developments in work on phenomenal consciousness. The first development is the rising recognition of a phenomenal character proper to cognition—so-called cognitive phenomenology. The second is the gathering momentum behind various ‘connection principles’ that specify some connection that a given state must bear to phenomenally conscious states in order to qualify as mental. These developments make it possible to formulate a new feeling theory of emotion, which would overcome the two fatal drawbacks of the old feeling theory. According to the new feeling theory, an emotion is a mental state that bears the right connection to conscious experiences with the right phenomenal character (involving, among other elements, a cognitive phenomenology). (shrink)

One of the significant courses in Chinese universities is English. This course is usually taught by a foreign language instructor. There will, however, necessarily be some communication hurdles between “foreign language teachers” and “native students.” This research presents an emotion recognition method for foreign language teachers in order to eliminate communication barriers between teachers and students and improve student learning efficiency. We discovered four factors of emotion recognition through literature analysis: smile, eye contact, gesture, and tone. We (...) believe that differences in foreign language teachers’ performance in these four areas will have an impact on students’ emotion recognition and, as a result, on their learning efficiency. The influence of the foreign language teacher’s eye contact and gestures is larger in the decision whether can improve the students’ classroom learning efficiency, according to 43 of the questionnaire data analysis. The second is the tone and smile. Our research contributes to the body of knowledge on emotion recognition in university foreign language teachers by presenting a practical method for recognizing emotion in foreign language teachers. We recommend that college foreign language teachers pay attention to eye and gesture communication with students in English classrooms based on the findings. By enriching the style of emotional expression in class, college language teachers, particularly foreign language teachers, can improve communication, and connection with students. (shrink)

Key ideas from expectation-states theory, symbolic interactionism, dramaturgical analysis, power-status theories, attribution theory, and psychoanalytic theories are combined in an effort to generate a more general theory of emotional arousal in face-to-face interaction. The level of emotional arousal in interaction is seen to reflect the degree of incongruity between expectations, including expectations for confirmation of self, and actual experiences. Such arousal involves the conversion of primary emotions into first and second-order combinations. The nature of emotional arousal is, however, (...) further complicated by the activation of defense mechanisms and attribution processes. The composite theory is formalized into a series of propositions which can serve as hypotheses for empirical tests. (shrink)

“Second-order Logic” in Anderson, C.A. and Zeleny, M., Eds. Logic, Meaning, and Computation: Essays in Memory of Alonzo Church. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. Pp. 61–76. -/- Abstract. This expository article focuses on the fundamental differences between second- order logic and first-order logic. It is written entirely in ordinary English without logical symbols. It employs second-order propositions and second-order reasoning in a natural way to illustrate the fact that second-order logic is (...) actually a familiar part of our traditional intuitive logical framework and that it is not an artificial formalism created by specialists for technical purposes. To illustrate some of the main relationships between second-order logic and first-order logic, this paper introduces basic logic, a kind of zero-order logic, which is more rudimentary than first-order and which is transcended by first-order in the same way that first-order is transcended by second-order. The heuristic effectiveness and the historical importance of second-order logic are reviewed in the context of the contemporary debate over the legitimacy of second-order logic. Rejection of second-order logic is viewed as radical: an incipient paradigm shift involving radical repudiation of a part of our scientific tradition, a tradition that is defended by classical logicians. But it is also viewed as reactionary: as being analogous to the reactionary repudiation of symbolic logic by supporters of “Aristotelian” traditional logic. But even if “genuine” logic comes to be regarded as excluding second-order reasoning, which seems less likely today than fifty years ago, its effectiveness as a heuristic instrument will remain and its importance for understanding the history of logic and mathematics will not be diminished. Second-order logic may someday be gone, but it will never be forgotten. Technical formalisms have been avoided entirely in an effort to reach a wide audience, but every effort has been made to limit the inevitable sacrifice of rigor. People who do not know second-order logic cannot understand the modern debate over its legitimacy and they are cut-off from the heuristic advantages of second-order logic. And, what may be worse, they are cut-off from an understanding of the history of logic and thus are constrained to have distorted views of the nature of the subject. As Aristotle first said, we do not understand a discipline until we have seen its development. It is a truism that a person's conceptions of what a discipline is and of what it can become are predicated on their conception of what it has been. (shrink)

Social relations are of the greatest significance for human progress and, further, the sustenance and well-being of our relationships requires emotional competence. On these grounds, this paper will draw on the work of John Macmurray in order to show that the emotions have been previously misrepresented and would benefit from education. Secondly, Daniel Goleman’s practical account of emotional education will be employed to illustrate the application of Macmurray’s position. Finally, some objections to educating the emotions will be raised and (...) countered; thus, leading to the conclusion that our development as individuals would benefit from the education of the emotions. (shrink)

Two aspects about meaning and emotion are discussed in this paper. The first, which is the main focus of this paper, addresses the semantic shaping of emotions (semanticization). It will be shown how language acquisition leads to the semantic shaping of emotions. For this purpose I will first introduce the theory of language acquisition that has been developed mainly by Michael Tomasello and also by Donald Davidson. Then I will take basic emotions into account in order to show (...) that language plays a crucial role when it comes to the shaping of emotions and how we feel. The second aspect about meaning and emotion addresses the signification that an emotion might have for a person. One could also say that this aspect addresses the meaning an emotion has for a person. This issue will only play a minor part in my investigations. (shrink)

In the human-computer interaction, electroencephalogram access for automatic emotion recognition is an effective way for robot brains to perceive human behavior. In order to improve the accuracy of the emotion recognition, a method of EEG access for emotion recognition based on a deep hybrid network was proposed in this paper. Firstly, the collected EEG was decomposed into four frequency band signals, and the multiscale sample entropy features of each frequency band were extracted. Secondly, the constructed 3D (...) MSE feature matrices were fed into a deep hybrid network for autonomous learning. The deep hybrid network was composed of a continuous convolutional neural network and hidden Markov models. Lastly, HMMs trained with multiple observation sequences were used to replace the artificial neural network classifier in the CNN, and the emotion recognition task was completed by HMM classifiers. The proposed method was applied to the DEAP dataset for emotion recognition experiments, and the average accuracy could achieve 79.77% on arousal, 83.09% on valence, and 81.83% on dominance. Compared with the latest related methods, the accuracy was improved by 0.99% on valence and 14.58% on dominance, which verified the effectiveness of the proposed method. (shrink)

Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa’s theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of (...) knowledge among social agents. Second, we offer criticism of Sosa’s integrative project. It’s not clear that reflective knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order to avoid regress, Sosa should recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that reflective knowledge has a more marginal role than Sosa seems at first sight to suggest. (shrink)

In the language of second-order logic, first- and second-order variables are distinguished syntactically and cannot be grammatically substituted. According to a prominent argument for the deployment of these languages, these substitution failures are necessary to block the derivation of paradoxes that result from attempts to generalize over predicate interpretations. I first examine previous approaches which interpret second-order sentences using expressions of natural language and argue that these approaches undermine these syntactic restrictions. I then examine (...) Williamson’s primitivist approach according to which second-order sentences are not offered readings in a previously understood language. I argue that the syntactic restrictions alone do not block the derivation of the paradox, unless they are backed by a principled reason that the language cannot be expanded to allow the grammatical substitution of first- and second- order variables. I argue that there is neither a syntactic nor a semantic principle that prohibits such an expansion. (shrink)

I discuss recent work by Ernst Fehr and his collaborators on cooperation and reciprocity. (i) Their work demonstrates conclusively the reality and importance of non-self-interested motivations. (ii) It allows for a useful distinction between trust and blind trust. (iii) It points to a category of quasi-moral norms, distinct both from social norms and moral norms. (iv) It demonstrates how social interactions can generate irrational belief formation. (v) It shows the potential of punishment for sustaining social norms and for overcoming the (...) second-order free rider problem as well as obstacles to group selection. (vi) It offers a provocative experimental basis for the ‘warm-glow’ explanation of altruistic behavior. I conclude by suggesting some experiments that might allow for further developments of the theory. (shrink)

Deryck Beyleveld has forged a theory of ethical rationalism that has made an important impact on legal and moral philosophy—that this collection of essays makes clear. He has not only refined and improved the original account developed by Alan Gewirth, but provides us with ethical rationalism’s most prolific defender today. One area of particular insight is Beyleveld’s many applications of ethical rationalism to practice and, most especially, to medical law and ethics which has been especially influential. This work has set (...) the bar for all proponents and critics alike. -/- We focus narrowly on a specific concern that we have with ethical rationalism: its primacy of rationality over other characteristics, such as our emotions. This is not to deny the importance of reason in our thinking about law and ethical concerns. But we have concerns with any view that holds that reason is the only key to how any tensions should be resolved. Such a position claims for reason a privileged status it does not have or merit. One problem for us is that, in our view, ethical rationalism does not appear to adequately consider the importance of emotions and so it does not provide a satisfactory account of law and morality as a result. We examine this concern in the first part of our chapter. -/- This chapter’s second part raises concerns with the application of ethical rationalism as a model for understanding sexual offences. We highlight both the need to foreground emotion in order to understand the current law, as well as the dangers from a normative perspective of appearing to marginalise the role of emotion in sexual offences. Not only would a prioritisation of rationality fail to reflect the role emotion can play in current rape law, but we would argue, is particularly problematic in this area of law in terms of promoting justice. In summary, Beyleveld’s ethical rationalism exercises an important impact on legal theory and legal practices. Nonetheless, we raise some reservations about its connection to these impacts that lead us to support revisions to this approach. (shrink)

This study explores the social representations of cloning taking in consideration a series of associated emotions and the subjects' level of religiosity. The participants in our study consisted of 356 subjects of different ages and professions. The data collection included four tasks for the subjects to fill in. First, they had to fill in a free task association: starting from the stimulus-word „cloning" they had to associate five words or expressions, and then rank these five words according to their importance. (...) The second task required polarity association for each of the expressions; thus, the subjects had to evaluate them as positive, negative or neutral in relation to „cloning". The third task was a questionnaire evaluating the level of religiosity (28 items). The last task included a list of 35 emotions (positive as well as negative) which subjects had to associate on a scale from 1 to 10 with the bio-medical procedure of cloning. The data analysis was focused on comparing the different groups defined in relation to the level of religiosity, affective polarity, age and level of education. We used the prototipicality technique, developed in the framework of the social representation's theory, in order to identify the elements of the social representations of cloning belonging to the previously mentioned variables. . (shrink)

Two putative functions of emotion experience — its roles in intentional action and in social understanding — were investigated using a group of individuals (repressors) known to have impaired anxiety experience. Repressors, low-anxious, high-anxious, and defensive high-anxious individuals were asked to give a public presentation, and then given the opportunity to avoid the presentation. Repressors were the group most likely to avoid giving the presentation, but were the least likely to give an emotional explanation for their avoidance. By contrast, (...) they were not less likely than other groups to provide negative emotional explanations of another person’s behaviour in a film clip. We concluded that: (1) repressors are impaired in self- but not in other-explanation using emotion, implying that “simulation” is not the method used by repressors to ground their folk psychology, (2) the intentional avoidance shown by repressors is indicative of some intact first-order phenomenal anxiety experience but that they lack second-order awareness of this anxiety experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.1 (2003) 39-47 [Access article in PDF] Restraint and Emotion in Cicero's De Oratore Per Fjelstad In De Oratore Cicero has the revered orator Crassus ask, "Who then is the man who gives people a thrill? whom do they stare at in amazement when he speaks? who is interrupted by applause? who is thought to be so to say a god among men?" (1942a, III.53). (...) Crassus, who is asking his companions to think about emotional energy in speech, goes on, "It is those whose speeches are clear, explicit, and full, perspicuous in matter and language, and who in actual delivery achieve a sort of rhythm and cadence—that is, whose style I call 'ornate'."Several things are striking about the passage. First, it resolves its inquiry by invoking the concept of ornatus, a word widely used to translate the Greek idea of kosmos (DiLorenzo 1978). Cicero thus refers to a quality that joins the ideas of cosmic order, physical beauty, and earthly power. Second, the passage is delivered in the midst of Crassus's discussion of the fourth rhetorical canon, that referring to the elaboration of ideas in language, of selecting levels of style and modes of verbal embellishment. Third, the passage ranges across the entire field of rhetorical art, at least as indexed by the scope of the canons. The performative quality directly under discussion, that which gives people a thrill—initially associated with the Theophrastian virtues of style that Crassus has been enumerating, that is, clarity and explicitness—quickly is expanded to include copiousness of invention, perspicuity of language, and energetic beauty in delivery. Cicero's Crassus thus discusses a performative dynamic that appears to govern rhetoric as a whole.As the other characters in the dialogue discuss this quality of speech, which engages listeners emotionally and transforms their experience of the present, they bound beyond the preliminary categories of their analysis and describe a power of speech that is aesthetic and philosophical. As the [End Page 39] narrator of this dialogue, Cicero eventually associates the possibility of emotional transformation with a quality of performance we might identify as graceful or urbane. Cicero suggests that performative style can rise above particular details, conventions, and rules of standard rhetorical instruction. Ornate speech is, in sum, emotionally transformative. In detail, however, how does Cicero theorize this grand ability? What goals, resources, or models does he invoke?This essay argues that Cicero's theory of ornatus insists an orator display emotions relevant to the performance while responding to the need of listeners to hear emotional expression against a backdrop of relative calm. In developing this analysis, I claim that the dialogic format of De Oratore allows insight to emerge from juxtaposed perspectives, that Cicero's ideal of ornatus contains a limiting threshold for performative exuberance, and that his examples of emotional engagement illustrate the importance of context and aesthetic restraint. Theoretical tensions as sources for synthetic insight Theoretical tensions in Cicero's De Oratore are instructive. While Cicero's effort to reconcile Isocratean practice with Aristotelian teleology ultimately makes for a rough fit, the juxtaposition of those understandings within the dialogue also generates new insight, even about limits for rhetorical theory itself. Referring to this mode of theorizing as "ironic eloquence," Michael Leff holds that "through this merger of theory and practice, the rival conceptions of oratory as systematic art and oratory as synthetic practice coalesce within the text, the two perspectives interacting to produce a development that incorporates both" (1986, 323).A similar theoretical tension can be observed in De Oratore regarding the prospects and significance of emotional engagement in oratorical performance. In discussing the practices of emotional oratory Cicero draws on three distinct intellectual sources: a quasi-enthymematic model of emotional engagement, in which an orator need not share or display the sought-after emotional response; a mimetic theory of theatrical performance (that is, a typology of tonal and gestural "moods"); and a latent theory of "authenticity," according to which that which is being theatrically displayed is not "fakely" fictional, but somehow genuine.The conflicting theories suggest... (shrink)

This article presents the analysis of the main Spanish political candidates for the elections to be held on April 2019. The analysis focuses on the Facial Expression Analysis, a technique widely used in neuromarketing research. It allows to identify the micro-expressions that are very brief, involuntary. They are signals of hidden emotions that cannot be controlled voluntarily. The video with the final interventions of every candidate has been post-processed using the classification algorithms given by the iMotions's AFFDEX platform. We have (...) then analyzed these data. Firstly, we have identified and compare the basic emotions showed by each politician. Second, we have associated the basic emotions with specific moments of the candidate's speech, identifying the topics they address and relating them directly to the expressed emotion. Third, we have analyzed whether the differences shown by each candidate in every emotion are statistically significant. In this sense, we have applied the non-parametric chi-squared goodness-of-fit test. We have also considered the ANOVA analysis in order to test whether, on average, there are differences between the candidates. Finally, we have checked if there is consistency between the results provided by different surveys from the main media in Spain regarding the evaluation of the debate and those obtained in our empirical analysis. A predominance of negative emotions has been observed. Some inconsistencies were found between the emotion expressed in the facial expression and the verbal content of the message. Also, evidences got from statistical analysis confirm that the differences observed between the various candidates with respect to the basic emotions, on average, are statistically significant. In this sense, this article provides a methodological contribution to the analysis of the public figures' communication, which could help politicians to improve the effectiveness of their messages identifying and evaluating the intensity of the expressed emotions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.1 (2003) 39-47 [Access article in PDF] Restraint and Emotion in Cicero's De Oratore Per Fjelstad In De Oratore Cicero has the revered orator Crassus ask, "Who then is the man who gives people a thrill? whom do they stare at in amazement when he speaks? who is interrupted by applause? who is thought to be so to say a god among men?" (1942a, III.53). (...) Crassus, who is asking his companions to think about emotional energy in speech, goes on, "It is those whose speeches are clear, explicit, and full, perspicuous in matter and language, and who in actual delivery achieve a sort of rhythm and cadence—that is, whose style I call 'ornate'."Several things are striking about the passage. First, it resolves its inquiry by invoking the concept of ornatus, a word widely used to translate the Greek idea of kosmos (DiLorenzo 1978). Cicero thus refers to a quality that joins the ideas of cosmic order, physical beauty, and earthly power. Second, the passage is delivered in the midst of Crassus's discussion of the fourth rhetorical canon, that referring to the elaboration of ideas in language, of selecting levels of style and modes of verbal embellishment. Third, the passage ranges across the entire field of rhetorical art, at least as indexed by the scope of the canons. The performative quality directly under discussion, that which gives people a thrill—initially associated with the Theophrastian virtues of style that Crassus has been enumerating, that is, clarity and explicitness—quickly is expanded to include copiousness of invention, perspicuity of language, and energetic beauty in delivery. Cicero's Crassus thus discusses a performative dynamic that appears to govern rhetoric as a whole.As the other characters in the dialogue discuss this quality of speech, which engages listeners emotionally and transforms their experience of the present, they bound beyond the preliminary categories of their analysis and describe a power of speech that is aesthetic and philosophical. As the [End Page 39] narrator of this dialogue, Cicero eventually associates the possibility of emotional transformation with a quality of performance we might identify as graceful or urbane. Cicero suggests that performative style can rise above particular details, conventions, and rules of standard rhetorical instruction. Ornate speech is, in sum, emotionally transformative. In detail, however, how does Cicero theorize this grand ability? What goals, resources, or models does he invoke?This essay argues that Cicero's theory of ornatus insists an orator display emotions relevant to the performance while responding to the need of listeners to hear emotional expression against a backdrop of relative calm. In developing this analysis, I claim that the dialogic format of De Oratore allows insight to emerge from juxtaposed perspectives, that Cicero's ideal of ornatus contains a limiting threshold for performative exuberance, and that his examples of emotional engagement illustrate the importance of context and aesthetic restraint. Theoretical tensions as sources for synthetic insight Theoretical tensions in Cicero's De Oratore are instructive. While Cicero's effort to reconcile Isocratean practice with Aristotelian teleology ultimately makes for a rough fit, the juxtaposition of those understandings within the dialogue also generates new insight, even about limits for rhetorical theory itself. Referring to this mode of theorizing as "ironic eloquence," Michael Leff holds that "through this merger of theory and practice, the rival conceptions of oratory as systematic art and oratory as synthetic practice coalesce within the text, the two perspectives interacting to produce a development that incorporates both" (1986, 323).A similar theoretical tension can be observed in De Oratore regarding the prospects and significance of emotional engagement in oratorical performance. In discussing the practices of emotional oratory Cicero draws on three distinct intellectual sources: a quasi-enthymematic model of emotional engagement, in which an orator need not share or display the sought-after emotional response; a mimetic theory of theatrical performance (that is, a typology of tonal and gestural "moods"); and a latent theory of "authenticity," according to which that which is being theatrically displayed is not "fakely" fictional, but somehow genuine.The conflicting theories suggest... (shrink)

Are there are normative reasons to have – or refrain from having – certain emotions? The dominant view is that there are. I disagree. In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism – the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that agent’s deliberation to (...) that attitude. My argument for this premise is that in order to have reasons for an attitude, we need to be able to exhibit some relevant form of control over this attitude, and this relevant form of control is deliberative control. The second premise is that no one can deliberate to any emotion. My argument for this premise turns on the claim that there is no deliberative question that is settled by forming (or giving up) an emotion. I contend that this is so due to the well-known phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions: for any deliberative question that can be settled, there is no guarantee that the relevant emotional state will follow (or be revised). Strong Eliminativism follows from these two premises. (shrink)

I present an argument for the existence of nonconceptual states. A nonconceptual state is an intentional state which does not require the bearer to possess all requisite concepts in order to represent the state. I frame the debate by outlining two constraints that an argument for nonconceptuality should meet. First, successful argument must present a platitude of concepts and illustrate that there are intentional states which both actually violate this platitude and explain behavior independently of conceptual states. This ensures (...) that the notion of nonconceptuality established by the argument will have a significant part in the explanatory arsenal of the intentional psychologist. Secondly, I formulate a platitude of concepts based on the intuition that an individual can only legitimately be held responsible for behavior caused by conceptual states. After qualifying the platitude, I argue that emotional states actually violate the platitude and meet the necessary constraints. Finally, I defend my argument against two challenges: one which denies that the empirical constraint has been met and the other which denies that the robustness constraint has been met. I conclude my discussion with some general remarks on the nature of nonconceptual representation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's ‘Rhetoric’ to Modern Brain ScienceMichael J. HydeThe Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle's ‘Rhetoric’ to Modern Brain Science. Daniel M. Gross. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. Pp. x + 194. $35.00, Hardcover.The twofold goal of this book is clearly stated by its author: "to reconstitute by way of critical intellectual history a deeply nuanced, rhetorical understanding of (...) class='Hi'>emotion that prevailed until the triumph of psychophysiology; second, to show by way of literary and philosophical example how this rhetorical perspective helps us read anew the emotional complex of modernity, whether early or late" (8). Gross' appreciation of the function of emotion emphasizes a phenomenological orientation that is inspired by Martin Heidegger's unpublished 1924 lecture course on Aristotle's Rhetoric. Gross recently co-edited with Ansgar Kemmann a book of original essays dedicated to a critical assessment of this lecture course (Gross and Kemmann 2006). In concluding her contribution to the book, the well-known Renaissance scholar Nancy S. Struever maintains that the course "remains, arguably, the best twentieth-century reading of Aristotle's Rhetoric" (Struever 2006: 127). Gross advances this reading with his creative and insightful assessment of his topic.This advance unfolds as Gross, abiding by phenomenology's well-known critique of the matter, takes issue with the reductive psychophysiology of emotion that Descartes first proposed and that informs latter-day sciences of the mind and the brain. Gross turns to the research program of the distinguished cognitive scientist Antonio Damasio as a way of arguing "how brain science of emotion goes awry when it blunders into social fact" (29). The reductionism of science, in other words, misses the forest for the trees. Admitting that Damasio is open to inquiries outside the boundaries of neurobiology, Gross nevertheless takes particular issue with Damasio's model for such a project: Edward O. Wilson's, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. Indeed, Wilson never gives rhetoric a nod when he acknowledges the worth of the humanities in his book.This slight, coming from Wilson, Damasio, and other scientists, fuels Gross's enthusiasm for turning to Aristotle's analysis of the pathe in book two of the Rhetoric. With Aristotle's discussion of "anger" in mind, for example, Gross emphasizes how we live in "a contoured world of emotional investments, where some people have significantly more liabilities than others" (3). [End Page 326]The point warrants elaboration: "The contours of our emotional world have been shaped by institutions such as slavery and poverty that simply afford some people greater emotional range than others, as they are shaped by publicity that has nothing to do with the inherent values of each human life and everything to do with technologies of social recognition and blindness" (4). Gross links this Aristotelian based social-psychological insight with such early modern philosophers, psychologists, and cultural critics as Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, William Perfect, and then with such contemporary intellectuals as Judith Butler. Gross' discussion of this linkage enables him to argue a key point in his overall project: the constitutive power of emotions depends not on how the social passions originate in a moral sense equally shared by all, but rather on the "uneven distribution" of these passions in our social and political lives.Gross makes much of how the rhetoric of this uneven distribution is at work in such particular cases as Aristotle's apathetic slave, Seneca's angry tyrant, Hobbes's resentful preacher, Sarah Fielding's humble hero, and Adam Smith's compassionate spectator. Gross's intellectual acumen shines as he weaves together these cases and expands on their implications for developing a rhetorical understanding of emotion. For example, in chapter three ("Virtues of Passivity in the English Civil War"), Gross offers a critical assessment of Michael Walzer's classic The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics in order to show how the emotional makeup of passivity, too often "relegated to a diminished femininity" (87), not only informs the virtue of humility, but also helps it serve rhetorically "the most dramatic revolutionary ends" (110). Additional extended case studies emphasize the specific emotions of apathy, pride, pity... (shrink)

This paper has two aims. First, it raises the issue whether and how contractarian political theory can justify political obligations toward some particular political authority. Second, it attempts to draw some brief conclusion from this regarding the prospect of Europe as a political community. The paper argues that there is a common assumption to almost all contemporary versions of contractarian political theory which must be dropped in order to make room for the contractarian justification of such obligations. The (...) assumption of mutual unconcern seems to make it impossible for such theories to rationally justify particular obligations towards a particular political authority. I suggest that this limitation can be theoretically overcome. But I also suggest that the feeling of mutual concern of citizens towards each other is a necessary condition of their rationally justifiable obligations towards the decisions of a political authority. The development of this social emotion is a precondition of Europe as a political community. (shrink)

In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most ardent supporters of moral responsibility (...) acknowledge that the arguments in its favor are far from conclusive; and some of the least confident concerning the arguments for moral responsibility—such as Van Inwagen—are most confident of the truth of moral responsibility. Thus, argues Waller, whatever the verdict on the strength of philosophical arguments for moral responsibility, it is clear that belief in moral responsibility—whether among philosophers or the folk—is based on something other than philosophical reasons. -/- He goes on to argue that there are several sources for the strong belief in moral responsibility, but the following four are particularly influential: First, moral responsibility is based in a powerful “strike back” emotion that we share with other animals. Second, there is a deep-rooted “belief in a just world”—a belief that, according to Waller, most philosophers reject when they consciously consider it, but which has a deep nonconscious influence on what we regard as just treatment and which provides subtle (but mistaken) support for belief in moral responsibility. Third, there is a pervasive moral responsibility system—extending over criminal justice as well as “common sense”—that makes the truth of moral responsibility seem obvious, and makes challenges to moral responsibility seem incoherent. Finally, there is the enormous confidence we have in the power of reason, which mistakenly leads us to believe that our conscious, rational, and critically reflective selves are constantly guiding our behavior in accordance with our deep values. -/- In these comments, I would like to discuss the many points of agreement I have with Waller, providing along the way additional fuel for his skeptical fire (i.e., his moral responsibility skepticism and his skeptical analysis of the source of our strong belief in moral responsibility). I will also discuss, however, my one main point of disagreement—i.e., his desire to preserve the conception of free will. Waller believes free will can “flourish” in the absence of moral responsibility (see Ch.8), while I maintain they that the variety of free will that is of central philosophical and practical importance is the sort required for moral responsibility in a particular but pervasive sense. This sense of moral responsibility is set apart by the notion of basic desert and is purely backward-looking and non-consequentialist (see Pereboom 2001, 2014; Caruso and Morris, forthcoming). Understood this way, the sort of free will at issue in the historical debate is a kind of power or ability an agent must possess in order to justify certain kinds of desert-based judgments, attitudes, or treatments in response to decisions or actions that the agent performed or failed to perform. (shrink)