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Results for ', Kantian Maxim, Sinnott-Armstrong, Self-Imposed Impossibility, Time-Indexed Maxim, Zimmerman'
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- 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and the Argument from Self-Imposed Impossibility: a Critical Examination.Mostofa N. Mansur - 2013 - Copula 30:12.Defenders of the Kantian maxim, i.e. ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, defend the maxim taking the term “implication” in the sense of ‘entailment’. But if it is granted that “implication” means entailment, then it can be shown that the Kantian maxim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is false. Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to prove the falsity of the maxim by his argument from Self-Imposed Impossibility in which he offers his famous example of Adams. But Sinnott-Armstrong’s example of Adams appears (...)No categories
- Hypnotizing Libet: Readiness potentials with non-conscious volition.Alexander Schlegel, Prescott Alexander, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse & Thalia Wheatley - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33 (C):196-203.The readiness potential (RP) is one of the most controversial topics in neuroscience and philosophy due to its perceived relevance to the role of conscious willing in action. Libet and colleagues reported that RP onset precedes both volitional movement and conscious awareness of willing that movement, suggesting that the experience of conscious will may not cause volitional movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Rather, they suggested that the RP indexes unconscious processes that may actually cause both volitional movement and (...)
- Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research Integrity: Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. 31 May - 3 June 2015.Lex Bouter, Melissa S. Anderson, Ana Marusic, Sabine Kleinert, Susan Zimmerman, Paulo S. L. Beirão, Laura Beranzoli, Giuseppe Di Capua, Silvia Peppoloni, Maria Betânia de Freitas Marques, Adriana Sousa, Claudia Rech, Torunn Ellefsen, Adele Flakke Johannessen, Jacob Holen, Raymond Tait, Jillon Van der Wall, John Chibnall, James M. DuBois, Farida Lada, Jigisha Patel, Stephanie Harriman, Leila Posenato Garcia, Adriana Nascimento Sousa, Cláudia Maria Correia Borges Rech, Oliveira Patrocínio, Raphaela Dias Fernandes, Laressa Lima Amâncio, Anja Gillis, David Gallacher, David Malwitz, Tom Lavrijssen, Mariusz Lubomirski, Malini Dasgupta, Katie Speanburg, Elizabeth C. Moylan, Maria K. Kowalczuk, Nikolas Offenhauser, Markus Feufel, Niklas Keller, Volker Bähr, Diego Oliveira Guedes, Douglas Leonardo Gomes Filho, Vincent Larivière, Rodrigo Costas, Daniele Fanelli, Mark William Neff, Aline Carolina de Oliveira Machado Prata, Limbanazo Matandika, Sonia Maria Ramos de Vasconcelos & Karina de A. Rocha - 2016 - Research Integrity and Peer Review 1 (Suppl 1).Table of contentsI1 Proceedings of the 4th World Conference on Research IntegrityConcurrent Sessions:1. Countries' systems and policies to foster research integrityCS01.1 Second time around: Implementing and embedding a review of responsible conduct of research policy and practice in an Australian research-intensive universitySusan Patricia O'BrienCS01.2 Measures to promote research integrity in a university: the case of an Asian universityDanny Chan, Frederick Leung2. Examples of research integrity education programmes in different countriesCS02.1 Development of a state-run “cyber education program of research ethics” (...)No categories
- I’m not the person I used to be: The self and autobiographical memories of immoral actions.Matthew L. Stanley, Paul Henne, Vijeth Iyengar, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Psychology. General 146 (6):884-895.People maintain a positive identity in at least two ways: They evaluate themselves more favorably than other people, and they judge themselves to be better now than they were in the past. Both strategies rely on autobiographical memories. The authors investigate the role of autobiographical memories of lying and emotional harm in maintaining a positive identity. For memories of lying to or emotionally harming others, participants judge their own actions as less morally wrong and less negative than those in which (...)
- Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study.Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To account for these (...)
- Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.All contentious moral issues--from gay marriage to abortion and affirmative action--raise difficult questions about the justification of moral beliefs. How can we be justified in holding on to our own moral beliefs while recognizing that other intelligent people feel quite differently and that many moral beliefs are distorted by self-interest and by corrupt cultures? Even when almost everyone agrees--e.g. that experimental surgery without consent is immoral--can we know that such beliefs are true? If so, how? These profound questions lead (...)
- Blame, not ability, impacts moral “ought” judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of “ought” implies “can”.Vladimir Chituc, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2016 - Cognition 150 (C):20-25.Recently, psychologists have explored moral concepts including obligation, blame, and ability. While little empirical work has studied the relationships among these concepts, philosophers have widely assumed such a relationship in the principle that “ought” implies “can,” which states that if someone ought to do something, then they must be able to do it. The cognitive underpinnings of these concepts are tested in the three experiments reported here. In Experiment 1, most participants judge that an agent ought to keep a promise (...)
- How strong is this obligation? An argument for consequentialism from concomitant variation.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):438-442.The rule ‘Keep your promises’ is often presented as a challenge to consequentialism, because the ground of your moral obligation not to break a promise seems to lie in the past fact that you made the promise, which is not a consequence of the act. A different picture emerges, however, when we move beyond the question of whether you have any moral obligation at all to the related question of how strong that obligation is.If I promise to meet you and (...)
- Moral knowledge?: new readings in moral epistemology.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, Robert Audi, Richard Brandt, and Simon (...)
- How Stable are Moral Judgments?Paul Rehren & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1377-1403.Psychologists and philosophers often work hand in hand to investigate many aspects of moral cognition. In this paper, we want to highlight one aspect that to date has been relatively neglected: the stability of moral judgment over time. After explaining why philosophers and psychologists should consider stability and then surveying previous research, we will present the results of an original three-wave longitudinal study. We asked participants to make judgments about the same acts in a series of sacrificial dilemmas three (...)
- Some ethics of deep brain stimulation.Joshua August Skorburg & Walter Sinnott Armstrong - 2020 - In Dan Stein & Ilina Singh (eds.), Global Mental Health and Neuroethics. London, UK: pp. 117-132.Case reports about patients undergoing Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) for various motor and psychiatric disorders - including Parkinson’s Disease, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and Treatment Resistant Depression - have sparked a vast literature in neuroethics. Questions about whether and how DBS changes the self have been at the fore. The present chapter brings these neuroethical debates into conversation with recent research in moral psychology. We begin in Section 1 by reviewing the recent clinical literature on DBS. In Section 2, we (...)
- Which features of patients are morally relevant in ventilator triage? A survey of the UK public.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Hazem Zohny, Julian Savulescu, Dominic Wilkinson, Vincent Conitzer, Jana Schaich Borg & Lok Chan - 2022 - BMC Medical Ethics 23 (1):1-14.BackgroundIn the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, many health systems, including those in the UK, developed triage guidelines to manage severe shortages of ventilators. At present, there is an insufficient understanding of how the public views these guidelines, and little evidence on which features of a patient the public believe should and should not be considered in ventilator triage.MethodsTwo surveys were conducted with representative UK samples. In the first survey, 525 participants were asked in an open-ended format to provide (...)No categories
- Moral Psychology, Volume V: Virtue and Character.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Christian Miller (eds.) - 2017 - MIT Press.Philosophers have discussed virtue and character since Socrates, but many traditional views have been challenged by recent findings in psychology and neuroscience. This fifth volume of Moral Psychology grows out of this new wave of interdisciplinary work on virtue, vice, and character. It offers essays, commentaries, and replies by leading philosophers and scientists who explain and use empirical findings from psychology and neuroscience to illuminate virtue and character and related issues in moral philosophy. The contributors discuss such topics as eliminativist (...)
- Replies to Dreier and McNaughton.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (3):218-228.I very much appreciate the time and care that Jamie Dreier and David McNaughton put into my book, Moral Skepticisms. Their comments raise profound and challenging issues that I cannot treat adequately here. All I can hope to do is point to some directions in which further discussion should proceed.
- Killing versus totally disabling: a reply to critics.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Franklin G. Miller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):12-14.We are very grateful to the commentators for taking the time to respond to our little article, ‘What Makes Killing Wrong?’ They raise many points, so we cannot respond to them all, but we do want to head off a few misinterpretations.Our critics in this journal avoid one careless misinterpretation, but less informed readers have pressed this misinterpretation in popular venues, so we need to start by renouncing it. We do not deny that killing humans is morally wrong. To (...)
- Moral Knowledge New Readings.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.In Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven newly written essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The first chapter, written by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, provides a framework for understanding the basic (...)
- Scrupulosity and Moral Responsibility.Jesse Summers & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2022 - In Matt King & Joshua May (eds.), Agency in Mental Disorder: Philosophical Dimensions. Oxford University Press.Scrupulosity is a form of OCD where patients obsess about morality and sometimes compulsively confess or atone. It involves chronic doubt and anxiety as well as deviant moral judgments. This chapter argues that Scrupulosity is a mental illness and that its distortion of moral judgments undermines, or at least reduces, patients’ moral responsibility. The authors go on to argue that this condition challenges popular deep-self theories of responsibility, which assert that one is only blameworthy or praiseworthy for actions that (...)
- Responsibility for forgetting.Samuel Murray, Elise D. Murray, Gregory Stewart, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1177-1201.In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing (...)
- Cell and Psyche - The Biology of Purpose.Edmund Ware Sinnott - 2008 - Read Books.CELL AND PSYCHE THE BIOLOGY OF PURPOSE By EDMUND W. SINNOTT. PREFACE TO THE TORCHBOOK EDITION: SINCE the publication of this little book, as the McNair Lectures at the University of North Carolina, the author has written two others, as well as a number of papers, on the same gen eral theme. Though these elaborate the argument a little further, the essence of it is in Cell and Psyche. This is admittedly a specula tion, but one based solidly on (...)
- Paul Bloomfield.Diana Meyers, Joel Kupperman, Margaret Gilbert, Sonia Michel & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Albert A. Anderson, Steven V. Hicks, and Lech Witkowski, eds., Mythos and Logos. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2004, 268 pp.(indexed). ISBN 90-420-1020, $73.00 (pb). Kevin Bales, Disposable People. Berkley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2004, 298 pp.(indexed). ISBN 0-520-24384-6, $17.95 (pb). [REVIEW]Mark Coeckelbergh, Mark T. Conard, Aeon J. Skoble, William Lane Craig & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39:139-141.No categoriesExport citation
Bookmark - Making moral principles suit yourself.Matthew Stanley, Paul Henne, Laura Niemi, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2021 - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 1.Normative ethical theories and religious traditions offer general moral principles for people to follow. These moral principles are typically meant to be fixed and rigid, offering reliable guides for moral judgment and decision-making. In two preregistered studies, we found consistent evidence that agreement with general moral principles shifted depending upon events recently accessed in memory. After recalling their own personal violations of moral principles, participants agreed less strongly with those very principles—relative to participants who recalled events in which other people (...)
- Self-verification and the content of thought.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):59 - 75.Descartes famously argued, on purely conceptual grounds, that even an extremely powerful being could not trick him into mistakenly judging that he was thinking. Of course, it is not necessarily true that Descartes is thinking. Still, Descartes claimed, it is necessarily true that if a person judges that she is thinking, that person is thinking. Following Tyler Burge (1988) we call such judgments ‘self-verifying.’ More exactly, a judgment j performed by a subject S at a time t is (...)
- Some Varieties of Particularism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2):1-12.Analytic particularism claims that judgments of moral wrongness are about particular acts rather than general principles. Metaphysical particularism claims that what makes true moral judgments true is not general principles but nonmoral properties of particular acts. Epistemological particularism claims that studying particular acts apart from general principles can justify beliefs in moral judgments. Methodological particularism claims that we will do better morally in everyday life if we look carefully at each particular decision as it arises and give up the search (...)
- Moral Relativity and Intuitionism.Walter Sinnott–Armstrong - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):305 - 328.
- Abstract + concrete = paradox.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - In Joshua Michael Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (1):163-166.No categories
- Understanding arguments: an introduction to informal logic.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2015 - Australia: Cengage Learning. Edited by Robert J. Fogelin.ADVANGEBOOKS - UNDERSTANDING ARGUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFORMAL LOGIC, 9E shows readers how to construct arguments in everyday life, using everyday language. In addition, this easy-to-read textbook also devotes three chapters to the formal aspects of logic including forms of argument, as well as propositional, categorical, and quantificational logic. Plus, this edition helps readers apply informal logic to legal, moral, scientific, religious, and philosophical scenarios, too. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not (...)No categories
- Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):281-289.An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
- Studying Kanonbildung: An Exercise in a Distant Reading of Contemporary Self-descriptions of the 19th Century German Philosophy.Maxim Demin & Alexei Kouprianov - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (2):112-127.In 19th century Germany, the number of publications in the history of philosophy increased dramatically. According to Ulrich Schneider’s calculations, from 1810 through 1899, 148 original textbooks by 114 authors were published in German. The aim of this article is to analyse how the documented in these publications canonic vision of 19th century German philosophy evolved. An analysis of 66 treatises published from 1802 through 1918 allows dividing 19th century philosophers into groups based on the frequency of their names across (...)
- Unity and sameness of self as depicted in being and time.Michael E. Zimmerman - 1975 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 6 (3):157-167.
- “Mpp, Rip” Rip.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (2):125-131.No categories
- Modality, morality, and belief: essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher (eds.) - 1995 - New York: Cambridge University Press.Modality, morality and belief are among the most controversial topics in philosophy today, and few philosophers have shaped these debates as deeply as Ruth Barcan Marcus. Inspired by her work, a distinguished group of philosophers explore these issues, refine and sharpen arguments and develop new positions on such topics as possible worlds, moral dilemmas, essentialism, and the explanation of actions by beliefs. This 'state of the art' collection honours one of the most rigorous and iconoclastic of philosophical pioneers.
- Expanding the Duty to Rescue to Climate Migration.David N. Hoffman, Anne Zimmerman, Camille Castelyn & Srajana Kaikini - 2022 - Voices in Bioethics 8.Photo by Jonathan Ford on Unsplash ABSTRACT Since 2008, an average of twenty million people per year have been displaced by weather events. Climate migration creates a special setting for a duty to rescue. A duty to rescue is a moral rather than legal duty and imposes on a bystander to take an active role in preventing serious harm to someone else. This paper analyzes the idea of expanding a duty to rescue to climate migration. We address who should have (...)No categories
- God Inside Time and Before Creation.Dean Zimmerman - 2002 - In Gregory E. Ganssle & David M. Woodruff (eds.), God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature. Oxford Up. pp. 75--94.Many theists reject the notion that God’s eternity consists in his timelessness — i.e., in his lacking temporal extension and failing to possess properties at any times. Some of these “divine temporalists” hold that, for philosophical reasons, it is impossible to accept both the timelessness of God and the view that God knows what happens at different times and brings about events in time. 1 Many reject divine timelessness as a dubious import from Platonism with no biblical or theological (...)
- Brain Images as Legal Evidence.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):359-373.This paper explores whether brain images may be admitted as evidence in criminal trials under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which weighs probative value against the danger of being prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to fact finders. The paper summarizes and evaluates recent empirical research relevant to these issues. We argue that currently the probative value of neuroimages for criminal responsibility is minimal, and there is some evidence of their potential to be prejudicial or misleading. We also propose experiments that will (...)
- Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Oxford University Press USA.Provides a comprehensive introduction to the major philosophical theories attempting to explain the workings of language.
- The great transformation: the beginning of our religious traditions.Karen Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Knopf.In the ninth century BCE, the peoples of four distinct regions of the civilized world created the religious and philosophical traditions that have continued to nourish humanity to the present day: Confucianism and Daoism in China, Hinduism and Buddhism in India, monotheism in Israel, and philosophical rationalism in Greece. Later generations further developed these initial insights, but we have never grown beyond them. Rabbinic Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, for example, were all secondary flowerings of the original Israelite vision. Now, in (...)
- The Transcendental Claim of Deconstruction.Maxime Doyon - 2014 - In Zeynep Direk & Leonard Lawlor (eds.), A Companion to Derrida. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 132–149.Most twentieth‐century European philosophers have attempted to think anew the Kantian question about the necessary conditions of experience. A rapid survey of last century's European philosophy would easily show that in spite of the various criticisms formulated against the very project of transcendental foundationalism, the vast majority of the philosophers in the so‐called Continental tradition have not abandoned the project of formulating transcendental arguments altogether. These transcendental inquiries into the conditions of possibility of all these phenomena are certainly more (...)No categories
- Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- What is Consequentialism? A Reply to Howard-Snyder.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2001 - Utilitas 13 (3):342.If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that this argument (...)
- Can psychopathic offenders discern moral wrongs? A new look at the moral/conventional distinction.E. Aharoni, W. Sinnott-Armstrong & K. A. Kiehl - 2012 - Journal of Abnormal Psychology 121 (2):484-497..A prominent view of psychopathic moral reasoning suggests that psychopathic individuals cannot properly distinguish between moral wrongs and other types of wrongs. The present study evaluated this view by examining the extent to which 109 incarcerated offenders with varying degrees of psychopathy could distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions relative to each other and to nonincarcerated healthy controls. Using a modified version of the classic Moral/Conventional Transgressions task that uses a forced-choice format to minimize strategic responding, the present study found (...)
- Are moral judgments unified?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Thalia Wheatley - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):451-474.Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not unified on any of these levels and that moral (...)
- The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus ed. by Lloyd P. Gerson and James Wilberding.Brandon Zimmerman - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (2):349-351.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus ed. by Lloyd P. Gerson and James WilberdingBrandon ZimmermanGERSON, Lloyd P. and James Wilberding, editors. The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. xxiv + 471 pp. Cloth, $105.00; paper, $34.99The original 1996 Cambridge Companion to Plotinus had the advantage of being one of the few systematic studies of Plotinus available and was able to recruit some of the (...)
- Is Morality Unified? Evidence that Distinct Neural Systems Underlie Moral Judgments of Harm, Dishonesty, and Disgust.Carolyn Parkinson, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Philipp E. Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Victoria McGeer & Thalia Wheatley - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (10):3162-3180.Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether "moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment ofmoral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences (...)
- Moral dilemmas.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1988 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.A strong tradition in philosophy denies the possibility of moral dilemmas. Recently, several philosophers reversed this tradition. In this dissertation, I clarify some fundamental issues in this debate, argue for the possibility of moral dilemmas, and determine some implications of this possibility. ;In chapter I, I define moral dilemmas roughly as situations where an agent morally ought to adopt each of two alternatives but cannot adopt both. Moral dilemmas are resolvable if and only if one of the moral oughts overrides (...)
- The critique of natural rights and the search for a non-anthropocentric basis for moral behavior.Michael E. Zimmerman - 1985 - Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (1):43-53.MacIntyre, Clark, and Heidegger would all agree that the current problem with moral theory is its lack of a satisfactory conception of human telos. This lack leads us to resort to such fictions as rights, interests, and utility, which are “disguises for the will to power.” Ibid., p. 240. These thinkers would also agree that modern nation-states are cut off from the roots of the Western tradition. Modern political economy, with “its individualism, its acquisitiveness and its elevation of the values (...)
- Begging the question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.No topic in informal logic is more important than begging the question. Also, none is more subtle or complex. We cannot even begin to understand the fallacy of begging the question without getting clear about arguments, their purposes, and circularity. So I will discuss these preliminary topics first. This will clear the path to my own account of begging the question. Then I will anticipate some objections. Finally, I will apply my account to a well-known and popular response to scepticism (...)
- It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2005 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Richard B. Howarth (eds.), Perspectives on Climate Change. Elsevier. pp. 221–253.A survey of various candidates shows that there is no defensible moral principle that shows that individuals have an obligation to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
- The Disunity of Morality and Why it Matters to Philosophy.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):355-377.
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