Search results for 'Practical Knowledge' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tore Nordenstam (2013). Practical Knowledge and Ethics. AI and Society 28 (4):377-382.score: 180.0
    Systematic research in the wide field of practical knowledge is a recent phenomenon. In this paper, the approaches which have been developed in the main centres of research into practical knowledge in Norway and Sweden are compared with an emphasis on their potential for revitalizing the study of ethics. The focus on narratives and reflection based on the researcher’s own professional experience which is the distinguishing feature of the centre for practical knowledge at the (...)
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  2. John Schwenkler (2011). Perception and Practical Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):137-152.score: 156.0
    According to G.E.M. Anscombe, an agent’s knowledge of his own intentional actions differs from his knowledge of his unintended behaviors as well as the knowledge others can have of what he intentionally does, in being secured “without observation”. I begin by posing a problem for any conception of this theory according to which non-observational knowledge must be independent of sense-perception, and criticize several recent attempts to get around the problem. Having done this, I develop an alternative (...)
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  3. Thor Grunbaum (2009). Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What Is Happening. Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):41-67.score: 150.0
  4. Else Lykkeslet & Eva Gjengedal (2006). How Can Everyday Practical Knowledge Be Understood with Inspiration From Philosophy? Nursing Philosophy 7 (2):79-89.score: 150.0
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  5. Cheng-Hung Tsai (2010). Practical Knowledge of Language. Philosophia 38 (2):331-341.score: 144.0
    One of the main challenges in the philosophy of language is determining the form of knowledge of the rules of language. Michael Dummett has put forth the view that knowledge of the rules of language is a kind of implicit knowledge; some philosophers have mistakenly conceived of this type of knowledge as a kind of knowledge-that . In a recent paper in this journal, Patricia Hanna argues against Dummett’s knowledge-that view and proposes instead a (...)
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  6. Rachel McKinnon (2011). Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning. Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.score: 144.0
    This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne gainst the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, (...)
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  7. Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Constructivism About Practical Knowledge. In , Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press.score: 132.0
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space (...)
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  8. Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley (2005). I-Paper by Jennifer Hornsby. Semantic Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):107–130.score: 120.0
    [Jennifer Hornsby] The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided. /// [Jason Stanley] The central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, (...)
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  9. Kieran Setiya (2009). Practical Knowledge Revisited. Ethics 120 (1):128-137.score: 120.0
    Argues that the view propounded in "Practical Knowledge" (Ethics 118: 388-409) survives objections made by Sarah Paul ("Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking," Ethics 119: 546-557). The response gives more explicit treatment to the nature and epistemology of knowing how.
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  10. Richard Moran (2004). Anscombe on 'Practical Knowledge'. In J. Hyman & H. Steward (eds.), Agency and Action (Royal Institute of Philosophy Suppl. 55). Cambridge University Press. 43-68.score: 120.0
    Among the legacies of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1957 monograph Intention are the introduction of the notion of 'practical knowledge' into contemporary philosophical discussion of action, and her claim, pursued throughout the book, that an agent's knowledge of what he is doing is characteristically not based on observation.' Each idea by itself has its own obscurities, of course, but my focus here will be on the relation between the two ideas, how it is that the discussion of action may (...)
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  11. Carla Bagnoli (2012). Morality as Practical Knowledge. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):61-70.score: 120.0
    In his original essay, The Form of Practical Knowledge, Stephen Engstrom argues for placing Kant’s ethics in the tradition of practical cognitivism. My remarks are intended to highlight the merits of his interpretation in contrast to intuitionism and constructivism, understood as ways of appropriating Kant’s legacy. In particular, I will focus on two issues: first, the special character of practical knowledge—as opposed to theoretical knowledge and craft expertise; and second, the apparent tension between the (...)
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  12. Yukio Irie (2008). 'Our' Practical Knowledge. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:21-26.score: 120.0
    When I am asked “What are you doing?”, I answer e.g. “I am making coffee”. Anscombe called the knowledge that this kind of answer involves “practical knowledge”. Practical knowledge is knowledge not involving observation and inference. In this presentation I would like to apply this concept to the collectiveaction of many persons. Given that we are playing soccer if someone comes here and asks “What are you doing now?”, we can answer immediately “We are (...)
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  13. Kieran Setiya, Anscombe on Practical Knowledge.score: 120.0
    Argues that, for Anscombe, ‘practical knowledge’ is only sometimes ‘the cause of what it understands.’ It is the formal cause when its object is ‘formally the description of an executed intention.’ Nor is such knowledge confined to the present progressive: we have practical knowledge of the future and the past.
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  14. Julie Zahle (2012). Practical Knowledge and Participant Observation. Inquiry 55 (1):50 - 65.score: 120.0
    Abstract An important strand of theories of practice stress that individuals' practical knowledge, i.e., their ability to act in appropriate and/or effective ways, is mainly tacit. This means that the social scientist cannot find out about this knowledge by simply asking the individuals she studies to articulate how it is appropriate and/or effective to act in various circumstances. In this paper, I pursue the proposal that the method of participant observation may be used to find out about (...)
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  15. James D. Wallace (1994). Morality, Practical Knowledge, and Will. Journal of Philosophical Research 19:23-36.score: 120.0
    In Quandaries and Virtues, Edmund Pincoffs maintains that we observe a multiplicity of moral norms. A common life in which we participate supplies a context in which many virtues play diverse functional roles. He suggests, without developing the idea, that such a common life provides us with a structure for organizing and harmonizing the many moral norms we attempt to pursue. This essay explores that idea. Bodies of shared practical knowledge, such as medicine and scientific research, provide examples (...)
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  16. Practical Knowledge of What Is Happening (2009). Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What is Happening Thor Grünbaum University of Copenhagen. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie. Vol. 78 78:41-67.score: 120.0
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  17. Yves René Marie Simon (1991). Practical Knowledge. Fordham University Press.score: 120.0
    Yves R. Simon (1903-1961) was one of this century’s greatest students of the virtue of practical wisdom. Simon’s interest in this virtue ranged from ultimate theoretical and foundational concerns, such as the relationship between practical knowledge and science, to the most concrete and immediate questions regarding the role of practical wisdom in personal and social decision-making. These concerns occupied Simon from his earliest published writing to the final notes and correspondence he was working on at the (...)
     
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  18. Anne Newstead (2006). Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. 183.score: 108.0
    A fallibilist theory of knowledge is employed to make sense of the idea that agents know what they are doing 'without observation' (as on Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge).
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  19. Anne Newstead (2004). Self-Conscious Self-Reference: An Approach Based on Agent's Knowledge (DPhil Manuscript). Dissertation, Oxford Universityscore: 108.0
    This thesis proposes that an account of first-person reference and first-person thinking requires an account of practical knowledge. At a minimum, first-person reference requires at least a capacity for knowledge of the intentional act of reference. More typically, first-person reasoning requires deliberation and the ability to draw inferences while entertaining different 'I' thoughts. Other accounts of first-person reference--such as the perceptual account and the rule-based account--are criticized as inadequate. An account of practical knowledge is provided (...)
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  20. Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.score: 108.0
    Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. (...)
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  21. Cheng-Hung Tsai (forthcoming). Knowledge of Language in Action. Philosophical Explorations:1-22.score: 108.0
    Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a speaker to understand and perform a variety of linguistic actions in that language. In this paper, I pursue an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. I begin by examining two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language: Michael Dummett's Implicit Knowledge Model and Jennifer Hornsby's Practical Knowledge Model. I argue that each of these models is inadequate for different (...)
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  22. Stefan Aerts, Dirk Lips, Stuart Spencer, Eddy Decuypere & Johan De Tavernier (2006). A New Framework for the Assessment of Animal Welfare: Integrating Existing Knowledge From a Practical Ethics Perspective. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (1):67-76.score: 108.0
    When making an assessment of animal welfare, it is important to take environmental (housing) or animal-based parameters into account. An alternative approach is to focus on the behavior and appearance of the animal, without making actual measurements or quantifying this. None of these tell the whole story. In this paper, we suggest that it is possible to find common ground between these (seemingly) diametrically opposed positions and argue that this may be the way to deal with the complexity of animal (...)
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  23. J. Simons & R. Ewing (2001). Using Practical Knowledge of the Creative Arts to Foster Learning. In Joy Higgs & Angie Titchen (eds.), Practice Knowledge and Expertise in the Health Professions. Butterworth-Heinemann.score: 104.0
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  24. N. Ángel Pinillos (forthcoming). Knowledge, Experiments and Practical Interests. In Jessica Brown & MIkkel Gerken (eds.), New Essays On Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.score: 102.0
    Recently, some philosophers have defended the idea that knowledge is an interest-relative notion. According to this thesis, whether an agent knows P may depend on the practical costs of her being wrong about P. This perspective marks a radical departure from traditional accounts that take knowledge to be a purely intellectual concept. I think there is much to say on behalf of the interest-relative notion. In this paper, I report on some new evidence which strongly suggests that (...)
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  25. Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jay G. Hull & Aaron Zimmerman (2010). Practical Interests, Relevant Alternatives, and Knowledge Attributions: An Empirical Study. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):265–273.score: 96.0
    In defending his interest-relative account of knowledge in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), Jason Stanley relies heavily on intuitions about several bank cases. We experimentally test the empirical claims that Stanley seems to make concerning our common-sense intuitions about these bank cases. Additionally, we test the empirical claims that Jonathan Schaffer seems to make in his critique of Stanley. We argue that our data impugn what both Stanley and Schaffer claim our intuitions about such cases are. To (...)
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  26. Kieran Setiya (2008). Practical Knowledge. Ethics 118 (3):388-409.score: 96.0
    Argues that we know without observation or inference at least some of what we are doing intentionally and that this possibility must be explained in terms of knowledge-how. It is a consequence of the argument that knowing how to do something cannot be identified with knowledge of a proposition.
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  27. Stephen P. Engstrom (2009). The Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Harvard University Press.score: 96.0
    Introduction -- Part I: Willing as practical knowing -- The will and practical judgment -- Fundamental practical judgments : the wish for happiness -- Part II: From presuppositions of judgment to the idea of a categorical imperative -- The formal presuppositions of practical judgment -- Constraints on willing -- Part III: Interpretation -- The categorical imperative -- Applications -- Conclusion.
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  28. David Wiggins (2012). Practical Knowledge: Knowing How To and Knowing That. Mind 121 (481):97-130.score: 96.0
    Ryle’s account of practical knowing is much controverted. The paper seeks to place present disputations in a larger context and draw attention to the connection between Ryle’s preoccupations and Aristotle’s account of practical reason, practical intelligence, and the way in which human beings enter into the way of being and acting that Aristotle denominates ethos . Considering matters in this framework, the author finds inconclusive the arguments that Stanley and Williamson offer for seeing knowing how to as (...)
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  29. Jessica Brown (2008). Knowledge and Practical Reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.score: 96.0
    It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, (...)
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  30. Stephen R. Grimm (Forthcoming). Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides. In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.score: 96.0
    Defenders of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology (or what I call practicalism) need to address two main problems. First, the view seems to imply, absurdly, that knowledge can come and go quite easily—in particular, that it might come and go along with our variable practical interests. We can call this the stability problem. Second, there seems to be no fully satisfying way of explaining whose practical interests matter. We can call this the “whose stakes?” problem. I argue that (...)
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  31. Janet Levin (2008). Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.score: 96.0
    Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and (...) reason, the most serious arguments against it lose force. (shrink)
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  32. Matt Weiner, The Practical Importance of Knowledge (Such as It Is).score: 96.0
    In Knowledge and Lotteries, Hawthorne argues for a view on which whether a speaker knows that p depends on whether her practical environment makes it appropriate for her to use p in practical reasoning. It may seem that this view yields a straightforward account of why knowledge is important, based on the role of knowledge in practical reasoning. I argue that this is not so; practical reasoning does not motivate us to care about (...)
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  33. Christoph Kelp (2013). A Practical Explication of the Knowledge Rule of Informative Speech Acts. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):367-383.score: 96.0
    : This paper defends the knowledge rule of informative speech acts. It is argued that Edward Craig's insightful practical explication of the concept of knowledge can be extended to motivate the knowledge rule. A number of problem cases for the knowledge rule are addressed and accommodated.
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  34. Don Fallis (2011). What Liars Can Tell Us About the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.score: 96.0
    If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge-lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of (...) reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian framework to show that in each of Sorensen's examples, knowledge-lies alter people's behavior by affecting their beliefs. Second, I show that while we can imagine lies that target knowledge without targeting beliefs, they cannot alter people's behavior. In other words, knowledge-lies actually work (i.e., manipulate behavior) by targeting beliefs or they do not work at all. (shrink)
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  35. Bo Göranzon (1987). The Practice of the Use of Computers. AI and Society 1 (1):25-36.score: 96.0
    A quotation from Shakespeare's play King Lear, ‘I will teach you differences’, encapsulates the spirit of this paper. The distinction is introduced between three different categories of knowledge: i) propositional knowledge, ii) skill or practical knowledge and iii) knowledge of familiarity. In the present debate on ‘Information Society’, there is a clear tendency to overemphasise the theoretical knowledge at the expense of practical knowledge thereby completely ignoring the knowledge of familiarity. It (...)
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  36. Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.score: 90.0
    In this paper I present a new argument against internalist theories of practical reason. My argument is inpired by Frank Jackson's celebrated Knowledge Argument. I ask what will happen when an agent experiences pain for the first time. Such an agent, I argue, will gain new normative knowledge that internalism cannot explain. This argument presents a similar difficulty for other subjectivist and constructivist theories of practical reason and value. I end by suggesting that some debates in (...)
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  37. Sarah K. Paul (2009). Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking: Setiya on “Practical Knowledge”. Ethics 119 (3):546-557.score: 90.0
  38. Michael Hannon (forthcoming). Stabilizing Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.score: 90.0
    If epistemic contextualism is correct, then knowledge attributions do not have stable truth-conditions across different contexts. John Hawthorne (2004), Timothy Williamson (2005), and Patrick Rysiew (2012) argue that this unstable picture of knowledge attributions undermines the trans-contextual role that knowledge reports play in storing, retrieving, and transmitting useful information. I argue that there are several ways to stabilize the truth-conditions for ‘know’ across conversational contexts, which allows knowledge reports to serve a trans-contextual role. In particular, I (...)
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  39. Carla Bagnoli (2011). On Stephen Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge. [REVIEW] Iris 3 (6):191-203.score: 90.0
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  40. Julia Annas (2001). Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):236-.score: 90.0
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  41. John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.score: 90.0
    Knowledge and Lotteries is organized around an epistemological puzzle: in many cases, we seem consistently inclined to deny that we know a certain class of propositions, while crediting ourselves with knowledge of propositions that imply them. In its starkest form, the puzzle is this: we do not think we know that a given lottery ticket will be a loser, yet we normally count ourselves as knowing all sorts of ordinary things that entail that its holder will not suddenly (...)
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  42. Igal Kvart, Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment.score: 90.0
    Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in the truth (...)
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  43. Reviewed by Andrews Reath (2009). Stephen Engstrom, the Form of Practical Knowledge: A Study of the Categorical Imperative. Ethics 120 (1).score: 90.0
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  44. Wayne A. Davis (2007). Knowledge Claims and Context: Loose Use. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395 - 438.score: 90.0
    There is abundant evidence of contextual variation in the use of “S knows p.” Contextualist theories explain this variation in terms of semantic hypotheses that refer to standards of justification determined by “practical” features of either the subject’s context (Hawthorne & Stanley) or the ascriber’s context (Lewis, Cohen, & DeRose). There is extensive linguistic counterevidence to both forms. I maintain that the contextual variation of knowledge claims is better explained by common pragmatic factors. I show here that one (...)
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  45. Michael Hannon (2013). The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919.score: 90.0
    This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I (...)
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  46. Patricia Hanna (2006). Swimming and Speaking Spanish. Philosophia 34 (3):267-285.score: 90.0
    The dominant view of the status of knowledge of language is that it is theoretical or what Gilbert Ryle called knowledge-that. Defenders of this thesis may differ among themselves over the precise nature of the knowledge which underlies language, as for example, Michael Dummett and Noam Chomsky differ over the issue of unconscious knowledge; however, they all agree that acquisition, understanding and use of language require that the speaker have access to a theory of language. In (...)
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  47. Stephen Engstrom (2012). Summary of the Form of Practical Knowledge. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):58-60.score: 90.0
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  48. David Carr (1999). Art, Practical Knowledge and Aesthetic Objectivity. Ratio 12 (3):240–256.score: 90.0
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  49. Stephen Engstrom (2012). Bringing Practical Knowledge Into View: Response to Bagnoli, Hill, and Reath. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):89-97.score: 90.0
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