Machine generated contents note: List of figures. -- Acknowledgments. -- Introduction. -- Part One: Fundamental Issues. -- Part Two: The Transition from the Aristotelian Worldview to the Newtonian Worldview. -- Part Three: Recent Developments in Science and Worldviews. -- Chapter Notes and Suggested Reading. -- References. -- Index.

In a Sentences Commentary written about 1250 the Franciscan Richard Rufus subjects Anselm’s argument for God’s existence in his Proslogion to the most trenchant criticism since Gaunilon wrote his response on behalf of the “fool.” Anselm’s argument is subtle but sophistical, claims Rufus, because he fails to distinguish between signification and supposition. Rufus therefore offers five reformulations of the Anselmian argument, which we restate in modern formal logic and four of which we claim are valid, the fifth turning on (...) a possible scribal error. Rufus’s final conclusion is that the formulation in Proslogion, chapter 3, is convincing, but not that of chapter 2. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:125, HUME'S PROBABILITY ARGUMENT OF?,??,? In the Treatise,?,??,?, Hume presents an follows:' argument which, in the barest of outlines, goes as 1 (Pl) Every proposition has a probability less than one. (P2) If reason were the basis of our beliefs, then we would have no beliefs. (follows from (Pl)) (P3) We in fact do have beliefs. Hence, (P4) Reason is not the basis of our beliefs. The argument has (...) not been particularly well received. D. C. Stove, for example, refers to it as being "not merely defective, but one of the worst 2 arguments ever to impose itself on a man of genius." While not everyone is as unsympathetic as Stove, it nonetheless is difficult to find commentators favorably disposed toward the argument. Various sections of the Treatise are notoriously unclear.?,??,? is such a section; as such, it is difficult to say just what Hume intended his argument to be. My contention in the present paper is that there are two reasonable ways of reconstructing Hume's argument, both consistent with what Hume writes in?,??,?. The first reconstruction is clearly unsound; the second reconstruction fares somewhat better. In particular, my contention will be that this second reconstruction, if not sound, is at least valid 4 and contains no obviously false premises. Allow me to make some preliminary comments before presenting these reconstructions. The reconstructions to follow will primarily be concerned with premise (P2) above; in particular, the 126. reconstructions will focus on how Hume can claim that (P2) follows from (Pl). Premise (Pl) is a common 5 sceptical claim, not obviously false, and certainly not unique to Hume. As such, it strikes me that the more interesting part of the argument is Hume's claim that (P2) follows from (Pl), and such will be the focus of the reconstructions (although (Pl) will be discussed toward the end of this paper). Concerning (P2), why does Hume think this follows from (Pl)? His reasoning is contained in the following passage; Having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv'd from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having adjusted these two together, we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. This is a doubt, which immediately occurs to us, and of which, if we wou'd closely pursue our reason, we cannot avoid giving a decision. But this decision, tho' it shou'd be favourable to our preceeding judgment, being founded only on probability, must weaken still further our first evidence, and must itself be weaken'd by a fourth doubt of the same kind, and so on in infinitum; till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty. No finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum; and even the vastest quantity, which can enter into human imagination, must in this manner be reduc'd to nothing. (T182) Not for nothing did I claim that this section of the Treatise is unclear. At best, I can discern only the outline of Hume's reasoning, which seems to go as follows: first, when we assign a probability to some 127, proposition, reason dictates that we re-evaluate this probability. In particular, reason dictates that we "add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties." Note that Hume never specifies the object of this 'new doubt.' He might mean a) that our doubt concerns whether the probability we assigned the proposition is correct, or b) that our doubt concerns the evidence on which we based the assignment of that probability. Whatever the case, this 'new doubt' must "weaken still further our first evidence," presumably resulting in a lowering of the probability we originally assigned to the proposition. We then repeat this doubting process, adding new doubts of the same kind in infinitum, "till at last there remain nothing of the original... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Theory of Relativity Quantum Theory Conclusion References.

In this paper, I identify the source of the differences between classical logic and many-valued logics (including fuzzy logics) with respect to the set of valid formulas and the set of inferences sanctioned. In the course of doing so, we find the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for any many-valued semantics (again including fuzzy logics) to validate exactly the classically valid formulas, while sanctioning exactly the same set of inferences as classical logic. This in turn shows, contrary (...) to what has sometimes been claimed, that at least one class of infinite-valued semantics is axiomatizable. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: What Does Philosophy Have to Do with Science? Philosophical Issues in Scientific Practice Philosophical Issues in Scientific Foundations Conclusion References.

The past twenty or so years have seen the sorites paradox receive a good deal of philosophical air-time. Yet, in what is surely a sign of a good puzzle, no consensus has emerged. It is perhaps a good time to stop and take stock of the current status of the sorites paradox. My main contention is that the proposals offered to date as ways of blocking the paradox are seriously deficient, and hence there is, at present, no acceptable solution to (...) the sorites. In the final section I argue that, although vagueness is the source of the threat to modus ponens engendered by the sorites, it is also vagueness that protects modus ponens from clear counterexample. (shrink)

The past twenty or so years have seen the sorites paradox receive a good deal of philosophical air-time. Yet, in what is surely a sign of a good puzzle, no consensus has emerged. It is perhaps a good time to stop and take stock of the current status of the sorites paradox. My main contention is that the proposals offered to date as ways of blocking the paradox are seriously deficient, and hence there is, at present, no acceptable solution to (...) the sorites. In the final section I argue that, although vagueness is the source of the threat to modus ponens engendered by the sorites, it is also vagueness that protects modus ponens from clear counterexample. (shrink)

The Copernican revolution of the 1500s and 1600s was in large part due to new theories and discoveries, which indicated that the general view of the universe – the more or less Aristotelian, teleological view – was no longer viable. This revolution eventually resulted in a substantially different view on the sort of universe we inhabit. New discoveries in recent years, involving Bell’s theorem, quantum theory, and the outcome of carefully designed and replicated experiments, strongly suggest that the general view (...) of the universe we have had since the Copernican revolution is no longer viable. The main goals of this paper are (i) to present Bell’s theorem and the results of these recent experiments in a way accessible to a non-technical audience, and (ii) to explore the question of whether these new discoveries place us in a similar situation to that of our predecessors in the early years of the 1600s, or roughly, whether we are in the beginning stages of a modern Copernican revolution. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of well-known intentional realists have focused their energy on attempts to provide a naturalized theory of mental representation. What tends to be overlooked, however, is that a naturalized theory of mental representation will not, by itself, salvage intentional realism. Since most naturalistic properties play no interesting causal role, intentional realists must also solve the problem of showing how intentional properties , even if naturalized, could be causally efficacious. Because of certain commitments, this problem is especially (...) difficult for intentional realists such as Fodor. In the current paper I focus on the problem as it arises for such realists, and I argue that the best-known solution proposed to date is inadequate. If what I say is correct, then such intentional realists are left with an additional and substantial problem, and one that has generally not been sufficiently appreciated. (shrink)

A selection of speeches and essays from the author's second decade as president of Yale University.

This example is provided so that non-theorists may see actual applications of the theory previously described. This study considered directly some of the components of Field Sparrow breeding success as a measure of habitat suitability, and found these to vary in a way which was inconsistent with hypotheses that territorial behavior either cues, or limits density. This study provides a valid example of how the problem can be approached and offers a first step in the eventual identification of the role (...) of territorial behavior in the habitat distribution of a common species. (shrink)

Philosophers perennially debate the nature of the good for humans. Is it subjective or objective? That is to say, do the things that are intrinsically good for an agent, good for their own sakes and apart from further consequences, acquire this status only in virtue of how she happens to regard them? Or are there things that are good in themselves for an individual independently of her desires and attitudes toward them? The issue sounds recondite, but has been thought to (...) be pregnant with implications for politics as it ought to be. Plato vigorously insists that knowledge of the good is precious and the person who has it is uniquely fit to rule: "In the world of knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential Form of Goodness. Once it is perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to the light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of wisdom and truth. Without having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom, either in his own life or in matters of state.". (shrink)

Introduction i This book is about how we study history, how we research and write about it, and how we read it. In the postmodern age, historians are being ...

The renowned biologist and thinker Richard Dawkins presents his most expansive work yet: a comprehensive look at evolution, ranging from the latest developments in the field to his own provocative views. Loosely based on the form of Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, Dawkins's Tale takes us modern humans back through four billion years of life on our planet. As the pilgrimage progresses, we join with other organisms at the forty "rendezvous points" where we find a common ancestor. The band of pilgrims (...) swells into a vast crowd as we join first with other primates, then with other mammals, and so on back to the first primordial organism. Dawkins's brilliant, inventive approach allows us to view the connections between ourselves and all other life in a bracingly novel way. It also lets him shed bright new light on the most compelling aspects of evolutionary history and theory: sexual selection, speciation, convergent evolution, extinction, genetics, plate tectonics, geographical dispersal, and more. The Ancestor's Tale is at once a far-reaching survey of the latest, best thinking on biology and a fascinating history of life on Earth. Here Dawkins shows us how remarkable we are, how astonishing our history, and how intimate our relationship with the rest of the living world. (shrink)

The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. In this paper we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey's decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability maximising. (...) We end the paper by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be an expected utility. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles. (shrink)

The discussion of good and evil must not be confined to the sterile lecture halls of academics but related instead to ordinary human feelings, needs, and desires, says noted philosopher Richard Taylor. Efforts to understand morality by exploring human reason will always fail because we are creatures of desire as well. All morality arises from our intense and inescapable longing. The distinction between good and evil is always clouded by rationalists who convert the real problems of ethics into complex (...) philosophical puzzles. In the first part of Good and Evil, Taylor looks for a more meaningful conception by reexamining and rejecting the whole rationalistic tradition that dominates philosophical ethics. The second part provides an empirical explanation of good and evil, noting that one does not have to look too far to find prime examples of the failure of fixed moral rules. Including important commentary on Joseph Fletcher's groundbreaking situation ethics, and Aristotle's virtues (e.g., magnanimity and pride), Taylor rounds out the book by developing a philosophy of aspiration--personal worth as an ethical ideal--to replace the morality of duty. He offers a modified form of situation ethics to fit the contemporary problems we face. (shrink)

Orientalism and Religion offers us a timely discussion of the implications of contemporary post-colonial theory for the study of religion. Drawing on a variety of post-structuralist and post-colonial thinkers, including Foucault, Gadamer, Said, and Spivak, Richard King examines the way in which notions such as mysticism, religion, Hinduism and Buddhism are taken for granted, and shows us how religion needs to be redescribed along the lines of cultural studies.

Evidence is presented that the singularities induced in causal Lorentzian spacetimes by changes in 3-space topology give rise to infinite particle and energy production under reasonable laws of quantum field propagation. In the case of the gravitational field, if 3-space is compact the total energy must vanish. A topological transition therefore induces a violent collapse that effectively aborts the transition, since the collapse mode is the only mode carrying the negative energy needed to compensate the associated infinite energy production. The (...) existence of the Hamiltonian constraint of general relativity suggests that topological stability is a local property of the quantum theory that is maintained even when 3-space is noncompact. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory has gained some ground in the social sciences, but not without resistance. It must be said that at least some of the resistance on the part of social scientists is justified insofar as social and cultural phenomena such as sports are often much more complex than many evolutionary theorists seem to think. We propose in this paper an evolutionary approach to sports that takes into account its profoundly cultural character, thereby overcoming the traditional nature-culture dichotomies in the sociology (...) of sport. We argue that there are good reasons to view sports as culturally evolved signaling systems which serve a function similar to courtship rituals in other animals. Our approach combines the insights of evolutionary psychology, which states that biological adaptations determine the boundaries for the types of sport that are possible, and pure cultural theories, which describe the mechanism of cultural evolution without once referring to sport’s biological base. We substantiate this integrative theoretical framework by identifying several biological and cultural factors which may moderate the direct effect that signaling value has on a sport’s viability or popularity. A discussion of this framework’s implications for future theoretical and empirical research concludes this essay. (shrink)

My topic will be philosophical and, more precisely still, ontological. If we wish to conceive of what is at stake in the ‘dehumanization of the world’ and if we want to oppose it, we need to widen our perspective and take in not only the destiny of the human but the status of things and beings in general.The thesis I am going to put forward, which is still quite daring given the current stage of my thinking, is a hunch and (...) a hypothesis that I am trying gradually to clarify. My theory is that there was a kind of originating decision, a primal ontological choice made by the Greco-Latin as well as the Judeo-Christian West about the way of viewing beings in general; a decision in favour of differentiated forms and against the representation of a real, supposed to be composed in the final analysis of a basic single substrate whose differentiated forms were merely states, pure appearances without substance. I am also putting forward the notion that this primal choice, which is or was our choice and remains my own, was not absolutely necessary; it was a contingent free opting in favour of something and against another possible option. (shrink)

This is the third edition of a classic book first published in 1960, which has sold thousands of copies in two paperback edition and has been translated into several foreign languages. Popkin's work ha generated innumerable citations, and remains a valuable stimulus to current historical research. In this updated version, he has revised and expanded throughout, and has added three new chapters, one on Savonarola, one on Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, and one on Pascal. This authoritative treatment of the (...) theme of scepticism and its historical impact will appeal to scholars and students of early modern history now as much as ever. (shrink)

Thinking through the body: educating for the humanities -- The body as background -- Self-knowledge and its discontents: from Socrates to somaesthetics -- Muscle memory and the somaesthetic pathologies of everyday life -- Somaesthetics in the philosophy classroom: a practical approach -- Somaesthetics and the limits of aesthetics -- Somaesthetics and Burke's sublime -- Pragmatism and cultural politics: from textualism to somaesthetics -- Body consciousness and performance -- Somaesthetics and architecture: a critical option -- Photography as performative process -- Asian (...) ars erotica and the question of sexual aesthetics -- Philosophy as awakened life : everyday aesthetics of embodiment in American transcendentalism and Japanese Zen practice -- Somatic style. (shrink)