Temporal ontology is home to two central issues in the philosophy of time. The first issue concerns the ontological status of the present. The debate here is between A-theorists on the one hand, and both B- and C-theorists on the other. At the very least, all A-theorists hold that there is an objective present moment that changes as time passes. On the other hand, B-theorists hold that there exist relations of earlier than, later than, and simultaneous with, while C-theorists maintain that times are ordered but directionless (so times are not objectively earlier or later than any other time). The dispute between A-theorists, and B- and C-theorists is owed to the A-theorist’s acceptance of a changing present moment, and the B- and C-theoretical denial of this. Accordingly, the debate is often characterised as a dynamic/static divide. Additionally, a related issue is the relationship between future and agency. If, as B- and C-theorists maintain, the future is on equal footing with all other times, then arguably all of the facts about the future are already settled. But if the facts about the future are already settled, then the future is closed. If, however, the future is closed, then it would seem that there is nothing we can do now to alter what is going to happen. The central issue facing eternalism from agency then is how to avoid descending into fatalism. The second debate in the temporal ontology literature is that between different versions of the A-theory and concerns the ontological status of the past and future, given the A-theoretical acceptance of the present. These different accounts can be divided into liberal accounts of temporal ontology, according to which past, present and future entities all exist and conservative accounts of temporal ontology, which deny that past, present and future entities all exist. Liberal approaches to temporal ontology are comprised of versions of the moving spotlight view, according to which all times exist but the present is objectively privileged. The most severe form of conservativeness about temporal ontology is presentism, according to which only present entities exist.