This study is divided into three parts. In the first I survey various incidents in which the oscillating friend/foe pattern between philosophy and religious consciousness is played out, and seek to determine the nature of this alternating complicity and conflict. In the second part, the implications of attributing a posture to thinking are examined. Here I argue that human thought always occurs within, and is shaped by, a fundamental will and feeling toward reality. In the third part I argue that (...) rational consciousness has a structural tension built into it: the tension between acknowledgement and conformity to the other and assertion and enactment of the self. (shrink)

In Varia Socratica Professor A. E. Taylor devotes his first chapter to a proof that the impiety for which Socrates was condemned consisted in his connection with an Orphic-Pythagorean cult. This argument has more than historical interest, for it is the first step in an attempt to attribute to Socrates, and ultimately to Pythagorean sources, doctrines hitherto regarded as Platonic. Much of Dr. Taylor′s new evidence seems to rest on passages which in their context contradict or greatly modify his (...) inferences; other arguments have no better basis than the dubious principle that any fact shown to be related to Orphism in one connection is always so related; and, above all, the enquiry which set out to give precise legal grounds for the charge of impiety tails away lamentably into a mere discussion of doctrine. I propose, after examining the wording of the charge, to analyze the evidence for regarding Socrates′ offence as the importation of a foreign cultus, then to enquire how far Dr. Taylor′s discussion of doctrine is relevant to the legal charge, and, lastly, to ask whether the Apology of Plato and the Memorabilia really do preserve so suspicious a silence about the impiety as to justify a totally new theory to account for their reticence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to highlight several features of the concept of impiety and of its use in inscriptions. Two main types of epigraphic texts mention impiety: 1. preventive laws, where formulations such as ἀσεβὴς ἔστω, ἀσεβείτω and ἔνοχος ἔστω ἀσεβείᾳ have a double effect inasmuch as they categorize an offence as an impiety and, in addition, they give a culprit the status of impious and 2. reports of trials or of past wrongs. Being regarded (...) as impious entails other consequences on the relationship between the culprit and gods but also between the culprit and the human community – the main issue being that these consequences are seldom explicitly mentioned. Moreover, instead of a single law or text defining impiety or proceedings to take place in case of impiety, there is an array of texts in which impiety appears, the sum of which forms what a community would legally recognize as an impiety.Cet article vise à mettre en exergue différentes particularités du concept d’impiété et de son utilisation dans les inscriptions. Deux types principaux de textes épigraphiques mentionnent l’impiété : 1. des lois préventives, dans lesquelles des formulations telles que ἀσεβὴς ἔστω, ἀσεβείτω et ἔνοχος ἔστω ἀσεβείᾳ ont un double effet dans la mesure où elles définissent une infraction comme étant une impiété et, de surcroît, elles confèrent au coupable le statut d’impie et 2. des rapports de procès ou de torts commis par le passé. Être considéré impie entraîne d’autres conséquences, dans la relation du coupable avec les dieux mais également avec la communauté humaine – le problème étant principalement que ces conséquences sont rarement explicitement mentionnées. De plus, au lieu d’une loi unique définissant l’impiété ou envisageant les procédures à mettre en place en cas d’impiété, il y a un ensemble de textes dans lesquels apparaît l’impiété, dont la somme forme ce qu’une commu­nauté reconnaîtrait légalement comme impiété. (shrink)

In Varia Socratica Professor A. E. Taylor devotes his first chapter to a proof that the impiety for which Socrates was condemned consisted in his connection with an Orphic-Pythagorean cult. This argument has more than historical interest, for it is the first step in an attempt to attribute to Socrates, and ultimately to Pythagorean sources, doctrines hitherto regarded as Platonic. Much of Dr. Taylor′s new evidence seems to rest on passages which in their context contradict or greatly modify his (...) inferences; other arguments have no better basis than the dubious principle that any fact shown to be related to Orphism in one connection is always so related; and, above all, the enquiry which set out to give precise legal grounds for the charge of impiety tails away lamentably into a mere discussion of doctrine. I propose, after examining the wording of the charge, to analyze the evidence for regarding Socrates′ offence as the importation of a foreign cultus, then to enquire how far Dr. Taylor′s discussion of doctrine is relevant to the legal charge, and, lastly, to ask whether the Apology of Plato and the Memorabilia really do preserve so suspicious a silence about the impiety as to justify a totally new theory to account for their reticence. (shrink)

Dotted throughout the records of the turbulent last decades of fourth-century Athens are reports—often frustratingly vague—of prosecutions, many of intellectuals on the charge of . Most belong to the period of Macedonian domination: Theophrastus was one targeted at this time, and we hear also of actions against Demetrius of Phalerum, Theodorus the atheist, and Stilpo of Megara. Even before the Athenian capitulation to Macedon, in the immediate aftermath of the death of Alexander, prosecutions were launched against Demades and Aristotle. These (...) two early prosecutions are generally accepted to have had a political purpose, being attacks aimed at Macedonian sympathizers by the more staunchly pro-democratic Athenian elements; the later trials, however, are poorly attested in the sources and have received less scholarly attention, particularly for their political aspects. (shrink)

Dotted throughout the records of the turbulent last decades of fourth-century Athens are reports—often frustratingly vague—of prosecutions, many of intellectuals on the charge of . Most belong to the period of Macedonian domination: Theophrastus was one targeted at this time, and we hear also of actions against Demetrius of Phalerum, Theodorus the atheist, and Stilpo of Megara. Even before the Athenian capitulation to Macedon, in the immediate aftermath of the death of Alexander, prosecutions were launched against Demades and Aristotle. These (...) two early prosecutions are generally accepted to have had a political purpose, being attacks aimed at Macedonian sympathizers by the more staunchly pro-democratic Athenian elements; the later trials, however, are poorly attested in the sources and have received less scholarly attention, particularly for their political aspects. (shrink)

In the surviving plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles the gods appear to men only rarely. In the Eumenides Apollo and Athena intervene to bring acquittal to Orestes. In Sophocles' Philoctetes Heracles appears ex machina to ensure that the hero returns to Troy, and we learn from a messenger how the gods have summoned the aged Oedipus to a hero's tomb. In Sophocles' Ajax Athena drives Ajax mad and taunts him cruelly. Prometheus Bound might seem to be an exception, since all (...) but one of its characters are gods. But nonetheless the intervention of the gods in the life of the one human character, Io, brings pain and trouble as well as promise of benefit. Io has been driven mad because she has refused to obey the dreams that tell her to go to the meadow where Zeus wants to have intercourse with her. The god does not make his request in person, and it is only in the course of her wanderings that Io learns how Zeus will bring a gentle end to her sufferings. Her informant is another god, Zeus' adversary Prometheus, who answers her questions, at times grudgingly , and in ways that are not immediately clear to her. (shrink)

The Republic rarely speaks of piety; yet religious concerns inform more of its treatment of poetry than readers acknowledge. A pair of tripartite rankings in Book 10 has puzzled interpreters: first the triad Form-couch-painting, then the ostensibly equivalent triad of a flute’s or bridle’s user-maker-imitator. The tripartitions work better together if one recognizes the divinity at work behind Athena’s gifts the flute and bridle. This mythic reading reveals the imitator to stand, yet again, in opposition to the gods; but it (...) also points toward an ambiguity about knowledge that Plato has forcibly excluded from his discussion. (shrink)

Socrates was convicted of corrupting the youth and of not believing in the city’s gods. Scholars disagree about whether the main problem was religion or politics and, if religion, whether it was heterodoxy or heteropraxy, atheism or heresy. This paper focuses on an aspect of this debate, namely, the controversy about whether Socrates’ moral theology was a significant factor in the trial. It argues that while Vlastos and Burnyeat fail to show that Socrates’moral theology was a factor, the arguments for (...) the opposing side are problematic as well. While the belief inmoral gods in itself probably was not sufficiently disturbing to result in a trial, its implications for patriotism and for divine power over humans could have been troubling enough to contribute to Socrates being brought to trial. (shrink)

in the euthyphro, socrates tells euthyphro that Meletus is taking him to court for impiety.1 Upon hearing Euthyphro’s claim to have knowledge of piety, Socrates asks Euthyphro to take him on as a pupil, so that he might acquire knowledge of piety himself. Although this may seem unsurprising, given Socrates’s high regard for knowledge in other dialogues, the reason that Socrates gives for wishing to acquire knowledge, in this case, is bizarre—for he says it is because knowledge of piety (...) will help him to secure his acquittal on charges of impiety.It is unclear, however, why Socrates believes that his learning what piety is should lead to the impiety charges against him being dropped, yet no one has ever made a.. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Dispelling a Confusion ‘You Shall Not Make … Any Marks Upon Yourselves: I Am YHVH’ ‘You Are Not Your Own … Therefore Honor God with Your Body’ ‘We Must Not Injure Our Bodies: This Is the Beginning of Filial Piety’ The Christian Confucian Confusion.

Pamphilus's neglected role of narrator in Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), with its twin themes of piety and world origination, is vital in appreciating the significance of the work. Pamphilus illustrates the stultifying effects of the early inculcation of piety on the creative arguments of natural religion and mirrors the contemporary institutional opposition to Hume. The DNR is not simply a brilliant dissection of divine authorship of morality and creation; it is a model of impiety. Philo's brilliant attack (...) on the morality of the deity, the foundation of piety, and his analysis of divine models of world origination, fails to move the pious Pamphilus who finds for his tutor, Cleanthes, at the conclusion of the debate. (shrink)

I argue that the tragedies envisioned by the Symposium are two, both of which are introduced in the dialogue: (i) within months of Agathon's victory, half the characters who celebrated with him suffer death or exile on charges of impiety; (ii) Socrates is executed weeks after the dramatic date of the frame. Thus the most defensible notion of tragedy across Plato's dialogues is a fundamentally epistemological one: if we do not know the good, we increase our risk of making (...) mistakes and of suffering what are sometimes their catastrophic consequences. (shrink)

Faced with charges of impiety and corruption of the youth, Socrates attempts a defence designed to vindicate the philosophic way of life. In this he seems to be successful, as Socrates is today highly regarded for his description of the good life and for his unwillingness to live any other sort of life, a position that is most obviously exemplified by his defence in the Apology. After his sentencing, Socrates’ arguments and actions—in the Crito and the Phaedo—also lend considerable (...) support to the idea that the philosopher is committed to living a particularly good sort of life. While the sequence of dialogues that culminates in Socrates’ execution might seem to be the most obviously critical of the life of the philosopher, these dialogues actually serve to enshrine the character of Socrates as the quintessential moral hero. (shrink)

Faced with charges of impiety and corruption of the youth, Socrates attempts a defence designed to vindicate the philosophic way of life. In this he seems to be successful, as Socrates is today highly regarded for his description of the good life and for his unwillingness to live any other sort of life, a position that is most obviously exemplified by his defence in the Apology. After his sentencing, Socrates' arguments and actions -- in the Crito and the Phaedo (...) -- also lend considerable support to the idea that the philosopher is committed to living a particularly good sort of life. While the sequence of dialogues that culminates in Socrates' execution might seem to be the most obviously critical of the life of the philosopher, these dialogues actually serve to enshrine the character of Socrates as the quintessential moral hero. (shrink)

The chief concepts involved are those of piety and impiety, and after a thorough analysis of the philosophical texts Mikalson offers a refined definition of ...

In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt to lead to contradiction. In the Euthyphro, piety is defined as that which is loved by some of the gods while impiety is defined as that which is hated by some of the gods. Socrates points out that since the gods harbor contrary sentiments, some things are both pious and impious. But “pious” (...) and “impious” are contrary predicates; they cannot simultaneously characterize the same thing. Euthyphro changes his definition, but the problem of recognizing emotional ambivalence is only side-stepped. I go on to show how contemporary philosophers run into a similar problem. According to Prinz, something is good if and only if we harbor positive sentiments towards it and bad if and only if we harbor negative sentiments towards it. Thus, if we are ambivalent towards something (if we harbor both positive and negative sentiments towards it), then it is both good and bad. Like “pious” and “impious”, “good” and “bad” are contraries. Next, according to the fitting-attitude theory first elaborated by Brentano and favored by contemporary meta-ethicists like Blackburn, Brandt, Ewing, Garcia, Gibbard, McDowell, and Wiggins, something is good if and only if it is a fitting (appropriate) object of approbation, and something is bad if and only if it is a fitting (appropriate) object of disapprobation. I argue that moral ambivalence is sometimes appropriate, i.e., that the correct response to some things is to both love and hate them. Hence, according to the fitting-attitudes theory, some things are both good and bad. I conclude by discussing a variety of ways in which the problem of ambivalence may be solved, suggesting that attitudes of approbation and disapprobation be further individuated by the reasons for them. (shrink)

In the dialogue Plato portrays a confrontation between Euthyphro, a self-appointed expert on matters divine, who is about to charge his own father with impiety for alleged mistreatment and eventual death of a slave, and Socrates, already charged with impiety, who exploits the coincidence to elicit from Euthyphro certain complexities of the concept of 'piety'.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume and Hume’s Connexions ed. by M. A. Stewart, John P. WrightIra SingerM. A. Stewart and John P. Wright, eds. Hume and Hume’s Connexions. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1995. Pp. xvi + 266. Cloth, $40.00. Paper, $18.95.This collection is organized around the theme of Hume’s connections with his philosophical predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.In a historical prelude, Roger Emerson meticulously describes the factions that supported and opposed (...) Hume’s efforts to gain a professorship. Emerson attributes Hume’s failure not only to the charges of impiety leveled against him, but also to the intricate workings of a political patronage system.Four essays about moral theory follow. James Moore attacks the conventional view that Hume’s moral theory is deeply similar to Hutcheson’s. In fact, Moore argues, surface similarities here mask systematic disagreements about justice, self-interest, teleology, theology, reason’s role within a sentimentalist framework, and about whether morality is, fundamentally, justified approbation for benevolence (Hutcheson) or sympathy’s merely natural tendency to generate feelings of approbation (Hume). These differences make sense, Moore notes, in light of Hutcheson’s debts to Stoicism, and Hume’s debts to Epicureanism. Stephen Darwall argues that, by parting company with Hutcheson on one crucial point, Hume opens up a logical space for Bentham’s Utilitarianism. Hutcheson explains the goodness of natural [End Page 141] goods, such as happiness, in terms of our distinctively moral approval of benevolence: happiness is good because a benevolent person wills general happiness. Hume instead explains our moral approval of qualities of character in terms of natural goods and the psychological mechanism of sympathy: a benevolent person receives moral approval because she produces happiness for herself and others, including sympathetic spectators. Darwall claims that Hume thus foreshadows Bentham’s efforts to set our moral judgments on an uncontroversial nonmoral foundation. Pauline C. Westerman discusses the relation between Hume and the natural lawyers. Hume shares some of their characteristic concerns, such as accounting for the origin of private property, and employs some of their terminology. Still, Westerman argues, while Grotius and Pufendorff wanted to justify morality, Hume wants only to explain it. Finally, John P. Wright invokes Butler’s account of habit to illuminate Hume’s notion of a calm passion. Butler argues that, as a habit develops, repetition weakens feelings while strengthening the tendency to act: distress will seldom shock someone habituated into generosity, who will reliably act to relieve that distress. Citing this psychological dynamic, Wright argues, helps to explain what a calm passion is, and how it can prevail over a violent passion.Two essays concern philosophy of mind and epistemology. P. B. Wood uses Thomas Kuhn’s concept of texts that are “exemplars” for working scientists to illuminate the “science of mind” as Hume and Reid practiced it. David Owen puts “inductive skepticism” into historical context, arguing that in that context, Hume appears as neither the victim nor the opponent of deductivism about rationality. Instead, Hume’s focus is Locke’s account of probable reasoning, according to which such reasoning involves a chain of associated ideas (not a formal structure of propositions). Hume’s argument is that our causal thinking proceeds differently than Locke requires, because in it we do not follow an unbroken series of associated perceptions, but rather leap over the gap between our impressions up to now and the general causal idea.The book’s centerpiece is a fragmentary Hume manuscript, discovered in 1993, about the problem of evil. The manuscript appears in both facsimile and transcription. In introducing the manuscript, M. A. Stewart argues plausibly that it is one of the “nobler parts” that Hume cut from the Treatise to avoid offending Bishop Butler.Four essays discuss philosophy of religion. Reflecting on miracles, Stewart traces a tradition of critically examining religious testimony back to the Port-Royal Logic and to Locke; moreover, Stewart emphasizes that Hume’s method in “Of Miracles” is similar to his method in debunking the Ossian poems. Michel Malherbe, taking as his point of departure those remarks by “Pamphilus” that preface the Dialogues, and reviewing in detail Shaftesbury’s pronouncements about the art of philosophical dialogue, discusses... (shrink)

Socrates, one of the first of the great philosophers, left no written works. What survives of his thought are second-hand descriptions of his teachings and conversations—including, most famously, the accounts of his trial and execution composed by his friend, student, and philosophical successor, Plato. In _Euthyphro_, Socrates examines the concept of piety and displays his propensity for questioning Athenian authorities. Such audacity is not without consequence, and in the _Apology_ we find Socrates defending himself in court against charges of (...) class='Hi'>impiety and corruption of the youth. _Crito_ depicts Socrates choosing to accept the resulting death sentence rather than escape Athens and avoid execution. All three dialogues are included here, as is the final scene of _Phaedo_, in which the sentence is carried out. (shrink)

Petrić motivira svoj pokušaj deheleniziranja filozofije i kršćanske teologije činjenicom da su oko četiri stotine godina nakon »starih teologa«, koji su bili pod utjecajem Platonove filozofije, skolastički teolozi počeli u teologiju uvoditi Aristotelovu filozofiju i uzimati njegove »bezbožnosti« kao temelje vjere. Ispričava ih što nisu poznavali niti mogli poznavati stare teologe jer nisu znali grčki i stoga su im bili nepoznati Platonovi i Aristotelovi izvorni tekstovi u kojima se ti stari mudraci spominju. Ne oprašta im, međutim, što su pokušali »bezbožnošću (...) poduprijeti pobožnost«. Stoga Petrić nastoji pokazati da je Aristotel našao sve problemske motive svoje metafizike, fizike i etike u prastarih egipatskih i kaldejskih mudraca, i to najvećim dijelom posredovanjem Platona. Isto tako nastoji pokazati kako je spomenute probleme Aristotel preformulirao, pretumačio u duhu starogrčkog jezika i duha, ali djelomično i prešućivao.Heideggerov analogni noviji pokušaj dehelenizacije filozofije i kršćanske teologije polazi od teze o »zaboravu pitanja o bitku«, odnosno o »smislu bitka«. Taj »zaborav« skrivila je tradicionalna metafizika koja je tretirala bitak kao »najopćenitiji« i stoga »najrazumljiviji« pojam i na taj način dispenzirala filozofiju da ponovo promišlja pitanje o bitku. Pitanje o bitku blokirala je metafizika i time što je bitak tretirala kao »biće« i navela teologiju da i Boga tretira kao »biće«, doduše kao »najviše«, ali ipak kao biće. To je omogućilo da se teologija razumije kao »pozitivna« znanost i time se uvrsti među druge »pozitivne« znanosti. Heideggerov motiv da »destruira« tradicionalnu metafiziku jest da usmjeri mišljenje prema njegovoj zaboravljenoj bitnoj zadaći, a time i teologiju da se, oslobođena od tradicionalne metafizike, uputi novim putovima.Najnoviji poticaj kritičkom tematiziranju dehelenizacije kršćanske vjere, i uopće europskog duha, dao je teolog i sadašnji papa Joseph Ratzinger, posebno u svom predavanju na Sveučilištu u Regensburgu, u kojem je desetak puta kritički apostrofirao dehelenizaciju. Podvrgnuo je kritici tri vala dehelenizacijskog programa u kršćanskoj teologiji: od izgona metafizike iz teologije u Reformaciji, preko historiziranja u liberalnoj teologiji 19. i 20. stoljeća, do brisanja tragova helenizacije kršćanske vjere u ideji inkulturacije. Ratzinger podvrgava kritici ograničavanje uma , započeto matematizacijom europske znanosti u renesansnom platonizmu, koje je Kant kanonizirao. Posljedice toga ograničavanja uma nisu relevantne samo za kršćanstvo koje teži suprotnome, tj. proširenju uma , nego i za zapadnoeuropski duh u cjelini.Petrić’s attempt at dehellenizing philosophy and Christian theology was motivated by the fact that about four centuries after the “ancient theologians”, who were influenced by Plato’s philosophy, scholastic theologians began to introduce Aristotle’s philosophy into theology and adopt his “impieties” as the foundations of faith. He justifies their ignorance and inability to learn about the ancient wise men by the fact that they had no knowledge of Greek and were thus not familiar with the original texts of Plato and Aristotle in which the wise men were mentioned. He does not forgive them, however, for trying to “support piety by impiety”. Thus Petrić attempts to demonstrate how Aristotle found all the problem motives of his metaphysics, physics and ethics in the wise men, drawing mostly upon Plato. He also attempts to show how Aristotle reformulated the mentioned problems, reinterpreted them in the spirit of the old Greek language and thought, but also ignored some of them.Heidegger’s more recent similar attempt at dehellenizing philosophy and Christian theology is grounded on a thesis of the “neglect of the question of being” – that is, the “meaning of being”. This “neglect” is the result of traditional metaphysics which treated being as “the most general” and thus “the most understandable” notion, and in such a way dispensed philosophy to reconsider the question of being. The question of being was blocked by metaphysics in that it treated being as an “entity”, prompting theology to treat God as an “entity” as well, though “the supreme” but still an entity. This led to the understanding of theology as a “positive” science and its eventual classification among the “positive” sciences. Heidegger’s motive to “destroy” traditional metaphysics is to stream thought towards his forgotten major goal, and thus prompt theology, once freed from traditional metaphysics, to seek new strands.The most recent attempt at critical thematization of dehellenization of Christian faith and European spirit in general has been made by the theologian and present pope, Joseph Ratzinger, particularly in his lecture delivered at the University in Regensburg in which he repeatedly criticized dehellenization. Three stages of dehellenization program in Christian theology are the subject of his criticism: from the banishment of metaphysics from theology in the Reformation, through historization in liberal theology of the nineteenth and twentieth century to the erasing of the traces of Hellenization of Christian faith in the idea of inculturation. He also argues against mind limitation started by mathematization of European science in Renaissance Platonism and canonized by Kant. The consequences of mind limitation are not only relevant to Christianity which strives towards the very opposite – broadening of the mind , but to the Western spirit on the whole. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Piety, Justice, and the Unity of VirtueMark L. McPherranNo doubt the Socrates of the Euthyphro would be delighted to encounter many of its readers, offering as they do an audience of piety-seeking interlocutors, eager to mend the dialogical breach created by Euthyphro’s sudden departure. Socrates’ enthusiasm for this pursuit is at least as intense and comprehensible as theirs. We are told, after all, that he will never abandon his (...) quest for knowledge of “what the pious is” (15c–16a), since not only is this enterprise both pious and “inconceivably happy” (cf. Ap. 41c3–4) in itself,1 but coming to understand piety would allow one to “live better the rest of one’s life,” (15e7–16a4), especially should its continuation be threatened by a charge of impiety (3b–d, 5a–c, 12e, 15e–16a).2 My own search here is no less happy and ambitious, since I wish to uncover Socrates’ own, implicit understanding of piety and its relation to his claim elsewhere that “the virtues are one.”3 The account of this I shall provide will also touch on Platonic piety, although this notion obviously rests on a tendentious distinction. Nevertheless, there do seem to be some interesting differences between the way piety is treated in elenctic dialogues such as the Euthyphro and Protagoras, and the more explicitly theory-laden, constructive works such as the Republic and Laws. I shall later characterize [End Page 299] these differences, primarily in terms of the more carefully articulated, internalist moral psychology of the Republic.42. SOCRATIC PIETYThe distinct phenomena the term “religion” popularly designates for us were for the Greeks seamlessly integrated into everyday life. Thus, it is natural that the term “piety”—εὐσέβεια—carried a wider sense than our English equivalent commonly does: it concerned not only one’s immediate relation to the gods—emphasizing proper religious conduct and carrying a sense of respect and fear towards divinity (concomitant with a grasp of one’s own mortal limits)—but also often designated appropriate behavior towards parents, native land, and the dead.5 It is to this rough, inclusive conception of piety that Euthyphro appeals when confronted by Socrates on the Porch of the King (2a–6a). Moreover, and despite his own shockingly irreverent attempt at father-bashing and the subsequent elenctic drubbing he then receives from Socrates, toward the close of the dialogue Euthyphro still manages to envision piety in the quasi-traditionalist fashion with which he began—as “a knowledge of how to ensure the preservation of families and states by gratifying the gods through proper prayer and sacrifice” (14b; cf. 14c–15c).6 It is, however, precisely [End Page 300] at this dramatic juncture (14a–c) that we find—arguably—the final elements of a Socratically-acceptable conception of piety; one that builds upon Euthyphro’s initial concession to Socrates that piety and “human justice” are to be distinguished from one another (11e–12e). This, in turn, is a move that in principle forces Euthyphro to disengage from those aspects of the traditional conception of piety which would—from Socrates’ perspective—conflate the two.7 Recent challenges to this reading, however, have seen in Euthyphro’s initial holism not the heterogeneous presumptions of popular thought, but a semi-sophisticated grasp of the Socratic unity of the virtues.8 And since it does appear that the character Euthyphro is designed to serve not only as a hubristically-inflated, Homeric “fundamentalist,” but as an odd and Sophistically-influenced doppelgänger of Socrates as well—a lesson, that is, in what Socrates both is and is not—it now seems worthwhile to reexamine the view that Socratic piety is but a part and not the whole of justice.9Turning to our text, then, we discover that following the failure of Euthyphro’s initial definitional attempts to specify the nature of pious action and the resulting aporetic interlude, Socrates is willing to offer Euthyphro renewed assistance (11e1–4). This he does by asking whether all the just is pious, or whether justice is broader than piety such that piety is then merely a “part” (μóϱιον) of justice (11e4–12e5). Subsequent to his explanation of these alternatives, Socrates... (shrink)

The trial of Socrates -- Socrates in court -- How the system worked -- The charge of impiety -- The war years -- Alcibiades, Socrates, and the aristocratic milieu -- Pestilence and war -- The rise and fall of Alcibiades -- The end of the war -- Critias and Civil War --- Crisis and conflict -- Symptoms of change -- Reactions to intellectuals -- The condemnation of Socrates -- Socratic politics -- A cock for Asclepius.

Scholasticism, appropriation, and censure -- Humanists' invectives and Aristotle's impiety -- Renaissance Aristotle, Renaissance Averroes -- Italian Aristotelianism after Pomponazzi -- Religious reform and the reassessment of Aristotelianism -- Learned anti-Aristoteliansim -- History, erudition, and Aristotle's past -- Pious novelty.

In the tense religious climate of the late Renaissance (ca. 1550-1650), traditional charges of impiety directed against Aristotle carried new weight. Many turned to alternative philosophical authorities in the search for a truly pious philosophy. Another, "most pious" solution was to ground natural philosophy on a literal reading of the Bible, especially Genesis. I examine this kind of physics, often called Mosaic, or sacred, or Christian, through the example of Johann Amos Comenius and those whom he praises as predecessors (...) in his attempt to reform physics according to the "divine light" of Scripture. In analyzing the works of these authors, I conclude that what they shared most effectively was an agenda rather than a practice. They defended the single, universal truth of a "Christian philosophy" grounded in biblical literalism against the impious excesses of philosophical naturalism, on the one hand, and against the antiphilosophical attacks of extreme theologians, on the other hand. This peculiar strand of natural philosophy, neither traditional nor "modern," needs to be included in attempts to map the complex dynamics of contemporary debates and self-presentations. -/- . (shrink)

Many think that the aim of Hume’s Dialogues is simply to discredit the design argument for the existence of an intelligent designer. We think instead that the Dialogues provides a model of true religion. We argue that, for Hume, the truly religious person: believes that an intelligent designer created and imposed order on the universe; grounds this belief in an irregular argument rooted in a certain kind of experience, for example, in the experience of anatomizing complex natural systems such as (...) the eye; and retains this belief, on the basis of these reasons, even after careful scrutiny. We argue that two of the Dialogues’s characters, Philo and Cleanthes, exhibit true religion. A third character, Demea, exhibits false religion and a persistent impiety. Taken as a whole, we see the Dialogues as an educational performance for the benefit of Pamphilus, Cleanthes’s ward, as well as for the benefit of readers of the Dialogues. Specifically, we think, given that its lessons concern theology and the principles of religion, the dynamics of the Dialogues’s discussion and the interplay between its characters can be seen as a demonstration of a method for becoming truly religious. (shrink)

Socrates is one of the most important yet enigmatic philosophers of all time; his fame has endured for centuries despite the fact that he never actually wrote anything. In 399 B.C.E., he was tried on the charge of impiety by the citizens of Athens, convicted by a jury, and sentenced to death (ordered to drink poison derived from hemlock). About these facts there is no disagreement. However, as the sources collected in this book and the scholarly essays that follow (...) them show, several of even the most basic facts about these events were controversial in antiquity, and the questions persist today: How and why was Socrates brought to trial? Why did the jurors, members of the world's first democracy, find him guilty? When he was given an opportunity to escape execution, why did he refuse to do so and instead accept the punishment that he and his friends agreed was unjustly assigned to him? How exactly did Socrates die? Differences of opinion on these and other issues continue to arouse our curiosity and to challenge new generations of students and scholars. The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies is the first work to collect in one place all of the major ancient sources on Socrates' death--those of both his critics and his defenders--as well as recent scholarly views. Part I includes new translations of Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and the death scene from Phaedo, as well as other ancient sources that shed light on Socrates' trial and execution. Part II features some of the most influential recent scholarship on this historically momentous event with work by M. F. Burnyeat, Robert Parker, Mark L. McPherran, Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Richard Kraut, Christopher Gill, and Enid Bloch (whose essay is published here for the first time). Ideal for undergraduate surveys of ancient Greek philosophy and upper-level courses on Socrates and Socratic philosophy, this unique collection provides an unprecedented look into the many perplexing questions surrounding the trial and execution of this remarkable man. (shrink)

Piety is not a theme that normally attracts the modern mind. In our own age rebellion has a more prominent position and the theme of impiety strikes a more sympathetic note. We are led to examine Plato's Euthyphro as much for the hints we find on the subject of impiety as for whatever it might contain on the seemingly drab subject of the holy. The Euthyphro is also a dialogue concerned with justice, a recurrent theme in the Platonic (...) corpus, and it questions the accepted relationship of justice to piety and orthodoxy. The secular implications of the argument, which seem to be the more important to Socrates, himself, are as relevant to modern politics and religion as they were to the life of ancient Athens. (shrink)

Eusebius' magisterial Praeparatio Evangelica offers a defence of Christianity in the face of Greek accusations of irrationality and impiety. Aaron P. Johnson seeks to appreciate Eusebius' contribution to the discourses of Christian identity by investigating the constructions of ethnic identity at the heart of his work.

In This Paper I Aim to Place Spinoza’s famous injunction in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, to separate philosophy from theology, in its historical context. I contend that in order to properly understand Spinoza’s views concerning the relationship between philosophy and theology, we must view his work in the context of philosophical discussions taking place during his time and in his country of residence, the Dutch Republic. Of particular relevance is a meta-philosophical thesis advocated by a certain group of Cartesian philosophers and (...) theologians. Their thesis was developed in response to attacks on Cartesianism from more conservative authors, who saw it as a source of impiety. It stated that Cartesian .. (shrink)

An undergraduate honors thesis, this work addresses the question of whether or not the historical Socrates is best understood as a sophist, the charge Plato seems most keen to refute. Using the evidence of both Plato's dialogues and other contemporary sources, this study assesses potential arguments regarding Socrates' identity, putting forward the position that Socrates is most accurately to be described not as a sophist but as a "sage" (Greek: sophos). Although the "sage" is a model drawn from the 6th (...) and 5th centuries BCE, this thesis argues that Socrates seeks to revive traditional Greek values and models of the "wise man" and that this conservatism is at the root of his misidentification as a sophist and, thus, his conflict with the restored democracy that tries him for impiety. (shrink)

: In her recent paper, “How to Escape Indictment for Impiety: Teaching as Punishment in the Euthyphro,” G. Fay Edwards argues that if Socrates were to become Euthyphro’s student, this should count as the appropriate punishment for Socrates’ alleged crime. In this paper, we show that the interpretation Edwards has proposed conflicts with what Socrates has to say about the functional role of punishment in the Apology, and that the account Socrates gives in the Apology, properly understood, also provides (...) the correct interpretation of what Socrates says in the Euthyphro about the role of instruction for wrongdoers. (shrink)

Allegorical interpretation of the ancient Greek myths began not with the grammarians, but with the philosophers. As speculative thought developed, there grew up also the belief that in mystical and symbolic terms the ancient poets had expressed profound truths which were difficult to define in scientifically exact language. Assuming that the myth-makers were concerned to edify and to instruct, the philosophers found in apparent immoralities and impieties a warning that both in offensive and in inoffensive passages one must look beneath (...) the surface for the true significance of the tales. Thus allegory was originally positive, not negative, in its aim; its purpose was not so much to defend the poetic traditions against charges of immorality as to make fully explicit the wealth of doctrine which ex hypothesi the myths contained. Those who wrote to defend the poets could, if they chose, make some use of the results of the allegorical method; passages to which exception had been taken could be shown by allegorical treatment to be quite consistent with the view that the poets were wise and divinely inspired. But the first dim beginnings of allegory can be traced to another and a weightier motive—namely, the desire of speculative thinkers to appropriate for their own use some at least of the mythical traditions. Nor is there any reason to doubt that the same motive was the main driving force in the later history of allegorical interpretation. Objectionable passages were, indeed, regarded as among the richest in deeper meaning; but the leading allegorists applied their method to offensive and inoffensive passages alike. (shrink)

THE TENTH BOOK OF THE LAWS, which contains Plato's last word on cosmology and theology, has often been considered as presenting Plato's views in a more exoteric way in contrast with the more esoteric style of the Timaeus. And there are good reasons to think that this view is correct. Whereas the Timaeus stresses that "to find the maker and father of this All is difficult, and, having found it, it is impossible to communicate it to the crowd", Plato is (...) in Laws 10 intending to establish a "proemium" or rational foundation for his laws against impiety, which are supposed to be known by all. In this proemium Plato tries to argue for three propositions: that the gods exist ; that they take care of human affairs ; that they cannot be bribed by sacrifices or prayers. The underlying assumption is that learning these facts about the gods will also help to prevent impiety which, like any kind of vice, is often due to ignorance. (shrink)

Purpose: Some enigmatic remarks and behaviors of Socrates have been a subject of debate among scholars. We investigated the possibility of underlying epilepsy in Socrates by analyzing pathographic evidence in ancient literature from the viewpoint of the current understanding of seizure semiology. Methods: We performed a case study from a literature survey. Results: In 399 BCE, Socrates was tried and executed in Athens on the charge of “impiety.” His charges included the “introduction of new deities” and “not believing in (...) the gods of the state,” because he publicly claimed that he was periodically and personally receiving a “divine sign,” or daimonion, that directed him in various actions. We found textual evidence that his daimonion was probably a simple partial seizure (SPS) of temporal lobe origin. It was a brief voice that usually prohibited Socrates from initiating certain actions. It started when he was a child, and it visited Socrates unpredictably. Moreover, we found at least two descriptions of Socrates’ unique behavior that are consistent with complex partial seizures (CPSs). The fact that Socrates had been experiencing both SPSs and CPSs periodically since childhood makes the diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) likely. Conclusions: We hypothesize that Socrates had a mild case of TLE without secondary generalization. This is the first report in 2,400 years to present a pathographic diagnosis of TLE in Socrates based on specific diagnostic features in the ancient textual evidence. Our study demonstrates that the knowledge of modern epileptology could help understand certain behaviors of historic figures. (shrink)

Quand, en 1747, Diderot et d’Alembert reprennent la direction de l’Encyclopédie, ils héritent d’un projet conçu au départ comme une traduction de la Cyclopaedia d’Ephraïm Chambers. Celle-ci ayant laissé son empreinte sur ce qui sera présenté par la suite comme un ouvrage original, les éditeurs seront souvent amenés à revenir sur leur relation au modèle anglais. Dans les polémiques autour de la publication des premiers volumes, les emprunts à Chambers, entre autres, ont été relevés par les défenseurs de la religion, (...) qui accusaient les encyclopédistes à la fois de plagiat et d’impiété. À partir de ces remarques, cet article propose de considérer la contribution de l’abbé Mallet, l’un des premiers collaborateurs recrutés par Diderot et d’Alembert, et auteur de plusieurs centaines d’articles de l’Encyclopédie. Définir ce qui y relève de l’emprunt ou de l’invention révèle des erreurs majeures dans l’histoire de la réception de cet ouvrage, ce qui nécessite une réévaluation de son théologien principal. (shrink)

Piety is not a theme that normally attracts the modern mind. In our own age rebellion has a more prominent position and the theme of impiety strikes a more sympathetic note. We are led to examine Plato's Euthyphro as much for the hints we find on the subject of impiety as for whatever it might contain on the seemingly drab subject of the holy. The Euthyphro is also a dialogue concerned with justice, a recurrent theme in the Platonic (...) corpus, and it questions the accepted relationship of justice to piety and orthodoxy. The secular implications of the argument, which seem to be the more important to Socrates, himself, are as relevant to modern politics and religion as they were to the life of ancient Athens. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:David Hume and the Danish Debate about Freedom of the Press in the 1770sJohn Christian LaursenWhen the reception history of David Hume’s political writings is written, there will have to be some discussion of their fate in “peripheral” countries like Denmark. Hume’s “Of Liberty of the Press” was translated into Danish as early as 1771. It is not widely known that Denmark was the first country officially to declare (...) freedom of the press and that a lively debate broke out once such freedom was declared. Hume’s essay was put to work in that debate. The story of this translation provides insights into the influence of Hume’s ideas in peripheral countries in Europe, and of Denmark in continental European ideas. Among other things, here we have an example of Hume’s work used in a concrete propaganda battle.The Danish translation of Hume’s essay was published as the last of three supplemental essays in a 31-page pamphlet entitled Mr. F. A. de Voltaire’s Letter to His Majesty the King of Denmark concerning freedom of the press in his states, together with some essays of relevant content. 1 A copy can be found at the Royal Library in Copenhagen in volume twenty of the forty-five bound volumes of pamphlets and booklets from 1770 to 1773 which make up Luxdorph’s Collection of Press Freedom Writings. 2 These pamphlets, in German, French, and (mostly) Danish, were collected at the time by Bolle Willum Luxdorph, a Danish man of letters and court counselor. [End Page 167]The occasion for Voltaire’s letter and our pamphlet was King Christian VII’s declaration of freedom of the press in his territories (the Kingdoms of Norway and Denmark and the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein) on 4 September 1770. It was in the form of a Cabinet Order to his Danish Chancellery, in the following words:We are fully convinced that it is as harmful to the impartial search for truth as it is to the discovery of obsolete errors and prejudices, if upright patriots, zealous for the common good and what is genuinely best for their fellow citizens, because they are frightened by reputation, orders, and preconceived opinions, are hindered from being free to write according to their insight, conscience, and conviction, attacking abuses and uncovering prejudices. And thus in this regard, after ripe consideration, we have decided to permit in our kingdoms and lands in general an unlimited freedom of the press of such a form, that from now on no one shall be required and obliged to submit books and writings that he wants to bring to the press to the previously required censorship and approval, and thus to submit them to the control of those who have undertaken the business until now of inspecting them; so have we graciously revealed and made known this our will concerning our kingdoms to our Danish Chancellery. Given at Friedrichsberg, the 4 September 1770. Christian. 3The foregoing cabinet order was largely the idea of Johann Friedrich Struensee, court physician and soon to be Prime Minister for Christian VII. 4 Less than ten years earlier, two periodicals he was involved with when he lived in Danish Altona had been suppressed, 5 and when he came to power by a series of accidents, one of his first acts was to arrange for the king to declare freedom of the press. [End Page 168]Response to this declaration was immediate. In Denmark it led to a flurry of pamphlets on a myriad of topics, including the high cost of living and the salaries of ministers, 6 monopolies and trade issues (vol. III), coinage (vol. IV), civil servants, the public debt, the agricultural economy (vol. V), the abolition of tenant farmers’ work obligations (vol. VI), the Iceland trade (vol. VII), marriage law, breweries (vol. VIII), banks, lotteries (vol. IX), soldiers’ and sailors’ pay (vol. X), the Norwegian economy (vol. XI), the universities and academies (vol. XII), the power of women (vol. XIII), irreligion and impiety (vol. XIV), prophecies of doom (vol. XV), fables, allegories and libels (vols. XVI–XVIII), and the eternity of hell (vol. XIX).Many pamphlets discussed press freedom... (shrink)

_Socrates and Alcibiades: Four Texts _gathers together translations our four most important sources for the relationship between Socrates and the most controversial man of his day, the gifted and scandalous Alcibiades. In addition to Alcibiades’ famous speech from Plato’s Symposium, this text includes two dialogues, the Alcibiades I and Alcibiades II, attributed to Plato in antiquity but unjustly neglected today, and the complete fragments of the dialogue Alcibiades by Plato’s contemporary, Aeschines of Sphettus. These works are essential reading for anyone (...) interested in Socrates’ improbable love affair with Athens’ most desirable youth, his attempt to woo Alcibiades from his ultimately disastrous worldly ambitions to the philosophical life, and the reasons for Socrates’ failure, which played a large role in his conviction by an Athenian court on charges of impiety and corrupting the youth. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato’s immediate audience. (shrink)

This study presents a full-length interpretation of two Platonic dialogues, the Theaetetus and the Sophist. The reading pursues a dramatic motif which I believe runs through these dialogues, namely the confrontation of Socratic philosophy, as it is understood by Plato, with the practise of sophistry. I shall argue that a major point for Plato in these two dialogues is to examine and defend his own Socratic or dialectical understanding of philosophy against the sophistic claim that false opinions and statements are (...) impossible, a claim which undermines the point of Socratic conversation. As this claim in PlatoÕs view rests on a certain understanding of Heraclitus and Parmenides, the confrontation with the sophists implies a confrontation with these two Presocratics as well. This defence of dialectical philosophy takes place, dramatically, at the crucial time when Socrates is publically accused of impiety and of corrupting the youth of Athens, the Theaetetus right before he first faces the accusation, the Sophist on the following day. I shall argue that this fact is important in understanding the argument of the two dialogues. (shrink)

Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian war was the arena for a dramatic battle between politics and religion in the hearts and minds of the people. 'Fear and loathing in ancient athens', originally published in German but now available for the first time in an expanded and revised English edition, sheds new light on this dramatic period of history and offers a new approach to the study of Greek religion. The book explores an extraordinary range of events and topics: (...) impiety charges and prosecutions; the horrors of the plague; the mutilation of hermai and the profanation of the mysteries; the controversy created by the adoption of new gods; the impressive architectural structures of the sculptor Phidias; the military conflicts of the Peloponnesian war; and the thoughts of the mysterious philosopher Socrates. 'Fear and Loathing in Ancient Athens' will be an indispensible study for students and scholars studying Athenian religion and politics. (shrink)