Quines són les causes del dèficit filosòfic que arrossega la cultura catalana contemporània? Aquest llibre ofereix un panorama bastant complet —i amarg— de les condicions acadèmiques i extraacadèmiques en què s’ha hagut de conrear als Països Catalans la filosofia, tota la filosofia, centrant-se, això sí, en les aventures personals i col·lectives dels qui han tingut la vel·leïtat de dedicar-se a la lògica. Hi són narrades amb amenitat i lucidesa l’estada de Bertrand Russell a Barcelona, la defenestració d’Eugeni d’Ors, les aberracions (...) docents de Josep Daurella i Rull, la breu i fulgurant trajectòria intel·lectual de Joan Crexells, les peripècies eclesiàstiques de David Garcia Bacca i Miquel Soy, l’exili de Josep Ferrater Mora i la gestació del seu voluminós Diccionario de filosofía, la marginació de Manuel Sacristan, els conflictes de la Facultat de Filosofia de València en els anys 70... El resultat és una història de la filosofia apartada en molts aspectes de la imatge «abstracta» i «idealitzada» que sol oferir la historiografia filosòfica a l’ús. (shrink)
One of the most recognizable features of the fragmentary work of the Spanish philosopher Manuel Sacristán is a critical reception of different Marxist currents by means of epistemological tools inherited from the analytic philosophical tradition. It is a frame that anticipated in several decades the emergence of “analytical Marxism”, a collective intervention of great international impact in which, however, Sacristán barely took part. This article tries to reconstruct a possible dialogue between some central elements of analytical Marxism and (...) the epistemological and political reflections of Manuel Sacristán. (shrink)
This classic edition presents the correspondence of one of the great thinkers of the 18th century, and offers a rich picture of the man and his age. This first volume contains David Hume's letters from 1727 to 1765. Hume's correspondents include such famous public figures as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith, James Boswell, and Benjamin Franklin.
Este artículo es una tentativa de análisis de las influencias e intereses que marcaron la juventud de Manuel Sacristán. Se examinan las particularidades de este autor en sus años de formación, desde sus aportaciones en Laye , pasando por sus cuestionamientos filosóficos y políticos juveniles, hasta sus estudios de especialización en lógica simbólica y la posterior entrada en el PSUC-PCE en la clandestinidad. Este periplo, que recoge la etapa de cambio ideológico de Sacristán, es abordado, siguiendo a Bachelard (...) y a Bourdieu, como “un caso particular de lo posible” que busca construir un programa de investigación que examine las relaciones entre campo filosófico y campo político durante el franquismo. (shrink)
Sobre dialéctica recoge las principales aportaciones –inéditas en su mayor parte– de Manuel Sacristán Luzón (1925-1985) en torno a esta debatida noción, entre las que se incluye el importante prólogo que escribió en 1964 para su traducción castellana del Anti-Dühring, prólogo que Javier Muguerza ha caracterizado como “el texto filosófico más significativo de Sacristán –el que más me impactó cuando lo leí y prolongó más duraderamente dicho impacto” y del que Gregorio Morán escribió que “otro tanto ocurrió con (...) su soberbio prólogo al Anti-Dühring…; fue un texto capital en la formación marxista de una generación”. Como señaló Sacristán, y tal como reflejan los distintos textos que configuran este volumen, la dialéctica es una visión global del mundo, no un método, y una hipótesis de estas características no se aplica: se realiza, se concreta, y para ello hay que trabajar de verdad y verazmente. Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Manuel Monleón Pradas y Félix Ovejero Lucas son los autores del prólogo, nota final y epílogo del volumen. Antoni Domènech ha traducido para esta edición la “Loa a la dialéctica” de Brecht. Manuel Sacristán Luzón (Madrid, 1925-Barcelona, 1985) estudió Derecho y Filosofía y Letras en la Universidad de Barcelona y cursó estudios de lógica y epistemología en el Instituto de Lógica Matemática e Investigación de Fundamentos de la Universidad de Münster (Westfalia, Alemania) entre 1954 y 1956. Sacristán se doctoró en Filosofía en 1959 con una tesis sobre Las ideas gnoseológicas de Heidegger y en 1964, dos años después de que le fuera negada la cátedra de lógica de la Universidad de Valencia, publicó Introducción a la lógica y al análisis formal, uno de los textos que más contribuyeron a la presencia y consolidación de la lógica formal en la cultura científica y filosófica española. Profesor de “Fundamentos de Filosofía” y de “Metodología de las ciencias sociales” en la Universidad de Barcelona, impartió durante el curso 1982-1983 dos seminarios de postgrado en la UNAM de México. Miembro del comité central del PCE y del PSUC, entre 1965 y 1970 formó parte del comité ejecutivo del PSUC. En su faceta de filósofo marxista, destaca la sensatez y originalidad con que siempre trató el complejo, y en ocasiones oscuro, tema de la dialéctica y su concepción del marxismo como una tradición de política revolucionaria. De uno de los escritos aquí recogidos, Félix Ovejero Lucas señaló en 1985: “Apenas veinte páginas tenía la introducción de Manuel Sacristán a la edición castellana del Anti-Dühring, de Engels; veinte páginas que enseñaron a varias generaciones de marxistas mucho más acerca de lo que significaba ser marxista que la marabunta editorial de unos años más tarde”. (shrink)
In 'How Many Lives Has Schrödinger's Cat?' David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does.
Open peer commentary on the article “Learning about Learning with Teachers and Young Children” by Chrystalla Papademetri-Kachrimani. Upshot: The activities that Papademetri-Kachrimani presents in her stories create situations that lead to unexpected results, thus opening the potential for learning about learning in teachers’ professional development. These integrate modeling-based learning - arguably a form of constructionism -, and allow learners to move back-and-forth between representations in order to develop strategies and rules.
David and Mary Norton present the definitive scholarly edition of Hume's Treatise, one of the greatest philosophical works ever written. This set comprises the two volumes of texts and editorial material, which are also available for purchase separately. -/- David Hume (1711 - 1776) is one of the greatest of philosophers. Today he probably ranks highest of all British philosophers in terms of influence and philosophical standing. His philosophical work ranges across morals, the mind, metaphysics, epistemology, religion, and (...) aesthetics; he had broad interests not only in philosophy as it is now conceived but in history, politics, economics, religion, and the arts. He was a master of English prose. -/- The Clarendon Hume Edition will include all of his works except his History of England and minor historical writings. It is the only thorough critical edition, and will provide a far more extensive scholarly treatment than any previous editions. This edition (which has been in preparation since the 1970s) offers authoritative annotation, bibliographical information, and indexes, and draws upon the major advances in textual scholarship that have been made since the publication of earlier editions - advances both in the understanding of editorial principle and practice and in knowledge of the history of Hume's own texts. (shrink)
It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 548).
Does morality override self-interest? Or does self-interest override morality? These questions become important in situations where there is conflict between the overall verdicts of morality and self-interest, situations where morality on balance requires an action that is contrary to our self-interest, or where considerations of self-interest on balance call for an action that is forbidden by morality. In situations of this kind, we want to know what we ought simpliciter to do. If one of these standpoints over-rides the other, then (...) there is a straightforward answer. We ought simpliciter to act on the verdict of the overriding standpoint. For purposes of this essay, I assume that there are possible cases in which the overall verdicts of morality and self-interest conflict. I will call cases of this kind “conflict cases.” The verdict of morality in a conflict case would be a proposition as to what we ought morally to do, or as to what we have the most moral reason to do; the verdict of self-interest would be a proposition as to what we ought to do in our self-interest, or as to what action is best supported by reasons or considerations of self-interest. These propositions are action-guiding or normative in a familiar sense. The conflict between morality and self-interest in conflict cases is there-fore a normative conflict; it is a conflict between the overall verdicts of different normative standpoints. I take it that the question of whether morality overrides self-interest is the question of whether the verdicts of morality are normatively more important than the verdicts of self-interest. In due course, I will explain the idea of normative importance as well as the ideas of a normative proposition and of a reason. (shrink)
Jon Elster reports that in 1940, and again in 1970, the U.S. draft lottery was challenged for falling short of the legally mandated ‘random selection’. On both occasions, the physical mixing of the lots appeared to be incomplete, since the birth dates were clustered in a way that would have been extremely unlikely if the lots were fully mixed. There appears to have been no suspicion on either occasion that the deficiency in the mixing was intended, known, or believed to (...) favor or disfavor any identifiable group. If the selection was non-random in the way charged, Elster asks, was it unfair? (shrink)
Moral realism and antirealist-expressivism are of course incompatible positions. They disagree fundamentally about the nature of moral states of mind, the existence of moral states of affairs and properties, and the nature and role of moral discourse. The central realist view is that a person who has or expresses a moral thought is thereby in, or thereby expresses, a cognitive state of mind; she has or expresses a belief that represents a moral state of affairs in a way that might (...) be accurate or inaccurate. The view of antirealist-expressivism is that such a person is in, or expresses, a conative state of mind, one that consists in a certain kind of attitude or motivational stance toward something, such as an action or a person. Realism holds that moral thoughts have truth conditions and that in some cases these truth conditions are satisfied so that our moral thoughts are true. Antirealist-expressivism holds, to a first approximation, that the distinctive moral content of a moral thought does not have truth conditions. (shrink)
The priority view has become very popular in moral philosophy, but there is a serious question about how it should be formalized. The most natural formalization leads to ex post prioritarianism, which results from adding expected utility theory to the main ideas of the priority view. But ex post prioritarianism entails a claim which is too implausible for it to be a serious competitor to utilitarianism. In fact, ex post prioritarianism was probably never a genuine alternative to utilitarianism in the (...) first place. By contrast, ex ante prioritarianism is defensible. But its motivation is very different from the usual rationales offered for the priority view. Given the untenability of ex post prioritarianism, it is more natural for most friends of the priority view to revert to utilitarianism. (shrink)
When the United States and the late Soviet Union were fighting for hegemony, one of the indicators of their power was the development of space industry. Today there is an increase of competitors; at the same time, the American supremacy has increased and goals had suffered change, since stepping on ..
Este texto analiza las políticas de empleo para los trabajadores extranjeros en España, los de situación estable y los de tipo temporal. Se fija especialmente en el marco legal vigente, español y comunitario, y aporta los análisis críticos de otras perspectivas, como por ejemplo los sindicatos. Los datos demuestran que los flujos de inmigrantes tienen una creciente importancia en muchos sectores de la economía y, por tanto, la legislación debe actualizarse y abrir los ojos a la realidad para acabar con (...) las irregularidades y mejorar las condiciones contractuales de los trabajadores inmigrantes.This text analyzes the employment policies for the foreign workers in Spain, those of stable situation and those of temporary type. It is fixed specially in the legal in force, Spanish and community frame, and contributes the critical analyses of other perspectives, as for example the unions. The information demonstrates that the immigrants' flows have an increasing importance in many sectors of the economy and, therefore, the legislation must get up-to-date and open the eyes for the reality to finish with the irregularities and to improve the contractual conditions of the immigrant workers. (shrink)
Las políticas activas de empleo para el colectivo latinoamericano pretenden contribuir al incremento de las posibilidades de incorporación y mantenimiento laboral de estos trabajadores tan ligados a la cultura española, combinando, al mismo tiempo, flexibilidad y seguridad en el empleo. Además, en términos macroeconómicos, la actuación selectiva sobre la oferta y la demanda, con medidas tales como el fomento de la iniciativa privada, la ayuda a la movilidad a sectores con suficiente demanda o la creación directa de empleo, permiten reducir (...) los desequilibrios o desajustes en el mercado de trabajo.The active policies of use for the Latin American group try to contribute to the increase of the incorporation possibilities and labor maintenance of these workers so related to the Spanish culture, combining, at the same time, flexibility and security in the use. In addition, in macroeconomic terms, the selective performance on the supply and the demand, with measures such as the promotion of the deprived initiative, the aid to mobility to sectors with sufficient demand or the direct creation of use, allow to reduce to the imbalances or misalignments in the work market. (shrink)
Consequentialism is often criticized for failing to accommodate impersonal constraints and personal options. A common consequentialist response is to acknowledge the anticonsequentialist intuitions but to argue either that the consequentialist can, after all, accommodate the allegedly recalcitrant intuitions or that, where accommodation is impossible, the recalcitrant intuition can be dismissed for want of an adequate philosophical rationale. Whereas these consequentialist responses have some plausibility, associational duties represent a somewhat different challenge to consequentialism, inasmuch as they embody neither impersonal constraints nor (...) personal options, but rather personal constraints. Our intuitions about associational duties resist capture within the intellectual net of consequentialism, and such duties do admit of a philosophical rationale at least as plausible as anything the consequentialist has to offer. (shrink)
The question I shall attempt to address in what follows is an essentially historical one, namely: Why did analytic philosophy emerge first in Cambridge, in the hands of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and as a direct consequence of their revolutionary rejection of the philosophical tenets that form the basis of British Idealism? And the answer that I shall try to defend is: it didn't. That is to say, the ‘analytic’ doctrines and methods which Moore and Russell embraced in (...) the very last years of the nineteenth century were not revolutionary, did not emerge first in Cambridge, were the creation of neither Russell nor Moore and cannot be explained by appeal to facts concerning British Idealism. The adoption of the doctrines and methods which characterised the earliest manifestations of British analytic philosophy are to be explained neither by reference to anything specifically British, nor by appeal to anything unproblematically philosophical. Or so I shall argue. (shrink)
Propositions are the referents of the ‘that’-clauses that appear in the direct object positions of typical ascriptions of assertion, belief, and other binary cognitive relations. In that sense, propositions are the objects of those cognitive relations. Propositions are also the semantic contents (meanings, in one sense ) of declarative sentences, with respect to contexts. They are what sentences semantically express, with respect to contexts. Propositions also bear truth-values. The truth-value of a sentence, in a context, is the truth-value of the (...) proposition that it semantically expresses, in that context. This much is common ground among many (but not all) philosophers. I accept other claims about propositions that are more controversial. Propositions (I hold) are Russellian: they are structured entities whose constituents include individuals, properties, and relations. The contribution of a proper name to the proposition that a sentence semantically expresses (in a context) is the referent of that name. Thus, the semantic content of ‘Bill Clinton’ is Bill Clinton himself, and the semantic content of ‘Bill Clinton smokes’ is a proposition whose constituents are Bill Clinton and the property of smoking (ignoring tense, as I shall do from here on). Such 1 singular propositions are among the objects of belief, assertion, and other cognitive relations. This combination of a Millian view about proper names with a Russellian theory of propositions might appropriately be called ‘Millian Russellianism’, or ‘MR’ for short. David Chalmers, in his stimulating paper “Probability and Propositions,” defines a closely related view, Referentialism, as follows (see also the penultimate paragraph of his introduction). Referentialist views say that insofar as beliefs are about individuals (such as Nietzche), the objects of these belief are determined by those individuals. On one such view, the objects of belief are Russellian propositions composed from the individuals and properties that one’s belief is about.. (shrink)
This essay explains the inescapability of moral demands. I deny that the individual has genuine reason to comply with these demands only if she has desires that would be served by doing so. Rather, the learning of moral reasons helps to shape and channel self- and other-interested motivations so as to facilitate and promote social cooperation. This shaping happens through the “embedding” of reasons in the intentional objects of motivational propensities. The dominance of the instrumental conception of reason, according to (...) which reasons must be based in desires of the individual, has made it harder to recognize that reasons shape desires. I attempt to undermine this dominance by arguing that the concept of a self that extends over time is constructed to meet the demands of social cooperation. Prudential reasons to act on behalf of the persisting self's desires are often taken to constitute the paradigm of reasons based on desires of the individual. But such reasons, along with the very concept of the persisting self, are constructed to promote human cooperation and to shape the individual's desires. (shrink)
In 1929, doubtless to the discomfort of his logical positivist host Moritz Schlick, Wittgenstein remarked, ‘To be sure, I can understand what Heidegger means by Being and Angst ’ . I return to what Heidegger meant and Wittgenstein could understand later. I begin with that remark because it has had an instructive career. When the passage which it prefaced was first published in 1965, the editors left it out—presumably to protect a hero of ‘analytic’ philosophy from being compromised by an (...) expression of sympathy for the arch-fiend of ‘continental’ philosophy. It was as if a diary of Churchill's had been discovered containing admiring references to Hitler. This was the period, after all, when Heidegger was, as Michael Dummett recalls, a ‘joke’ among Oxford philosophers, the paradigm of the sort of metaphysical nonsense Wittgenstein had dedicated himself to exposing. (shrink)