Results for 'Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure'

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  1. Extrinsic attitudinal pleasure.Thomas A. Blackson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):277-291.
    I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness. According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form S is pleased/glad that P and S is displeased/sad that P should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation (...)
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  2. On Feldman's theory of happiness.Thomas Blackson - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):393-400.
    Fred Feldman conceives of happiness in terms of the aggregation of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure, but he distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and excludes extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure from the aggregation that constitutes happiness. I argue that Feldman has not provided a strong reason for this exclusion.
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  3. Attitudinal Pleasure in Plato’s Philebus.Brooks A. Sommerville - 2019 - Phronesis 64 (3):247-276.
    This paper addresses two interpretive puzzles in Plato’s Philebus. The first concerns the claim, endorsed by both interlocutors, that the most godlike of lives is a pleasureless life of pure thinking. This appears to run afoul of the verdict of the earlier so-called ‘Choice of Lives’ argument that a mixed life is superior to either of its ‘pure’ rivals. A second concerns Socrates’ discussion of false pleasure, in which he appears to be guilty of rank equivocation. I argue that (...)
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  4. The Limits of Hedonism: Feldman on the Value of Attitudinal Pleasure.Serena Olsaretti - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):409-415.
    This paper is part of a book symposium on Fred Feldman's, *Pleasure and the Good Life*. I argue that Feldman’s defence of hedonism, although successful on its own terms, is of less significance than it may seem at first, for two main reasons. First, Feldman’s defence of the claim that attitudinal pleasures are the chief good is either implausible or crucially incomplete. Second, Feldman’s claim that hedonists can overcome the objections levelled against them while remaining pure hedonists is (...)
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  5. Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure.Eden Lin - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):510-524.
    On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious (...)
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  6. Unconscious Pleasures and Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure.Chris Heathwood - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):219-227.
    This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations (...)
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  7. Attitudinal Theories of Pleasure and De Re Desires.Elizabeth Ventham - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (3):361-369.
    This article has two main aims. First, it will defend an ‘attitudinal’ account of pleasure, that is, an account of what it is that makes an experience pleasurable for a subject that explains it in terms of a certain kind of de re desire that the subject has towards that experience. Second, in doing so, the article aims to further our understanding of unconscious desires, and of what the subjects of such desires can be. The article begins by (...)
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  8.  67
    Unconscious Pleasures and Pains: A Problem for Attitudinal Theories?Fred Feldman - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):472-482.
  9. Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Fred Feldman.
    Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining the question about the Good Life. As he understands it, the question is not about the morally good life or about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the general features of the life that is good in itself for (...)
  10. Unconscious Pleasure as Dispositional Pleasure.James Fanciullo - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    A good deal of recent debate over the nature of pleasure and pain has surrounded the alleged phenomenon of unconscious sensory pleasure and pain, or pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them while experiencing them. According to Ben Bramble, these putative pleasures and pains present a problem for attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, since these theories claim that what makes something a sensory pleasure or pain is that one has a special (...)
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  11.  65
    Happiness, Pleasure, and Belief.Edward Skidelsky - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):435-446.
    This paper argues that happiness and pleasure are distinct states of mind because they stand in a distinct logical relation to belief. Roughly, being happy about a state of affairs s implies that one believes that s satisfies the description ‘s’ and that it is in some way good, whereas taking pleasure in s does not. In particular, Fred Feldman's analysis of happiness in terms of attitudinal pleasure overlooks this distinction.
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  12. Unknown pleasures.Ben Bramble - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1333-1344.
    According to attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, what makes a given sensation count as a pleasure or a pain is just the attitudes of the experiencing agent toward it. In a previous article, I objected to such theories on the grounds that they cannot account for pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them at the time of experience. Recently, Chris Heathwood and Fred Feldman, the two leading contemporary defenders of attitudinal theories, have (...)
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  13.  68
    A half dozen puzzles regarding intrinsic attitudinal hedonism.Michael R. Depaul - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):629-635.
    I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory (...)
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  14. How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.
    A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis (...)
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  15. An examination of the role of attitudinal characteristics and motivation on the cheating behavior of business students.Jeanette A. Davy, Joel F. Kincaid, Kenneth J. Smith & Michelle A. Trawick - 2007 - Ethics and Behavior 17 (3):281 – 302.
    This study examines cheating behaviors among 422 business students at two public Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business-accredited business schools. Specifically, we examined the simultaneous influence of attitudinal characteristics and motivational factors on reported prior cheating behavior, the tendency to neutralize cheating behaviors, and likelihood of future cheating. In addition, we examined the impact of in-class deterrents on neutralization of cheating behaviors and the likelihood of future cheating. We also directly tested potential mediating effects of neutralization on cheating (...)
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  16. The nature of pleasure: A critique of Feldman.Elinor Mason - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (3):379-387.
    In these remarks on Feldman's recent book, Pleasure and the Good Life, I concentrate on Feldman's account of pleasure as attitudinal. I argue that an account of pleasure according to which pleasure need not have any feel is implausible. I suggest that Feldman could avoid this problem but retain the advantages of his attitudinal hedonism by giving an account of the attitude such that the attitude has a feel.
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  17. An Honest Look at Hybrid Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):887-907.
    What makes it the case that a given experience is pleasurable? According to the felt-quality theory, each pleasurable experience is pleasurable because of the way that it feels—its “qualitative character” or “felt-quality”. According to the attitudinal theory, each pleasurable experience is pleasurable because the experiencer takes certain attitudes towards it. These two theories of pleasure are typically framed as rivals, but it could be that they are both partly right. It could be that pleasure is partly a (...)
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  18. Intrinsic and extrinsic value and valuation.Rem B. Edwards - 1979 - Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (2):133-143.
    This article critically examines the several definitions of, or elements of a single definition of, Robert S. Hartman's understanding of “intrinsic values,” “intrinsic evaluations,” “extrinsic values,” and “extrinsic valuations”. [I have since changed my mind about what is said in the last few sentences. I now think, with Hartman, that only unique, non-repeatable, conscious individuals have intrinsic worth. Repeatable qualities like pleasure and knowledge are “good for us” properties, but not “good in, to, and for themselves” or (...)
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  19.  67
    The Good Life: A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):604-628.
    What makes a life go well for the one who lives it? Hedonists hold that pleasure enhances the value of a life; pain diminishes it. Hedonism has been subjected to a number of objections. Some are (a) based on the claim that hedonism is a form of “mental statism”. Others are (b) based on the claim that some pleasures are base or degrading. Yet others are (c) based on the claim that when a bad person enjoys a pleasure, (...)
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  20.  11
    Teaching Students to Feel Pleasure and Pain at the Wrong Thing.Brian A. Williams - 2022 - Principia: A Journal of Classical Education 1 (1):92-113.
    Despite their ubiquity and widespread acceptance in contemporary education, formal grading systems are relatively recent innovations in the history and philosophy of education. Far from innocuous tools which aid the student’s academic development, grades and grading systems developed as ad hoc tools for ranking students against one another in academic competitions. This article examines the history of assessment, grades, and grading in light of the longer tradition of education and suggests alternative practices could better orient students toward the true, good, (...)
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  21. The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure.Daniel Pallies & Alexander Dietz - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In virtue of what do we enjoy episodes of pleasure? According to the phenomenological theory of pleasure, we enjoy pleasures in virtue of having certain kinds of phenomenal experiences. According to the attitude theory of pleasure, we enjoy pleasures in virtue of having a certain kind of pro-attitude. In this chapter, we show that the attitude theory faces a dilemma. The attitude that is relevant to pleasure—the desire, liking, or favoring—is either necessarily co-instantiated with certain phenomenology, (...)
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  22. Varieties of hedonism in Feldman's pleasure and the good life.Alastair Norcross - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (3):388-397.
    In these comments on Fred Feldman's Pleasure and the Good Life, I first challenge the dichotomy between sensory and attitudinal hedonisms as perhaps presenting a false dilemma. I suggest that there may be a form of hedonism that employs the concept of a that is not purely sensory. Next, I raise some problems for several of the versions of hedonism explored in the book.
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  23.  46
    Clearing our Minds for Hedonic Phenomenalism.Lorenzo Buscicchi & Willem van der Deijl - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    What constitutes the nature of pleasure? According to hedonic phenomenalism, pleasant experiences are pleasant in virtue of some phenomenological features. According to hedonic attitudinalism, pleasure involves an attitude—a class of mental states that necessarily have an object. Consequently, pleasures are always _about_ something. We argue that hedonic attitudinalism is not able to accommodate pleasant moods. We first consider this argument more generally, and then consider what we call _the globalist strategy response_ to the possible objectless of moods, namely (...)
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  24. The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being.Eden Lin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):99-114.
    A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In (...)
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  25. Buddhism, naturalism, and the pursuit of happiness.Charles Goodman - 2014 - Zygon 49 (1):220-230.
    Owen Flanagan's important book The Bodhisattva's Brain presents a naturalized interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. Although the overall approach of the book is very promising, certain aspects of its presentation could benefit from further reflection. Traditional teachings about reincarnation do not contradict the doctrine of no self, as Flanagan seems to suggest; however, they are empirically rather implausible. Flanagan's proposed “tame” interpretation of karma is too thin; we can do better at fitting karma into a scientific worldview. The relationship between eudaimonist (...)
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  26.  54
    Two Visions of Welfare.Fred Feldman - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):99-118.
    In earlier work I defended Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism—a view about what makes for individual personal welfare. On this view, a person’s level of welfare is entirely determined by the amounts of intrinsic attitudinal pleasure and pain he or she takes in things. The view seems to run into trouble in cases involving individuals who take their pleasure in disgusting, immoral things; and in cases involving individuals who take their pleasure in things that really don’t actually (...)
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  27.  87
    Reply to Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross.Fred Feldman - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (3):398-406.
    In comments originally presented at the ISUS conference at Dartmouth College in 2005, Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross raised a number of objections to various things I said in Pleasure and the Good Life. One especially interesting objection concerns one of my central claims about the nature of pleasure. I distinguished between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure. I said that a feeling counts as a sensory pleasure if the one who feels it takes intrinsic (...)
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  28.  12
    Comments on Two of Depaul’s Puzzles.Michael R. Depaul - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):636-639.
    I’m not sure one even needs to think a state of affairs is true for us to take attitudinal pleasure in it. We surely take pleasure in imagining states of affairs. In such a case, we are well aware that the state of affairs that is the object of our enjoyment does not obtain. What is the proper account of the pleasure we take from imagining? I am fairly sure this is not a type of sensory (...)
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  29.  38
    New Reflections on the Mirror: the Interests Proximity Bias Solution.Ricardo Miguel & Diogo Santos - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1527-1542.
    We worry about becoming non-existent, but not about coming into being. But both events are similarly bad according to Deprivationism; hence, it seems that we should display symmetric attitudes towards both. This entails the implausible conclusion that we should display negative attitudes towards the time of our birth. In a series of articles Brueckner and Fischer offered one of the most prominent attempts to block this conclusion by appealing to a temporal bias towards future pleasures. Inspired by Yi’s criticism of (...)
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  30. More Than a Feeling.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically (...)
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  31. Reflective blindness, depression and unpleasant experiences.Elizabeth Ventham - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):684-693.
    This paper defends a desire-based understanding of pleasurable and unpleasant experiences. More specifically, the thesis is that what makes an experience pleasant/unpleasant is the subject having a certain kind of desire about that experience. I begin by introducing the ‘Desire Account’ in more detail, and then go on to explain and refute a prominent set of contemporary counter-examples, based on subjects who might have ‘Reflective Blindness’, looking particularly at the example of subjects with depression. I aim to make the Desire (...)
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  32.  22
    On Saying It Hurts: Performativity and Politics of Pain.Grant Duncan - 2019 - In Marc A. Russo, Joletta Belton, Bronwyn Lennox Thompson, Smadar Bustan, Marie Crowe, Deb Gillon, Cate McCall, Jennifer Jordan, James E. Eubanks, Michael E. Farrell, Brandon S. Barndt, Chandler L. Bolles, Maria Vanushkina, James W. Atchison, Helena Lööf, Christopher J. Graham, Shona L. Brown, Andrew W. Horne, Laura Whitburn, Lester Jones, Colleen Johnston-Devin, Florin Oprescu, Marion Gray, Sara E. Appleyard, Chris Clarke, Zehra Gok Metin, John Quintner, Melanie Galbraith, Milton Cohen, Emma Borg, Nathaniel Hansen, Tim Salomons & Grant Duncan (eds.), Meanings of Pain: Volume 2: Common Types of Pain and Language. Springer Verlag. pp. 283-301.
    Pain and pleasure affect us all. Knowing this with empathy, and acting upon it, civilises us. Without such empathy, pain can become a means of domination and injustice. Moreover, pain is expressed and responded to in all social contexts, and the word “pain” has diverse meanings, depending on the associated activities. To observe various ways in which we say that it hurts, and the many meanings of pain, I follow ordinary-language philosophy, particularly Ludwig Wittgenstein and John L Austin, and (...)
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  33.  72
    Are Emotions Evaluative Modes?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):271-292.
    Following Meinong, many philosophers have been attracted by the view that emotions have intrinsically evaluative correctness conditions. On one version of this view, emotions have evaluative contents. On another version, emotions are evaluative attitudes; they are evaluative at the level of intentional mode rather than content. We raise objections against the latter version, showing that the only two ways of implementing it are hopeless. Either emotions are manifestly evaluative or they are not. In the former case, the Attitudinal View (...)
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  34.  39
    Workplace Values and Outcomes: Exploring Personal, Organizational, and Interactive Workplace Spirituality.Robert W. Kolodinsky, Robert A. Giacalone & Carole L. Jurkiewicz - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2):465-480.
    Spiritual values in the workplace, increasingly discussed and applied in the business ethics literature, can be viewed from an individual, organizational, or interactive perspective. The following study examined previously unexplored workplace spirituality outcomes. Using data collected from five samples consisting of full-time workers taking graduate coursework, results indicated that perceptions of organizational-level spirituality (“organizational spirituality”) appear to matter most to attitudinal and attachment-related outcomes. Specifically, organizational spirituality was found to be positively related to job involvement, organizational identification, and work (...)
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  35.  9
    Asi habló Zaratustra una subervisión de la temporalidad.Rebeca Maldonado - 2000 - Signos Filosóficos 4:135-143.
    "Así­ habló Zaratustra: Una subversión de la temporalidad" En La gaya ciencia, Nietzsche habí­a percibido ya el vací­o sobre el cual se asienta la existencia humana con la muerte de Dios. En Asi habló Zaratustra descubre que el sentido originario de la existencia no es el dolor ni el sufrimiento sino el placer y la risa. Así­, Zaratustra abre el abismo del hombre, su lugar sin Dios, para descubrir en el gozo la posibilidad de sí­ntesis entre la voluntad y el (...)
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  36. Hedonic Value.Stuart Rachels - 1998 - Syracuse University.
    In this essay I support, develop and apply a theory of hedonic value. These tasks are interwoven, but principally, I support the theory in chapters 1-4, develop it in chapters 5 and 6, and apply it to a challenging cluster of problems in chapter 7. ;Sentient experience, I suggest in chapter 1, provides key evidence for founding ethics: a severely painful experience gives its subject evidence that it's bad in some way. Moreover, similar considerations, as well as analogies, support thinking (...)
     
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  37.  43
    Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):45-63.
    Following Moore, value invariabilists deny that the intrinsic value of something can be affected by features extrinsic to it. The primary focuses of this paper are (i) to examine the invariabilistic thesis and expand upon how we ought to understand it, in light of contemporary axiological distinctions, and (ii) to argue that distinguishing between different kinds of invariabilism provides resources to undermine a prominent argument against variabilism. First, I use two contemporary axiological distinctions to clarify what kind of value (...)
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  38. For the Sake of the Friendship: Relationality and Relationship as Grounds of Beneficence.Thaddeus Metz - 2010 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 57 (125):54-76.
    I contend that there are important moral reasons for individuals, organisations and states to aid others that have gone largely unrecognised in the literature. Most of the acknowledged reasons for acting beneficently in the absence of a promise to do so are either impartial and intrinsic, on the one hand, being grounded in properties internal to and universal among individuals, such as their pleasure or autonomy, or partial and extrinsic, on the other, being grounded in non-universal properties regarding (...)
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  39.  17
    Reason over passion: the social basis of evaluation and appraisal.Evan Simpson - 1979 - Waterloo, ON, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
    "Reason is not passion's slave." Rather, the author argues, reason appraises the cultural appropriateness of passion, thus directing our attitudinal behaviour. He refutes those theories of value which correspond philosophically to societies described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: societies of "honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, pleasure without happiness." His argument, which takes into account traditional philosophic positions, is divided into five parts: Attitudes, Evaluation, Characterization, Culture, Morality.
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  40. Hedonism as the Explanation of Value.David Brax - 2009 - Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis defends a hedonistic theory of value consisting of two main components. Part 1 offers a theory of pleasure. Pleasures are experiences distinguished by a distinct phenomenological quality. This quality is attitudinal in nature: it is the feeling of liking. The pleasure experience is also an object of this attitude: when feeling pleasure, we like what we feel, and part of how it feels is how this liking feels: Pleasures are Internally Liked Experiences. Pleasure (...)
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  41. The motivational state of the virtuous agent.Lorraine Besser-Jones - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):93 - 108.
    Julia Annas argues that Aristotle's understanding of the phenomenological experience of the virtuous agent corresponds to psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's concept of the ?flow,? which is a form of intrinsic motivation. In this paper, I explore whether or not Annas? understanding of virtuous agency is a plausible one. After a thorough analysis of psychological accounts of intrinsic and extrinsic states of motivation, I argue that despite the attractiveness of Annas? understanding of virtuous agency, it is subject to a serious problem: (...)
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  42.  12
    Reply to Cover’s 1993 Review of Leibniz’s Metaphysics.Catherine Wilson - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4:5-8.
    It is an honor to have been given the opportunity by the editor to reply to J.A. Cover’s review of Leibniz’s Metaphysics, and to have a chance to revisit, five years after the book’s publication, the still-active battleground of intrinsic and extrinsic properties, the extensionality and intensionality of perception, and the reality of aggregates and to say more, a little informally perhaps, about about some methodological questions in Leibniz scholarship. Cover’s review when it appeared gave me a great deal (...)
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  43.  4
    Reason Over Passion: The Social Basis of Evaluation and Appraisal.Evan Simpson - 1979 - Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier Press.
    "Reason is not passion's slave." Rather, the author argues, reason appraises the cultural appropriateness of passion, thus directing our attitudinal behaviour. He refutes those theories of value which correspond philosophically to societies described by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: societies of "honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, pleasure without happiness." His argument, which takes into account traditional philosophic positions, is divided into five parts: Attitudes, Evaluation, Characterization, Culture, Morality.
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  44.  32
    Reply to Cover’s 1993 Review of Leibniz’s Metaphysics.Catherine Wilson - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4:5-8.
    It is an honor to have been given the opportunity by the editor to reply to J.A. Cover’s review of Leibniz’s Metaphysics, and to have a chance to revisit, five years after the book’s publication, the still-active battleground of intrinsic and extrinsic properties, the extensionality and intensionality of perception, and the reality of aggregates and to say more, a little informally perhaps, about about some methodological questions in Leibniz scholarship. Cover’s review when it appeared gave me a great deal (...)
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  45. A Relational Theory of Mental Illness: Lacking Identity and Solidarity.Thaddeus Metz - 2021 - Synthesis Philosophica 71 (1):65-81.
    In this article I aim to make progress towards the philosophical goal of ascertaining what, if anything, all mental illnesses have in common, attempting to unify a large sub-set of them that have a relational or interpersonal dimension. One major claim is that, if we want a promising theory of mental illness, we must go beyond the dominant western accounts of mental illness/health, which focus on traits intrinsic to a person such as pain/pleasure, lethargy/liveliness, fragmentation/integration, and falsehood/authenticity. A second (...)
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  46. Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity.Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.) - 2019 - London: Routledge.
    A collection, edited by David Bain, Michael Brady, and Jennifer Corns, originating in our Value of Suffering Project. Table of Contents: Michael Wheeler - ‘How should affective phenomena be studied?’; Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni – ‘Pleasures, unpleasures, and emotions’; Hilla Jacobson – ‘The attitudinal representational theory of painfulness fleshed out’; Tim Schroeder – ‘What we represent when we represent the badness of getting hurt’; Hagit Benbaji – ‘A defence of the inner view of pain’; Olivier Massin – ‘Suffering (...)
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  47. Intrinsicalism and conditionalism about final value.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.
    The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of (...)
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  48.  30
    Kant on Feelings, Sensations and the Gap Between Rationality and Morality.Alexander Rueger - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (1):125-148.
    In §3 of the Critique of Judgement Kant argues that if the feeling of pleasure were a sensation distinct from whatever representation gives rise to the feeling, then we would be – in the terminology of the Metaphysics of Morals – rational beings but not moral beings ; we would inescapably be hedonists. I reconstruct this at first glance strange argument and suggest, first, that Kant’s actual view of pleasure is an attitudinal theory that avoids the problem (...)
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  49. The Rectitude of Inclination.Nicholas Ingham - 1996 - The Thomist 60 (3):417-437.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE RECTITUDE OF INCLINATION NICHOLAS INGHAM, 0.P. Provincial Archives Providence, Rhode Island 0 F THE MOST plausible mainline treatments of the relation of inclination to action and of their combination to moral estimation-Kantian, Classical Utilitarian, and Aristotelian-Thomist--only the third, remarkably enough, provides for the possibility of intrinsic rectitude as regards inclination. For Kant, of course, inclination is not only indifferent to morality but censurable as a criterion for action; (...)
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    Nature-Based Physical Activity and Hedonic and Eudaimonic Wellbeing: The Mediating Roles of Motivational Quality and Nature Relatedness.Matthew Jenkins, Craig Lee, Susan Houge Mackenzie, Elaine Anne Hargreaves, Ken Hodge & Jessica Calverley - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    The current study evaluated the degree to which nature-based physical activity influenced two distinct types of psychological wellbeing: hedonic wellbeing and eudaimonic wellbeing. The type of motivation an individual experiences for physical activity, and the extent to which individuals have a sense of relatedness with nature, have been shown to influence the specific type of psychological wellbeing that is experienced as a result of NPA. However, the role of these two variables in the relationship between NPA and psychological wellbeing has (...)
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