Results for 'normative facts'

999 found
Order:
  1.  98
    III—Normative Facts and Reasons.Fabienne Peter - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):53-75.
    The main aim of this paper is to identify a type of fact-given warrant for action that is distinct from reason-based justification for action and defend the view that there are two types of practical warrant. The idea that there are two types of warrant is familiar in epistemology, but has not received much attention in debates on practical normativity. On the view that I will defend, normative facts, qua facts, give rise to entitlement warrant for action. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2.  22
    On Pre-Conventions as ‘Normative Facts’.Luís Duarte D’Almeida - 2017 - Revus.
    In his essay “Pre-Conventions: A Fragment of the Background”, Bruno Celano seems to endorse three claims about what he calls ‘pre-conventions’: that such ‘entities’ exist; that they are neither rules nor de facto regularities; and that their ‘character’ is at once factual and normative: that pre-conventions are “literally, ‘normative facts’.” I suggest that and are not particularly striking claims, and that Celano’s case for is unpersuasive.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  21
    Celano on Normative Facts.Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido - 2016 - Revus.
    In “Pre-Conventions. A Fragment of the Background”, Celano argues that there are ways of acting that can be called “conventions” which are, literally, normative facts. There are a number of interesting claims in Celano’s paper about the nature of these conventions, and showing that they amount to normative facts is only part of his strategy for establishing their significance. But given that the question of whether there are normative facts deserves a treatment of its (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Hartian Positivism and Normative Facts : How Facts Make Law II.Mark Greenberg - 2006 - In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I deploy an argument that I have developed in a number of recent papers in the service of three projects. First, I show that the most influential version of legal positivism – that associated with H.L.A. Hart – fails. The argument’s engine is a requirement that a constitutive account of legal facts must meet. According to this rational-relation requirement, it is not enough for a constitutive account of legal facts to specify non-legal facts that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  5. Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246–272.
    Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse (by which I mean our practice of evaluating beliefs as justified or unjustified, and so forth) are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotent as well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  11
    Do Normative Facts Need to Explain?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):246-272.
    Much moral skepticism stems from the charge that moral facts do not figure in causal explanations. However, philosophers committed to normative epistemological discourse are in no position to demand that normative facts serve such a role, since epistemic facts are causally impotentas well. I argue instead that pragmatic reasons can justify our continued participation in practices which, like morality and epistemology, do not servethe function of causal explanation.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  35
    The Creation of Normative Facts.Carsten Heidemann - 2000 - Law and Philosophy 19 (2):263-281.
    In Kelsen's formalist and reductionist theory of law, the concepts of `authority' and `competence' may be explained exclusively in terms of those norms on which the validity of other legal norms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describes the nature of these norms in different ways; at least three different conceptions can be distinguished. A rational reconstruction of the most plausible of these conceptions will understand sentences expressing such `norms of competence' either to state truth conditions for normative (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
    This paper is about the relationship between two widely accepted and apparently conflicting claims about how we should understand the notion of ‘reason giving’ invoked in theorising about reasons for action. According to the first claim, reasons are given by facts about the situation of agents. According to the second claim, reasons are given by ends. I argue that the apparent conflict between these two claims is less deep than is generally recognised.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  9.  26
    Grounding Thick Normative Facts.Justin Morton - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Many philosophers have been concerned with the nature of thick normative concepts. In this paper, I try to motivate a different project: understanding the nature of thick normative properties and facts. I propose a ground-theoretic approach to this project. I then argue that some of the simplest and most initially plausible ways of understanding thick facts fail, and that we are forced to accept some initially implausible views. I try to show how these views are not (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Ethics, Fitting Attitudes, and Practical Reason: A Theory of Normative Facts.Howard Nye - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I present and defend (1) an account of ethical judgments as judgments about our reasons to feel specific motivationally laden attitudes, (2) an account of what an agent should do in terms of what would achieve ends that she has reason to be motivated to pursue, and (3) an account of an agent’s reasons for motivation (and thus action) in terms of the prescriptions of the most fundamental principles that guide her deliberations. Using these accounts, I explain the connection between (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts: A Reply to Habermas.Robert Brandom - 2000 - European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):356–374.
  12. The Is-Ought Correlation in Neo-Confucian Qi-Realism: How Normative Facts Exist in Natural States of Qi.JeeLoo Liu - 2011 - Contemporary Chinese Thought 43 (1):60-77.
  13.  10
    Facts, Norms, and Normative Facts: A Reply to Habermas.Robert Brandom - 2000 - European Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):356-374.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  14.  7
    Do Normative Facts Matter... To What is Feasible?Geoffrey Brennan & Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 2016 - Social Philosophy and Policy 33 (1-2):434-456.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  20
    Normative Facts.Peter Schaber - unknown
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  7
    Ethics and Science: Some Normative Facts and a Conclusion. [REVIEW]Arnold Berleant - 1977 - Journal of Value Inquiry 11 (4):244-258.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  12
    Abductive Moral Arguments and Godless Normative Realism: An Evaluation of Explanations for Moral Facts and Motivations for Moral Behavior.Jonathan Smith - 2020 - Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1).
    Within this paper, I examine Godless normative realism, a naturalistic explanation of morality given by Erik Wielenberg and determine whether the theory poses a threat to abductive moral arguments for the existence of God. In particular, I argue that Wielenberg’s theory is a possible explanation for the existence of moral facts and that it offers a motivation for one to act morally, but that theism, as a whole, remains a better explanation for the moral aspects of the world. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. How Insensitive: Principles, Facts and Normative Grounds in Cohen’s Critique of Rawls.Daniel Kofman - 2012 - Socialist Studies 8 (1):246-268.
    Cohen’s hostility to Rawls’ justification of the Difference Principle by social facts spawned Cohen’s general thesis that ultimate principles of justice and morality are fact-insensitive, but explain how any fact-sensitive principle is grounded in facts. The problem with this thesis, however, is that when facts F ground principle P, reformulating this relation as the "fact-insensitive" conditional “If F, then P” is trivial and thus explanatorily impotent. Explanatory, hence justificatory, force derives either from subsumption under more general principles, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  69
    Normative Reasons Qua Facts and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy: A Response to Rønnow-Rasmussen.Jamie Buckland - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):207-225.
    This paper offers a defence of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons for action from scepticism aired by Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. In response it is argued that the Nagelian notion of an agent-neutral reason is not incomprehensible, and that agent-neutral reasons can indeed be understood as obtaining states of affairs that count in favour of anyone and everyone performing the action they favour. Furthermore, I argue that a distinction drawn between agent-neutral and agent-relative reason-statements that express the salient features of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  20. Realizing Deliberative Democracy as a Mode of Inquiry: Pragmatism, Social Facts, and Normative Theory.James Bohman - 2004 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 18 (1):23-43.
  21. On the Normative Significance of Brute Facts.Ram Neta - 2004 - Legal Theory 10 (3):199-214.
  22. Is There Any Normative Claim Internal to Stating Facts?Andreas Dorschel - 1988 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 21:5-16.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  59
    Facts, Values, and Normative Supervenience.Stephen W. Ball - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (2):143 - 172.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24.  4
    Back to the Facts. Herder on the Normative Role of Sensibility and Imagination.Anik Waldow - 2013 - In Martin Lenz & Anik Waldow (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy. New York: Springer. pp. 115-133.
    n his 1785 review of Herder’s Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit Kant stresses the negative effects of sensibility and imagination in undermining philosophy. This essay will offer a defence of Herder against Kant in order to gesture towards a more positive account of the cognitive function of these capacities. I will argue that the eighteenth-century fascination with the experimental sciences and the demand to engage in anti-speculative philosophy in fact called for the integration of sensibility and imagination. The reason for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  82
    Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts.Neil MacCormick - 1998 - Law and Philosophy 17 (3):301-345.
    Norms explained as grounds of practical judgment, using example of queue. Some norms informal, inexact, depend on common understanding ; some articulated in context of two-tier normative order: `rules', explicit or implicit. Logical structure of rules displayed. Informal and formal normative order explained, `institutional facts ' depend on acts and events interpreted in the light of normative order. Practical force of rules differentiated; either `absolute application' or `strict application' or `discretionary application', depending on second-tier empowerment. Discretion (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26.  63
    Against Deliberative Indispensability as an Independent Guide to What There Is.Brendan Cline - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3235-3254.
    David Enoch has recently proposed that the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative facts suffices to support their inclusion in our ontology, even if they are not necessary for the explanation of any observable phenomena. He challenges dissenters to point to a relevant asymmetry between explanation and deliberation that shows why explanatory indispensability, but not deliberative indispensability, is a legitimate guide to ontology. In this paper, I aim to do just that. Given that an entity figures in the actual (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Primary Reasons as Normative Reasons.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue that Davidson's conception of motivating reasons as belief-desire pairs suggests a model of normative reasons for action that is superior to the orthodox conception according to which normative reasons are propositions, facts, or the truth-makers of such facts.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Can Character Traits Be Based on Brute Psychological Facts?Iskra Fileva - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):233-251.
    Some of our largely unchosen first-order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally-laden character traits. This observation is in tension with the plausible idea that virtues and vices are based on reasons. I propose a way to resolve the tension.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Grounding and Normative Explanation.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):155-178.
    This paper concerns non-causal normative explanations such as ‘This act is wrong because/in virtue of__’. The familiar intuition that normative facts aren't brute or ungrounded but anchored in non- normative facts seems to be in tension with the equally familiar idea that no normative fact can be fully explained in purely non- normative terms. I ask whether the tension could be resolved by treating the explanatory relation in normative explanations as the sort (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  30. Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language, by Stephen Finlay. [REVIEW]Daniel Fogal - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):281-288.
    Stephen Finlay’s Confusion of Tongues is a bold and sophisticated book. The overarching goal is metaphysical: to reductively analyze normative facts, properties, and relations in terms of non-normative facts, properties, and relations. But the method is linguistic: to first provide a reductive analysis of the corresponding bits of normative language, with a particular focus on ‘good’, ‘ought’, and ‘reason’. The gap between language and reality is then bridged by taking linguistic analysis as a guide to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31.  57
    Normative Reasons: Response-Dependence and the Problem of Idealization.Marko Jurjako - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):261-275.
    David Enoch, in his paper “Why Idealize?”, argues that theories of normative reasons that hold that normative facts are subject or response-dependent and include an idealization condition might have a problem in justifying the need for idealization. I argue that at least some response-dependence conceptions of normative reasons can justify idealization. I explore two ways of responding to Enoch’s challenge. One way involves a revisionary stance on the ontological commitments of the normative discourse about reasons. (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Facts, Principles, and Politics.Enzo Rossi - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2):505-520.
    Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  33. Metanormative Contextualism and Normative Uncertainty.John Pittard & Alex Worsnip - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):155-193.
    We offer a new argument in favour of metanormative contextualism, the thesis that the semantic value of a normative ‘ought’ claim of the form ‘ S ought to Φ’ depends on the value of one or more parameters whose values vary in a way that is determined by the context of utterance. The debate over this contextualist thesis has centred on cases that involve ‘ought’ claims made in the face of uncertainty regarding certain descriptive facts. Contextualists, relativists, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Logical and Epistemic Foundationalism About Grounding: The Triviality of Facts and Principles.Robert Jubb - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (4):337-353.
    In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen ’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘ Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  35.  19
    Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False.Spencer Case - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1):1-20.
    Normative pluralism is the view that practical reason consists in an irreducible plurality of normative domains, that these domains sometimes issue conflicting recommendations and that, when this happens, there is never any one thing that one ought simpliciter to do. Here I argue against this view, noting that normative pluralism must be either unrestricted or restricted. Unrestricted pluralism maintains that all coherent standards are reason-generating normative domains, whereas restricted pluralism maintains that only some are. Unrestricted pluralism, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  36.  36
    Normativity and Moral Psychology : The Social Intuitionist Model and a World Without Normative Moral Rules?Radosław Zyzik - 2011 - In Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek (eds.), The Normativity of Law. Copernicus Center Press.
    The paper pores over the recent conceptions of normative judgement developed against the background of advances in psychology and neuroscience. It begins by analyzing what normative claim of morality and law consists of before presenting and criticizing the Social Intuitionist Model of normative judgement developed by Jonathan Haidt. The model poses serious challenges for well-established normative concepts, and the concept of normativity as objective reason for action in particular. A question is asked of what the relationship (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37.  40
    Mechanisms of Illocutionary Games.Maciej Witek - 2015 - Language and Communication 42:11-22.
    The paper develops a score-keeping model of illocutionary games and uses it to account for mechanisms responsible for creating institutional facts construed as rights and commitments of participants in a dialogue. After introducing the idea of Austinian games—understood as abstract entities representing different levels of the functioning of discourse—the paper defines the main categories of the proposed model: interactional negotiation, illocutionary score, appropriateness rules and kinematics rules. Finally, it discusses the phenomenon of accommodation as it occurs in illocutionary games (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  14
    Celano: Ontological Commitment and Normative Bite.José Juan Moreso - 2016 - Revus 30:77-80.
    In his article on pre-conventions, Celano presents, what the author calls, the Ontological Commitment Thesis and the Normative Bite Thesis. In this short comment, the author argues that the two theses are together both incompatible with the idea that pre-conventions are facts which have causal powers in human behaviour; also, if the ontological thesis is abandoned, normative determination could not be obtained. In other terms, the author argues that either pre-conventions are part of our causal explanation of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  31
    On Judicial Ascertainment of Facts.Csaba Varga - 1991 - Ratio Juris 4 (1):61-71.
    I. Playing a Game II. The Precondition to Mete out a Legal Sanction III. A Non-cognitively Homogeneous Activity IV. The Reproduction of the Law as a System 1. The Claim for Normative Closedness 2. The Openness of the Communication about Facts Rule of law proclaims the ethos of legal distinctiveness through institutionalizing normative closure, while the rule of facts proclaims a legal functioning embedded in facts as rooted in common sense evidence, backed by practical openness (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. The Normative Force of Reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
    What exactly is reasoning? Like many other philosophers, I shall endorse a broadly causal conception of reasoning. Reasoning is a causal process, in which one mental event (say, one’s accepting the conclusion of a certain argument) is caused by an antecedent mental event (say, one’s considering the premises of the argument). Just like causal accounts of action and causal accounts of perception, causal accounts of reasoning have to confront a version of what has come to be known as the problem (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  41.  90
    How Facts Make Law.Mark Greenberg - 2006 - In Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford University Press. pp. 157-198.
    I offer a new argument against the legal positivist view that non-normative social facts can themselves determine the content of the law. I argue that the nature of the determination relation in law is rational determination: the contribution of law-determining practices to the content of the law must be based on reasons. That is why it must be possible in principle to explain what makes the law have the content that it does. It follows, I argue, that non- (...) facts about statutes, judicial decisions, and other practices cannot themselves determine the content of the law. A full account must appeal to considerations independent of the practices that determine the relevance of the practices to the content of the law. Normative facts are the best candidates. (shrink)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  42. A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories.Mark Greenberg - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper concern not (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  43.  67
    'Along an Imperfectly-Lighted Path': Practical Rationality and Normative Uncertainty.Andrew Sepielli - unknown
    Nobody's going to object to the advice "Do the right thing", but that doesn't mean everyone's always going to follow it. Sometimes this is because of our volitional limitations; we cannot always bring ourselves to make the sacrifices that right action requires. But sometimes this is because of our cognitive limitations; we cannot always be sure of what is right. Sometimes we can't be sure of what's right because we don't know the non-normative facts. But sometimes, even if (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  44. Normative Appeals to the Natural.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):279 - 314.
    Surprisingly, many ethical realists and anti-realists, naturalists and not, all accept some version of the following normative appeal to the natural (NAN): evaluative and normative facts hold solely in virtue of natural facts, where their naturalness is part of what fits them for the job. This paper argues not that NAN is false but that NAN has no adequate non-parochial justification (a justification that relies only on premises which can be accepted by more or less everyone (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  45.  92
    Meta‐Normative Realism, Evolution, and Our Reasons to Survive.Jeff Behrends - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):486-502.
    In this article, I articulate and respond to an epistemological challenge to meta-normative realism. The challenge has it that, if realism about the normative is correct, and if evolutionary forces have significantly influenced our normative judgments, then it would be a remarkable coincidence if the content of the normative facts and our normative judgments were aligned. I criticize David Enoch's recent attempt to meet this challenge, but provide an alternative response that is structurally similar. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  46.  25
    Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Joshua Gert offers an original account of normative facts and properties, those which have implications for how we ought to behave. He argues that our ability to think and talk about normative notions such as reasons and benefits is dependent on how we respond to the world around us, including how we respond to the actions of other people.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  47.  70
    Grounding the Normative: A Problem for Structured Non-Naturalism.Justin Morton - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):173-196.
    Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse the view that some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative facts and normative principles. In this paper, I argue that non-naturalism is inconsistent with this thesis, due to the nature of normative principles and their grounds. I then consider two ways in which the nonnaturalist position could be modified or expanded to solve this problem. No solution, it turns out, is without its problems. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  15
    Why the Facts Matter to Public Justification.Philip Shadd - 2015 - Critical Review 27 (2):198-212.
    ABSTRACTIt is often held that disagreement over non-normative facts is less significant to the project of public justification than disagreement over relevant moral norms. But this dismissal of non-normative factual disagreement is unjustified—an ad hoc attempt to save the ideal of public justification from the endemic actual disagreement that threatens it. Disagreement over norms is relevant to political legitimacy; so, too, is disagreement over facts. I draw two implications from this point. First, inasmuch as accounts of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  49.  36
    Normative Realism, or Bernard Williams and Ethics at the Limit.Joseph Mendola - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (3):306 – 318.
    Recent arguments for normative realism have centered on attempts to meet a demand on normative facts articulated by harman, That they be required for explanations of uncontroversial phenomena. This paper argues that another argument for normative realism should take precedence, An argument suggested by williams's skeptical discussion of moral objectivity in "ethics and the limits of philosophy".
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Normative Concepts: A Connectedness Model.Laura Schroeter - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    This paper proposes a new relational account of concepts and shows how it is particularly well suited to characterizing normative concepts. The key advantage of our ‘connectedness’ model is that it explains how subjects can share the same normative concepts despite radical divergences in the descriptive or motivational commitments they associate with them. The connectedness model builds social and historical facts into the foundations of concept identity. This aspect of the model, we suggest, reshapes normative epistemology (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
1 — 50 / 999