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  1. Reason in Kant's Theory of Cognition.Nabeel Hamid - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):636-653.
    This paper reconstructs and defends Kant's argument for the transcendental status of reason's principles of the systematic unity of nature in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic. On the present account, these principles are neither mere methodological recommendations for conducting scientific inquiry nor do they have the normative force of categorical imperatives, two extant interpretations of Kant's discussion of reason in the Appendix. Instead, they are regulative yet transcendental principles restricted to theoretical cognition. The principles of the systematic unity of (...)
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  2. The Pittsburgh Kantians: Brandom, Conant, Haugeland, and McDowell on Kant.Jacob Browning - 2021 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis (1):1-32.
    Over the last thirty years, a group of philosophers associated with the University of Pittsburgh—Robert Brandom, James Conant, John Haugeland, and John McDowell—have developed a novel reading of Kant. Their interest turns on Kant’s problem of objective purport: how can my thoughts be about the world? This paper summarizes the shared reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction by these four philosophers and how it solves the problem of objective purport. But I also show these philosophers radically diverge in how they view (...)
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  3. On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  4. Kant’s false subtlety of the four syllogistic figures in its intellectual context.Alberto Vanzo - 2018 - In Marco Sgarbi & Matteo Cosci (eds.), The Aftermath of Syllogism. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 157-190.
    This chapter discusses the relation between Kant’s views on the foundations of syllogistic inference in ‘The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’, the views of eighteenth-century German authors who wrote on syllogism, and the conception of metaphysics that Kant developed in 1762-1764. Kant’s positions are, on the whole, rather original, even though they are not as independent from the intellectual context as Kant’s later, Critical philosophy. Despite Kant’s polemical tone, his views on syllogism are not primarily motivated by polemical (...)
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  5. The Place of Logic in Kant's Philosophy.Clinton Tolley - 2017 - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. London: Palgrave. pp. 165-87.
    This chapter spells out in detail how Kant’s thinking about logic during the critical period shapes the account of philosophy that he gives in the Critiques. Tolley explores Kant’s motivations behind his formation of the idea of a new “transcendental” logic, drawing out in particular how he means to differentiate it from the traditional “merely formal” approaches to logic, insofar as transcendental logic investigates not just the basic forms of the activity of thinking but also its basic contents. Kant’s understanding (...)
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  6. David Landy, Kant’s Inferentialism: The Case Against Hume New York and London: Routledge: 2015 Pp. 308 ISBN 9781138913080 $148.00. [REVIEW]Thomas Vinci - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (2):331-338.
  7. Kant's Argument that Existence is not a Determination.Nicholas F. Stang - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):583-626.
    In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant's target is not merely ontological arguments as such (...)
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  8. What Does It Mean That “Space Can Be Transcendental Without the Axioms Being So”?: Helmholtz’s Claim in Context.Francesca Biagioli - 2014 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 45 (1):1-21.
    In 1870, Hermann von Helmholtz criticized the Kantian conception of geometrical axioms as a priori synthetic judgments grounded in spatial intuition. However, during his dispute with Albrecht Krause (Kant und Helmholtz über den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der Raumanschauung und der geometrischen Axiome. Lahr, Schauenburg, 1878), Helmholtz maintained that space can be transcendental without the axioms being so. In this paper, I will analyze Helmholtz’s claim in connection with his theory of measurement. Helmholtz uses a Kantian argument that can be (...)
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  9. Kant's Theory of Inductive Reasoning: The reflecting power of judgment in Kant's Logic.Matthew McAndrew - 2014 - Kant Studies Online (1):43-64.
  10. Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic.Lawrence Pasternack - 2014 - Kant Studien 105 (1):41-82.
    Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent (...)
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  11. Kant, Bolzano, and the Formality of Logic.Nicholas Stang - 2014 - In Sandra Lapointe & Clinton Tolley (eds.), The New Anti-Kant. pp. 193–234.
    In §12 of his 1837 magnum opus, the Wissenschaftslehre, Bolzano remarks that “In the new logic textbooks one reads almost constantly that ‘in logic one must consider not the material of thought but the mere form of thought, for which reason logic deserves the title of a purely formal science’” (WL §12, 46).1 The sentence Bolzano quotes is his own summary of others’ philosophical views; he goes on to cite Jakob, Hoffbauer, Metz, and Krug as examples of thinkers who held (...)
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  12. Kant on Existential Import.Alberto Vanzo - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (2):207-232.
    This article reconstructs Kant's view on the existential import of categorical sentences. Kant is widely taken to have held that affirmative sentences (the A and I sentences of the traditional square of opposition) have existential import, whereas negative sentences (E and O) lack existential import. The article challenges this standard interpretation. It is argued that Kant ascribes existential import only to some affirmative synthetic sentences. However, the reasons for this do not fall within the remit of Kant's formal logic. Unlike (...)
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  13. Die merk-würdigen Modi Baroco und Bocardo: Zur Axiomatik der Syllogismen bei Aristoteles, Boethius und den moderni.Reinhold F. Glei - 2013 - Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 16 (1):163-184.
  14. The Synthetic Nature of Geometry, and the Role of Construction in Intuition.Anja Jauerning - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 89-100.
  15. Kant on Experiment.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor. Springer. pp. 75-96.
    This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...)
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  16. Le inferenze del giudizio riflettente nella logica di Kant: l'induzione e l'analogia.Mirella Capozzi - 2011 - Studi Kantiani 24:11-48.
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  17. Kant's Subjective Deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  18. Mathematical method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel.Frederick Beiser - 2010 - In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
  19. Kant on the imagination and geometrical certainty.Mary Domski - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (4):409-431.
    My goal in this paper is to develop our understanding of the role the imagination plays in Kant’s Critical account of geometry, and I do so by attending to how the imagination factors into the method of reasoning Kant assigns the geometer in the First Critique. Such an approach is not unto itself novel. Recent commentators, such as Friedman (1992) and Young (1992), have taken a careful look at the constructions of the productive imagination in pure intuition and highlighted the (...)
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  20. Poincaréan intuition revisited: what can we learn from Kant and Parsons?Margaret MacDougall - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):138-147.
    This paper provides a comprehensive critique of Poincaré’s usage of the term intuition in his defence of the foundations of pure mathematics and science. Kant’s notions of sensibility and a priori form and Parsons’s theory of quasi-concrete objects are used to impute rigour into Poincaré’s interpretation of intuition. In turn, Poincaré’s portrayal of sensible intuition as a special kind of intuition that tolerates the senses and imagination is rejected. In its place, a more harmonized account of how we perceive concrete (...)
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  21. ""¿ Es una" falsa sutileza" la división lógica de las figuras del silogismo?: sobre la crítica de Kant a la doctrina aristotélica del silogismo categórico.Rogelio Rovira - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):5-22.
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  22. Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2.Michael Wolff - 2010 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (2):359 - 371.
    In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 341-355) I have compared Aristotle's syllogistic with Kant's theory of "pure ratiocination". "Ratiocinia pura" („reine Vernunftschlüsse") is Kant's designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called 'perfect'. In Kant's view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant's view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia (...)
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  23. Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 1.Michael Wolff - 2010 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (1):199 - 213.
    In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341-355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357-365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part [1] of the following article. I (...)
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  24. Why do informal proofs conform to formal norms?Jody Azzouni - 2009 - Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):9-26.
    Kant discovered a philosophical problem with mathematical proof. Despite being a priori , its methodology involves more than analytic truth. But what else is involved? This problem is widely taken to have been solved by Frege’s extension of logic beyond its restricted (and largely Aristotelian) form. Nevertheless, a successor problem remains: both traditional and contemporary (classical) mathematical proofs, although conforming to the norms of contemporary (classical) logic, never were, and still aren’t, executed by mathematicians in a way that transparently reveals (...)
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  25. Michael Wolff über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant.Th Ebert - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):357-372.
    This is a critique of Michael Wolff's ideas on Kant and Aristotle. I criticize in particular his overestimation of Kant as a logician and his claim that Aristotle wants to offer proofs for his perfect syllogisms.
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  26. Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant.Michael Wolff - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):341-355.
  27. Concerning the Problem of Error in Kant.Edgard José Jorge Filho - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:67-76.
    In the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents a conception of error. In the (Jäsche) Logic, he also deals with the problem of error, albeit in a different way. This paper aims to highlight this difference and arguing that, in the (Jäsche) Logic, error is explained more consistently and suitably than it is in the Transcendental Dialectic. It begins by considering judgment as the place of truth, falsehood and error, and inquiring into the (...)
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  28. Brandom’s Demarcation of Logic.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Philosophical Topics 36 (2):55-62.
    This is a lightly edited version of my comments on Brandom’s Lecture 2, as delivered in Prague at the “Prague Locke Lectures” in April, 2007. I try to say why Brandom’s proposed demarcation is significant, by placing it in a broader context of demarcation proposals from Kant to the twentieth century. I then raise some questions about the basic ingredients of Brandom’s demarcation—the notions of PP-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency—and question whether the vocabulary of conditionals, Brandom’s paradigm for logical vocabulary, can be (...)
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  29. Kant’s transcendental and empirical psychology of cognition.Claudia M. Schmidt - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (4):462-472.
    One of the perennially intriguing questions regarding Kant’s approach to the human sciences is the relation between his ‘transcendental psychology’ and empirical cognitive psychology. In this paper I compare his analysis of the a priori conditions of human cognition in the Critique of pure reason with his empirical account of the human cognitive faculties in his Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. In comparing his approach to self-consciousness, sensibility, imagination, and understanding in these two works, I argue that Kant (...)
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  30. Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation.Marcel Quarfood - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (4):735-747.
    Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological (...)
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  31. Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws.Clinton Tolley - 2006 - Philosophical Topics 34 (1-2):371-407.
  32. Containment Analyticity and Kant’s Problem of Synthetic Judgment.R. Lanier Anderson - 2004 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
    One of the central and most distinctive theses of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics is that mathematical knowledge is synthetic. In this context, synthetic judgments are defined in opposition to analytic ones, whose predicate concept is “contained in” the subject. Kant’s thesis has often been attacked as indefensible, but just as frequently critics have complained that the thesis itself, and even the analytic/synthetic distinction on which it rests, are simply unintelligible. Thus, even prior to questions of its correctness, the Kantian doctrine (...)
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  33. Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic.Mary Tiles - 2004 - In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. pp. 85-130.
  34. Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but realism regarding physical (...)
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  35. Logic and analyticity.Tyler Burge - 2003 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
    The view that logic is true independently of a subject matter is criticized—enlarging on Quine's criticisms and adding further ones. It is then argued apriori that full reflective understanding of logic and deductive reasoning requires substantial commitment to mathematical entities. It is emphasized that the objectively apriori connections between deductive reasoning and commitment to mathematics need not be accepted by or even comprehensible to a given deductive reasoner. The relevant connections emerged only slowly in the history of logic. But they (...)
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  36. The cognition-knowledge distinction in Kant and Dilthey and the implications for psychology and self-understanding.A. R. - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):149-164.
    Both Kant and Dilthey distinguish between cognition and knowledge, but they do so differently in accordance with their respective theoretical interests. Kant's primary cognitive interest is in the natural sciences, and from this perspective the status of psychology is questioned because its phenomena are not mathematically measurable. Dilthey, by contrast, reconceives psychology as a human science.For Kant, knowledge is conceptual cognition that has attained certainty by being part of a rational system. Dilthey also links knowledge with certainty; however, he derives (...)
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  37. Variaciones modales en la apropiación del conocimiento: sobre las fuentes a priori y a posteriori de la necesidad y la contingencia en Kant.Alvaro López Fernández - 2002 - Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 28:107-124.
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  38. Is logic a theoretical or practical discipline? Kant and/or Bolzano.Anita Kasabova - 2002 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (3):319-333.
    Does logic describe something or not? If not, is it a normative or practical discipline? Is there a radical division between the practical or normative level and the theoretical or descriptive level? A discipline is theoretical, we may say, if its main propositions contain descriptive expressions, such as “is” or “have”, but no normative expressions, such as “ought”, “ought not” or “may”. A discipline is normative if its main propositions are of the form “it ought to be”. Theoretical propositions express (...)
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  39. Frege and the surprising history of logic: Introduction to Claude Imbert, "Gottlob Frege, one more time".Emily Grosholz - 2000 - Hypatia 15 (4):151-155.
    Convinced that logic has a history and that its history always manages to surprise the philosophers, Claude Imbert has devoted much of her work to the study of the Stoic school and of the late-nineteenth-century German logician Gottlob Frege. In the fifth chapter of her book Pour une histoire de la logique, she examines the trajectory of Frege's awareness of what his new logic entails, in particular the way it subverts the project of Kant.
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  40. Kant's categories and the capacity to judge: Responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedgwick.Beatrice Longuenesse - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):91 – 110.
    In response to Henry Allison's and Sally Sedwick's comments on my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, I explain Kant's description of the understanding as being essentially a "capacity to judge", and his view of the relationship between the categories and the logical functions of judgment. I defend my interpretation of Kant's argument in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B edition. I conclude that, in my interpretation, Kant's notions of the "a priori" and the "given" (...)
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  41. Forme, variation et déductïbilité dans la logique de Bolzano / Form, variation and deducibility in Bolzano's logic.Jan Sebestik - 1999 - Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3):479-506.
  42. A Kantian critique of scientific essentialism.Robert Hanna - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):497-528.
    According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) "Gold is a yellow metal" is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of "scientific essentialism" (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) "Gold is the element with atomic number number 79" are metaphysically (...)
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  43. How do we know necessary truths? Kant's answer.Robert Hanna - 1998 - European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):115–145.
    It is traditionally held that our knowledge of necessity is a priori; but the familiar theories of a priori knowledge – platonism and conventionalism – have now been discredited, and replaced by either modal skepticism or a posteriori essentialism. The main thesis of this paper is that Kant's theory of a priori knowledge, when detached from his transcendental idealism, offers a genuine alternative to these unpalatable options. According to Kant's doctrine, all epistemic necessity is grounded directly or indirectly on our (...)
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  44. Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason.Pauline Kleingeld - 1998 - Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
    In his critical works of the 1780's, Kant claims, seemingly inconsistently, that (1) theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, (2) that he still needs to show that they are, and (3) that theoretical and practical reason are united. I first argue that current interpretations of Kant's doctrine of the unity of reason are insufficient. But rather than concluding that Kant’s doctrine becomes coherent only in the Critique of Judgment, I show that the three statements (...)
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  45. Kants kritik an der traditionellen syllogistik.Wolfgang Malzkorn - 1995 - History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1):75-88.
    In this paper it will be argued that in his critical writings Kant not only maintains his attack on the traditional syllogistic theory of the four figures, which he had stated in his early paper Di...
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  46. Kant: Objectividade e Causalidade na Segunda Analogia da Experiência.Alfredo Dinis - 1993 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 49 (4):627 - 633.
    O objectivo central de Kant no texto da "Segunda Analogia da Experiência", na Crítica da Razão Pura, é o de estabelecer a condição de possibilidade da experiência de uma sucessão objectiva de fenómenos. A sucessão contingente de fenómenos ao nível da intuição converte-se na percepção objectiva de uma sequência de fenómenos apenas pela actividade sintética da imaginação de acordo com o princípio de causalidade. No texto em análise, a aplicação daquele princípio não vai além das formas a priori do espaço (...)
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  47. Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Proposition from Kant to Carnap.Michael Friedman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):532-542.
  48. Critical and Pre-Critical Phases in Kant’s Philosophy of Logic.Charles Nussbaum - 1992 - Kant Studien 83 (3):280-293.
    The transition in Kant's writings form a pre-critical to a critical standpoint has been thoroughly documented with regard to Kant's changing conception of metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of mathematics. But a similar alteration in standpoint in Kant's philosophy of logic has received little or no attention. This paper documents the existence of this shift in Kant's philosophy of logic and examines its nature. The resulting analysis provides evidence for the thesis that Kant began with a strictly intensional term (...)
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  49. Lectures on Logic.J. Michael Young (ed.) - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
  50. Kant's Transcendental Psychology.Patricia Kitcher - 1990 - Oup Usa.
    In this innovative study Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in terms of his attempt to fathom the psychological prerequisites of thought. Thus a consideration of his conception of psychology is essential to an understanding of his philosophy. Kitcher specifically considers Kant's claims about the unity of the thinking self; the spatial forms of human perceptions; the relations among mental states necessary for them to have content; the (...)
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