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Profile: Rocco J. Gennaro (University of Southern Indiana)
  1. Rocco J. Gennaro, Visual Agnosia and Higher- Order Thought Theory.
    In general, the idea is that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation (HOR). A mental state M becomes conscious when there is a HOR of M. A HOR is a “meta-psychological” state, i.e. a mental state directed at another mental state. So, for example, my desire to do a good powerpoint presentation becomes conscious when I am (non-inferentially) “aware” of the desire. Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, as (...)
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  2. Rocco J. Gennaro (forthcoming). Misrepresentation, Empty HOTs, and Intrinsic HOTs: A Reply to Pereplyotchik. :1-3.
    Misrepresentation, empty HOTs, and intrinsic HOTs: A reply to Pereplyotchik. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.838819.
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  3. Rocco J. Gennaro (2013). Defending HOT Theory and The Wide Intrinsicality View: A Reply to Weisberg, Van Gulick, and Seager. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (11-12):82-100.
    This is my reply to Josh Weisberg, Robert Van Gulick, and William Seager, published in JCS vol 20, 2013. This symposium grew out of an author-meets-critics session at the Central APA conference in 2013 on my 2012 book THE CONSCIOUSNESS PARADOX (MIT Press). Topics covered include higher-order thought (HOT) theory, my own "wide intrinsicality view," the problem of misrepresentation, targetless HOTs, conceptualism, introspection, and the transitivity principle.
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  4. Rocco J. Gennaro (2012). Synesthesia, Experiential Parts, and Conscious Unity. Philosophy Study 2:73-80.
    Synesthesia is the “union of the senses” whereby two or more of the five senses that are normally experienced separately are involuntarily and automatically joined together in experience. For example, some synesthetes experience a color when they hear a sound or see a letter. In this paper, I examine two cases of synesthesia in light of the notions of “experiential parts” and “conscious unity.” I first provide some background on the unity of consciousness and the question of experiential parts. I (...)
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  5. Rocco J. Gennaro (2011). The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. Mit Pr.
    In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal ...
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  6. Rocco J. Gennaro (2009). Animals, Consciousness, and I-Thoughts. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 184--200.
    I argue that recent developments in animal cognition support the conclusion that HOT theory is consistent with animal consciousness. There seems to be growing evidence that many animals are indeed capable of having I-thoughts, including episodic memory, as well as have the ability to understand the mental states of others.
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  7. Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Are There Pure Conscious Events? In Chandana Chakrabarti & Gordon Haist (eds.), Revisiting Mysticism. Cambridge Scholars Press. 100--120.
    There has been much discussion about the nature and even existence of so-called “pure conscious events” (PCEs). PCEs are often described as mental events which are non-conceptual and lacking all experiential content (Forman 1990). For a variety of reasons, a number of authors have questioned both the accuracy of such a characterization and even the very existence of PCEs (Katz 1978, Bagger 1999). In this chapter, I take a somewhat different, but also critical, approach to the nature and possibility of (...)
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  8. Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
    It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...)
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  9. Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.) (2007). The Interplay of Consciousness and Concepts. Imprint Academic.
    This is a special double issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (vol. 14, Sept/Oct) which I guest edited. It is also sold separately as a book and published by Imprint Academic. The essays are authored by both philosophers and psychologists (including Jose Bermudez, Georges Rey, Art Markman, Jesse Prinz, and Simon Baron-Cohen) and include topics such as conceptualism, phenomenal concepts, infant consciousness, and synesthesia.
     
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  10. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, JCW Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
     
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  11. Rocco J. Gennaro (2006). Between Pure Self-Referentialism and the (Extrinsic) HOT Theory of Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
     
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  12. Rocco J. Gennaro, Consciousness. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  13. Rocco J. Gennaro, Douglas J. Herrmann & Michael Sarapata (2006). Aspects of the Unity of Consciousness and Everyday Memory Failures. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):372-385.
  14. Rocco J. Gennaro (2005). The HOT Theory of Consciousness: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.
    The so-called 'higher-order thought' (HOT) theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it (Rosenthal, 1986; 1990; 1993; 2002; 2004; Gennaro, 1996; 2004). The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg (1998) has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other (...)
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  15. Rocco J. Gennaro (2004). Higher-Order Thoughts, Animal Consciousness, and Misrepresentation: A Reply to Carruthers and Levine. In , Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  16. Rocco J. Gennaro (2004). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Overview. In , Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. John Benjamin.
  17. Rocco J. Gennaro (2003). Papineau on the Actualist HOT Theory of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.
    In Thinking About Consciousness , David Papineau [2002] presents a criticism of so-called 'actualist HOT theories of consciousness'. The HOT theory, held most notably by David Rosenthal, claims that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of an actual higher-order thought directed at the mental state. Papineau contends that actualist HOT theory faces an awkward problem in relation to higher-order memory judgements; for example, that the theory cannot explain how one could (...)
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  18. Rocco J. Gennaro (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.
  19. Rocco J. Gennaro (2000). A Note on Abortion and Capital Punishment. International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (4):491-495.
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  20. Rocco J. Gennaro (2000). Fiction, Pleasurable Tragedy, and the HOT Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):107-20.
    [Final version in Philosophical Papers, 2000] Much has been made over the past few decades of two related problems in aesthetics. First, the "feeling fiction problem," as I will call it, asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? How can we care about what happens to people who we know are not real?[i] Second, the so-called "paradox of tragedy" is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks (...)
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  21. Rocco J. Gennaro (1999). Leibniz on Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. In Chalres Huenemann & Rocco J. Gennaro (eds.), New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford University Press. 353--71.
    In the absence of any plausible reductionist account of consciousness in nonmentalistic terms, the HOT theory says that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought (or awareness) that one is in that state.[i] The sense of.
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  22. Rocco J. Gennaro (1999). The Rediscovery of the Mind. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (2):151-153.
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  23. Rocco J. Gennaro & Charles Huenemann (eds.) (1999). New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford University Press.
    This collection presents some of the most vital and original recent writings on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, the three greatest rationalists of the early modern period. Their work offered brilliant and distinct integrations of science, morals, metaphysics, and religion, which today remain at the center of philosophical discussion. The essays written especially for this volume explore how these three philosophical systems treated matter, substance, human freedom, natural necessity, knowledge, mind, and consciousness. The contributors include some of the most prominent writers (...)
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  24. Charles Huenemann & Rocco J. Gennaro (eds.) (1999). New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford University Press.
    This collecton presents some of the most vital and original recent writings on Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, the three greatest rationalists of the early modern period. Their work offered brilliant and distinct integrations of science, morals, metaphysics, and religion, which today remain at the centre of philosophical discussion. These essays explore how these three philosophical systems treated matter, substance, human freedom, natural necessity, knowledge, mind, and consciousness.
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  25. Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
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  26. Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett.
    Topics include immortality; materlialism; Descartes's 'Divisibility Argument' for dualism; the Argument from introspection'; the problems with...
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  27. Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). The Relevance of Intentions in Morality and Euthanasia. International Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):217-227.
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  28. Rocco J. Gennaro (1995). Does Mentality Entail Consciousness? Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.
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  29. Rocco J. Gennaro (1994). Kant Versus Lewis on the Singularity of Space and Time. History of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (2):205 - 218.
  30. Rocco J. Gennaro (1993). Brute Experience and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69.
  31. Rocco J. Gennaro (1992). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Episodic Memory. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.
    My aim in this paper is to show that consciousness entails self-consciousness by focusing on the relationship between consciousness and memory. More specifically, I addreess the following questions: (1) does consciousness require episodic memory?; and (2) does episodic memory require self-consciousness? With the aid of some Kantian considerations and recent empirical data, it is argued that consciousness does require episodic memory. This is done after defining episodic memory and distinguishing it from other types of memory. An affirmative answer to (2) (...)
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