Search results for 'simulation' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Franck Varenne (2003). La simulation conçue comme expérience concrète. In Jean-Pierre Müller (ed.), Le statut épistémologique de la simulation. Editions de l'ENST.score: 21.0
    Par un procédé d'objections/réponses, nous passons d'abord en revue certains des arguments en faveur ou en défaveur du caractère empirique de la simulation informatique. A l'issue de ce chemin clarificateur, nous proposons des arguments en faveur du caractère concret des objets simulés en science, ce qui légitime le fait que l'on parle à leur sujet d'une expérience, plus spécifiquement d'une expérience concrète du second genre.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (1995). Second Thoughts on Simulation. In Martin Davies & Tony Stone (eds.), Mental Simulation. Blackwell.score: 21.0
    The essays in this volume make it abundantly clear that there is no shortage of disagreement about the plausibility of the simulation theory. As we see it, there are at least three factors contributing to this disagreement. In some instances the issues in dispute are broadly empirical. Different people have different views on which theory is favored by experiments reported in the literature, and different hunches about how future experiments are likely to turn out. In 3.1 and 3.3 we (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Franck Varenne (2001). What Does a Computer Simulation Prove? The Case of Plant Modeling at CIRAD. In N. Giambiasi & C. Frydman (eds.), Simulation in industry - ESS 2001, Proc. of the 13th European Simulation Symposium. Society for Computer Simulation (SCS).score: 19.0
    The credibility of digital computer simulations has always been a problem. Today, through the debate on verification and validation, it has become a key issue. I will review the existing theses on that question. I will show that, due to the role of epistemological beliefs in science, no general agreement can be found on this matter. Hence, the complexity of the construction of sciences must be acknowledged. I illustrate these claims with a recent historical example. Finally I temperate this diversity (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Franck Varenne (2010). Framework for M&S with Agents in Regard to Agent Simulations in Social Sciences: Emulation and Simulation. In Alexandre Muzy, David R. C. Hill & Bernard P. Zeigler (eds.), Activity-Based Modeling and Simulation. Presses Universitaires Blaise-Pascal.score: 19.0
    The aim of this paper is to discuss the “Framework for M&S with Agents” (FMSA) proposed by Zeigler et al. [2000, 2009] in regard to the diverse epistemological aims of agent simulations in social sciences. We first show that there surely are great similitudes, hence that the aim to emulate a universal “automated modeler agent” opens new ways of interactions between these two domains of M&S with agents. E.g., it can be shown that the multi-level conception at the core of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Axel Gelfert (2011). Scientific Models, Simulation, and the Experimenter's Regress. In Paul Humphreys & Cyrille Imbert (eds.), Models, Simulations, and Representations. Routledge.score: 19.0
    According to the "experimenter's regress", disputes about the validity of experimental results cannot be closed by objective facts because no conclusive criteria other than the outcome of the experiment itself exist for deciding whether the experimental apparatus was functioning properly or not. Given the frequent characterization of simulations as "computer experiments", one might worry that an analogous regress arises for computer simulations. The present paper analyzes the most likely scenarios where one might expect such a "simulationist's regress" to surface, and, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Margaret Morrison (2009). Models, Measurement and Computer Simulation: The Changing Face of Experimentation. Philosophical Studies 143 (1):33 - 57.score: 18.0
    The paper presents an argument for treating certain types of computer simulation as having the same epistemic status as experimental measurement. While this may seem a rather counterintuitive view it becomes less so when one looks carefully at the role that models play in experimental activity, particularly measurement. I begin by discussing how models function as “measuring instruments” and go on to examine the ways in which simulation can be said to constitute an experimental activity. By focussing on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Edoardo Zamuner & Julian Kiverstein (2010). Could Embodied Simulation Be a by-Product of Emotion Perception? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):449 - 449.score: 18.0
    The SIMS model claims that it is by means of an embodied simulation that we determine the meaning of an observed smile. This suggests that crucial interpretative work is done in the mapping that takes us from a perceived smile to the activation of one's own facial musculature. How is this mapping achieved? Might it depend upon a prior interpretation arrived at on the basis of perceptual and contextual information?
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Vittorio Gallese (2005). Embodied Simulation: From Neurons to Phenomenal Experience. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):23-48.score: 18.0
    The same neural structures involved in the unconscious modeling of our acting body in space also contribute to our awareness of the lived body and of the objects that the world contains. Neuroscientific research also shows that there are neural mechanisms mediating between the multi-level personal experience we entertain of our lived body, and the implicit certainties we simultaneously hold about others. Such personal and body-related experiential knowledge enables us to understand the actions performed by others, and to directly decode (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Tom Cochrane (2010). A Simulation Theory of Musical Expressivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):191-207.score: 18.0
    This paper examines the causal basis of our ability to attribute emotions to music, developing and synthesizing the existing arousal, resemblance and persona theories of musical expressivity to do so. The principal claim is that music hijacks the simulation mechanism of the brain, a mechanism which has evolved to detect one's own and other people's emotions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Isabelle Peschard, Is Simulation a Substitute for Experimentation?score: 18.0
    It is sometimes said that simulation can serve as epistemic substitute for experimentation. Such a claim might be suggested by the fast-spreading use of computer simulation to investigate phenomena not accessible to experimentation (in astrophysics, ecology, economics, climatology, etc.). But what does that mean? The paper starts with a clarification of the terms of the issue and then focuses on two powerful arguments for the view that simulation and experimentation are ‘epistemically on a par’. One is based (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification. Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.score: 18.0
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Paul Bernier (2002). From Simulation to Theory. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.score: 18.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Johan E. Gustafsson & Martin Peterson (2012). A Computer Simulation of the Argument From Disagreement. Synthese 184 (3):387–405.score: 18.0
    In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Justin C. Fisher (2006). Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.score: 18.0
    This paper contributes to an ongoing debate regarding the cognitive processes involved when one person predicts a target person's behavior and/or attributes a mental state to that target person. According to simulation theory, a person typically performs these tasks by employing some part of her brain as a simulation of what is going on in a corresponding part of the brain of the target person. I propose a general intuitive analysis of what 'simulation' means. Simulation is (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ronald N. Giere (2009). Is Computer Simulation Changing the Face of Experimentation? Philosophical Studies 143 (1):59 - 62.score: 18.0
    Morrison points out many similarities between the roles of simulation models and other sorts of models in science. On the basis of these similarities she claims that running a simulation is epistemologically on a par with doing a traditional experiment and that the output of a simulation therefore counts as a measurement. I agree with her premises but reject the inference. The epistemological payoff of a traditional experiment is greater (or less) confidence in the fit between a (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (1997). Cognitive Penetrability, Rationality, and Restricted Simulation. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):297-326.score: 18.0
    In a series of recent papers, Jane Heal (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) has developed her own quite distinctive version of simulation theory and offered a detailed critique of the arguments against simulation theory that we and our collaborators presented in earlier papers. Heal's theory is clearly set out and carefully defended, and her critique of our arguments is constructive and well informed. Unlike a fair amount of what has been written in this area in recent years, her (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Luca Barlassina (2013). Simulation is Not Enough: A Hybrid Model of Disgust Attribution on the Basis of Visual Stimuli. Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.score: 18.0
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Mitchell Herschbach (2012). Mirroring Versus Simulation: On the Representational Function of Simulation. Synthese 189 (3):483-513.score: 18.0
    Mirror neurons and systems are often appealed to as mechanisms enabling mindreading, i.e., understanding other people’s mental states. Such neural mirroring processes are often treated as instances of mental simulation rather than folk psychological theorizing. I will call into question this assumed connection between mirroring and simulation, arguing that mirroring does not necessarily constitute mental simulation as specified by the simulation theory of mindreading. I begin by more precisely characterizing “mirroring” (Sect. 2) and “simulation” (Sect. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Russell Trenholme (1994). Analog Simulation. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):115-131.score: 18.0
    The distinction between analog and digital representation is reexamined; it emerges that a more fundamental distinction is that between symbolic and analog simulation. Analog simulation is analyzed in terms of a (near) isomorphism of causal structures between a simulating and a simulated process. It is then argued that a core concept, naturalistic analog simulation, may play a role in a bottom-up theory of adaptive behavior which provides an alternative to representational analyses. The appendix discusses some formal conditions (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Monika Dullstein (2013). Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein's Account of Empathy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.score: 18.0
    The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a (...)-based approach—the account given by de Vignemont and Jacob—is compatible with the direct-perception view. My argument has two parts: My first step is to show that the conflict between these accounts is not—as it seems at first glance—a disagreement on the mechanism by which empathy comes about. Rather, it is due to the fact that their proponents attribute two very different roles to empathy in understanding others. My second step is to introduce Stein’s account of empathy. By not restricting empathy to either one of these two roles, her process model of empathy helps to see how the divergent intuitions that have been brought forward in the current debate could be integrated. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. François Recanati (2002). Varieties of Simulation. In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.score: 18.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Marcus Arvan (forthcoming). A Unified Explanation of Quantum Phenomena? The Case for the Peer-to-Peer Simulation Hypothesis as an Interdisciplinary Research Program. Philosophical Forum.score: 18.0
    In my 2013 article, “A New Theory of Free Will”, I argued that several serious hypotheses in philosophy and modern physics jointly entail that our reality is structurally identical to a peer-to-peer (P2P) networked computer simulation. The present paper outlines how quantum phenomena emerge naturally from the computational structure of a P2P simulation. §1 explains the P2P Hypothesis. §2 then sketches how the structure of any P2P simulation realizes quantum superposition and wave-function collapse (§2.1.), quantum indeterminacy (§2.2.), (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. J. Campbell (2002). Joint Attention and Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. 241-253 (with a reply by Elisabe.score: 18.0
  24. William S. Wilkerson (2001). Simulation, Theory, and the Frame Problem: The Interpretive Moment. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153.score: 18.0
    The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Theodore Bach (2010). Pornography as Simulation. In Dave Monroe (ed.), Pornography: Philosophy for Everyone.score: 18.0
    This essay explains the prevalence of porn consumption by modeling it as a form of simulation. According to simulation theory (Gordon 1986, Goldman 2006) people predict and explain other’s behavior by using their own mind to model the mind of a target individual, much like an engineer might use a model aircraft to simulate the behavior of an actual aircraft. However, the cognitive mechanisms required for simulation have application outside of psychological interpretation. For example, it is plausible (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Franck Varenne (2008). Émergences par les règles sans « formes de vie » une relecture de Kripke (1982) pour la simulation informatique du vivant. Noesis 14:201-236.score: 18.0
    Cet article ne se veut pas un commentaire suivi de la réflexion de Wittgenstein sur les règles. Ce ne sera pas non plus un commentaire de l’interprétation que Kripke fait du « suivi de la règle » chez Wittgenstein. Il ne sera pas davantage une application des thèses de Wittgenstein ni une tentative d’application directe d’une interprétation de ces thèses à l’épistémologie de la simulation du vivant ; ce qui serait, en soi, d’ailleurs contestable. Ce travail vise seulement à (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Joel Pust (1999). External Accounts of Folk Psychology, Eliminativism, and the Simulation Theory. Mind and Language 14 (1):113-130.score: 18.0
    Stich and Ravenscroft (1994) distinguish between internal and external accounts of folk psychology and argue that this distinction makes a significant difference to the debate over eliminative materialism. I argue that their views about the implications of the internal/external distinction for the debate over eliminativism are mistaken. First, I demonstrate that the first of their two external versions of folk psychology is either not a possible target of eliminativist critique, or not a target distinct from their second version of externalism. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Theodore Bach (2011). Structure-Mapping: Directions From Simulation to Theory. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):23-51.score: 18.0
    The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. I propose a “dynamic” hybrid that is informed by recent work on the nature of similarity cognition. I claim that Gentner’s model of structure-mapping allows us to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.) (2002). Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.score: 18.0
    CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.score: 18.0
    Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986 ) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Shannon Spaulding (2012). Mirror Neurons Are Not Evidence for the Simulation Theory. Synthese 189 (3):515-534.score: 18.0
    Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in theories of mindreading. New discoveries in neuroscience have revitalized the languishing debate. The discovery of so-called mirror neurons has revived interest particularly in the Simulation Theory (ST) of mindreading. Both ST proponents and theorists studying mirror neurons have argued that mirror neurons are strong evidence in favor of ST over Theory Theory (TT). In this paper I argue against the prevailing view that mirror neurons are evidence for the ST of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Jonathan Birch (2013). On the 'Simulation Argument' and Selective Scepticism. Erkenntnis 78 (1):95-107.score: 18.0
    Nick Bostrom’s ‘Simulation Argument’ purports to show that, unless we are confident that advanced ‘posthuman’ civilizations are either extremely rare or extremely rarely interested in running simulations of their own ancestors, we should assign significant credence to the hypothesis that we are simulated. I argue that Bostrom does not succeed in grounding this constraint on credence. I first show that the Simulation Argument requires a curious form of selective scepticism, for it presupposes that we possess good evidence for (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Jordi Fernández (2003). Explanation by Computer Simulation in Cognitive Science. Minds And Machines 13 (2):269-284.score: 18.0
    My purpose in this essay is to clarify the notion of explanation by computer simulation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science. My contention is that computer simulation may be understood as providing two different kinds of explanation, which makes the notion of explanation by computer simulation ambiguous. In order to show this, I shall draw a distinction between two possible ways of understanding the notion of simulation, depending on how one views the relation in which a (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Rebecca Saxe (2009). The Neural Evidence for Simulation is Weaker Than I Think You Think It Is. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):447 - 456.score: 18.0
    Simulation theory accounts of mind-reading propose that the observer generates a mental state that matches the state of the target and then uses this state as the basis for an attribution of a similar state to the target. The key proposal is thus that mechanisms that are primarily used online, when a person experiences a kind of mental state, are then co-opted to run Simulations of similar states in another person. Here I consider the neuroscientific evidence for this view. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Pierre Jacob (2002). The Scope and Limit of Mental Simulation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.score: 18.0
  36. Wendy S. Parker (2008). Computer Simulation Through an Error-Statistical Lens. Synthese 163 (3):371 - 384.score: 18.0
    After showing how Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical philosophy of science might be applied to address important questions about the evidential status of computer simulation results, I argue that an error-statistical perspective offers an interesting new way of thinking about computer simulation models and has the potential to significantly improve the practice of simulation model evaluation. Though intended primarily as a contribution to the epistemology of simulation, the analysis also serves to fill in details of Mayo’s epistemology of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. James W. Garson (2003). Simulation and Connectionism: What is the Connection? Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):499-515.score: 18.0
    Simulation has emerged as an increasingly popular account of folk psychological (FP) talents at mind-reading: predicting and explaining human mental states. Where its rival (the theory-theory) postulates that these abilities are explained by mastery of laws describing the connections between beliefs, desires, and action, simulation theory proposes that we mind-read by "putting ourselves in another's shoes." This paper concerns connectionist architecture and the debate between simulation theory (ST) and the theory-theory (TT). It is only natural to associate (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Joëlle Proust (2002). Can 'Radical' Simulation Theories Explain Psychological Concept Acquisition? In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.score: 18.0
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Annika Wallin (2011). Is Egocentric Bias Evidence for Simulation Theory? Synthese 178 (3):503 - 514.score: 18.0
    Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor's genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones' own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors' own (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Elisa Galgut (2005). Simulation and Irrationality. Philosophical Papers 34 (1):25-44.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I hope to show how a recent theory in the philosophy of mind concerning how we ‘read’ the minds of others – namely, Heal’s version of simulation theory – is consistent with the view that the kind of understanding we bring to bear on the irrational is different in kind from the way we understand one another in the course of everyday life. I shall attempt to show that Heal’s version of simulation theory (co-cognition) is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Tibor Bosse, Martijn C. Schut & Jan Treur (2009). Formal Analysis of Dynamics Within Philosophy of Mind by Computer Simulation. Minds and Machines 19 (4):543-555.score: 18.0
    Computer simulations can be useful tools to support philosophers in validating their theories, especially when these theories concern phenomena showing nontrivial dynamics. Such theories are usually informal, whilst for computer simulation a formally described model is needed. In this paper, a methodology is proposed to gradually formalise philosophical theories in terms of logically formalised dynamic properties. One outcome of this process is an executable logic-based temporal specification, which within a dedicated software environment can be used as a simulation (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. J. Decety (2002). Neurophysiological Evidence for Simulation and Action. In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins.score: 18.0
  43. Mitchell Aboulafia (2011). Through the Eyes of Mad Men: Simulation, Interaction, and Ethics. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (2):133-147.score: 18.0
    Traditionally pragmatists have been favorably disposed to improving our understanding of agency and ethics through the use of empirical research. In the last two decades simulation theory has been championed in certain cognitive science circles as a way of explaining how we attribute mental states and predict human behavior. Drawing on research in psychology and neuroscience, Alvin I. Goldman and Robert M. Gordon have not only used simulation theory to discuss how we “mindread”, but have suggested that the (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Ian Ravenscroft (2003). Simulation, Collapse and Humean Motivation. In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. 162-174.score: 18.0
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Luca Barlassina (2011). After All, It’s Still Replication: A Reply to Jacob on Simulation and Mirror Neurons. Res Cogitans 8 (1):92-111.score: 18.0
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the simulation theory (ST), mindreading is based on the ability the mind has of replicating others' mental states and processes. Mirror neurons (MNs) are a class of neurons that fire both when an agent performs a goal-directed action and when she observes the same type of action performed by another individual. Since MNs appear to form a replicative mechanism in which a portion of the observer's brain (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Josef Perner & Anton Kühberger (2002). Framing and the Theory-Simulation Controversy. Predicting People's Decisions. Mind and Society 3 (2):65-80.score: 18.0
    We introduce a particular way of drawing the distinction between the use of theory and simulation in the prediction of people's decisions and describe an empirical method to test whether theory or simulation is used in a particular case. We demonstrate this method with two effects of decision making involving the choice between a safe option (take amount X) and a risky option (take double the amount X with probability 1/2). People's predictions of choice frequencies for trivial (€ (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Holmes Miller & Kurt J. Engemann (2004). A Simulation Model of Intergroup Conflict. Journal of Business Ethics 50 (4):355-367.score: 18.0
    In this paper we investigate intergroup conflict and examine the impact of strategies to manage and hopefully reduce it. To do this, we use a probabilistic computer simulation model, based on feedback principles. The model examines how conflict between two groups evolves over time. Group differences and the occurrence of intergroup incidents drive the model. Intergroup hostility which depends on past history, recent conflict incidents, and group differences is the key variable that indicates the proclivity toward conflict between the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Peter J. Lewis (2013). The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument. Synthese 190 (18):4009-4022.score: 18.0
    The Simulation Argument and the Doomsday Argument share certain structural similarities, and hence are often discussed together (Bostrom 2003, Aranyosi 2004, Richmond 2008, Bostrom and Kulczycki 2011). Both are cases where reflecting on one’s location among a set of possibilities yields a counter-intuitive conclusion—in one case that the end of humankind is closer than you initially thought, and in the second case that it is more likely than you initially thought that you are living in a computer simulation. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Josef Perner & Johannes L. Brandl (2009). Review: Simulation à la Goldman: Pretend and Collapse. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):435 - 446.score: 18.0
    Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions. To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined. Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. John Michael, Simulation as an Epistemic Tool Between Theory and Practice: A Comparison of the Relationship Between Theory and Simulation in Science and Folk Psychology. EPSA07.score: 18.0
    Simulation as an epistemic tool between theory and practice: A Comparison of the Relationship between Theory and Simulation in Science and in Folk Psychology In this paper I explore the concept of simulation that is employed by proponents of the so-called simulation theory within the debate about the nature and scientific status of folk psychology. According to simulation theory, folk psychology is not a sort of theory that postulates theoretical entities (mental states and processes) and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000