First published in 1999, this book brings together the extensive modern evidence for innate imitation in babies. Modern research has shown imitation to be a natural mechanism of learning and communication which deserves to be at centre stage in developmental psychology. Yet the very possibility of imitation in newborn humans has had a controversial history. Defining imitation has proved to be far from straightforward and scientific evidence for its existence in neonates is only now becoming accepted, despite more than a (...) century of enquiry. In this book, some of the world's foremost researchers on imitation and intellectual development review evidence for imitation in newborn babies. They discuss the development of imitation in infancy, in both normal and atypical populations and in comparison with other primate species, stressing the fundamental importance of imitation in human development, as a foundation of communication and a precursor to symbolic processes. (shrink)

Adopting a functionalist perspective, we emphasize the interest of considering imitation as a single capacity with two functions: communication and learning. These two functions both imply such capacities as detection of novelty, attraction toward moving stimuli and perception-action coupling. We propose that the main difference between the processes involved in the two functions is that, in the case of learning, the dynamics is internal to the system constituted by an individual whereas in the case of communication, the dynamics concerns the (...) system composed by the perception of one individual coupled with the action of the other.In this paper, we compare the first developmental steps of imitation in three populations: typically developing children, children with autism, and robots. We show evidence of strong correlations between imitating and being imitated in typical infants and low-functioning children with autism. Relying on this evidence, the robotic perspective is to provide a generic architecture able not only to learn via imitation but also to interact as an emerging property of the system constituted by two similar architectures with a different history. (shrink)

In this volume an outstanding group of scientists consider emotional development from fetal life onwards. The book includes views from neuroscience, primatology, robotics, psychopathology, and prenatal development. The first book of its kind, this book will be of major interest to all those interested in emotion, from the fields of social, developmental, and clinical psychology, to psychiatry, and neuroscience.

Precursors of inferential capacities concerning self- and other- understanding may be found in the basic experience of social contingency and emotional sharing. The emergence of a sense of self- and other-agency receives special attention here, as a foundation for self-understanding. We propose that synchrony, an amodal parameter of contingent self-other relationships, should be especially involved in the development of a sense of agency. To explore this framework, we have manipulated synchrony in various ways, either by delaying mother’s response to infant’s (...) behaviour, disorganizing mother’s internal synchrony between face and voice, freezing the partner in a still attitude, or on the contrary maximizing synchrony through imitation. We report results obtained with healthy and clinical populations that are supposed to be at the beginning of basic experiences concerning the ownership of their actions: infants of 2 months and 6 months, low-functioning children with autism and MA matched young children with Down Syndrome. Our results support the idea of a two-step process linking understanding of self to understanding of other and leading on to form the concept of human beings as universally contingent entities. (shrink)

Adopting a functionalist perspective, we emphasize the interest of considering imitation as a single capacity with two functions: communication and learning. These two functions both imply such capacities as detection of novelty, attraction toward moving stimuli and perception-action coupling. We propose that the main difference between the processes involved in the two functions is that, in the case of learning, the dynamics is internal to the system constituted by an individual whereas in the case of communication, the dynamics concerns the (...) system composed by the perception of one individual coupled with the action of the other. In this paper, we compare the first developmental steps of imitation in three populations: typically developing children, children with autism, and robots. We show evidence of strong correlations between imitating and being imitated in typical infants and low-functioning children with autism. Relying on this evidence, the robotic perspective is to provide a generic architecture able not only to learn via imitation but also to interact as an emerging property of the system constituted by two similar architectures with a different history. (shrink)

This study investigates a specific aspect of joint attention, that is, the emergence of the sense that one is leading the attentional focus of others. Thirty participants were placed in front of two avatars and had to pay attention to objects that were also attended to by the avatars. Unbeknownst to the participant, the avatars’ gaze orientations were alternately controlled by the participant’s eyes. Eye-tracking data were collected and participants were enquired about their experience to account for their sense of (...) agency. Only five participants noticed that the avatars were following their gaze. The 25 participants who remained unaware that they controlled the avatars nevertheless modified their gazing behavior with an increase in direct gaze toward one of the avatars. This outcome highlights a dissociation between an implicit feeling that a change occurred and the explicit awareness of being the cause of this change. (shrink)

Our exploratory research aims at suggesting design principles for educational software dedicated to people with high functioning autism. In order to explore the efficiency of educational games, we developed an experimental protocol to study the influence of the specific constraints of the learning areas as well as Human Computer Interface modalities. We designed computer games that were tested with 10 teenagers diagnosed with high functioning autism, during 13 sessions, at the rate of one session per week. Participants’ skills were assessed (...) before and after a training period. A group of 10 typical children matched on academic level also took part in the experiment. A software platform was developed to manage interface modalities and log users’ actions. Moreover, we annotated video recordings of two sessions. Results underline the influence of the task and interface modalities on executive functions. (shrink)

Our exploratory research aims at suggesting design principles for educational software dedicated to people with high functioning autism. In order to explore the efficiency of educational games, we developed an experimental protocol to study the influence of the specific constraints of the learning areas as well as Human Computer Interface modalities. We designed computer games that were tested with 10 teenagers diagnosed with high functioning autism, during 13 sessions, at the rate of one session per week. Participants’ skills were assessed (...) before and after a training period. A group of 10 typical children matched on academic level also took part in the experiment. A software platform was developed to manage interface modalities and log users’ actions. Moreover, we annotated video recordings of two sessions. Results underline the influence of the task and interface modalities on executive functions. (shrink)

Background: Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have pronounced difficulties in attending to relevant visual information during social interactions. Method: We designed and evaluated the feasibility of a novel method to train this ability, by exposing participants to virtual human characters displayed on a screen which was entirely blurred, except for a gaze-contingent viewing window that followed participants’ eyes direction. The goal was to incite participants to direct their gaze towards the facial expressions of the virtual characters. Twenty-one adolescents with (...) ASD who attended ordinary school were randomized to either an experimental group, who was trained during a month and a half, or to a control group. Social communicative abilities were assessed during pre, post and follow-up tests. Results: After training, the experimental group showed significantly more interest in facial expressions on a test which involved understanding a dialogue. Significant differences were not found for the other tests used. Conclusions: This outcome suggests that the training method fostered participants’ awareness of the relevance of facial expressions. (shrink)

Theories of spatial cognition are derived from many sources. Psychologists are concerned with determining the features of the mind which, in combination with external inputs, produce our spatialized experience. A review of philosophical and other approaches has convinced us that the brain must come equipped to impose a three-dimensional Euclidean framework on experience – our analysis suggests that object re-identification may require such a framework. We identify this absolute, nonegocentric, spatial framework with a specific neural system centered in the hippocampus.A (...) consideration of the kinds of behaviours in which such a spatial mapping system would be important is followed by an analysis of the anatomy and physiology of this system, with special emphasis on the place-coded neurons recorded in the hippocampus of freely moving rats. A tentative physiological model for the hippocampal cognitive map is proposed. A review of lesion studies, in tasks as diverse as discrimination learning, avoidance, and extinction, shows that the cognitive map notion can adequately explain much of the data.The model is extended to humans by the assumption that spatial maps are built in one hemisphere, semantic maps in the other. The latter provide a semantic deep structure within which discourse comprehension and production can be achieved. Evidence from the study of amnesic patients, briefly reviewed, is consistent with this extension. (shrink)

Let M be a structure for a language L on a set M of urelements. HYP(M) is the least admissible set above M. In § 1 we show that pp(HYP(M)) [ = the collection of pure sets in HYP(M] is determined in a simple way by the ordinal α = ⚬(HYP(M)) and the $\mathscr{L}_{\propto\omega}$ theory of M up to quantifier rank α. In § 2 we consider the question of which pure countable admissible sets are of the form pp(HYP(M)) for (...) some M and show that all sets L α (α admissible) are of this form. Other positive and negative results on this question are obtained. (shrink)

This article investigates how companies make sense of CSR. It is based on an explorative comparative case study of 18 companies in the Netherlands using background information, interviews and annual reports. Initially, the sensemaking process of CSR is guided and coordinated by change agents who are specifically appointed to explore the implementation of CSR in their company. These change agents initiate the CSR process within their own organisations. The meaning they develop stems from their personal and organisational values and frames (...) of reference. By attuning the vocabulary of CSR to the language of their colleagues, they aim to gain support for this undertaking in their organisation. This sensemaking procedure can be divided into pragmatic, external, procedural, policy‐oriented and value‐driven processes. The capability of an organisation to embed CSR is the result of trial and error, personal preferences and the use of language by the change agent that fits the (dynamic) situation at hand. Thus, each organisation needs a tailor‐made approach to implement CSR successfully. (shrink)

Let $\mathscr{M}$ be a structure for a language $\mathscr{L}$ on a set $M$ of urelements. $\mathrm{HYP}(\mathscr{M})$ is the least admissible set above $\mathscr{M}$. In $\S 1$ we show that $pp(\mathrm{HYP}(\mathscr{M})) \lbrack = \text{the collection of pure sets in} \mathrm{HYP}(\mathscr{M}\rbrack$ is determined in a simple way by the ordinal $\alpha = \circ(\mathrm{HYP}(\mathscr{M}))$ and the $\mathscr{L}_{\propto\omega}$ theory of $\mathscr{M}$ up to quantifier rank $\alpha$. In $\S 2$ we consider the question of which pure countable admissible sets are of the form $pp(\mathrm{HYP}(\mathscr{M}))$ for (...) some $\mathscr{M}$ and show that all sets $L_\alpha (\alpha$ admissible) are of this form. Other positive and negative results on this question are obtained. (shrink)

In a recent letter, Dillion et. al (2023) make various suggestions regarding the idea of artificially intelligent systems, such as large language models, replacing human subjects in empirical moral psychology. We argue that human subjects are in various ways indispensable.

In this chapter, I argue that scientific practice in the neurosciences of cognition is not conducive to the discovery of natural kinds of cognitive capacities. The “neurosciences of cognition” include cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neurobiology, two research areas that aim to understand how the brain gives rise to cognition and behavior. Some philosophers of neuroscience have claimed that explanatory progress in these research areas ultimately will result in the discovery of the underlying mechanisms of cognitive capacities. Once such mechanistic understanding (...) is achieved, cognitive capacities purportedly will be relegated into natural kind categories that correspond to real divisions in the causal structure of the world. I provide reasons here, however, in support of the claim that the neurosciences of cognition currently are not on a trajectory for discovering natural kinds. As I explain, this has to do with how mechanistic explanations of cognitive capacities are developed. Mechanistic explanations and the kinds they explain are abstract representational byproducts of the conceptual, experimental and integrative practices of neuroscientists. If these practices are not coordinated towards developing mechanistic explanations that mirror the causal structure of the world, then natural kinds of cognitive capacities will not be discovered. I provide reasons to think that such coordination is currently lacking in the neurosciences of cognition and indicate where changes in these practices appropriate to the natural kinds ideal would be required if achieving this ideal is indeed the goal. However, I suggest that an evaluation of current practices in these research areas is suggestive that discovering natural kinds of cognitive capacities is not the goal. (shrink)

We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.

What can contemporary machine learning (ML) models do? Given the proliferation of ML models in society, answering this question matters to a variety of stakeholders, both public and private. The evaluation of models' capabilities is rapidly emerging as a key subfield of modern ML, buoyed by regulatory attention and government grants. Despite this, the notion of an ML model possessing a capability has not been interrogated: what are we saying when we say that a model is able to do something? (...) And what sorts of evidence bear upon this question? -/- In this paper, we aim to answer these questions, using the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) as a running example. Drawing on the large philosophical literature on abilities, we develop an account of ML models' capabilities which can be usefully applied to the nascent science of model evaluation. Our core proposal is a conditional analysis of model abilities (CAMA): crudely, a machine learning model has a capability to X just when it would reliably succeed at doing X if it 'tried'. The main contribution of the paper is making this proposal precise in the context of ML, resulting in an operationalisation of CAMA applicable to LLMs. We then put CAMA to work, showing that it can help make sense of various features of ML model evaluation practice, as well as suggest procedures for performing fair inter-model comparisons. (shrink)

Against those who dismiss Kant's project in the "Religion" because it provides a Pelagian understanding of salvation, this paper offers an analysis of the deep structure of Kant's views on divine justice and grace showing them not to conflict with an authentically Christian understanding of these concepts. The first part of the paper argues that Kant's analysis of these concepts helps us to understand the necessary conditions of the Christian understanding of grace: unfolding them uncovers intrinsic relations holding between God's (...) justice and grace. Parts two and three provide an analysis of two concepts of grace used by Kant. Getting clear on their differences is the key to understanding why Kant's account is not Pelagian. (shrink)

This paper explores Kant's concept of the highest good and the postulate of the existence of God arising from it. Kant has two concepts of the highest good standing in tension with one another, an immanent and a transcendent one. I provide a systematic exposition of the constituents of both variants and show how Kant’s arguments are prone to confusion through a conflation of both concepts. I argue that once these confusions are sorted out Kant’s claim regarding the need to (...) postulate God’s existence from a moral point of view makes much more sense. (shrink)

Samkara has been regarded by many as the most authoritative Hindu thinker of all time. A great Indian Vedantin brahmin, Samkara was primarily a commentator on the sacred texts of the Vedas and a teacher in the Advaitin teaching line. This book serves as an introduction to Samkara's thought which takes this as a central theme. The author develops an innovative approach based on Samkara's ways of interpreting sacred texts and creatively examines the profound interrelationship between sacred text, content and (...) method in Samkara's thought. The main focus of the book is on Samkara's teaching method. This method is, for Samkara, based on the Upanishads' own; it is to be employed by Advaitin teachers to draw pupils skilfully towards that realisation which is beyond all words. Consequently, this book will be of interest not only to students and scholars of Indian philosophy, but to all those interested in the relation between language and that which is held to transcend it. (shrink)

Despite its centrality in the philosophy of cognitive science, there has been little prior philosophical work engaging with the notion of representation in contemporary NLP practice. This paper attempts to fill that lacuna: drawing on ideas from cognitive science, I introduce a framework for evaluating the representational claims made about components of neural NLP models, proposing three criteria with which to evaluate whether a component of a model represents a property and operationalising these criteria using probing classifiers, a popular analysis (...) technique in NLP (and deep learning more broadly). The project of operationalising a philosophically-informed notion of representation should be of interest to both philosophers of science and NLP practitioners. It affords philosophers a novel testing-ground for claims about the nature of representation, and helps NLPers organise the large literature on probing experiments, suggesting novel avenues for empirical research. (shrink)

The eminent classical scholar Jacqueline de Romilly offers a compelling reassessment of the intellectual and cultural achievement of the Sophists of classical Athens, who were among the most important and influential thinkers of the ancient world. She provides a vivid reconstruction of their original methods and bold doctrines, arguing that they have been widely misunderstood because of the lack of direct evidence, and she investigates the reasons for their success and for the subsequent reaction against them.

ABSTRACT This article addresses the growing literature in critical race studies, which holds that racism is permanent or incurable, and that by adopting this pessimistic view of racism, we can enact improved and healthier racialized lives. I argue that the focus on curing anti-Black racism, and the failure to do so in the civil rights era and its aftermath has left people of all races, to varying degrees, stuck in pessimistic states of racialized anger, resentment, guilt, and shame. These pessimistic (...) states have brought about an additional level of oppression for targets of racialized oppression. I call it “meta-oppression,” and it is the oppression of being oppressed. I argue that this oppression has exacerbated the effects of the social disease of racism, and it has literally affected the physiologies of many African Americans. This article provides a diagnosis of these existential and physiological states of meta-oppression and a clarification of its characteristics. This diagnosis is an initial step in a larger project of formulating and enacting effective treatments for it. I then argue that meta-oppression is a helpful diagnostic tool for clarifying the characteristics and ramifications on Blacks of US systemic racism during the post–civil rights movement period. I aim to establish meta-oppression as an existential and physiological condition that requires attention so as to expand the social imaginations of people of color and to allow us to engage in more systemic joyful affirmations of our racialized lives while still living within racist conditions. (shrink)

We all seem to think that we do the acts we do because we consciously choose to do them. This commonsense view is thrown into dispute by Benjamin Libet's eyebrow-raising experiments, which seem to suggest that conscious will occurs not before but after the start of brain activity that produces physical action.

In this rich and detailed study of early modern women's thought, Jacqueline Broad explores the complexity of women's responses to Cartesian philosophy and its intellectual legacy in England and Europe. She examines the work of thinkers such as Mary Astell, Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway and Damaris Masham, who were active participants in the intellectual life of their time and were also the respected colleagues of philosophers such as Descartes, Leibniz and Locke. She also illuminates the continuities (...) between early modern women's thought and the anti-dualism of more recent feminist thinkers. The result is a more gender-balanced account of early modern thought than has hitherto been available. Broad's clear and accessible exploration of this still-unfamiliar area will have a strong appeal to both students and scholars in the history of philosophy, women's studies and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Although the biological bases of forgetting remain obscure, the consensus among cognitive psychologists emphasizes interference processes, rejecting decay in accounting for memory loss. In contrast to this view, recent advances in understanding the neurobiology of long-term memory maintenance lead us to propose that a brain-wide well-regulated decay process, occurring mostly during sleep, systematically removes selected memories. Down-regulation of this decay process can increase the life expectancy of a memory and may eventually prevent its loss. Memory interference usually occurs during certain (...) active processing phases, such as encoding and retrieval, and will be stronger in brain areas with minimal sensory integration and less pattern separation. In areas with efficient pattern separation, such as the hippocampus, interference-driven forgetting will be minimal, and, consequently, decay will cause most forgetting. (shrink)

There are different groups in society who may be considered vulnerable, for example those experiencing mental or physical health issues, learning disabilities, prisoners or children. There are, however, other groups in society who may also be regarded as vulnerable, such as those who are bereaved. Vulnerability in relation to the bereaved occurs as a result of experiencing a normal life event, death or a loss. In this situation vulnerability may be transient and, depending upon the management of the bereavement, generally (...) temporary. Unlike the aforementioned groups, participants required for this type of research (bereavement, death and dying) are able to consent themselves into projects, and the capacity to do so is not an issue. Undertaking research with those who may be considered vulnerable into sensitive, emotive topics such as death and dying can create difficulties for the National Research Ethics Service (NRES), making it difficult to get approval for such studies. It appears that the ethical issues are concerned with not wishing to cause distress to participants when asked for research purposes to recollect what for some may have been emotionally challenging and traumatic events. The article offers a narrative, reflective account of the above from several perspectives: being employed as a contract researcher in a university; having experience of being an active member of a National Health Service Research Ethics Committee; and later assuming the role of full-time postgraduate (PhD) student requiring ethical approval to undertake research with what may be considered a vulnerable group involving a sensitive and emotive topic. Valuable insights from participants – their views on participation in an emotive research project and good practice in research having been explored via questionnaire – are highlighted and discussed. (shrink)

The past decade has witnessed a growing awareness of conceptual and methodological hurdles within psychology and neuroscience that must be addressed for taxonomic and explanatory progress in understanding psychological functions to be possible. In this paper, I evaluate several recent knowledge-building initiatives aimed at overcoming these obstacles. I argue that while each initiative offers important insights about how to facilitate taxonomic and explanatory progress in psychology and neuroscience, only a “coordinated pluralism” that incorporates positive aspects of each initiative will have (...) the potential for success. (shrink)