Large prospective biobanks are being established containing DNA, lifestyle and health information in order to study the relationship between diseases, genes and environment. Informed consent is a central component of research ethics protection. Disclosure of information about the research is an essential element of seeking informed consent. Within biobanks, it is not possible at recruitment to describe in detail the information that will subsequently be collected because people will not know which disease they will develop. It will also be difficult (...) to describe the specific research that will be performed using the biobank, other than to stipulate categories of research or diseases that are not included. Potential subjects can only be given information about the sorts of research that will be performed and by whom. Organisations responsible for biobanks usually argue that this disclosure of information is adequate when seeking informed consent, especially if coupled with a right to withdraw, as it would not be feasible or it would be too expensive to seek consent renewal on a regular basis. However, there are concerns about this ‘blanket consent’ approach’. Consent waivers have also been proposed in which research subjects entrust their consent with an independent third party to decide whether subsequent research using the biobank is consistent with the original consent provided by the subject. (shrink)

There are three main categories of rationale for withholding information or telling lies: if overwhelming harm can only be averted through deceit; complete triviality such that it is irrelevant whether the truth is told; a duty to protect the interests of others. Public health authorities are frequently having to form judgements about the public interest, whether to release information or issue warnings. In June 1992, routine surveillance detected patulin levels (a known carcinogen) in samples of apple juice exceeding safety threshold. (...) Remedial actions were promptly taken and it was planned to subsequently publish the information in the routine way. However, the media portrayed the handling of the problem as a conspiracy and there was a short term reduction in juice sales. In October 1995, the UK Committee on Safety of Medicines issued a warning about certain brands of the contraceptive pill, based on the interim results of three unpublished studies. The increased risk of thromboembolism was small, but the resulting scare led to an increase in unwanted pregnancies. The handling of the B.S.E. crisis in the U.K. also led to accusations of incompetence or conspiracy. Public health authorities have to handle uncertainty and frequently have to form judgements for public safety on the basis of evidence of poor quantity and quality. Their task is not helped by the sometimes conflicting agenda of scientists and media. The public also have differing perceptions and interpretations of risk. The series of scares and crises are having a detrimental effect on public confidence in public health authorities. (shrink)

The word enhancement is value laden and potentially misleading in the context of genetics. Dictionary definitions of enhance include and The term geneticenhancement would be better replaced with a more neutral term such as to reflect the fact that the consequences of as yet largely untried technology may be beneficial, balanced, or harmful. The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the potential negative consequences of the use of and hence to challenge whether are actually always enhancements. Thus (...) it is necessary to question whether what may appear to be a new means of enhancement may not actually result in any significant change or is less effective than existing means of enhancement; may actually make things worse; or may on some measures actually make some things better, but on other measures or in other senses make things worse. (shrink)

The Government in the UK is encouraging consumerism within health care and is requiring Health Authorities to consult with the public on prioritisation of resources. Public consultation within the National Health Service (NHS) has had limited success in the past. Many of the techniques used are flawed. Despite the limited scope of the public surveys conducted so far, a number of themes have emerged: — a willingness to pay for experimental, ‘high‐tech’ life‐saving treatments rather than more cost‐effective treatments which will (...) improve quality of life, which are more likely to maximise utility from the scarce resources available; — preference for treating the young rather than the old; — preference for treating patients with dependants (e.g. spouse, children) rather than those who have none; — a willingness to discriminate against those patients who were partially responsible for their illness due to choice of `unhealthy' lifestyle (e.g. smoking cigarettes, drinking excess alcohol). These public preferences raise ethical problems. For example, is it just to spend more on heroic treatments which are likely to fail? Is there a right to health care irrespective of whether you have had ‘a fair innings’ or whether a patient is in part responsible for their illness due to an unhealthy lifestyle? If there are ethical concerns about these preferences, should health authorities consult with the public at all? Is human life and suffering incommensurable, and hence is it impossible to prioritise anyway? Some of the ethical consequences of using empirical data on public preferences are discussed. (shrink)

The privacy concerns discussed in the 1990s in relation to the New Genetics failed to anticipate the relevant issues for individuals, families, geneticists and society. Consumers, for example, can now buy their personal genetic information and share it online. The challenges facing genetic privacy have evolved as new biotechnologies have developed, and personal privacy is increasingly challenged by the irrepressible flow of electronic data between the personal and public spheres and by surveillance for terrorism and security risks. This book considers (...) the right to know and the right not to know about your own and others’ genomes. It discusses new privacy concerns and developments in ethical thinking, with the greater emphasis on solidarity and equity. The multidisciplinary approach covers current topics such as biobanks and forensic databases, DIY testing, group rights and accountability, the food we eat and the role of the press and the new digital media. (shrink)

This volume contains essays which cover a range of aspects in the debate over genetic testing. It looks at both the advantages and disadvantages involved in knowing or not knowing whether one is a carrier of certain genetic traits.

Increases in international travel and migratory flows have enabled infectious diseases to emerge and spread more rapidly than ever before. Hence, it is increasingly easy for local infectious diseases to become global infectious diseases (GIDs). National governments must be able to react quickly and effectively to GIDs, whether naturally occurring or intentionally instigated by bioterrorism. According to the World Health Organisation, global partnerships are necessary to gather the most up-to-date information and to mobilize resources to tackle GIDs when necessary. Communicable (...) disease control also depends upon national public health laws and policies. The containment of an infectious disease typically involves detection, notification, quarantine and isolation of actual or suspected cases; the protection and monitoring of those not infected; and possibly even treatment. Some measures are clearly contentious and raise conflicts between individual and societal interests. In Europe national policies against infectious diseases are very heterogeneous. Some countries have a more communitarian approach to public health ethics, in which the interests of individual and society are more closely intertwined and interdependent, while others take a more liberal approach and give priority to individual freedoms in communicable disease control. This paper provides an overview of the different policies around communicable disease control that exist across a select number of countries across Europe. It then proposes ethical arguments to be considered in the making of public health laws, mostly concerning their effectiveness for public health protection. (shrink)

Analysis and comparison of genetic screening programs shows that the extent of development of programs varies widely across Europe. Regional variations are due not only to genetic disease patterns but also reflect the novelty of genetic services. In most countries, the focus for genetic screening programs has been pregnant women and newborn children. Newborn children are screened only for disorders which are treatable. Prenatal screening when provided is for conditions for which termination may be offered. The only population screening programs (...) for adults are those for thalassaemia carrier status in Cyprus, Greece and Italy. Social responses to genetic screening range from acceptance to hostility. There is a fundamental tension between individual and communi ty in the debates in various European countries about implementation of screening programs. Opposition to genetic screening is frequently expressed in terms of arguments about "eugenics" with insufficient regard to the meaning of the term and its implications. Only a few countries have introduced explicit legislation on genetic screening. Legislation to address discrimination may provide more safeguards than legislation protecting genetic information itself. (shrink)

The project Euroscreen 2 has examined genetic screening and testing with particular reference to implications for insurance, commercialization through marketing of genetic tests direct to the public, and issues surrounding raising public awareness of these and other developments in genetics, including the practical experiment of a Gene Shop. This paper provides a snapshot of the three year project. The study groups work included monitoring developments in different European countries and exploring possibilities for regulation in insurance and commercialization together with public (...) attitudes to regulation. The success or failure of different strategies is not independent of public awareness. Exploration of policy, however, also requires examination of fundamental concepts such as solidarity and geneticization. (shrink)

Hoping is an integral part of what it is to be human, and its significance for education has been widely noted. Hope is, however, a contested category of human experience and getting to grips with its characteristics and dynamics is a difficult task. The paper argues that hope is not a singular undifferentiated experience and is best understood as a socially mediated human capacity with varying affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions. Drawing on the philosophy, theology and psychology of hope, five (...) modes of hoping are outlined: patient, critical, sound, resolute and transformative. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how different modes of hoping are associated with different pedagogical strategies. Phrased differently, the paper seeks to delineate a range of pedagogies of hope. The phrase ‘pedagogy of hope’ is very much associated with critical theory—one thinks instantly of, for example, Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux or bell hooks. There are many pedagogies of hope, however, and an explicitly conservative text such as William Bennett’s Book of Virtues has as strong a claim to the title as Freire’s radical and utopian ideas. A broader argument, therefore, is that there is nothing inherently radical or subversive about a pedagogy of hope. Pedagogies of hope can serve to reproduce social relations as well as to transform them. (shrink)

Whilst continuing racism is often invoked as evidence of the urgent need for Philosophy for Children, there is little in the current literature that addresses the topic. Drawing on Critical Race Theory and the related field of Critical Whiteness Studies , I argue that racism is deeply ingrained culturally in society, and best understood in the context of ‘Whiteness’. Following a CRT-informed analysis of two picturebooks that have been recommended as starting points for philosophical enquiry into multiculturalism, racism and diversity (...) – ‘Elmer’ and ‘Tusk Tusk’ by David McKee, I argue that whilst the use of stories with animals is commonly regarded as offering children the comfort of distance from emotionally challenging topics, this has the effect of separating racism from its temporal and spatial realities, which limits rather than enhances opportunities for engaging philosophically with it. I argue in favour of the practice of ‘reading against the text’ and consider the epistemological and practical obstacles to this practice drawing on my own experiences discussing race with P4C practitioners in the UK. I attempt to illustrate how the selection of recommended materials, combined with commonly held principles of P4C, make for a climate where a philosophical engagement with race and racism that considers the discourse of ‘Whiteness’ is highly unlikely to occur. This leads me to posit the idea of The Gated Community of Enquiry. (shrink)

Did you know that insects could be tried for criminal acts in pre-industrial Europe, that the dead could be executed, that statues could be subjected to public humiliation, or that it was widely accepted that corpses could return to life? What made reasonable, educated men and women behave in ways that seem utterly nonsensical to us today? Strange Histories presents for the first time a serious account of some of the most extraordinary occurrences of European history. Throughout the ages, people (...) have held ideas and events have taken place which have baffled later societies. Religious disbelievers were thought deserving of death, insects were occasionally excommunicated, studying the biology of angels was a legitimate activity, and the pursuit of personal happiness was considered rather misguided as a life strategy. Using case studies from the Middle Ages and the early modern period with some from the more recent past, this book provides fascinating insights into the world-view through the ages, and shows how such goings-on fitted in quite naturally with the "common sense" of the time. Explanations of these phenomena, riveting and ultimately rational, encourage further reflection on what really shapes our beliefs. In the light of history, can we be sure of the validity of our own ideas? How many of our own beliefs might no longer "make sense" a few centuries from now? (shrink)

Seth MacFarlane’s space adventure, The Orville, is not “Family Guy in Space.” It is a social commentary of the most direct and compelling sort. Through satire, humor, and symbolism, The Orville explores the potential dangers of religion. It does so in individual episodes, such as “If the Stars Should Appear” and “Mad Idolatry,” as well as through the series as a whole in its depiction of how the Union resolves its political differences with the Krill and the Moclans. In this (...) chapter, we will look at how The Orville criticizes religion, both generally and specifically. We will see that while it is not a condemnation of all religious believers, it is a critique of religion itself, suggesting that it can become dangerous when it merges religious dogma with political power. (shrink)

The book moves from descriptive through to more interpretative phenomenological methods to enable the reader to learn to use the main approaches to ...

What if your peers tell you that you should disregard your perceptions? Worse, what if your peers tell you to disregard the testimony of your peers? How should we respond if we get evidence that seems to undermine our epistemic rules? Several philosophers have argued that some epistemic rules are indefeasible. I will argue that all epistemic rules are defeasible. The result is a kind of epistemic particularism, according to which there are no simple rules connecting descriptive and normative facts. (...) I will argue that this type of particularism is more plausible in epistemology than in ethics. The result is an unwieldy and possibly infinitely long epistemic rule — an Uber-rule. I will argue that the Uber-rule applies to all agents, but is still defeasible — one may get misleading evidence against it and rationally lower one’s credence in it. (shrink)

The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life (...) is selected for observation. Once we take account of the procedure, we find that the support for the Many Universe hypothesis remains. (shrink)

Formal methods are changing how epistemology is being studied and understood. A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology introduces the types of formal theories being used and explains how they are shaping the subject. Beginning with the basics of probability and Bayesianism, it shows how representing degrees of belief using probabilities informs central debates in epistemology. As well as discussing induction, the paradox of confirmation and the main challenges to Bayesianism, this comprehensive overview covers objective chance, peer disagreement, the concept of (...) full belief, and the traditional problems of justification and knowledge. Subjecting each position to a critical analysis, it explains the main issues in formal epistemology, and the motivations and drawbacks of each position. Written in an accessible language and supported study questions, guides to further reading and a glossary, positions are placed in an historic context to give a sense of the development of the field. As the first introductory textbook on formal epistemology, A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology is an invaluable resource for students and scholars of contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

In this title the author explores the time-tested practice and philosophy using modern examples from more than a decade of experience with this ancient practice. He brings the principles of yoga into focus and makes them user-friendly for yogis living in the post modern era.

Screening programmes are becoming increasingly popular since prevention is considered 'better than cure'. While earlier diagnosis may result in more effective treatment for some, there will be consequent harm for others due to anxiety, stigma, side-effects etc. A screening test cannot guarantee the detection of all 'abnormal' cases, therefore there will be false reassurance for some. A proper consideration of the potential benefit and harm arising from screening may lead to the conclusion that the programme should not be offered. A (...) modified utilitarian approach may be used for allocation of scarce resources in health care. Ethics has an important role in this evaluation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that whether or not a computer can be built that passes the Turing test is a central question in the philosophy of mind. Then I show that the possibility of building such a computer depends on open questions in the philosophy of computer science: the physical Church-Turing thesis and the extended Church-Turing thesis. I use the link between the issues identified in philosophy of mind and philosophy of computer science to respond to a prominent argument (...) against the possibility of building a machine that passes the Turing test. Finally, I respond to objections against the proposed link between questions in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of computer science. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Turing’s responses to the mathematical objection are straightforward, despite recent claims to the contrary. I then go on to show that by understanding the importance of learning machines for Turing as related not to the mathematical objection, but to Lady Lovelace’s objection, we can better understand Turing’s response to Lady Lovelace’s objection. Finally, I argue that by understanding Turing’s responses to these objections more clearly, we discover a hitherto unrecognized, substantive thesis in his philosophical (...) thinking about the nature of mind. (shrink)

Many epistemological problems can be solved by the objective Bayesian view that there are rationality constraints on priors, that is, inductive probabilities. But attempts to work out these constraints have run into such serious problems that many have rejected objective Bayesianism altogether. I argue that the epistemologist should borrow the metaphysician’s concept of naturalness and assign higher priors to more natural hypotheses.

If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...) Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating her fair betting odds, plus the assumption that Sleeping Beauty’s credences should track her fair betting odds. We will show that this last assumption is false. Sleeping Beauty’s credences should not follow her fair betting odds due to a peculiar feature of her epistemic situation. (shrink)

Should philosophers prefer simpler theories? Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) argues that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.

How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and (...) draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs. (shrink)

Many who take a dismissive attitude towards metaphysics trace their view back to Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’. But the reason Carnap takes a dismissive attitude to metaphysics is a matter of controversy. I will argue that no reason is given in ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, and this is because his reason for rejecting metaphysical debates was given in ‘Pseudo-Problems in Philosophy’. The argument there assumes verificationism, but I will argue that his argument survives the rejection of verificationism. The root (...) of his argument is the claim that metaphysical statements cannot be justified; the point is epistemic, not semantic. I will argue that this remains a powerful challenge to metaphysics that has yet to be adequately answered. (shrink)

Interpreting the world through a social lens is a central characteristic of human cognition. Humans ascribe intentions to the behaviors of other individuals and groups. Humans also make inferences about others’ emotional and mental states. This capacity for social attribution underlies many of the concepts at the core of legal and political systems. The developing scientific understanding of the neural mechanisms used in social attribution may alter many earlier suppositions. However, just as often, these new methods will lead back to (...) old conundrums. Cognitive neuroscience will not dispel the hard problems of social judgment. (shrink)

Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant (...) to learning where we are in the world ( Section 2 ). I will show how measurements in the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics can be understood as learning where you are in the world via some observation selection effect ( Section 3 ). I will apply a similar argument to the Sleeping Beauty Problem ( Section 4 ) and explain what I take the significance of the analogy to be ( Section 5 ). Finally, I will defend the Restricted Principle of Indifference on which some of my arguments depend ( Section 6 ). (shrink)

The Protein Ontology (PRO) provides a formal, logically-based classification of specific protein classes including structured representations of protein isoforms, variants and modified forms. Initially focused on proteins found in human, mouse and Escherichia coli, PRO now includes representations of protein complexes. The PRO Consortium works in concert with the developers of other biomedical ontologies and protein knowledge bases to provide the ability to formally organize and integrate representations of precise protein forms so as to enhance accessibility to results of protein (...) research. PRO (http://pir.georgetown.edu/pro) is part of the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry. (shrink)

There is currently a lively debate about whether there are practical reasons for belief, epistemic reasons for belief, or both. I will argue that the intuitions on all sides can be fully accounted for by applying an independently motivated contextualist semantics for normative terms. Specifically, normative terms must be relativized to a goal. One possible goal is epistemic, such as believing truly and not believing falsely, while another possible goal is practical, such as satisfying desires, or maximizing value. I will (...) argue that we have practical reasons given the practical goal and epistemic reasons given the epistemic goal. Disagreement disappears when we make the context explicit. The result is an independently motivated version ofpluralism. (shrink)

This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.

There is a widely shared belief that the higher-level sciences can provide better explanations than lower-level sciences. But there is little agreement about exactly why this is so. It is often suggested that higher-level explanations are better because they omit details. I will argue instead that the preference for higher-level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, logically strong, beliefs. I argue that our preference for informative beliefs entirely accounts for why higher-level explanations are sometimes (...) better—and sometimes worse—than lower-level explanations. The result is a step in the direction of the unity of science hypothesis. 1Introduction2Background: Is Omitting Details an Explanatory Virtue? 2.1Anti-reductionist arguments2.2Reductionist argument2.3Logical strength3Bases, Links and Logical Strength4Functionalism and Fodor’s Argument5Two Generalizations6Should the Base Really Be Maximally Strong?7Anti-reductionist Arguments Regarding the Base8Should the Antecedent of the Link Really Be Maximally Weak? (shrink)

The essay reflects on how Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Barth view interpretation of the Christian Bible. It proceeds in three main sections. The first contends that Gadamer secularizes Christian theology, and that this has drawbacks for the sort of reading his hermeneutic can give to Christian Scripture. The second part turns to Barth, arguing that the whole structure of his approach to the Bible factors in theological commitment, with benefits for the readings he can deliver. The final part makes a (...) case that contemporary reflection on interpretation can nonetheless glean important insights from Gadamer, especially regarding the readerly reception of texts, because his perspective has a certain sort of richness that Barth’s cannot match. The overall suggestion emerging from the interrogation of these two thinkers is that phenomenology and theology might learn from one another, that they each contribute something valuable to discussions of biblical interpretation. (shrink)

This book shows that cyberculture has been a long time coming.In Prefiguring Cyberculture, media critics and theorists, philosophers, and historians of science ...