Results for 'Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain'

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  1.  50
    Neither Truth nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success.E. C. Barnes - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):418 – 431.
  2.  2
    Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success. E. Barnes - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):418.
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  3.  21
    INDEX for Volume 80, 2002.Eric Barnes, Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain, Matti Eklund, Deep Inconsistency, Barbara Montero, Harold Langsam, Self-Knowledge Externalism, Christine McKinnon Desire-Frustration, Moral Sympathy & Josh Parsons - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):545-548.
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  4.  36
    CAPS Psychology and the Empirical Adequacy of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics.Laura Papish - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):537-549.
    For the past decade and a half, Aristotelians have tried to counter the following criticism articulated by John Doris: if we look at personality and social psychology research, we must conclude that we generally neither have, nor have the capacity to develop, character traits of the kind envisioned by Aristotle and his followers. Some defenses of Aristotelian virtue ethics proceed by trying to insulate it from this challenge, while others have tried to dissipate the force of Doris's critique by (...)
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  5.  73
    Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science.Andre Kukla - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):305.
    Scientific realists have argued that the truth(likeness) of our theories provides the only explanation for the success of science. I consider alternative explanations proposed by antirealists. I endorse Leplin's contention that neither van Fraassen's Darwinist explanation nor Laudan's methodological explanation provides the sort of explanatory alternative which is called for in this debate. Fine's suggestion--that the empirical adequacy of our theories already explains their success--is more promising for antirealists. Leplin claims that this putative explanation collapses into (...)
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  6.  56
    The Doxastic Requirement of Scientific Explanation and Understanding.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Prolegomena 13 (2):279-290.
    Van Fraassen (1980) and Winther (2009) claim that we can explain phenomena in terms of scientific theories without believing that they are true. I argue that we ought to believe that they are true in order to use them to explain and understand phenomena. A scientific antirealist who believes that scientific theories are merely empirically adequate cannot use them to explain or to understand phenomena. The mere belief that they are empirically adequate produces neither explanation nor (...)
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  7. Approximate Truth Vs. Empirical Adequacy.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Epistemologia 37 (1):106-118.
    Suppose that scientific realists believe that a successful theory is approximately true, and that constructive empiricists believe that it is empirically adequate. Whose belief is more likely to be false? The problem of underdetermination does not yield an answer to this question one way or the other, but the pessimistic induction does. The pessimistic induction, if correct, indicates that successful theories, both past and current, are empirically inadequate. It is arguable, however, that they are approximately true. Therefore, scientific realists overall (...)
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  8. Truth Does Not Explain Predictive Success.Carsten Held - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):232-234.
    Laudan famously argued that neither truth nor approximate truth can be part of an explanation of a scientific theory's predictive success because in the history of science there were theories that enjoyed some limited success but now are considered outright false. The power of his argument lay in the many historic examples he listed . Realists have disputed that all theories on Laudan's list can be regarded as predictively successful but let's suppose momentarily that at least some (...)
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  9.  3
    Czarnocka’s Conception of Symbolic Truth.Michael H. Mitias - 2019 - Dialogue and Universalism 29 (2):153-188.
    The proposition I elucidate and defend in this paper is that the explanatory power of Malgorzata Czarnocka’s conception of symbolic truth extends beyond our knowledge of empirical reality and includes our knowledge of human nature and human values. The paper is composed of two parts. In the first part I present a detailed analysis of the conception of symbolic truth. The focus in this analysis is on the nature of the correspondence relation which connects a true statement (...)
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  10. When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Is the point of belief and assertion invariably to think or say something true? Is the truth of a belief or assertion absolute, or is it only relative to human interests? Most philosophers think it incoherent to profess to believe something but not think it true, or to say that some of the things we believe are only relatively true. Common sense disagrees. It sees many opinions, such as those about matters of taste, as neither true nor false; (...)
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  11.  5
    Truth and Adequacy. Remarks on Petrażycki’s Methodology.Jan Woleński - 2018 - Studia Humana 7 (4):3-8.
    The paper discusses the concept of adequacy central for Pertażycki’s methodology. According to Petrażycki any valuable scientific theory should be adequate, that is, neither limping nor jumping. Consequently, adequacy of a theory is a stronger condition than its truth. Every adequacy theory is true, but not conversely. However, there is problem, because scientific laws are conditionals. This suggests that adequacy is too strong conditions, because the consequence of an implication has a wider scope than (...)
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  12. Empirical Adequacy: A Partial Structures Approach.Otávio Bueno - 1997 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (4):585-610.
    Based on da Costa's and French's notions of partial structures and pragmatic truth, this paper examines two possible characterizations of the concept of empirical adequacy, one depending on the notion of partial isomorphism, the other on the hierarchy of partial models of phenomena, and both compatible with an empiricist view. These formulations can then be employed to illuminate certain aspects of scientific practice.An empirical theory must single out a specific part of the world, establish reference to (...)
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  13. Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles.Julian Dodd - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):383-401.
    This paper argues that a consideration of the problem of providing truthmakers for negative truths undermines truthmaker theory. Truthmaker theorists are presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. Either they must take up the challenge of providing truthmakers for negative truths, or else they must explain why negative truths are exceptions to the principle that every truth must have a truthmaker. The first horn is unattractive since the prospects of providing truthmakers for negative truths do not look good neither (...)
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  14. Truth Values, Neither-True-nor-False, and Supervaluations.Nuel Belnap - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (3):305 - 334.
    The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that (...)
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  15.  54
    Empirical Incoherence and Double Functionalism.Sam Baron - 2019 - Synthese:1-27.
    Recent work on quantum gravity suggests that neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entites exist at a fundamental level. The loss of both brings with it the threat of empirical incoherence. A theory is empirically incoherent when the truth of that theory undermines the empirical justification for believing it. If neither spacetime nor spatiotemporally located entities exist as a part of a fundamental theory of QG, then such a theory seems to imply that there are no (...)
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  16. Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2016 - Mind:fzw010.
    This paper reexamines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [Fordoblelse], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. (...)
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  17.  46
    The Semantic View, Empirical Adequacy, and Application.Mauricio Suárez - 2005 - Critica 37 (109):29-63.
    It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory's domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation. (...)
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  18.  5
    Neither Yours nor Mine but Ours: On the Communal Nature of Truth and Rational Belief.Mary Magada-Ward - 2020 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 34 (4):478.
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  19.  5
    Neither Demon nor Angel: Theology and Empirical Studies on Reciprocity.Alexander Massmann - 2021 - Modern Theology 37 (2):434-457.
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  20. 'Neither Masters nor Slaves': Small States and Empire in the Long Eighteenth Century.Richard Whatmore - 2009 - In Duncan Kelly (ed.), Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought. pp. 53.
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  21. Neither'Behemoth'nor'Leviathan': Explaining Hobbes's Illiberal Politics.William Lund - 2003 - Filozofski Vestnik 24 (2):59-83.
     
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  22.  9
    Leigh A. Payne, Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions of State Violence; Maja Zehfuss, Wounds of Memory: The Politics of War in Germany.Emma Hutchison - 2009 - Millennium - Journal of International Studies 38 (1):201-204.
  23. Why Unification is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Explanation.Victor Gijsbers - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):481-500.
    In this paper, I argue that unification is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanation. Focusing on the versions of the unificationist theory of explanation of Kitcher and of Schurz and Lambert, I establish three theses. First, Kitcher’s criterion of unification is vitiated by the fact that it entails that every proposition can be explained by itself, a flaw that it is unable to overcome. Second, because neither Kitcher’s theory nor that of Schurz and Lambert can solve the problems (...)
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  24.  21
    Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.
    Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
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  25.  57
    Neither Fragments nor Ellipsis.Robert Stainton - manuscript
    Jason Merchant (2004, and Chap. 3, this volume) proposes to account for all speech acts performed with “fragments,” whether in discourse-initial position or otherwise, by appealing to syntactic ellipsis. Though his proposal is insightful, I offer empirical and methodological considerations against it. Empirical problems include: (a) His alleged “elliptical sentences” do not embed the way they should; (b) in some cases where Merchant requires fronting to take place, it is blocked – either by an island (e.g., in English) (...)
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  26.  65
    Empirical Psychology, Common Sense, and Kant’s Empirical Markers for Moral Responsibility.Patrick Frierson - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (4):473-482.
    This paper explains the empirical markers by which Kant thinks that one can identify moral responsibility. After explaining the problem of discerning such markers within a Kantian framework, I briefly explain Kant’s empirical psychology. I then argue that Kant’s empirical markers for moral responsibility—linked to higher faculties of cognition—are not sufficient conditions for moral responsibility, primarily because they are empirical characteristics subject to natural laws. Next, I argue that these markers are not necessary conditions of (...)
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  27.  51
    Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):197-223.
    This paper re-examines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [ Fordoblelse ], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a (...)
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  28.  63
    Govier’s Distinguishing A Priori From Inductive Arguments by Analogy: Implications for a General Theory of Ground Adequacy.James B. Freeman - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (2):175-194.
    In a priori analogies, the analogue is constructed in imagination, sharing certain properties with the primary subject. The analogue has some further property clearly consequent on those shared properties. Ceteris paribus the primary subject has that property also. The warrant involves non-empirical, e.g., moral intuition but is also defeasible. The argument is thus neither deductive nor inductive, but an additional type. In an inductive analogy, the analogues back the warrant from below. Distinguishing these two types of arguments by (...)
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  29.  73
    Does Frege Use a Truth-Predicate in His ‘Justification’ of the Laws of Logic? A Comment on Weiner.Dirk Greimann - 2008 - Mind 117 (466):403-425.
    Joan Weiner has recently claimed that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth-predicate in his justification of the logical laws. She argues that because of the assimilation of sentences to proper names in his system, Frege does not need to make use of the Quinean device of semantic ascent in order to formulate the logical laws, and that the predicate ‘is the True’, which is used in Frege's justification, is not to be considered as (...)
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  30.  95
    Goodman's Only World.Vladan Djordjevic - 2012 - In Majda Trobok, Nenad Miscevic & Berislav Zarnic (eds.), Between Logic and Reality: Modeling Inference, Action and Understanding. Springer. pp. 269.
    An incorrect interpretation of Goodman’s theory of counterfactuals is persistently being offered in the literature. I find that strange. Even more so since the incorrectness is rather obvious. In this paper I try to figure out why is that happening. First I try to explain what Goodman did say, which of his claims are ignored, and what he did not say but is sometimes ascribed to him. I emphasize one of the bad features of the interpretation: it gives counterfactuals (...)
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  31.  36
    Truths, Facts, and Liars.Peter Marton - 2018 - CEJSH: Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 25 (2):155-173.
    A Moderate Anti-realist approach to truth and meaning, built around the concept of knowability, will be introduced and argued for in this essay. Our starting point will be the two fundamental anti-realists principles that claim that neither truth nor meaning can outstrip knowability and our focus will be on the challenge of adequately formalizing these principles and incorporating them into a formal theory. Accordingly, the author will introduce a MAR truth operator that is built on a (...)
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  32. On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity.Joel Pust - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):71–87.
    Moderate rationalists maintain that our rational intuitions provide us with prima facie justification for believing various necessary propositions. Such a claim is often criticized on the grounds that our having reliable rational intuitions about domains in which the truths are necessary is inexplicable in some epistemically objectionable sense. In this paper, I defend moderate rationalism against such criticism. I argue that if the reliability of our rational intuitions is taken to be contingent, then there is no reason to think that (...)
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  33.  22
    Between Analytic and Empirical.J. W. N. Watkins - 1957 - Philosophy 32 (121):112 - 131.
    One of the most serious pre-occupations of post-medieval philosophy has been to distinguish those kinds of assertion which are either true or false from those which are neither true nor false. A solution to this problem would be of the highest importance. It would indicate in what areas rational inquiry has some hope of success and in what areas it is doomed to frustration. It would tell us, for example, whether it is worth trying to think about the possible (...)
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  34.  67
    Phenomenal Concepts: Neither Circular nor Opaque.E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1186-1199.
    In this paper, I focus on an influential account of phenomenal concepts, the recognitional account, and defend it from some recent challenges. According to this account, phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that we use when we recognize experiences as “another one of those.” Michael Tye has argued that this account is viciously circular because the relevant recognitional abilities involve descriptions of the form “another experience of the same type,” which is also a phenomenal concept. Tye argues that we avoid the (...)
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  35.  47
    Nuclear Power is Neither Right Nor Wrong: The Case for a Tertium Datur in the Ethics of Technology.Rafaela Hillerbrand & Martin Peterson - 2014 - Science and Engineering Ethics 20 (2):583-595.
    The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we propose, nuclear power is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, but rather right and wrong to some degree. We are aware that this non-binary analysis of nuclear power is controversial from a theoretical point of view. Utilitarians, Kantians, and other moral (...)
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  36. Objects as Temporary Autonomous Zones.Tim Morton - 2011 - Continent 1 (3):149-155.
    continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...)
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  37. What’s Truth Got to Do with It?Paul Horwich - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (3):309-322.
    This paper offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good theory must (1) explain relations of entailment, (ii) show how the meanings of complex expressions derive from the meanings of their parts, and (iii) characterize facts of meaning in truth-theoretic terms. It then proceeds to criticize the orthodox conception of semantics that is articulated in these three desiderata. This critique is followed by a sketch (...)
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  38.  71
    Descartes on the Eternal Truths and Essences of Mathematics: An Alternative Reading.Helen Hattab - 2016 - Vivarium 54 (2-3):204-249.
    René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear to commit Descartes to (...)
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  39.  56
    Empirical Adequacy.Joseph F. Hanna - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (1):1-34.
    In his book, The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen argues for an anti-realist view of science according to which the sole epistemological aim of science is to "save the phenomena". As originally conceived, his constructive empiricism is strongly extensional, but in his account of the empirical adequacy of probabilistic theories, van Fraassen reluctantly abandons this extensional position, arguing that modal (intensional) notions are unavoidable in interpreting probability. I argue in this paper that van Fraassen has not presented the (...)
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  40.  26
    Ratnākaraśānti’s Theory of Cognition with False Mental Images and the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument.Shinya Moriyama - 2014 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 42 (2-3):339-351.
    The paper aims to clarify Ratnākaraśānti?s epistemological theory that mental images in a cognition are false (*alīkākāravāda) in comparison with Śāntarakṣita?s criticism of the Yogācāra position. Although Ratnākaraśānti frequently uses the neither-one-nor-many argument for explaining his Yogācāra position, the argument, unlike Śāntarakṣita?s original one, does not function for refuting the existence of awareness itself as the basis of mental images. This point is examined in the first two sections of this paper by analyzing Ratnākaraśānti?s proof of the selflessness of (...)
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  41. Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth.Alberto Vanzo - 2010 - Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166.
    Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth is: “Truth is the agreement of cognition with its object”. In this paper, I analyse the relevant features of Kant's theory of definition in order to explain the meaning of that claim and its consequences for the vexed question of whether Kant endorses or rejects a correspondence theory of truth. I conclude that Kant's claim implies neither that he holds, nor that he rejects, a correspondence theory of (...)
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  42. A Neo-Aristotelian Substance Ontology: Neither Relational nor Constituent.E. J. Lowe - 2012 - In Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-248.
    Following the lead of Gustav Bergmann ( 1967 ), if not his precise terminology, ontologies are sometimes divided into those that are ‘relational’ and those that are ‘constituent’ (Wolterstorff 1970 ). Substance ontologies in the Aristotelian tradition are commonly thought of as being constituent ontologies, because they typically espouse the hylemorphic dualism of Aristotle ’s Metaphysics – a doctrine according to which an individual substance is always a combination of matter and form. But an alternative approach drawing more on the (...)
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  43. Toward an Epistemology of Blindness Why the New Forms of `Ceremonial Adequacy' Neither Regulate nor Emancipate.Boaventura de Sousa Santos - 2001 - European Journal of Social Theory 4 (3):251-279.
    My starting point in this paper is the artistic structures of the Renaissance. Resorting to what I call an epistemology of blindness, I set out to identify the limits of representation in modern science. This epistemology applies to different sciences in different degrees. I argue that the degree is particularly high in the case of mainstream economics. At the end of the paper I indicate some possible ways of advancing from an epistemology of blindness toward an epistemology of seeing.
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  44.  18
    A Mind Selected by Needs: Explaining Logical Animals by Evolution.Fabian Seitz - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):579-597.
    Explaining humans as rational creatures—capable of deductive reasoning—remains challenging for evolutionary naturalism. Schechter 437–464, 2011, 2013) proposes to link the evolution of this kind of reasoning with the ability to plan. His proposal, however, does neither include any elaborated theory on how logical abilities came into being within the hominin lineage nor is it sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. I present such a theory in broad outline and substantiate it with archeological findings. It is argued that the cognitive (...)
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  45.  18
    Descartes on the Eternal Truths and Essences of Mathematics: An Alternative Reading.Helen Hattab - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Vivarium.
    _ Source: _Page Count 46 René Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages that, on standard readings, are in conflict are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that (...)
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  46.  5
    Neither Substance nor Essence.Francesco Aronadio - 2020 - Chôra 18:19-40.
    The purpose of this paper is to highlight the basic meaning of ousia in Plato’s philosophical use of the term. “Basic” is not intended as “the strongest”, let alone “exclusive”, insofar as the semantics of ousia encompasses a variety of philosophical meanings. On the contrary, the basic meaning is proposed to be the elementary semantic component of ousia, which is present in the background of Plato’s quasi‑technical use of the term and marks the difference from its ordinary meaning. In view (...)
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  47. Necessary Moral Truths and Theistic Metaethics.John Danaher - 2014 - Sophia 53 (3):309-330.
    Theistic metaethics usually places one key restriction on the explanation of moral facts, namely: every moral fact must ultimately be explained by some fact about God. But the widely held belief that moral truths are necessary truths seems to undermine this claim. If a moral truth is necessary, then it seems like it neither needs nor has an explanation. Or so the objection typically goes. Recently, two proponents of theistic metaethics — William Lane Craig and Mark Murphy — (...)
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  48.  1
    Neither Xi (洗) Nor Jin (浸), But Fu (袚): Zhang Yijing’s (张亦镜) Translation of Baptism, Viewed From the Perspective of Identity.Jue Wang - 2017 - Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies 34 (3):214-222.
    This paper studies the key issue of how the concept of baptism is translated into Chinese. The primary source material is a series of papers written by Zhang Yijing and published in True Light during the 1920s. Reviewing Zhang’s work, I argue that translation strategies alone are insufficient to explain the choice of translation used. This conclusion is supported by a text analysis of his translation choices and a survey of the methods used. Building on the theory of identity, (...)
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  49. Neither Tortoises nor Snakes: How to Be a Conscientious Objector in the Conflict Between Foundationalism and Coherentism.Matthew A. Burstein - 2003 - Dissertation, Georgetown University
    A great deal of ink has been spilt debating the relative merits of foundationalism and coherentism in contemporary epistemology. In this dissertation, I argue that the debate itself, lively as it's been, rides atop a fundamental mistake. Careful examination of the defenses of these views indicates that both sides rest on a set of problematic presuppositions about justification and the nature of mind. More specifically, they all assume, in one form or another, that epistemic dependence must be inferential, and, as (...)
     
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  50.  19
    Neither First, nor Second, nor… in His Commentary on the Sentences. Francis of Marchia’s Intentiones Neutrae.William Duba - 2010 - Quaestio 10:285-313.
    n a recent monograph, Sabine Folger-Fonfara introduces neutral intentions as the crowning achievement of Francis of Marchia’s metaphysics. Neutral intentions express the common characteristics of first intentions and of second intentions and therefore play the role of supertranscendentals. The doctrine of neutral intentions also explains how, in Francis of Marchia’s theory of general metaphysics, being can have maximum extension. Yet this signal development in the history of philosophy does not appear in Francis of Marchia’s main philosophical work, his Commentary on (...)
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