I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity. A real relation (relatio) is numerically the same thing (res) as its absolute (non-relative) foundation, without being identical to its foundation. This not only holds for creaturely real relations but also for the divine persons’ distinguishing real relations. A divine person who is constituted by a real relation (relatio) (...) and the divine essence is numerically the same thing (res) as the divine essence without being identical to it. Further, I compare Mark Henninger’s and Jos Decorte’s interpretations of Henry’s general theory of real relations and show that Henninger’s is to be preferred and how it is consistent with my interpretation. I argue that the difficulty with Decorte’s interpretation stems, in part, from his misrepresentation of Henry’s Trinitarian theology. Subsequently, I fill in some missing pieces to Decorte’s presentation of Henry’s Trinitarian theology, and this in turn shows why Henninger’s interpretation in conjunction with mine is to be preferred. (shrink)

Some Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objects View). Others argue that they are the same things (One Object View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker (2010) and Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant’s claim that we lack knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a weaker version of the One (...) Object View that is not couched in terms of Numerical Identity and, consequently, avoids the problem raised by Walker and Stang. My case is based on a sustained analogy with perceptual experience that aims at showing that appearances and things in themselves are the same things in the following sense: the very same things can be presented under the mode of sensory intuition or (possibly) under the mode of intellectual intuition. Those things presented under the mode of sensory intuition are appearances; presented under the (possible) mode of intellectual intuition are things in themselves. This way of construing appearances and things in themselves preserves the core insight of the One Object View. At the same time, as it does not entail any isomorphism between appearances and things in themselves, it does not clash against Noumenal Ignorance. (shrink)

Many theories about human number representation stress the importance of a central semantic representation that includes the magnitude information of small integer numbers, and that is conceived as an abstract, compressed number line. However, thus far there has been little or no direct evidence that units and teens are represented on the same number line. In two masked priming experiments, we show that single-digit and two-digit Arabic numerals are equally well primed by an Arabic numeral with the same number of (...) digits as by an equally distant Arabic numeral with a different number of digits (e.g. the priming effect of 7 on the target 9 is the same as the priming effect of 11 on the target 9). The finding was obtained both with a number naming task and with a parity judgement task. This is in line with the hypothesis that units and teens are part of a continuous number line. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution. The problem of material constitution arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same parts and yet are essentially related to their parts in different ways. (A familiar example: A lump of bronze constitutes a statue of Athena. The lump and the statue share all of the same parts, but it appears that the lump can, whereas the statue (...) cannot, survive radical rearrangements of those parts.) I argue that if we are prepared to follow Aristotle in making a distinction between numerical sameness and identity, we can solve the problem of material constitution without recourse to co-location or contingent identity and without repudiating any of the familiar objects of common sense (such as lumps and statues) or denying that these objects have the essential properties we ordinarily think that they have. (shrink)

Numerical identity is the non-relational sameness of an object to itself. It is concerned with understanding how entities undergo change and maintain their identity. In substance metaphysics, an entity is considered a substance with an essence and such an essence is the source of its power. However, such a framework fails to explain the sense in which an entity is still the entity it was, amidst changes. Those who claim that essence is unaffected by existence are faced with (...) challenge of exploring the epistemic access to such an essence, which is questionable at best. Process metaphysics is a strong candidate for a theory that can ontologically explain regularity and change without appeal to essence. Process and its interactions is the main category. Every process is an emergent organization of constitutive interactions and is individuated on the basis of its interactive powers, that is, the ways in which it interacts with the world around it. Interactions are situated adaptation to changes. In this way, changes are crucial within process metaphysics and are included in the starting point of its investigation. What seems to the naked eyes as one-ness/singularity is a complex process where an organization of interactions is emerging from moment to moment by continually adapting to the changes around and within it. The question of numerical identity over time becomes valid only within substance metaphysics which has no space to accommodate change, due to its allegiance to essence. (shrink)

Kant's philosophy must be understood nonnaturalistically and anti-psychologistically. Self-consciousness must be interpreted as preceding the distinction between different persons. Kant departs from the traditional idea that I thoughts are always mediated by a certain specific I sense or conceptualization of oneself. At the same time the so-called paradoxes of self-consciousness are resolved. The possibility of a pre-personal self-consciousness is what links the way all objects are given to finite beings to the way they are conceptualized by those beings. It serves (...) as the unifying basis for intuitions and concepts. Intuitions and concepts of objects are connected by their relation to a numerically identical self. ;The subject construed impersonally provides the frame for any possible experience and is one in the same in all possible experience. As such it can never be experienced as a distinct entity. It is the condition under which it is possible to have a point of view at all. One must be in a position to become conscious of the numerical identity of this logical subject of all representation if is to be possible to communicate indeed to compare and contrast representational contents at all. ;Self-consciousness is inherently empty and yet also necessarily in relation to contents of consciousness. This means that its numerical identity can only be sustained if all potential contents of consciousness present themselves to the self in such a way that they sustain the possibility of consciousness of the self as having a discrete empirical identity. Kant's argument in the First Analogy and the Refutation of Idealism fulfills this demand for a correlate to the numerical identity of pre-personal consciousness in the data presented to self-consciousness spatio-temporally. We must view self-construction and construction of objects existing outside of us as part of a single process which presupposes an impersonal self-consciousness. (shrink)

There is a category of objects such that for any two occurrences of an object in that category, Establishing the highest degree of their qualitative identity will not be sufficient to establish that the object involved is one and the same. It is first argued that objects in this category occupy positions in a spatio-Temporal continuum and obey certain principles of conservation. And then two criteria for the numerical identity of these objects are developed: (a) that there are scientific (...) laws which can, In principle, Predict or retrodict a continuous path for the object; (b) that the parts of the object and their arrangement are preserved in a certain specified way. (shrink)

Parfit’s Branch Line argument is intended to show that the relation of survival is possibly a one-many relation and thus different from numerical identity. I offer a detailed reconstruction of Parfit’s notions of survival and personal identity, and show the argument cannot be coherently formulated within Parfit’s own setting. More specifically, I argue that Parfit’s own specifications imply that the “R-relation”, i.e., the relation claimed to capture of “what matters in survival,” turns out to hold not only along but (...) also across the branches representing the development of a reduplicated person. This curious fact of ‘interbranch survival,’ as I call it, has gone unnoticed so far. The fact that the R-relation also holds across branches creates a trilemma for Parfit’s approach. Either the envisaged notion of personal identity is circular, or the R-relation fails as a reconstruction of the common sense notion of survival, or talk about persons ‘branching’ (being reduplicated etc.) remains semantically empty. In the paper’s last section I suggest that my criticism does not detract from the larger systematic significance of Parfit’s argument. The argument is simply terminologically miscalibrated. Even though Parfit’s branch line argument fails to establish the conceptual separability of survival and identity, it can be used to show the separability of sameness and numerical identity, which should have similar implications for meta-ethics as the original argument. (shrink)

I formulate an apparent inconsistency between some claims Aristotle makes in his Metaphysics about the sameness and non-sameness relations which obtain between an object and its essence: while a object is not the same as its essence, an essence is thought as being the same as its essence. I discuss different ways in which one may propose to overcome this apparent inconsistency and show that they are problematic. My diagnosis of the problem is that all these putative solutions (...) share the assumption that Aristotle is operating exclusively with the notion of strict numerical identity between an object and its essence, or between definiendum and definiens. I introduce the notion of sameness in nature which holds between an object and its essence, understood as the metaphysical counterpart to the relation of 'being defined as': two items are the same in nature just in case the answer to the 'what is it?' or 'what is its nature/essence?' question is common to both. I argue that the notions of sameness in nature and 'being defined as' need not entail strict identity. Further, they are compatible with, indeed require, the idea that an essence is prior to its essence-bearer, or that a definiens is prior to the relevant definiendum. I conclude that the twin notions of sameness in nature and 'being defined as' successfully defuse the apparent inconsistency formulated at the outset. (shrink)

In his essay Thinking Colours and/or Machines Kittler hints at a key point in the emergence of modern European culture: the point at which ‘letters and numbers no longer coincide’. In this essay - first published in 2003 as Zahl und Ziffer - Kittler traces the split between numerals and numbers in sweeping historical detail. This is part of a much larger project, the aim of which is to think about technology, history and culture anew by considering the ways in (...) which ‘letters, numbers, images and tones’ have been differentiated and re-integrated by developing notation systems and media technologies. In this present essay, Kittler is concerned specifically with the question of number. His argument is that numbers and numerals have not always stood apart. In Old Hebrew and even nursery rhymes, for example, numbers are in fact words. This might seem like a banal observation, but for Kittler it is crucial as historically, mathematics proper only developed ‘in cultures in which numbers are present as numerals’, a development which entailed the transformation of numbers from signifiers into signifieds and which rested on the emergence of storage and transmission media that Kittler calls ‘the media of mathematics’. This connection between media and mathematics is explored through a wide range of philosophical sources: Plato, Philolaus, Aristotle and Aquinas, to name but a few. Kittler is fascinated by the inscription technologies that make mathematics possible, and which at the same time structure cultural forms as well as our bodily experience of them. As he puts it in a programmatic aside, ‘media studies only make sense’ if they focus on how ‘media make senses.’ Hence his focus on the Greek phonetic alphabet: for Kittler, its superiority has less to do with its ability to reproduce the spoken words of any language, than with the fact that at one point it was used to handle language, music, and mathematics - that is, one and the same set of signs was used to encode letters, tones and numbers. This, however, was not an abstract undertaking but developed in constant feedback with specific instruments or media, especially the lyre and the bow. It was here that fundamental concepts such as logoi were first developed that were subsequently distorted, misunderstood and deprived of their musico-technical origins by philosophers such as Aristotle. Kittler’s essay is thus also part of a larger cultural project, indebted in particular to Martin Heidegger, whose aim it is to ferret out the different, as yet unrevealed beginning of occidental culture. Moreover, while it was necessary for the evolution of modern mathematics that numbers receive a notation system of their own that will allow for ratios and decimals, among others, it is obvious that Kittler sees the computer as a return of universal alphabet that operates in constant feedback with a medium that shapes our senses: ‘In the Greek alphabet our senses were present - and thanks to Turing they are so once again.’. (shrink)

What makes someone the same person over time? There are (at least) two ways of understanding this question: A person can be the same in the sense of being very similar to how they used to be (similarity), or they can be the same in the sense of being the same individual (numerical identity). In recent years, several papers have claimed to explore the commonsense notion of numerical identity. However, we suggest here that these researchers have instead been (...) studying similarity. We develop a novel method that uses simple intuitions about objects to illustrate these two notions of “same person”, and then asks which concept applies to instances of personal change. Across 4 studies (N = 2446), we find that these previously documented intuitions are best understood as reflecting judgments about similarity, not identity (Experiments 1 and 2). We then use this method to explore the situations in which participants do perceive a change in numerical identity. We find that when a person's entire brain (Experiments 3 and 4) or soul (Experiment 4) has been replaced with that of another person, the majority of participants judge that numerical identity has changed. However, we also note that a substantial minority of participants denied that identity had changed, opening new questions about the role of the body in intuitive judgments of personal identity. (shrink)

The anchoring heuristic refers to phenomena when an arbitrary number affects subsequent numerical estimations. Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf and Brewer showed that it is not necessary for the anchor to be a numerical value, yet current models describing the anchoring heuristic do not fully account for the mechanism of non-numerical anchoring. However, this effect shows similarity to the basic anchoring effect - obtained without the comparative question and based on the availability of the given number in working memory. In (...) this study, we attempt to verify whether those two effect share the same psychological mechanism. In Experiment 1, we show that non-numerical anchoring based on magnitude priming cannot be obtained when the lines are just observed. The examined mechanism proves to be dependent on the act of drawing, displaying limitations similar to the basic anchoring effect, previously pointed out by Brewer and Chapman. By using the same numerical anchors in different size formats, in Experiment 2 we showed that anchoring based on magnitude priming occurs even when the numerical values do not affect the estimations. The results are discussed in the light of a possible mechanism that underlies the investigated effect. (shrink)

Organic evolution, or change, among the diatoms has proceeded with considerable regularity. The origins, the extinctions, and the increases in numbers of species and genera, on the whole, have submitted to law and order, as rules-within-limits . The changes of evolution have followed from two sorts of phenomena — 1) the origin and extinction of shortlived or unstable species, in a proportion which has been more or less constant, but different in the two groups of diatoms, Centricae and Pennatae; these (...) short-lived species died out in the subperiod of their origin even under favourable enough environment or surrounding conditions, because of the innate instability of these particular species: and 2) the origin of new species which demonstrated their innate capacity for permanence by remaining in the living condition from their origins mostly up to the present time. The continued or continual additions of new and long-living species, in proportion to the number available as possible and parental species, has given the geometrical progressions.Consequently evolution in the diatoms has been monopodial, or one-stemmed, and not sympodial or not with many substitutions of one species after another in successions. The two kinds of species-durations are well-known in other classes of plants and animals. Exactly the same processes of additions, subtractions, and multiplications, particularly as found in the centric diatoms, are very probable in these classes of plants and animals which have given the same answer or arithmetical result for the whole of their previous histories, in the form of the frequency distribution of the present sizes of their genera.The rules-within-limits of this basic evolution are described, defined, and discussed in their relations to various theories of evolution which perhaps only concern the working of factors of superimposed modifications that reduce the results of the pattern or plan of basic evolution.Die phylogenetische Entwicklung wurde im Bereich der Kieselalgen von bestimmten Gesetzmässigkeiten beherrscht. Die Entstehung neuer Arten und Gattungen, ihr Wiederverschwinden und die Zunahme des Formenreichtums, resultierend aus der Zahl der neuentstandenen, vermindert um die der wieder verschwindenen Arten und Gattungen und vollzog sich nach Regeln , die durch folgende Phänomene gekennzeichnet sind: Zwischen der Zahl der neuentstehenden und der Zahl der in der gleichen geologischen Subperiode aus inneren Gründen wieder aussterbenden Arten besteht eine mehr oder wenig feste Beziehung. Diese ist für die Centricae und Pennatae verschieden. Ein bestimmter Anteil der neuentstandenen Arten und Gattungen erwies sich aus inneren Gründen als „ausdauernd” und blieb bis auf den heutigen Tag erhalten. Die Zunahme der Arten- Zahl durch das Hinzukommen langlebiger Formen war stetig und vollzog sich nach Massgabe geometrischer Progressionen.Diese Tatsachen führen zu dem Schluss, dass die phylogenetische Entwicklung der Kieselalgen nach monopodialem, und nicht nach sympodialem Muster vorsichging. Auch in andern Pflanzengruppen und im Tierreich durften die gleichen Gesetzmässigkeiten herrschend sein. Am klarsten gelangen sie bei den Centricae zum, Ausdruck und werden vom Autor als das Fazit von Additions-, Subtraktions-, und Multiplikationsprozessen aufgefasst. Die heutige Situation bezüglich Häufigkeit der Grössen der Gattungen, in Zahl der Arten, ist das Endergebnis der summativen Wirkung dieser Einzelprozesse.Diese als ‚rules-within-limits’ bezeichneten Gesetzmässigkeiten werden im einzelnen beschrieben, erklärt und zusammenfassend dargestellt. Zu andern Evolutionstheorien in Beziehung gebracht, werden sie schliesslich für Erörterung des Problems benutzt, inwieweit noch andere evolutionsgeschichtliche Prozesse als übergeordnete Faktoren in den vom Verfasser dargestellten Grundplan des Evolutionsgeschehens eingreifen können.L'évolution organique ou le changement parmi les Diatomées s'est effectué avec une régularité considérable. Les origines et les extinctions, et les accroissements des nombres des espèces et des genres, se sont soumis en tout aux lois et aux ordres, commes des régularités à l'intérieur de légères déviations. Le changement de l'évolution fut la conséquence de deux sortes de phénomène: l'origine et l'extinction des espèces éphémères dans une proportion plus ou moins déterminée mais différente pour les deux classes des Diatomées, Centricae et Pennatae; ces espèces éphémères moururent dans la subpériode de leur origines malgré le caractère assez favorable des circonstances environnantes, à cause de l'évanescence inhérente aux espèces particulières, et l'origine des espèces nouvelles qui démontrèrent leur qualité innée de permanence tout en continuant de vivre depuis leurs origines, pour la plupart, jusqu'à présent. Les additions continuelles d'espèces nouvelles et permanentes, en nombres proportionnés aux nombres disponibles comme espèces parentes et possibles, donnèrent des accroissements par progressions géométriques.Par conséquent, l'évolution parmi les Diatomées fut monopodiale et non pas sympodiale. Les deux sortes d'espèces-durées sont bien connues parmi beaucoup d'autres classes de plantes et d'animaux. Les mêmes procédés d'additions, de soustractions et de multiplications, particulièrement tels qu'on les trouve dans les Centricae, sont très probables pour ces classes de plantes et d'animaux qui ont donné un résultat le plus semblable pour la somme totale de leur histoire précédente, sous la forme de la répartition des fréquences de leurs grandeurs générique actuelles.Les régularités à l'intérieur de légères déviations de cette évolution fondamentale sont détaillées, définies et discutées dans leurs relations aux diverses théories touchant les autres méthodes de l'évolution qui jouent le rôle de facteurs modifiants superposés au dessin général ou au dessein de l'évolution fondamentale. (shrink)

Ordinary judgments about personal identity are complicated by the fact that phrases like “same person” and “different person” have multiple uses in ordinary English. This complication calls into question the significance of recent experimental work on this topic. For example, Tobia (2015) found that judgments of personal identity were significantly affected by whether the moral change described in a vignette was for the better or for the worse, while Strohminger and Nichols (2014) found that loss of moral conscience had more (...) of an effect on identity judgments than loss of biographical memory. In each case, however, there are grounds for questioning whether the judgments elicited in these experiments engaged a concept of numerical personal identity at all (cf. Berniūnas and Dranseika 2016; Dranseika 2017; Starmans and Bloom 2018). In two pre-registered studies we validate this criticism while also showing a way to address it: instead of attempting to engage the concept of numerical identity through specialized language or the terms of an imaginary philosophical debate, we should consider instead how the identity of a person is described through the connected use of proper names, definite descriptions, and the personal pronouns “I”, “you”, “he”, and “she”. When the experiments above are revisited in this way, there is no evidence that the differences in question had an effect on ordinary identity judgments. (shrink)

Do neurosurgical procedures ever result in the patient prior to the procedure not being identical with the individual who wakes up postsurgery in the hospital bed? We address this question by offering an analysis of the persistence of persons that emphasizes narrative, rather than numerical, identity. We argue that a narrative analysis carries the advantage of highlighting what matters to patients in their ordinary lives, explaining the varying degrees of persistence of personal identity, and enhancing our understanding of patients' (...) experiences. We illustrate these points in cases involving temporal lobectomy for treatment of refractory epilepsy and deep brain stimulation for refractory Parkinson's disease. (shrink)

Spinoza claims that a person’s mind and body are one and the same. But he also claims that minds think and do not move, whereas bodies move and do not think. How can we reconcile these claims? I believe that Spinoza is building on a traditional view about identity over time. According to this view, identity over time is linked to essence, so that a thing that is now resting is identical to a thing that was previously moving, provided that (...) they share the same essence. I believe that Spinoza has a similar view about the identity of minds and bodies. In particular, a thing that is thinking in the attribute of thought is identical to a thing that is moving in the attribute of extension, provided that they share the same essence. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to how he is often read, Spinoza did not believe that the mind and the body were numerically identical. This means that we must find some alternative reading for his claims that they are 'one and the same thing'.

The aim of this study was to investigate the effect of numeracy and the emotion of fear on the decision-making process. While previous research demonstrated that these factors are independently related to search effort, search policy and choice in a decision from experience task, less is known about how their interaction contributes to processing information under uncertainty. We attempted to address this problem and to fill this gap. In the present study, we hypothesized that more numerate people would sample more (...) information about a decision problem and that the effect of fear would depend on the source of this emotion: whether it is integral (i.e., relevant) or incidental (i.e., irrelevant) to a decision problem. Additionally, we tested how these factors predict choices. We addressed these hypotheses in a series of two experiments. In each experiment, we used a sampling paradigm to measure search effort, search policy and choice in nine binary problems included in a decision from experience task. In Experiment 1, before the sampling task we elicited incidental fear by asking participants to recall fearful events from their life. In Experiment 2, integral fear was elicited by asking participants to make choices concerning medical treatment. Decision problems and their payoff distributions were the same in the two experiments and across each condition. In both experiments, we assessed objective statistical numeracy and controlled for a change in the current emotional state. We found that more numerate people sampled more information about a decision problem and switched less frequently between alternatives. Incidental fear marginally predicted search effort. Integral fear led to larger sample sizes, but only among more numerate people. Neither numeracy nor fear were related to the number of choices that maximized expected values. However, across two experiments sample sizes predicted the number of choices that maximized experienced mean returns. The findings suggest that people with higher numeracy may be more sensitive to integral emotions; this may result in more effortful sampling of relevant information leading to choices maximizing experienced returns. (shrink)

It is an intimate experience for us to think, to understand and to perceive things as being identical to themselves, and to suppose, consequently, that things are truly “what” they are. Something is always conceived as itself. The given is given full of itself in all its modifications. For instance, I can think or perceive partially some lips, I can see them almost in their whole or in some of their aspects, or just see them disappear. But it does not (...) seem to be possible to think or to perceive a given as almost itself, as an aspect or as part of itself. It is the aim of this work to study the assumptions and conditions for the original position of sameness in experience, just as it occurs in the synthesis of the datum singular and distinct. The polarization of single tone (einstimmig) intentional rays in an αvτó already contains the aporiae peculiar to the experience of the identical, whose revelation shall lead us, on the one hand, to one of the nuclei of the analysis of passive synthesis, and, on the other hand, to point up how critical revision of the numerical or extensional model of self-identity is for the unity of meaning. Then, it will be a question of pointing out the reasons why in a phenomenology of identity, the renunciation of the phenomenological legitimacy of the αvτó as a guarantee for the different positions of identity must be observed. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3464-4_13 . (shrink)

This paper describes the investigations performed to better understand two-stage rotor speed matching in a contrarotating fan. In addition, this study develops a comprehensive measuring and communication system for a contrarotating fan using ZigBee network. The investigation method is based on three-dimensional RANS simulations; the RANS equations are solved by the numerical method in conjunction with a SST turbulence model. A wireless measurement system using big data method is first designed, and then a comparison is done with experimental measurements (...) to outline the capacity of the numerical method. The results show that when contrarotating fan worked under designed speed, performance of two-stages rotors could not be matched as the designed working condition was deviated. Rotor 1 had huge influences on flow rate characteristics of a contrarotating fan. Rotor 2 was influenced by flow rates significantly. Under large flow rate condition, the power capability of rotor 2 became very weak; under working small flow rate condition, overloading would take place to class II motor. In order to solve the performance mismatch between two stages of CRF under nondesigned working conditions, under small flow rate condition, the priority shall be given to increase of the speed of rotor 1, while the speed of rotor 2 shall be reduced appropriately; under large flow rate condition, the speed of rotor 1 shall be reduced and the speed of rotor 2 shall be increased at the same time. (shrink)

What is the impact of genetics and genomics on issues of identity and what do we mean when we speak of identity? This paper explores how certain concepts of identity used in philosophy can be brought together in a multi-layered concept of identity. It discusses the concepts of numerical, qualitative, personal and genetic identity-over-time as well as rival concepts of genomic identity-over-time. These are all understood as layers in the multi-layered concept of identity. Furthermore, the paper makes it clear (...) that our understanding of genomic identity and the importance attached to genomic sameness-over-time matters for the ethical questions raised by certain new gene technologies. (shrink)

Object identity, the apprehension that two glimpses refer to the same object, is offered as an example of combining generality, mathematics, and evolution. We argue that it applies to glimpses in time (apparent motion), modality (ventriloquism), and space (Gestalt grouping); that it has a mathematically elegant solution of nested geometries (Euclidean, Similarity, Affine, Projective, Topology); and that it is evolutionarily sound despite our Euclidean world. [Shepard].

The theologian Hugo Rahner argued that the homo ludens is a man of ‘Ernstheiterkeit’, a person who can smile under tears but also recognizes the gravity in all earthly cheerfulness. The primary aim of this study was to test the validity of this notion: Do homines ludentes exist? Two hundred sixty-three adult subjects were measured for seriousness and cheerfulness and playfulness. Results provided unequivocal support for Rahner's thesis. Numerous subjects scored high in both seriousness and cheerfulness thus confirming the existence (...) of homines ludentes. It was further found that these subjects were among those scoring highest in playfulness. Subjects scoring high in cheerfulness but low in seriousness were, however, even more closely associated with playfulness. The scores for homines ludentes did not differ from the rest of the subjects in the creative and dynamic facets of playfulness. The importance of developing empirical research to investigate hypotheses derived from non-scientific concepts is discussed. (shrink)

The theologian Hugo Rahner argued that the homo ludens is a man of ‘Ernstheiterkeit’, a person who can smile under tears but also recognizes the gravity in all earthly cheerfulness. The primary aim of this study was to test the validity of this notion: Do homines ludentes exist? Two hundred sixty-three adult subjects were measured for seriousness and cheerfulness and playfulness. Results provided unequivocal support for Rahner's thesis. Numerous subjects scored high in both seriousness and cheerfulness thus confirming the existence (...) of homines ludentes. It was further found that these subjects were among those scoring highest in playfulness. Subjects scoring high in cheerfulness but low in seriousness were, however, even more closely associated with playfulness. The scores for homines ludentes did not differ from the rest of the subjects in the creative and dynamic facets of playfulness. The importance of developing empirical research to investigate hypotheses derived from non-scientific concepts is discussed. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the linguistic features in Nietzsche's presentations that have led readers to assume that “the same” means numerical identity. I also evaluate the following argument about personal identity that has been used to support this assumption: if we are not numerically identical to our recurring counterparts, then we have no reason to be concerned about the prospect of reliving our lives and Nietzsche's theory cannot have any of the existential significance he ascribes to it. My (...) conclusion is that Nietzsche actually has in mind a complete qualitative identity that includes all spatiotemporal properties. Thus, the supporting argument fails because the problem of persistence through change over time is not relevant to a theory in which persons are neither recurring at a later time nor undergoing any change when they recur. (shrink)

Chemicals have penetrated everyday lives of men who have sex with men as never before, along with new online and mobile technologies used to seek pleasures and connections. Poststructuralist (including queer) explorations of these new intensities show how bodies exist in the form of (political) surfaces able to connect with other bodies and with other objects where they may find/create a function (e.g., reproduce or disrupt hegemonies). This federally funded netnographic study explored how a variety of chemicals such as recreational (...) drugs, pharmaceuticals and steroids are contributing to the construction of gay, bisexual and other men having sex with men (GBMSM) communities and their interactions with idealized masculinities in the age of increasing technology. Five major thematic categories emerged from our analysis: (1) assembling bodies and technologies, (2) becoming orgiastic, (3) experiencing stigma, (4) becoming machinic and (5) negotiating practices. Our analysis explores how and why GBMSM pursue excesses of pleasure and connection through the assemblages they make with sexualized drug use, online platforms and other men. (shrink)

Trinitarians are charged with at least two contradictions. First, the Father is God and the Son is God, so it seems to follow that the Father is the Son. Trinitarians affirm the premises but deny the conclusion, which seems contradictory. Second, the Father is a God, the Son is a God, and the Holy Spirit is a God, but the Father is not the Son, the Father is not the Holy Spirit, and the Son is not the Holy Spirit. This (...) argument seems to entail that there are three Gods. Again, Trinitarians affirm the premises but deny the conclusion. In this article, I present a novel Trinitarian solution to these alleged contradictions. The solution allows one to maintain that the premises in the above arguments are absolute identity statements, forestalls the need to develop a new way of counting (e.g. by sortals or numerical sameness), and is compatible with divine simplicity. (shrink)

This chapter examines historical reconstruction and literary structures of rabbinic texts using the Leviticus Rabbah as an example. It explains that Leviticus Rabbah is a commentary on the Book of Leviticus which now forms part of Midrash Rabbah. It proposes ten theses about the special problems which the literary structures of rabbinic texts pose for the historian and analyses a section of the amoraic work of Leviticus Rabbah to describe some of those literary structures. The findings suggest that it is (...) impossible to explain how the textuality of rabbinic sources worked and that many rabbinic works fill the same functional position in a text more than once. (shrink)

The paper presents, motivates, critiques, and proposes revisions to Baker’s Constitution View, which includes her definitions of constitution, derivative features, and numerical sameness. The paper argues that Baker should add a mereological clause to her definition of constitution in order to avoid various counterexamples.

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Sameness and Objects The “Softness” of Sameness in Kind and Numerical Sameness Carving out Strange Kinds Carving Out Strange Individuals The World Onto Which We Project Kind ‐ Sameness and Persistence We Who Project Kind ‐ Sameness and Persistence References.

This volume reflects the late Norman Calder's own interests and contributions. It includes articles by scholars who are already renowned, like Calder, for their sophisticated and challenging approaches to Arabic and Islamic texts. The papers are on a variety of topics of interest to people in the field of Middle Eastern cultures, and similar in nature to other collections, conference volumes and Festschriften. Also represented are his former students colleagues working in the field of Rabbinic Studies, which informed his own (...) work. Topics include: Transformations of Jewish Traditions in Early Islam: The case of Enoch/Idris, Narrative and Doctrine in the First Story of Rumi's Masnavi, Fiqh for beginners: an Anatolian text on jihad, Research Muslim Minorities: some reflections on fieldwork in Britain, Defective marriages in classical Hanafi law, and Can rights co-exist with religion? (shrink)

The potential of the soil to hold plant nutrients is governed by the cation-exchange capacity of any soil. Estimating soil CEC aids in conventional soil management practices to replenish the soil solution that supports plant growth. In this study, a multiple model integration scheme supervised with a hybrid genetic algorithm-neural network was developed and employed to predict the accuracy of soil CEC in Tabriz plain, an arid region of Iran. The standalone models and extreme learning machine ) were implemented for (...) incorporation into the MM-GANN. In addition, it was tested to enhance the prediction accuracy of the standalone models. The soil parameters such as clay, silt, pH, carbonate calcium equivalent, and soil organic matter were used as model inputs to predict soil CEC. With the use of several evaluation criteria, the results showed that the MM-GANN model involving the predictions of ELM and ANN models calibrated by considering all the soil parameters as inputs provided superior soil CEC estimates with a Nash Sutcliffe Efficiency = 0.87, Root Mean Square Error = 2.885, Mean Absolute Error = 2.249, Mean Absolute Percentage Error = 12.072, and coefficient of determination = 0.884. The proposed MM-GANN model is a reliable intelligence-based approach for the assessment of soil quality parameters intended for sustainability and management prospects. (shrink)

This volume reflects the late Norman Calder's own interests and contributions. It includes articles by scholars who are similarly renowned for their sophisticated and challenging approaches to Arabic and Islamic texts. Also represented are his former students and colleagues working in the field of Rabbinic Studies, which informed his own work.

Within cognitive psychology it is widely accepted that the human visual system represents the numerical sameness of objects. However, the relation of visual sameness itself has not attracted as much attention and no detailed description of this relation is yet available. One of the most important questions is whether this relation can be understood as classical identity, and thus whether it is an equivalence relation. Despite this research gap, I intend to show that results of some psychological (...) works can be interpreted as having a high relevance for the question of equivalence. I demonstrate this by analyzing a study by Drew et al. (2013). (shrink)

Modal conventionalism is the view that two crucial forms of sameness are mind-dependent. There is no phenomenon of sameness in kind, on this view, except in virtue of our conventions for individuating nature’s kinds; there is no phenomenon of numerical sameness across time, for an individual member of some natural kind, except in virtue of our conventions for individuating such members.1 Modal conventionalism has its realist opponents. These opponents have argued, following Kripke’s lead more than thirty (...) years ago (Kripke 1972), that the boundaries of at least many of nature’s kinds are carved out by nature itself, and not by our classifi catory practices (e.g., Millikan 2000: passim, e.g., pp. 25 and 72). But they have not generally argued, with anything approaching the same vigor, that modal conventionalism is wrong in its other main claim. They have not in general argued that the world-given connections among properties, that make those properties mind-independently be membership conditions for some natural kind, at the same time make those properties mind-independently be persistence conditions for the members of the kind—properties the departure of which constitutes a ceasing-to-exist for the object that formerly had them. On the contrary, opponents of modal conventionalism have.. (shrink)

This article focuses on some topics in Jeffrey Brower’s recent and excellent book, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World: Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects. Part of Brower’s goal for the book is to reconstruct Aquinas’s views. I offer some reflections on Brower’s use of this metaphor of reconstruction, before considering four topics in some detail. These are: 1. Brower’s discussion of the relation between Aristotle’s Ten Categories and the not-obviously-connected four-fold division of being into substance, form, prime matter, and accidental (...) unity. 2. Brower’s interpretation of prime matter as “non-individual stuff.” 3. Brower’s account of numerical sameness without identity along with some discussion of how this is supposed to be useful for solving a particular puzzle about accidental change. 4. I’ll close with some reflections on Brower’s somewhat novel solution to a longstanding problem with Aquinas’s metaphysics of the afterlife. (shrink)

In virtue of what are later and an earlier group members of one and the numerically same tradition? Gallie was one of the few philosophers to have engaged with issues surrounding this question. My article is not a faithful exegesis of Gallie but develops a terminology in which to discuss issues surrounding the numerical identity of a tradition over time, based on some of his insights.

In this paper I provide a metaphysical account of the incarnation that starts from substantive assumptions about the nature of natures and about the metaphysics of the Trinity and develops in light of these a story about the relations among the elements involved in the incarnation. Central to the view I will describe are two features of Aristotle's metaphysics, though I do not claim that my own development of these ideas is anything of which Aristotle himself would have approved: (i) (...) a hylomorphic understanding of material objects; (ii) a doctrine of numerical sameness without identity; and (iii) the view that the nature of a thing can appropriately be identified with its form. These ideas, along with other important aspects of the metaphysical framework with which I shall be working, are laid out in the first five sections below, followed in the sixth section by a brief sketch of the account of the Trinity that Jeff Brower and I have presented in detail elsewhere. In the final section, I present my account of the incarnation. (shrink)

This book is a study of Aristotle's metaphysics in which the central argument is that Aristotle's views on substance are a direct response to Plato's Theory of Forms. The claim is that Aristotle believes that many of Plato's views are tenable once one has rejected Plato's notion of separation. There have been many recent books on Aristotle's theory of substance. This one is distinct from previous books in several ways: firstly, it offers a completely new, coherent interpretation of Aristotle's claim (...) that substances are separate in which substances turn out to be specimens of natural kinds. Secondly, it covers a broad range of issues, including Aristotle's criticism of Plato, his views on numerical sameness and identity, his epistemology and his account of teleology. There is also a discussion of much of the recent literature on Aristotle. (shrink)

In recent analytic literature on the Trinity we have seen a variety of "social" models of the Trinity. By contrast there are few "non-­‐social" models. One prominent "non-­‐social" view is Brian Leftow's "Latin Trinity." I argue that the name of Leftow's model is not sufficiently descriptive in light of diverse models within Latin speaking theology. Next, I develop a new "non-­‐social" model that is inspired by Richard of St. Victor's description of a person in conjunction with my appropriating insights about (...) indexicals from David Kaplan and John Perry. I point out that the copula in tokens of statements like, "I am the Father," is an ambiguous term and when used by a certain divine person a different proposition is affirmed. Central to this model is the claim that the copula bears the "is of identity" and the "is of numerical sameness without identity." Further, I show that Leftow's model employs two concepts of "person," a Lockean one and a Boethian one, and mine employs Richard of St. Victor's. I describe Leftow's model as a "hard non-­‐social" model and mine as a "soft non-­‐social" model that is nearer to some social models. I conclude that Leftow's model is not the lone candidate among "non-­‐social" models and that the variety of "non-­‐social" models has yet to be exhausted. (shrink)

Derek Parfit’s thesis that identity doesn’t matter in survival has been extensively discussed except for its metaphysical robustness. How can we justify the abandonment of identity in the way Parfit suggests? My argument is the following. Those who want to endorse the thesis that identity doesn’t matter (and, therefore, abandon identity across time) should adopt exdurantism, i.e. a metaphysics according to which the world is composed by temporal parts each existing at a time and according to which there is nothing (...) as a numerically same entity which exists at different times. I show that the metaphysics behind Parfit’s theory is neither compatible with endurantism, according to which object persists by being wholly present at different times, nor with perdurantism, according to which entities are aggregates of temporal and spatial parts. (shrink)

I reconstruct and analyze al-Ghazali’s arguments defending a plurality of real divine attributes in The Incoherence of the Philosophers. I show that one of these arguments can be made to engage with and defend Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea’s “Numerical Sameness Without Identity” model of the Trinity. To that end, I provide some background on the metaphysical commitments at play in al-Ghazali’s arguments.

In this paper, I respond to Joshua Mugg and James T. Turner, Jr's claim that the doctrine of the resurrection requires the numerical sameness of ante- and post-mortem bodies. I argue that they have not shown that Scripture teaches this view and, therefore, that animalism, as opposed to substance dualism, does not offer a superior explanation for the necessity of the resurrection.

Of all of Berkeley’s claims about perception, perhaps the most unusual is his assertion that we do not see the numerically same objects we feel. Ideas are radically heterogeneous. The question I seek to answer is why Berkeley thought this thesis true. Traditional accounts hold that Berkeley was forced into accepting heterogeneity by his views concerning either distance or abstraction, but careful analysis reveals these to be mistaken. I conclude that how Berkeley thought of the ontic status of ideas finishes (...) the incomplete picture provided by traditional accounts, and supplies us with a better under‐standing of his views on perceptual heterogeneity. (shrink)