Results for 'Rational'

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Bibliography: Rationality and Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Bibliography: Moral Rationalism in Meta-Ethics
Bibliography: Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics
Bibliography: Rationality in Epistemology
Bibliography: Rationalism in Metaphilosophy
Bibliography: Operationalism in General Philosophy of Science
Bibliography: Rational Choice Theory in Philosophy of Social Science
Bibliography: Rationality-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Irrationality in Epistemology
Bibliography: Rational Requirements in Epistemology
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  1.  16
    Ending the Rationality Wars.Rationality Disappear - 2002 - In Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 236.
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  2.  6
    Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, & Michael Bishop.Rationality Disappear - 2002 - In Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 236.
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  3.  4
    Primary works.Rational Grammar - 2005 - In Siobhan Chapman & Christopher Routledge (eds.), Key thinkers in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 10.
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  4. Is Rationality Normative?John Broomespecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality - 2007 - Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).
     
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  5. Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
    Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value (...)
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  6. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus.Model Of Rationality - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 115.
  7. Moral Faith, and Religion.".Rational Theology - 1992 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 394--416.
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  8.  15
    Stephen Neale.Rational Belief - 1996 - Mind 105 (417).
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  9. Leonard M. Fleck.Care Rationing & Plan Fair - 1994 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (4-6):435-443.
     
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  10.  19
    Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations.John C. Harsanyi - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his (...)
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  11.  54
    The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Scott Sturgeon presents an original account of mental states and their dynamics. He develops a detailed story of coarse- and fine-grained mental states, a novel perspective on how they fit together, an engaging theory of the rational transitions between them, and a fresh view of how formal methods can advance our understanding in this area. In doing so, he addresses a deep four-way divide in literature on epistemic rationality. Formal epistemology is done in specialized languages--often seeming a lot more (...)
  12. Discourses on Africa.Man is A. Rational Animal - 2003 - In P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings 2nd Edition. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
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  13. Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully (...)
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  14.  67
    Rational belief systems.Brian David Ellis - 1979 - Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
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  15.  12
    The Probabilistic Foundations of Rational Learning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    According to Bayesian epistemology, rational learning from experience is consistent learning, that is learning should incorporate new information consistently into one's old system of beliefs. Simon M. Huttegger argues that this core idea can be transferred to situations where the learner's informational inputs are much more limited than Bayesianism assumes, thereby significantly expanding the reach of a Bayesian type of epistemology. What results from this is a unified account of probabilistic learning in the tradition of Richard Jeffrey's 'radical probabilism'. (...)
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  16. Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of (...)
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  17.  19
    Rational adaptation under task and processing constraints: Implications for testing theories of cognition and action.Andrew Howes, Richard L. Lewis & Alonso Vera - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):717-751.
  18.  13
    Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    In past years, the traditional Bayesian theory of rational decision making, based on subjective calculations of expected utility, has faced powerful attack from philosophers such as David Lewis and Brian Skyrms, who advance an alternative causal decision theory. The test they present for the Bayesian is exemplified in the decision problem known as 'Newcomb's paradox' and in related decision problems and is held to support the prescriptions of the causal theory. As well as his conclusions, the concepts and methods (...)
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  19.  17
    Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use (...)
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  20. Rational Action.Carl G. Hempel - 1961 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35:5 - 23.
  21. Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
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  22.  17
    Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues.Alasdair C. MacIntyre - 1999 - Open Court.
    According to the author of "After Virtue, " to flourish, humans need to develop virtues of independent thought and acknowledged social dependence. This book presents the moral philosopher's comparison of humans to other animals and his exploration of the impact of these virtues.
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  23.  41
    The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1021-1040.
    Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...)
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  24.  14
    Religion and Rational Theology: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuael Kant.Immanuel Kant, Allen W. Wood & George Di Giovanni (eds.) - 1996 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP. Translated by George Di Giovanni, Mary J. Gregor & Allen W. Wood.
    This Volume contains seven works of Kant, newly translated and edited, with Introductions. What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? 1786 (Allen Wood) On the miscarriage of all philosophical trials in theodicy. 1791 (George di Giovanni Religion within the boundaries of mere reason. 1793 (George di Giovanni) The end of all things. 1794 (Allen Wood) The conflict of the faculties. 1798 (Mary J. Gregor & Robert Anchor) Preface to Reinhold Bernhard Jackmann's examination of the Kantian Philosophy of Religion. (...)
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  25.  22
    The Rational and the Social.G. S. Axtell - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):276-278.
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  26.  28
    Rational Belief Systems.James Cargile - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):454.
  27.  30
    A Rational Analysis of Rule-Based Concept Learning.Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Jacob Feldman & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (1):108-154.
  28.  61
    Rational Choice, Risk Aversion, And Evolution.Samir Okasha - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (5):217-235.
  29.  41
    Rational Desires.R. B. Brandt - 1969 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 43:43 - 64.
  30.  21
    The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1151-1168.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal (...)
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  31. Rational Persuasion as Paternalism.George Tsai - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):78-112.
    I argue that rationally persuading another to do something for their own good is sometimes (objectionably) paternalistic. Rational persuasion may express, and be guided by, the motive of distrust in the other’s capacity to gather or weigh evidence, and may intrude on the other’s deliberative activities in ways that conflict with respecting their agency and autonomy. I also examine factors that make a difference to whether (and when) the provision of reasons is respectful.
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  32. Rational 'ought' implies 'can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.
    Every kind of ‘ought’ implies some kind of ‘can’ – but there are many kinds of ‘ought’ and even more kinds of ‘can’. In this essay, I shall focus on a particular kind of ‘ought’ – specifically, on what I shall call the “rational ‘ought’”. On every occasion of use, this kind of ‘ought’ is focused on the situation of a particular agent at a particular time; but this kind of ‘ought’ is concerned, not with how that agent acts (...)
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  33. Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:143-164.
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  34.  83
    Rational Learners and Moral Rules.Shaun Nichols, Shikhar Kumar, Theresa Lopez, Alisabeth Ayars & Hoi-Yee Chan - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):530-554.
    People draw subtle distinctions in the normative domain. But it remains unclear exactly what gives rise to such distinctions. On one prominent approach, emotion systems trigger non-utilitarian judgments. The main alternative, inspired by Chomskyan linguistics, suggests that moral distinctions derive from an innate moral grammar. In this article, we draw on Bayesian learning theory to develop a rational learning account. We argue that the ‘size principle’, which is implicated in word learning, can also explain how children would use scant (...)
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  35.  45
    Rational approximations to rational models: Alternative algorithms for category learning.Adam N. Sanborn, Thomas L. Griffiths & Daniel J. Navarro - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (4):1144-1167.
  36.  18
    Rational Choice, Collective Decisions, and Social Welfare.Kotaro Suzumura - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary (...)
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  37.  55
    The rational and the social.James Robert Brown - 1989 - New York: Routledge.
    THE SOCIOLOGICAL TURN The problem we are concerned with is just this: How should we understand science? Are we to account for scientific knowledge (or ...
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  38. Non-rational behaviour, value conflicts, stakeholder theory, and firm behaviour.M. C. Jensen - 2008 - Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (2):167-171.
  39.  40
    Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics.Bas C. Fraassevann - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):165-.
    A general form is proposed for epistemological theories, the relevant factors being: the family of epistemic judgments, the epistemic state, the epistemic commitment , and the family of possible epistemic inputs . First a simple theory is examined in which the states are probability functions, and the subject of probability kinematics introduced by Richard Jeffrey is explored. Then a second theory is examined in which the state has as constituents a body of information and a recipe that determines the accepted (...)
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  40.  37
    The rational foundations of ethics.Timothy L. S. Sprigge - 1987 - New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    Can moral judgements be true or false? Can rational methods be applied to ethics? In this landmark study, Sprigge gives an account of how philosophers have tackled these questions and puts forward his own theory on the matter.
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  41. The symmetry of rational requirements.Jonathan Way - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.
    Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries (...)
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  42. Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions.Tamar Szabó Gendler & Karson Kovakovich - 2005 - In Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 241-253.
    The “paradox of fictional emotions” involves a trio of claims that are jointly inconsistent but individually plausible. Resolution of the paradox thus requires that we deny at least one of these plausible claims. The paradox has been formulated in various ways, but for the purposes of this chapter, we will focus on the following three claims, which we will refer to respectively as the Response Condition, the Belief Condition and the Coordination Condition.
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  43.  47
    Communicative Action and Rational Choice.Joseph Heath - 2001 - MIT Press.
    In this book Joseph Heath brings Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action into dialogue with the most sophisticated articulation of the instrumental conception of practical rationality-modern rational choice theory. Heath begins with an overview of Habermas's action theory and his critique of decision and game theory. He then offers an alternative to Habermas's use of speech act theory to explain social order and outlines a multidimensional theory of rational action that includes norm-governed action as a specific type.In the (...)
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  44.  25
    Rational temporal predictions can underlie apparent failures to delay gratification.Joseph T. McGuire & Joseph W. Kable - 2013 - Psychological Review 120 (2):395-410.
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  45. Rational authority and social power: towards a truly social epistemology.Miranda Fricker - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  46.  87
    Rational snacking: Young children’s decision-making on the marshmallow task is moderated by beliefs about environmental reliability.Celeste Kidd, Holly Palmeri & Richard N. Aslin - 2013 - Cognition 126 (1):109-114.
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  47.  50
    Rational variability in children’s causal inferences: The Sampling Hypothesis.Stephanie Denison, Elizabeth Bonawitz, Alison Gopnik & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2013 - Cognition 126 (2):285-300.
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  48. Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1):127 - 158.
    How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what is (...)
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  49.  79
    Rational dilemmas.G. Priest - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):11-16.
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  50.  48
    Nondeterminacy, cycles and rational choice.Anders Herlitz - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):443-449.
    A notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory and population ethics is the apparent ubiquity of what can be generally called nondeterminacy. This paper illustrates how nondeterminacy can spawn cyclical rankings. So, accepting that practical reasons can admit of nondeterminacy challenges the widely held idea that ‘better than’ is transitive. As a result, standard approaches to rational choice under nondeterminacy fail to be action-guiding, since in some situations all options are dominated, that is, impermissible (...)
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