Results for 'Rational'

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Bibliography: Rationality and Cognitive Science in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Bibliography: Moral Rationalism in Meta-Ethics
Bibliography: Moral Rationality in Meta-Ethics
Bibliography: Rationality in Epistemology
Bibliography: Rationalism in Metaphilosophy
Bibliography: Operationalism in General Philosophy of Science
Bibliography: Rational Choice Theory in Philosophy of Social Science
Bibliography: Rationality-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge in Philosophy of Mind
Bibliography: Irrationality in Epistemology
Bibliography: Rational Requirements in Epistemology
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  1.  16
    Ending the Rationality Wars.Rationality Disappear - 2002 - In Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 236.
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  2. Is Rationality Normative?John Broomespecial Issue On Normativity & Edited by Teresa Marques Rationality - 2007 - Special Issue on Normativity and Rationality, Edited by Teresa Marques 2 (23).
     
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  3.  6
    Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich, & Michael Bishop.Rationality Disappear - 2002 - In Renée Elio (ed.), Common sense, reasoning, & rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 236.
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  4.  4
    Primary works.Rational Grammar - 2005 - In Siobhan Chapman & Christopher Routledge (eds.), Key thinkers in linguistics and the philosophy of language. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 10.
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  5.  17
    Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    First published in 1982, Ellery Eells' original work on rational decision making had extensive implications for probability theorists, economists, statisticians and psychologists concerned with decision making and the employment of Bayesian principles. His analysis of the philosophical and psychological significance of Bayesian decision theories, causal decision theories and Newcomb's paradox continues to be influential in philosophy of science. His book is now revived for a new generation of readers and presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, including a specially (...)
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  6. Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.
    Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value (...)
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  7.  15
    Stephen Neale.Rational Belief - 1996 - Mind 105 (417).
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  8. Rational Hope, Possibility, and Divine Action.Andrew Chignell - 2014 - In Gordon E. Michalson (ed.), Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. pp. 98-117.
    Commentators typically neglect the distinct nature and role of hope in Kant’s system, and simply lump it together with the sort of Belief that arises from the moral proof. Kant himself is not entirely innocent of the conflation. Here I argue, however, that from a conceptual as well as a textual point of view, hope should be regarded as a different kind of attitude. It is an attitude that we can rationally adopt toward some of the doctrines that are not (...)
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  9. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart E. Dreyfus.Model Of Rationality - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 115.
  10. Leonard M. Fleck.Care Rationing & Plan Fair - 1994 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19 (4-6):435-443.
     
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  11. Moral Faith, and Religion.".Rational Theology - 1992 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 394--416.
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  12. Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
    It is valuable for inquiry to have researchers who are committed advocates of their own theories. However, in light of pervasive disagreement, such a commitment is not well explained by the idea that researchers believe their theories. Instead, this commitment, the rational attitude to take toward one’s favored theory during the course of inquiry, is what I call endorsement. Endorsement is a doxastic attitude, but one which is governed by a different type of epistemic rationality. This inclusive epistemic rationality (...)
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  13. Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully (...)
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  14.  87
    Modeling Rational Players: Part I.Ken Binmore - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179-214.
    Game theory has proved a useful tool in the study of simple economic models. However, numerous foundational issues remain unresolved. The situation is particularly confusing in respect of the non-cooperative analysis of games with some dynamic structure in which the choice of one move or another during the play of the game may convey valuable information to the other players. Without pausing for breath, it is easy to name at least 10 rival equilibrium notions for which a serious case can (...)
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  15.  26
    Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2008 - Princeton University Press.
    It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use (...)
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  16.  19
    Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations.John C. Harsanyi - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his (...)
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  17.  67
    Rational belief systems.Brian David Ellis - 1979 - Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
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  18.  12
    The Probabilistic Foundations of Rational Learning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.
    According to Bayesian epistemology, rational learning from experience is consistent learning, that is learning should incorporate new information consistently into one's old system of beliefs. Simon M. Huttegger argues that this core idea can be transferred to situations where the learner's informational inputs are much more limited than Bayesianism assumes, thereby significantly expanding the reach of a Bayesian type of epistemology. What results from this is a unified account of probabilistic learning in the tradition of Richard Jeffrey's 'radical probabilism'. (...)
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  19.  40
    Rational Animals.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):317-327.
    SummaryNeither an infant one week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If the infant survives long enough, he will probably become rational, while this is not true of the snail. If we like, we may say of the infant from the start that he is a rational creature because he will probably become rational if he survives, or because he belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk, there remains the difference, (...)
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  20. Rational Credence Through Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.
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  21.  19
    Rational adaptation under task and processing constraints: Implications for testing theories of cognition and action.Andrew Howes, Richard L. Lewis & Alonso Vera - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):717-751.
  22.  13
    Rational Decision and Causality.Ellery Eells - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    In past years, the traditional Bayesian theory of rational decision making, based on subjective calculations of expected utility, has faced powerful attack from philosophers such as David Lewis and Brian Skyrms, who advance an alternative causal decision theory. The test they present for the Bayesian is exemplified in the decision problem known as 'Newcomb's paradox' and in related decision problems and is held to support the prescriptions of the causal theory. As well as his conclusions, the concepts and methods (...)
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  23.  17
    Rational Decisions.Ken Binmore - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use (...)
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  24.  54
    The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Scott Sturgeon presents an original account of mental states and their dynamics. He develops a detailed story of coarse- and fine-grained mental states, a novel perspective on how they fit together, an engaging theory of the rational transitions between them, and a fresh view of how formal methods can advance our understanding in this area. In doing so, he addresses a deep four-way divide in literature on epistemic rationality. Formal epistemology is done in specialized languages--often seeming a lot more (...)
  25. Rational social and political polarization.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Jiin Jung, Karen Kovaka, Anika Ranginani & William J. Berger - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2243-2267.
    Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it’s standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources (...)
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  26. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need The Virtues.Alasdair Macintyre - 1999 - Environmental Values 9 (2):259-261.
     
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  27. Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.
    Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. (...)
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  28. Rational Action.Carl G. Hempel - 1961 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35:5 - 23.
  29. Rational Capacities.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
     
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  30. Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.
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  31. What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.
    A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality. On our view, it's rational to believe when it's sufficiently likely (...)
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  32.  98
    Rational Irrationality: Modeling Climate Change Belief Polarization Using Bayesian Networks.John Cook & Stephan Lewandowsky - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):160-179.
    Belief polarization is said to occur when two people respond to the same evidence by updating their beliefs in opposite directions. This response is considered to be “irrational” because it involves contrary updating, a form of belief updating that appears to violate normatively optimal responding, as for example dictated by Bayes' theorem. In light of much evidence that people are capable of normatively optimal behavior, belief polarization presents a puzzling exception. We show that Bayesian networks, or Bayes nets, can simulate (...)
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  33. Rational Beings with Emotional Needs: The Patient-Centered Grounds of Kant's Duty of Humanity.Tyler Paytas - 2015 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 32 (4):353-376.
    Over the course of the past several decades, Kant scholars have made significant headway in showing that emotions play a more significant role in Kant's ethics than has traditionally been assumed. Closer attention has been paid to the Metaphysics of Morals (MS) where Kant provides important insights about the value of moral sentiments and the role they should play in our lives. One particularly important discussion occurs in sections 34 and 35 of the Doctrine of Virtue where Kant claims we (...)
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  34. Discourses on Africa.Man is A. Rational Animal - 2003 - In P. H. Coetzee & A. P. J. Roux (eds.), Philosophy from Africa: A text with readings 2nd Edition. London, UK: Oxford University Press.
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  35. Rational understanding: toward a probabilistic epistemology of acceptability.Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2475-2494.
    To understand something involves some sort of commitment to a set of propositions comprising an account of the understood phenomenon. Some take this commitment to be a species of belief; others, such as Elgin and I, take it to be a kind of cognitive policy. This paper takes a step back from debates about the nature of understanding and asks when this commitment involved in understanding is epistemically appropriate, or ‘acceptable’ in Elgin’s terminology. In particular, appealing to lessons from the (...)
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  36. Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.
    We ordinarily suppose that there is a difference between having and failing to exercise a rational capacity on the one hand, and lacking a rational capacity altogether on the other. This is crucial for our allocations of responsibility. Someone who has but fails to exercise a capacity is responsible for their failure to exercise their capacity, whereas someone who lacks a capacity altogether is not. However, as Gary Watson pointed out in his seminal essay ’Skepticism about Weakness of (...)
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  37. Rational Relations Between Perception and Belief: The Case of Color.Peter Brössel - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (4):721-741.
    The present paper investigates the first step of rational belief acquisition. It, thus, focuses on justificatory relations between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs, and between their contents, respectively. In particular, the paper aims at outlining how it is possible to reason from the content of perceptual experiences to the content of perceptual beliefs. The paper thereby approaches this aim by combining a formal epistemology perspective with an eye towards recent advances in philosophy of cognition. Furthermore the paper restricts its (...)
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  38. Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
    The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we (...)
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  39. Rational Persuasion as Paternalism.George Tsai - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):78-112.
    I argue that rationally persuading another to do something for their own good is sometimes (objectionably) paternalistic. Rational persuasion may express, and be guided by, the motive of distrust in the other’s capacity to gather or weigh evidence, and may intrude on the other’s deliberative activities in ways that conflict with respecting their agency and autonomy. I also examine factors that make a difference to whether (and when) the provision of reasons is respectful.
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  40.  22
    The Rational and the Social.G. S. Axtell - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):276-278.
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  41.  49
    Rational Assent and Self–Reversion: A Neoplatonist Response to the Stoics.Ursula Coope - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 50:237-288.
  42.  61
    Rational Choice, Risk Aversion, And Evolution.Samir Okasha - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (5):217-235.
  43.  41
    Rational Desires.R. B. Brandt - 1969 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 43:43 - 64.
  44. A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.
    According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, a subject, S, has perceptual knowledge that p in virtue of being in possession of reasons for her belief that p which are both factive and reflectively accessible to S. It has been argued that ED is better placed than both knowledge internalism and knowledge externalism to undercut underdetermination-based skepticism. I identify several principles that must be true if ED is to be uniquely placed to attain this goal. After (...)
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  45.  15
    Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1994 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    J. Howard Sobel has long been recognized as an important figure in philosophical discussions of rational decision. He has done much to help formulate the concept of causal decision theory. In this volume of essays Sobel explores the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. Newcomb's Problem and The Prisoner's Dilemma are discussed, and Allais-type puzzles are viewed from the (...)
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  46.  21
    The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1151-1168.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal (...)
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  47.  30
    A Rational Analysis of Rule-Based Concept Learning.Noah D. Goodman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Jacob Feldman & Thomas L. Griffiths - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (1):108-154.
  48.  28
    Rational Belief Systems.James Cargile - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (3):454.
  49. Non-rational behaviour, value conflicts, stakeholder theory, and firm behaviour.M. C. Jensen - 2008 - Business Ethics Quarterly 18 (2):167-171.
  50. Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:143-164.
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