Der Gedanke, der im Folgenden artikuliert und entfaltet werden soll, besagt, dass Sinn und Gedächtnis in einem internen Zusammenhang stehen. Das heißt näherhin: Sinn ist gedächtnishaft, und Gedächtnis ist nur richtig zu verstehen, wenn es von der zeitlichen Tiefenstruktur des Sinns aus expliziert wird. Die Weise, in der dieser Gedanke ausgeführt und begründet werden soll, ist eine systematische Entwicklung in zwei Zügen: Zum einen gilt es, die basale und implizite Gedächtnishaftigkeit des Sinns zu charakterisieren; zum anderen werden Formen des expliziten (...) Gedächtnisses auf dieser Grundlage neu verstanden und als Reflexionsfiguren der Zeitlichkeit des Sinns ausgewiesen. Die Absicht, die ich dabei verfolge, ist eine doppelte: die irreduzible, in der jüngeren Sprachphilosophie auffällig ignorierte Zeitlichkeit des Sinns ins Licht zu setzen; die Bedeutung und den Wert von Formen des Gedächtnisses zu erschließen, die auch Teilen der jüngeren kulturwissenschaftlichen Diskussion als defizient oder irrelevant erscheinen. (shrink)

The variety of symptoms associated with schizophrenia are not easily unified under one coherent concept. Nevertheless, under the gaze of phenomenology, a disturbance of pre-reflexive experience has become increasingly apparent as the basis of the condition, which has so far been understood in two different ways: on the one hand, as a disturbance of basal self-experience, of my-ness or ipseity (Louis Sass, Josef Parnas, Dan Zahavi) and on the other hand, as a disturbance of the passive synthesis of inner time (...) consciousness (Aaron Mishara, Shaun Gallagher, Thomas Fuchs). The present work introduces a link between the two approaches by regarding the basal self-experience grounded in an inner time consciousness. Schizophrenia is thus described as a disturbance of the temporal constitution of self-experience, which on the one hand causes self-alienation and on the other impairs the pre-reflexive, embodied performance of thinking, perceiving and moving. These analyses are then applied to the social dimension of the disorder, which manifests itself, among other symptoms, in the loss of spontaneous attunement with others. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 160-161 [Access article in PDF] Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl. Edmund Husserl. Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität. Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 2000. Pp. 828. DM 178.00. Husserl himself understood the principle of a further development in phenomenology as a process of "critique of critique." One can find a realization of this principle in this impressive study by Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (University of Graz, Austria). Through the title (...) Edmund Husserl.Zeitlichkeit und Intentionalität the author announces her project to be an immanent analysis of central themes in transcendental phenomenology. The study concerns not only an interpretation of the whole published corpus, but also methodological problems and problems of the theory of subjectivity. Phenomenological topics like the lived body or psychology are exlcluded, which is a great advantage of the study. The themes are presented by critical analysis, and with systematic perspicacity in order to give new insights into traditional problems of research in Husserlian phenomenology. The author introduces her main points in three steps. In part one she deals with the "basis of phenomenology" and the "model of intentionality," which are presented in the first chapter through a commentary on the doctrine of intentionality in the Logical Investigations and the Noesis-Noema-correlation in Ideas I. Questions of method such as eidetic intuition and reduction are discussed in the second chapter. Overall, the study tries to understand Husserl's theory as an "intentional neutralism" (684) in which problems of a theory of knowledge are "bracketed." In the two chapters of the second part, the author connects Husserl's theory of subjectivity, the I-problematic and the problem of self-awareness, with his phenomenology of time consciousness. The I-problematic and the different concepts of consciousness in transcendental phenomenology are not only presented through an analysis of the Logical Investigations and Ideas I, but also an explanation of Husserl's later monadology. Rinofner-Kreidl shows convincingly that Husserl's position has to be understood as a non-egological theory of self-awareness.In the third part, the author demonstrates the limits of transcendental phenomenology within metaphysics by critisizing Husserl's thesis of a thinkable "world annihilation" [Weltvernichtung]. The investigation is finished by a chapter on the connection between phenomenology and science.Against the background of such questions, Rinofner-Kreidl develops her main argument against Husserl's phenomenology, namely, that it is able to solve neither the problem of the original temporal constitution of consciousness nor that of the pure I, because of certain methodological preconditions, e.g., intuition and the pure givenness of the phenomena to be described. Both threads are linked together in an impressive discussion of the often discussed reflective problematic. According to Rinofner-Kreidl, the heart of the matter is the question whether acts of reflection have to be understood as inner perception or as re-presentification [Vergegenwärtigung]. By preferring the first option one encounters difficulties by considering the act of reflection as occurring at the same time as the retentional constitution of the lived present. However, on the basis of Husserl's time phenomenology, the latter seems to be impossible. Non-intentional original constitution of time and intentional acts cannot be together at the same "objective" time. Thus, the author speaks about the "neuralgic problem" (511) of Husserl's phenomenology. Further, by preferring the second case one must give up the Cartesian [End Page 160] thread of phenomenology, because a representing reflection must "thematize" its objects, namely the experiences [Erlebnisse] themselves, as an object like any other object. However, this means that phenomenology, which is itself constituted by reflection, is unable "to refer to past objects without errors" (377). Consequently, The Cartesian ideal of an absolute apodicticity has to be given up.The author argues for the second option. She writes: "If a phenomenological philosophy is to keep itself clear of all constitution and speculation by strictly confining itself to the given, then precisely the time analysis comes into conflict with the basic principle, since it wants to describe what never can be an object" (499). Not only the analysis of time consciousness... (shrink)

If we read Hegel′s “phenomenology” not as a historical product of the intention of an author, but as an expression of the process of creative experience, whose autonomous “negativity” changes every intention of objectual cognition, then the fundamental problems of its “systematic” pretention emerges in a new manner. Creative processes possess an unconditional, incalculable dimension of time, which cannot be reduced to the progressive growth of experience theoretically mediated and controlled. Guided by this understanding, the essay develops the problem of (...) the temporality of the “selfmovement” of the “speculative concept” and its unavailable “negativity”, interpreting it as the logic of creative development which removes itself from the calculation by way of presupposed distinctions. (shrink)

There is a relationship between time and technology which has been obvious since the classical philosophies of time. Even telling the time necessitates technologies relating to measuring and counting. Technological developments have changed the temporal state of our reality. Key terms such as deceleration, synchronisation, prevention and de-temporalisation point to relevant problem areas in this respect. This yearbook, whose thematic focus is 2021, endeavours to reveal new technological and philosophical perspectives on the temporal conditions in which we think, communicate, work (...) and live. With contributions by Cornelius Borck, Stefan Böschen, Christopher Coenen, Olivier Del Fabbro, Andreas Folkers, Yvonne Förster, Alexander Friedrich, Steve Fuller, Gabriele Gramelsberger, Thilo Hagendorff, Thomas Hilgers, Dirk Hommrich, Erich Hörl, Sebastian Lederle, Janne Mende, Jürgen Meutgens, Carl Mitcham, Oliver Müller, Alfred Nordmann, Tom Poljanšek, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Ludger Schwarte, Astrid Schwarz, René von Schomberg, René Umlauf, Sarine Waltenspül, Bastian Weiß, Langdon Winner and Yongmou Liu. (shrink)

Der Beitrag untersucht (I) die Unterscheidung von Medium und Form und erläutert, inwiefern »Sinn« im Anschluss an Luhmann als Medium verstanden werden kann. Im zweiten Schritt (II) charakterisiert der Beitrag die komplexe Zeitlichkeit des Mediums Sinn. Der dritte Teil (III) weist schließlich exemplarisch und kursorisch auf, wie sich an einzelnen Formen des Mediums Sinn seine zeitliche Medialität manifestiert. Der Punkt, auf den es dabei ankommt, ist nicht einfach die im Medium des Sinns selbstverständlich mögliche Thematisierung der Zeit, sondern die (...) Lesbarkeit, die die Zeitlichkeit in der Medialität dieses Mediums selbst gewinnt. Es geht mithin um die Ausdeutung von Medialität als einer basalen Form von Selbstreflexivität. Ein wesentlicher, über Einzelbefunde hinausweisender Beitrag der Medientheorie liegt darin, den Formen einer solchen basalen Selbstremarkierung nachzugehen und mithin zu zeigen, inwiefern, mit McLuhan gesagt, das Medium zugleich seine Botschaft ist; oder mit Benjamin gesprochen: ein Medium sich in sich selbst mitteilt. Mit Blick auf die Beispiele, die ich im dritten Abschnitt gebe, könnte man auch sagen: inwiefern das Medium in seinen Formen ein Gedächtnis seiner selbst beweist: sich »erinnert«. (shrink)

Husserl and Contemporary Thought contains twelve essays that address certain key themes in Husserl's thought, each in some way confronting issues critical to the Husserlian project. The essays first appeared in the 1982 volume of Research in Phenornenology. The "contemporary thought" in the title should be understood in a limited sense as refer- ring to certain strains of thinking pursued in the present decade, build- ing however on past research. The volume shows several directions in which contemporary thinkers are taking (...) Husserlian phenomenology. The most common direction is through an evaluative contrast between Husserl's vision and the ideas of other philosophers, some of whom listened to Husserl but went their own ways. The second direction taken is represented in a series of current works by active phenomenol- ogists. Some of these essays - and here we have the greatest concentra- tion on a single theme - expand upon Husserl's analyses concerning the temporality of human experience. Other essays take up the threads of long-standing debates among Husserl scholars. I will treat each group of essays - on other philosophers, on time, and on topics other than time in turn, although the essays do not follow this order in the volume. (shrink)

Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner consciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds. On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, auditory experience or the audible (...) qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological tradition. The paper’s intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological framework. In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and the views that it encompasses— namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. In a third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl’s 1905 Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elaborate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (Raumlichkeit and Zeitlichkeit, respectively) of both consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding paragraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of Sound Individuation. (shrink)

Als erstes charakterisiere ich den historischen Wandel, der den modernen lebensweltlichen Verständnisweisen des Todes vorausliegt - und zwar im Hinblick auf die Rolle der Wissenschaften in diesem Prozess (Abschnitt 1). Insofern Verdrängung und Bewusstsein des Todes als Ent­wicklungstendenzen heute einander gegenüberstehen, resultiert für die Zukunft eine Entwicklungsoffenheit, die die Möglichkeit von Prognosen zum Verhältnis von lebensweltlicher und wissenschaftlicher Themati­sierung des Todes erheblich einschränkt. Insofern aber die Verdrängung gegenüber dem Bewusstsein des Todes dominiert, ergibt sich der Hinweis für einen veränderten Begriff (...) der Lebenswelt, auf den ich anschließend ein­gehe. Den neuen Begriff bestimme ich im Rückgriff auf die Le­bensweltkonzeptionen von Edmund Husserl und Alfred Schütz. Sie ge­statten es, die Randständigkeit der Erfahrung des Todes als Ausdruck der Spannung von dominanter Verdrängung und fortbestehenden Quellen des Todesbewusstseins zu charakterisieren (Abschnitt 2). Diese Ambivalenz gehört auch zu den Kennzeichen des Todesbegriffes von Martin Heideg­ger, der die wohl einflussreichste systematische These zum nichtwissen­schaftlichen Ursprung der lebensweltlichen Vorstellungen vom Tod for­muliert hat. Der kritischen Diskussion seines Todesbegriffes lassen sich allerdings nur noch die Jemeinigkeit und die Gewissheit als weitere Kenn­zeichen des Todes entnehmen, deren lebensweltlicher Ursprung sich rechtfertigen lässt (Abschnitt 3). Zusätzliche Hinweise auf Quellen und Grenzen lebensweltlicher Todesvorstellungen finden sich in Edmund Husserls Reflexionen zum Tod, die ich abschließend exemplarisch disku­tiere (Abschnitt 4). (shrink)

If one intends to analyse the relevant features, dimensions und conditions of experienced time, music is a particularly suited field. Music excellently exposes temporal structures and modes of time experience. Temporality is an essential feature of music in such a way that music has often been called “the art of time ”. The variety of music-specific qualities can be related to two fundamental structural features of music: the irreversible course of tones, i.e. sound events in time (music in time); (...) the temporal structures 'represented' in music (time in music). It is noteworthy that, on the one hand, music serves as the heuristic example in important philosophies of time, especially in philosophical theories of inner time consciousness. On the other hand, theories of musical time allow substantial conclusions to be drawn in philosophical accounts of time. The concepts of music and time, in their respective meaning, seem to be linked to each other in a non-contingent way. German Will man Merkmale, Dimensionen und Bedingungen erlebter Zeit erkunden, dann ist Musik ein besonders geeignetes Phänomen. Musik gibt in ausgezeichneter Weise Aufschluss über Zeitstrukturierung und Weisen der Zeiterfahrung. Zeitlichkeit ist ein so wesentliches Merkmal von Musik, dass man Musik häufig ,die Zeitkunst par excellence' nennt. Damit sind verschiedene Eigenschaften von Musik angesprochen, die sich großenteils auf zwei Grundsachverhalte zurückbeziehen lassen: der irreversible Verlauf der Tonoder Klangereignisse in der Zeit (Musik in der Zeit); die Zeitstrukturen, die in einer Musik zur ,Darstellung' kommen (Zeit in der Musik). Philosophiegeschichtlich fällt auf, dass Musik in bedeutenden philosophischen Zeittheorien, insbesondere in Theorien des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, als heuristisches Exemplifikationsmedium verwendet wird. Theorien musikalischer Zeit ergeben im Gegenzug substantielle Rückschlüsse für philosophische Zeittheorien. Musikbegriff und Zeitbegriff scheinen in ihrer jeweiligen Bedeutung auf eine nicht-kontingente Weise aufeinander verwiesen zu sein. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 133-134 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Heidegger's Concept of Truth Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Heidegger's Concept of Truth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xxx + 462. Cloth, $59.95. This somewhat trite and overly generic English title, from a Heideggerian perspective, is better specified by the title of the German original, which was perhaps too provocative for an analytical English (...) audience conditioned by Carnap's critique of Heidegger: "The Prejudice of Logic: Investigations into the Theory of Truth of the Early Heidegger." The author's more-than-literal, amplifying and supplementing translation of his own German text of 1994 aims to face up to all the "hard interpretive decisions" (xxii) that Heidegger poses by leaving no German term uninterpreted or untranslated, including even Dasein as "being-here." The translation is thus more illuminating from the start in the sense in which "logic" too narrowly conceived and claimed to be the sole arbiter of truth becomes a "disabling" prejudice (xvi) rather than the "enabling prejudice" that logic normally is for any discourse and thought. Dahlstrom's focus is on the early and so "logical" Heidegger (1912-29), before he decided to lose even logic (better, "onto-theo-logic") in a more original tornadic "whirl" of abyssal questioning in the "turning." Hence, the opening pages point to Heidegger's quest for a more original philosophical (transcendental, phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical) "logic of philosophy" (Emil Lask's phrase) that "produces" the fundamental concepts or categories for any field of being, including itself. This original productive logic of category formation "transcends" the formal logic of judgment while founding it.It is the transcendental and material logic that Heidegger found in Kant, which is oriented toward the spatio-temporal schematisms of the imagination that emerge from the transcendental aesthetic to mediate the application of the judicative forms of the understanding into befitting categories of reality. But Dahlstrom does not get around to detail this quasi-Kantian account of material logic, or Lask's version of it, which finds its fundamental stratum in the already categorized (i.e., conceptually interpreted) originally unitary object, prior to its distinction into form and matter, subject and predicate, etc. Lask calls this a priori categorized realm of intentionally structured meaning (intelligibility, truth) a "panarchy of the logos," which Heidegger will readily transform into his "hermeneutics of facticity" (double genitive: "life lays itself out, interprets itself") and identify with the prejudicative, prepredicative temporal realm of truth as "disclosedness" and "unconcealment." [End Page 134]But Dahlstrom does find, in Husserl's unpublished logic courses of the early twenties in which "Analyses of Passive Synthesis" are carried out, a "genetic logic" on the level of the "transcendental aesthetic" in the "complicated intentional systems" of the sensing human body situating itself by constituting the time and space of its world prepredicatively and prejudicatively, a "logic" or logos which accordingly "anticipates much of the analysis of being-in-the-world undertaken in Being and Time" (155). And yet Heidegger, who as Husserl's trusted assistant was granted generous access to such unpublished manuscripts, "remained silent" about these clear anticipations. Instead he criticizes Husserl publicly in his own courses, culminating in Being and Time, for neglecting the question of the "being of intentionality" as well as of the "sense" of being as such, which Heidegger finds in "timeliness" (Zeitlichkeit), the originary time of being-here. Yet in arriving at this temporal sense of being, Heidegger "clearly appropriates the horizonal (allegedly preobjective and presubjective) character of time-consciousness elaborated by Husserl." Why, then, "Heidegger's silence"? "These breakthroughs of Husserl's later thinking are not mentioned by Heidegger because he wants to appropriate them in his own way and without the framework out of which they arose. An injustice and a disservice is thus done to Husserl's phenomenology... [which is] the price of the philosophical maturity of its most famous student... [as] his thinking moves to a plane beyond the reach of Husserlian phenomenology and terminology" (169f).This in-depth discussion of Heidegger's relationship with Husserl... (shrink)

Definition of the problem: The connection between time and the good life has already been worked out for a number of medical specialties and practices. However, what role does the temporality of the good life play for medicine as a whole? That is the central question of this article. Arguments: The good life is here understood as a meaningful life. Living meaningfully is only possible through present action. A fulfilled presence in this sense is therefore an essential aspect of (...) the temporality of the good life. Illness tends to prevent a fulfilled presence. In this respect, medical treatments aim to enable a fulfilled presence. A second structure of time, that is central to the good life, consists in the chronobiological rhythms, upon the maintenance and restoration of which health is critically dependent. Conclusion: The temporality of the good life has a twofold relevance for medicine as a whole. First, the purpose of medical treatment is to enable a fulfilled present. Second, this can and should be done by maintaining and restoring chronobiological rhythms. ++++ Der Zusammenhang von Zeit und gutem Leben wurde bereits für eine Reihe medizinischer Disziplinen und Praktiken herausgearbeitet. Doch welche Rolle spielt die Zeitlichkeit des guten Lebens für die Medizin insgesamt? Das ist die leitende Frage dieses Artikels. Dabei wird das gute Leben als sinnvolles Leben verstanden. In diesem Sinne wird für eine zweifache medizinische Relevanz der Zeitlichkeit des guten Lebens argumentiert: Erstens besteht der Sinn medizinischer Behandlungen in der Ermöglichung erfüllter Gegenwart. Zweitens kann und sollte ebendies u. a. durch die Wahrung und Wiederherstellung der chronobiologischen Rhythmen geschehen. (shrink)

Many critics have attempted to give an account of a gendered incarnation of Dasein in response to Heidegger’s “neutral” or “asexual” interpretation. In this paper,I suggest gendered readings of Dasein are potentially misleading. I argue Dasein is gendered only to the extent that “the Anyone” (das Man)—understood as relational background of social practices, institutions, and languages—constitutes the space or “clearing” (Lichtung) of intelligibility. However, this reading misrepresents the core motivation of Heidegger’s early project, namely to arrive at “temporality” ( (...) class='Hi'>Zeitlichkeit) as the original source of any intelligibility whatsoever. For Heidegger, Dasein is to be understood in terms of the twofold movement of being “thrown” into the Past (Vergangenheit) and “projecting” into the Future (Zukunft). It is only the basis of the neutral temporal structures of “thrown projection” that beings can emerge-into-presence as such, enabling us to make sense of our Present (Gegenwart) gendered practices in the first place. (shrink)

Many critics have attempted to give an account of a gendered incarnation of Dasein in response to Heidegger’s “neutral” or “asexual” interpretation. In this paper,I suggest gendered readings of Dasein are potentially misleading. I argue Dasein is gendered only to the extent that “the Anyone” (das Man)—understood as relational background of social practices, institutions, and languages—constitutes the space or “clearing” (Lichtung) of intelligibility. However, this reading misrepresents the core motivation of Heidegger’s early project, namely to arrive at “temporality” ( (...) class='Hi'>Zeitlichkeit) as the original source of any intelligibility whatsoever. For Heidegger, Dasein is to be understood in terms of the twofold movement of being “thrown” into the Past (Vergangenheit) and “projecting” into the Future (Zukunft). It is only the basis of the neutral temporal structures of “thrown projection” that beings can emerge-into-presence as such, enabling us to make sense of our Present (Gegenwart) gendered practices in the first place. (shrink)

Impermanence is one of the fundamental buddhist principles and of Japan’s typical view on life and world as well. The paper attempts to clear up commonalities and differences between the buddhist view of Impermanence and of Nietzsche’s Nihilism, and to compare the buddhist view with that of Nietzsche. The paper contains five chapters. The first argues for peculiarities of the buddhist, the second for Nietzsche’s view of Impermanence by looking at their common principle of Negation. The third and forth chapter (...) attempts to find and emphasize the superiority of the principle of Negation as transition and development from the negative and passive standpoint to the positive and active. The fifth chapter elucidates essential characteristics of the buddhist view of Impermanence and Nietzsche’s Nihilism, by showing how their principles of Negation differ from each other regarding Naturality and Artificiality, Temporality and Historicity.Unbeständigkeit ist eines der Grundprinzipien des Buddhismus und der typischen Welt- und Lebensanschauung der Japaner. Der Aufsatz versucht, Gemeinsamkeiten und Verschiedenheiten zwischen der buddhistischen Unbeständigkeitssicht und dem Nihilismus Nietzsches herauszustellen, und die buddhistische Sicht mit der Nietzsches zu vergleichen. Der vorliegende Aufsatz gliedert sich in fünf Kapitel. Im ersten werden die Eigentümlichkeiten der buddhistischen Sicht der Unbeständigkeit und im zweiten die des Nihilismus von Nietzsche erörtert, wobei ihr gemeinsames Prinzip der Negation verglichen wird. Das dritte und vierte Kapitel versucht die Überlegenheit des Negationsprinzips zu begründen und hervorzuheben als Übergang und Entwicklung vom negativen und passiven Standpunkt zum positiven und aktiven. Das fünfte Kapitel erhellt die wesentlichen Grundzüge der buddhistischen Unbeständigkeitssicht und des Nihilismus Nietzsches mit dem Aufweis, wie sich das Prinzip der Negation beider Standpunkten im Hinblick auf Natürlichkeit und Künstlichkeit, Zeitlichkeit und Geschichtlichkeit voneinander unterscheidet. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn seinem Buch Einfache Formen entwickelt André Jolles in Auseinandersetzung mit Goethes Naturkunde die Vorstellung einer besonderen Zeitlichkeit der von ihm so genannten »Einfachen Formen«, die er als »Jedesmaligkeit« bezeichnet. Jolles greift damit den morphologischen Gedanken einer Vielgestaltigkeit von Form vor dem Hintergrund der sprachwissenschaftlichen Debatten seines politisierten akademischen Umfelds in Leipzig auf, das den Saussure’schen Systemgedanken der Sprache unter Rückbezug auf Wilhelm von Humboldt holistisch umdeuten wollte. Der Aufsatz verortet Jolles’ Überlegungen in der formorientierten Literatur- und Kulturtheorie der (...) Zeit. Anhand seiner Zeitbegriffe und seines Formkonzepts wird gezeigt, wie er die zeitgenössischen Ideen der Ganzheit und der Verzeitlichung von Form im Ausgang morphologischer Fragen auf eigenwillige Weise interpretierte.In his book Einfache Formen André Jolles develops the idea of a special temporality of so-called »simple forms«, which he calls »Jedesmaligkeit«, referencing Goethe’s reflections on the ›versatile forms‹ of nature. Jolles adopted the morphological idea of a versatility of form against the background of the linguistic debates of his politicized academic environment in Leipzig. In accordance with contemporary holistic thinking his colleagues reinterpreted Saussure’s idea that language is a system, drawing in particular on Wilhelm von Humboldt. The essay situates Jolles’ reflections in the form-oriented literary and cultural theory of the time. On the basis of his concepts of time and his thinking in terms of form, the article shows how he adapted the contemporary ideas of the wholeness and temporalization of form in an idiosyncratic way in the wake of morphological questions. (shrink)

Der Beitrag widmet sich der Frage historischer Folgeverhältnisse in der Kunst. Gegenüber dem Gedanken, dass es ein ursprüngliches Werk in der Reihe von Werken gibt, das späteren Werken seinen Sinn gibt, schlägt der Text vor, das Verhältnis umgekehrt zu denken: Im Lichte späterer Werke wird der Sinn früherer Werke neu ausgehandelt. Dazu geht der Text in drei Schritten vor. Im ersten Teil formuliert er unter der Überschrift ›Form‹ in kritischer Abgrenzung zu Danto und Eco mit Adorno den Gedanken, dass Kunstwerke (...) eigensinnig konstituierte Gegenstände sind. Die im Gedanken der Neuverhandlung früherer Werke im Lichte späterer Werke vorausgesetzte Unbestimmtheit des Sinns von Kunstwerken wird im zweiten Teil unter dem Schlagwort ›Zeitlichkeit‹ anhand des Paradigmas der Improvisation erörtert. Der dritte und letzte Teil wendet diese improvisatorische Logik unter dem Label ›Neuaushandlung‹ dann dezidiert auf das Verhältnis von Vorbild und Nachbild an. The article proposes a new understanding of historical succession in the realm of art. In contrast to the idea that there is an original work in the series of works that gives meaning to the works that come later, the text proposes to think it exactly the other way round: in the light of later works, the meanings of earlier works are renegotiated. The text proceeds in three steps to develop this idea. Under the heading ›Form‹ it develops in the first part a critical reading of Danto’s and Eco’s notion of the constitution of the artworks and argues with Adorno that each powerful work develops its own language. In the second part, the vagueness of the meaning of works of art presupposed in the idea of renegotiating earlier works in the light of later works is discussed under the term ›Temporality‹ in terms of the logic of improvisation. The third and final part uses this improvisational logic under the label ›Renegotiation‹ to understand the relationship between model and afterimage in the realm of art. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGHamanns »Geschmack an Zeichen« ist identisch mit seinem Glauben an die christologisch-eschatologisch bestimmte Anrede Gottes des Schöpfers und konstituiert durch die Textwelt der Bibel. Das Hauptcharakteristikum seines Zeichenbegriffs liegt in dessen eigentümlicher Zeitlichkeit: darin, dass das Ausstehen des »Vollkommenen« die konkrete, sinnliche Gegenwart seiner Fülle nicht ausschließt. Damit verbindet sich eine trotz der Skepsis angesichts der Nichtigkeit aller Dinge zugemutete elementare Lebensbejahung. Sie ist durch die eigentümliche Zeitansage dessen bestimmt, der, weil er die Gegenwart des kommenden Gottesreiches glaubte und (...) im Festmahl feierte, als »Fresser und Weinsäufer« verschrieen und wegen seiner Inanspruchnahme der Gegenwart Gottes und damit der Fülle der Zeit als der Erfüllung allen Lebenshungers und allen Lebensdurstes gekreuzigt worden war.SUMMARYHamann's “taste for signs” is identical to his faith in the address of God the creator, which is christologically and eschatologically determined, and is constituted by the textual world of the Bible. The main characteristic of his concept of sign lies in its peculiar temporality: That the „perfect” has not yet appeared does not exclude the concrete, sensuous presence of its fullness . This temporality is tied up with the encouragement to enjoy elementary life, despite the skepticism we feel in the face of the vanity of all things – an encouragement which is determined by the peculiar way in which the times are announced by HIM who was crucified because he believed the presence of the coming reign of God and celebrated it with banquets, for which he was denounced as “a glutton and a drunkard” , and because of his claiming that the presence of God and thus the fullness of time is the fulfillment of all life's hungers and all life's thirsts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 133-134 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Heidegger's Concept of Truth Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Heidegger's Concept of Truth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xxx + 462. Cloth, $59.95. This somewhat trite and overly generic English title, from a Heideggerian perspective, is better specified by the title of the German original, which was perhaps too provocative for an analytical English (...) audience conditioned by Carnap's critique of Heidegger: "The Prejudice of Logic: Investigations into the Theory of Truth of the Early Heidegger." The author's more-than-literal, amplifying and supplementing translation of his own German text of 1994 aims to face up to all the "hard interpretive decisions" (xxii) that Heidegger poses by leaving no German term uninterpreted or untranslated, including even Dasein as "being-here." The translation is thus more illuminating from the start in the sense in which "logic" too narrowly conceived and claimed to be the sole arbiter of truth becomes a "disabling" prejudice (xvi) rather than the "enabling prejudice" that logic normally is for any discourse and thought. Dahlstrom's focus is on the early and so "logical" Heidegger (1912-29), before he decided to lose even logic (better, "onto-theo-logic") in a more original tornadic "whirl" of abyssal questioning in the "turning." Hence, the opening pages point to Heidegger's quest for a more original philosophical (transcendental, phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical) "logic of philosophy" (Emil Lask's phrase) that "produces" the fundamental concepts or categories for any field of being, including itself. This original productive logic of category formation "transcends" the formal logic of judgment while founding it.It is the transcendental and material logic that Heidegger found in Kant, which is oriented toward the spatio-temporal schematisms of the imagination that emerge from the transcendental aesthetic to mediate the application of the judicative forms of the understanding into befitting categories of reality. But Dahlstrom does not get around to detail this quasi-Kantian account of material logic, or Lask's version of it, which finds its fundamental stratum in the already categorized (i.e., conceptually interpreted) originally unitary object, prior to its distinction into form and matter, subject and predicate, etc. Lask calls this a priori categorized realm of intentionally structured meaning (intelligibility, truth) a "panarchy of the logos," which Heidegger will readily transform into his "hermeneutics of facticity" (double genitive: "life lays itself out, interprets itself") and identify with the prejudicative, prepredicative temporal realm of truth as "disclosedness" and "unconcealment." [End Page 134]But Dahlstrom does find, in Husserl's unpublished logic courses of the early twenties in which "Analyses of Passive Synthesis" are carried out, a "genetic logic" on the level of the "transcendental aesthetic" in the "complicated intentional systems" of the sensing human body situating itself by constituting the time and space of its world prepredicatively and prejudicatively, a "logic" or logos which accordingly "anticipates much of the analysis of being-in-the-world undertaken in Being and Time" (155). And yet Heidegger, who as Husserl's trusted assistant was granted generous access to such unpublished manuscripts, "remained silent" about these clear anticipations. Instead he criticizes Husserl publicly in his own courses, culminating in Being and Time, for neglecting the question of the "being of intentionality" as well as of the "sense" of being as such, which Heidegger finds in "timeliness" (Zeitlichkeit), the originary time of being-here. Yet in arriving at this temporal sense of being, Heidegger "clearly appropriates the horizonal (allegedly preobjective and presubjective) character of time-consciousness elaborated by Husserl." Why, then, "Heidegger's silence"? "These breakthroughs of Husserl's later thinking are not mentioned by Heidegger because he wants to appropriate them in his own way and without the framework out of which they arose. An injustice and a disservice is thus done to Husserl's phenomenology... [which is] the price of the philosophical maturity of its most famous student... [as] his thinking moves to a plane beyond the reach of Husserlian phenomenology and terminology" (169f).This in-depth discussion of Heidegger's relationship with Husserl... (shrink)

„Daß alle Sätze die Zeit in irgendeiner Weise enthalten, scheint uns zufällig, im Vergleich damit, daß auf alle Sätze die Wahrheitsfunktionen anwendbar sind.“ Die Zeit „schmeckt nach Inhalt“, die Wahrheitsfunktionen hingegen nach „Darstellungsform“. Diese Bemerkung Wittgensteins spiegelt eine Intuition wider, von der sich der überwiegende Teil analytischer Sprachphilosophie leiten lässt. Sebastian Rödl zeigt in seinem Buch, dass diese Intuition fehlgeht und dabei mit einem verengten Verständnis von Logik und einer falschen Auffassung der Natur unseres endlichen Verstandes zusammenhängt. Für einen endlichen (...) Verstand sind entgegen dieser Intuition „Wahrheitsbezug und Zeitbewußtsein [...] zwei Seiten einer kognitiven Form“ (81), und in einer diesem Verstand angemessenen, aus dem Prinzip des Anschauungsbezugs entwickelten Logik fällt die Zeit nicht auf die Seite des Inhalts, wie Wittgenstein gemutmaßt hatte, sondern charakterisiert die Formen unseres Aussagens: die Formen prädikativer Einheit. Das von diesem Gedanken vorausgesetzte Verständnis von Logik entfaltet Rödl im ersten Teil seiner Arbeit; das für einen anschauungsbezogenen Verstand charakteristische System der Formen zeitlicher Aussagen entwickelt er im zweiten Teil. In meiner Besprechung konzentriere ich mich auf eine Beschreibung des Systems zeitlicher Aussageformen (I), um dieses System in einem zweiten Schritt daraufhin zu befragen, ob sich durch dessen Darstellung tatsächlich ein angemessenes und vollständiges Bild der Zeitlichkeit eines endlichen Verstandes ergibt (II). (shrink)

In einer kurzen Abhandlung über das Gedächtnis, die unter dem Namen De Memoria et Reminiscentia bekannt geworden ist, gibt Aristoteles zwei ebenso knappe wie grundlegende Bestimmungen des Gedächtnisses, deren Zusammenhang und mögliche Tragweite ich in diesem Beitrag freilege. Aristoteles schreibt in der ersten Umgrenzung seines Themas mit Blick auf den Gegenstand des Gedächtnisses: ,,Gedächtnis ist von Vergangenem". (Aristoteles 2004, 449a9 ff.) In der Charakterisierung der Art und Weise, wie im Gedächtnis die Affektion von etwas präsent sein kann, das selbst jedoch (...) abwesend bleibt, verwendet Aristoteles dann die enigmatische Formulierung, dass das Gedächtnisbild in uns „von anderem" sei (Aristoteles 2004, 450b30 f.). Um die Tragweite und den Zusammenhang dieser beiden Wendungen zu ermessen, werde ich sie nicht allein in ihrer Aristotelischen Fassung analysieren oder im Kontext ihrer jüngeren Deutung durch Ricoeur erläutern. Ich will sie vielmehr auf die Gedächtnisreflexionen Derridas beziehen, in denen ein innerer Zusammenhang der Zeitlichkeit des Gedächtnisses und der Erfahrung von Andersheit hervortritt und eine grundlegende ethische Dimension von Gedächtnis aufscheint. Um die „gemeinsame struktu- rale Wurzel" (Derrida 1976a, 201) der Temporalisation und des Verhältnisses zum Anderen nachzuzeichnen und ihre grundlegende Bedeutung für eine Ethik der Alterität zu erläutern, erörtere ich (I.) zunächst, was es heißen mag, dass Gedächtnis von Vergangenem ist und Vergangenes in seinem Vergangensein erschließt. In einem zweiten Zug (II.) beschreibe ich, inwiefern diese Bestimmung wesentlich damit verknüpft ist, dass Gedächtnis „von anderem" ist und eine Möglichkeit der Erfahrung von Andersheit eröffnet. Die systematische Bedeutung, die die Zeitlichkeit des Gedächtnisses vor diesem Hintergrund für eine Ethik der Alterität erhält, erläutere ich schließlich (III.), indem ich die gedächtnishafte Struktur der Verantwortungsrelation analysiere. (shrink)

The moral pedagogy in the fairy tales is simple but powerful. It is concentrated in the lesson –according to the message of Aristotle– about the finalism sense of action: it makes the child understand that the human answer is an action with sense. Everything in the fairy tale leads to this perspective. Moreover, it exemplifies MacIntyre’s opinion which says that current people tend to be proto-aristotelian and to understand their own life and the other’s in narrative terms.

Industry 4.0 The present work enables us to take the first steps in the world of the 4th Industrial Revolution, a world where robots, artificial intelligence and digital manufacturing technologies will change forever the way we design, produce and buy products and services. The first characteristics of this revolution is globalization: for the first time in history, an industrial transformation is taking place simultaneously on a global scale. The second key-factor is the word ecosystem: unlike the first three industrial revolutions (...) (steam engine, electricity and computers) over the past few years, no technologies nor machines were invented anew, but we understood how to keep together different technological platforms by using the same language (bit). If the revolution in place will complete the transformations announced, in twenty years we will look at today’s society the same way we nowadays look at the 19th Century society. (shrink)

The moral pedagogy in the fairy tales is simple but powerful. It is concentrated in the lesson -according to the message of Aristotle- about the finalism sense of action: it makes the child understand that the human answer is an action with sense. Everything in the fairy tale leads to this perspective. Moreover, it exemplifies MacIntyre's opinion which says that current people tend to be proto-aristotelian and to understand their own life and the other's in narrative terms.

Shame is notoriously ambivalent. On one hand, it operates as a mechanism of normalization and social exclusion, installing or reinforcing patterns of silence and invisibility; on the other hand, the capacity for shame may be indispensible for ethical life insofar as it attests to the subject’s constitutive relationality and its openness to the provocation of others. Sartre, Levinas and Beauvoir each offer phenomenological analyses of shame in which its basic structure emerges as a feeling of being exposed to others and (...) bound to one’s own identity. For Sartre, shame is an ontological provocation, constitutive of subjectivity as a being-for-Others. For Levinas, ontological shame takes the form of an inability to escape one’s own relation to being; this predicament is altered by the ethical provocation of an Other who puts my freedom in question and commands me to justify myself. For Beauvoir, shame is an effect of oppression, both for the woman whose embodied existence is marked as shameful, and for the beneficiary of colonial domination who feels ashamed of her privilege. For each thinker, shame articulates the temporality of social life in both its promise and its danger. (shrink)

This journal's well-intentioned consideration of the arts has turned out to be quite the Pandora's box. As soon as we broach the subject of aesthetics, we are already in the realm of ideology; as soon as we impose the frame of scientific inquiry upon any subject, we invoke another kind of ideology. The previous issues in this series have depicted the unfolding of an ideological clash of cultures between sciences and the humanities, enough to make C.P. Snow blush. For the (...) time being, this is an unavoidable condition; yet the more we remain aware of it, the further we may push our insights. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 195-198 [Access article in PDF] Implicit and Explicit Temporality Thomas Fuchs Keywords implicit/explicit temporality, embodiment, intersubjectivity, desynchronization, melancholia, schizophrenia Since Minkowski (1970), Strauss (1966), v. Gebsattel (1954), and Tellenbach (1980), temporality has been a main subject of phenomenological psychiatry. Drawing on philosophical concepts of Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, these authors have analyzed psychopathologic deviations of time experience, mainly from an (...) individual point of view, for example, as a slowing down or inhibition of lived time in depression or obsessive–compulsive disorder. Their analyses are still most valuable today, but may be carried further by introducing concepts such as embodied and intersubjective temporality into psychopathology. Martin Wyllie (2005), by opening up a wide scope of temporal phenomena and related concepts, makes a laudable effort to contribute to such a progress.In my commentary, I would like to propose a distinction that is suggested by much of Wyllie's analysis and may shed further light on psychopathology, namely between implicit and explicit temporality. If we look at a child while obliviously playing with his toys, lost to the world, we may assume that there is no sense of the time passing. Lived time runs with the movement of life, implicit in the child's experience of being engaged in his play and directed toward his goals. It "unfolds through the processes of bodily activity" (Wyllie 2005). Future and past do not stand out against the pure presence of "becoming." This implicit mode of temporality is retrieved every time that we are absorbed in what we are doing, and may even reach the climax of "flow experiences" (Csikszentmihalyi 1988) where the sense of time is lost in unimpeded, fluent performance.However, this changes when a gap arises between need and satisfaction, desire and fulfillment, or plan and execution. Now the future appears as a "not yet" or "yet to come," experienced as the temporality of awaiting, striving, or longing for. Time is felt as passing by and refusing the desired fulfillment; it becomes conscious or explicit. A similar gap arises between the present and something irretrievably lost, bringing the past to consciousness as a "no more." Again time is experienced explicitly, but now as moving on relentlessly and separating us from the lost object. The gap to the past may not be bridged any more: this is the temporality of missing or mourning. In both cases, explicit time arises as a negation of implicit or lived time (here my use of the term is a bit divergent from Wyllie's); it is experienced as a "not yet" or "no more," often with a component of displeasure or suffering (Fuchs 2001a, 2003)."Implicit" versus "explicit time" thus come near to another distinction well known in phenomenology, namely between the "lived" and [End Page 195] the "corporal body" (Leib versus Koerper). The first term refers to the body functioning in the tacit mode, as the medium of everyday performance. The second term points to the body as turning into the object of attention, for example, when it puts up resistance to our purposes, or is used as an instrument deliberately (Fuchs 2001b). In fact, implicit temporality and tacit performance of the body are nearly synonymous: Lived time may be regarded as a function of the lived body, opened up by its potentiality and capability. The more we are engaged in our tasks, the more we forget time as well as the body; we are, as it were, "inside time." On the other hand, in explicit temporality the body often appears in the corporal or explicit mode as well. For example, when falling ill, we experience our body no more as a tacit medium but rather as an object or obstacle, while we notice the slowing down of time and may even feel excluded from the movement of life. Thus, embodiment and temporality have a parallel background–foreground structure.I now try to carry these considerations further by including the intersubjective dimension of time. In an earlier paper, I describe the attunement of the living being to its environment as a continuous synchronization on the biological as... (shrink)

What is the relationship between sounds and time? More specifically, is there something essentially or distinctively temporal about sounds that distinguishes them from, say, colors, shapes, odors, tastes, or other sensible qualities? And just what might this distinctive relation to time consist in? Apart from their independent interest, these issues have a number of important philosophical repercussions. First, if sounds are temporal in a way that other sensible qualities are not, then this would mean that standard lists of paradigm secondary (...) qualities offered by Locke, Galileo, and other modern philosophers — lists which include colors, odors and sounds without any significant distinctions — overlook significant metaphysical differences. This, in turn, would threaten to undermine the coherence of the modern understanding of secondary qualities itself. Moreover, a number of authors have recently urged that the essential temporality of sounds makes it impossible to understand sounds as properties (except on a trope theory of properties; see note 3). If true, and given the more or less universal view that colors are properties, this last conclusion would make potentially inapplicable to sounds much of the comparatively well-developed philosophical taxonomy and apparatus that has arisen in philosophical disputes over the status of colors (for presentations of this taxonomy and apparatus see, for example, Byrne and Hilbert (2003); Cohen (2008b)).1 Therefore, the conclusion that sounds are distinctively temporal would be a serious blow to hopes for a theoretically unified treatment of the sensory qualities.2 For all these reasons, quite a lot seems to hang on the question of the temporality of sounds. (shrink)

Provocatively, David Armstrong's properties are supposed to be both universals and spatio-temporal. What does this amount to? I consider four of Armstrong's views, in order of ascending plausibility: (1) the exemplification account, on which universals are exemplified by space-times; (2) the location account, on which universals are located at space-times; (3) the first constituent account, on which spatio-temporal relations are elements of what I call the form of time; and, the true view, (4) the second constituent account, on which universals (...) are spatio-temporal only 'derivatively' by being constituents of states of affairs which are so 'primarily'. The first two accounts are rejected because they entail that space-times must be substantival. In making plausible the second constituent account, I distinguish primitive and derivative spatio-temporality. Something is primitively spatio-temporal when it is at a space-time, or stands in spatio-temporal relations. Something is derivatively spatio-temporal when it is a constituent of something primitively spatio-temporal. (shrink)

Assistive reproductive technologies are increasingly used to control the biology of fertility and its temporality. Combining historical, theoretical, and socio-empirical insights, this paper aims at expanding our understanding of the way temporality emerges and is negotiated in the contemporary practice of cryopreservation of reproductive materials. We first present an historical overview of the practice of cryo-fertility to indicate the co-production of technology and social constructions of temporality. We then apply a theoretical framework for analysing cryobiology and cryopreservation (...) technologies as creating a new epistemic perspective interconnecting biology and temporality. Thereafter, we focus on the case of ‘social egg freezing’ to present socio-empirical findings illustrating different reproductive temporalities and their connection to the social acceptance of and expectations towards the practice. SEF is a particularly interesting case as it aims to enable women to disconnect their reproductive potential from their biological rhythms. Based on 39 open interviews with Israeli and German SEF users, the cross-cultural comparative findings reveal three types of attitudes: postponing motherhood/reproductive decisions ; singlehood and “waiting” for a partner ; and the planning of and hope for multiple children. For theory building, this analysis uncovers temporality formations embedded in gender and reproductive moral values; including the ‘extended present’, ‘waiting’, and ‘reproductive futurism’. We conclude by discussing the contribution of our findings by advancing the theoretical framework of ‘cryopolitics’ highlighting the theoretical implications and importance of gendered and cultural imaginaries constructing medical technological innovations and related temporalities. (shrink)

Biological individuality is a notoriously thorny topic for biologists and philosophers of biology. In this paper we argue that biological individuality presents multiple, interconnected questions for biologists and philosophers that together form a problem agenda. Using a case study of an interdisciplinary research group in ecology, behavioral and evolutionary biology, we claim that a debate on biological individuality that seeks to account for diverse practices in the biological sciences should be broadened to include and give prominence to questions about uniqueness (...) and temporality. We show that broadening the problem agenda of biological individuality draws attention to underrecognized philosophical issues and discussions and thereby organizes and enriches the existing debate. (shrink)