Remarkable advances in cold fusion, known also as LENR, raised the hope for a safer and cheaper nuclear energy. The results, however, cannot be explained from the point of view of current physical understanding of nuclear fusion. This is an obstacle for research investment in this field. The present book suggests a new approach for analysis of the experimental results and practical recommendations based on the models of atomic nuclei derived in the BSM-Supergravitation Unified theory (BSM-SG). The (...) book provides: (1) a method for analysis of the LENR experiments using the BSM-SG atomic models; (b) a selection of isotopes suitable for a more efficient energy yield with a minimum of radioactive byproducts; (c) practical considerations for selection of the technical method and the reaction environment. (shrink)

In “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects”, Kris McDaniel argues that ordinary physical objects are fusions of monadic and polyadic tropes. McDaniel calls his view “TOPO”—for “Theory of Ordinary Physical Objects”. He argues that we should accept TOPO because of the philosophical work that it allows us to do. Among other things, TOPO is supposed to allow endurantists to reply to Mark Heller’s argument for perdurantism. But, we argue in this paper, TOPO does not help endurantists do that; (...) indeed, we argue that anyone who accepts TOPO should reject endurantism. (shrink)

Some people have stressed that there is a close analogy between meaning experiences, i.e., experiences as of understanding concerning linguistic expressions, and seeing-in experiences, i.e., pictorial experiences of discerning a certain item – what a certain picture presents, viz. the picture’s subject – in another item – the picture’s vehicle, the picture’s physical basis. Both can be seen as fusion experiences, in the minimal sense that they are experiential wholes made up of different aspects. Actually, two important similarities (...) between such experiences may lead one to think that they are experiences of the same type. In this paper, however, I will try to show that notwithstanding such similarities, these experiences are typologically different. For there are two dissimilarities between such experiences that are more relevant on this typological concern than their similarities. Indeed, unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are first of all recognitional experiences of a sort that makes them perceptual experiences as well. Moreover, again unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are fusion experiences in the substantial sense that the experiential whole is more than the sum of its experiential parts taken in isolation, for when such parts figure in that whole, they interact with each other. In a nutshell, unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are proper fusion experiences. (shrink)

The overall goal of the approach developed in this paper is to estimate the likelihood of a given kinetic kill scenario between hostile spacebased adversaries using the mathematical framework of Complex Conceptual Spaces Single Observation. Conceptual spaces are a cognitive model that provide a method for systematically and automatically mimicking human decision making. For accurate decisions to be made, the fusion of both hard and soft data into a single decision framework is required. This presents several challenges to this (...) data fusion framework. The first is the challenge involved in handling multiple complex terminologies, which is addressed by drawing on a set of Space Domain Ontologies. Another challenge is the complex combinatorics involved when considering all possible feature combinations. This can be mitigated by using integer linear programming optimization that is outlined by the Complex Conceptual Spaces Single Observation mathematical model framework. A third challenge is the complicated physics that is involved in a spacecraft collision that must be addressed to obtain a better understanding of threat assessment. Overcoming these various challenges allows for a quantitative ranking for the potential of a kinetic kill collision across multiple spacecraft pairs. In addition to overcoming these challenges this paper will break down threat assessment into four domains and identify a ranking of threat both for each individual domain and for the four domains combined. Simulation results are shown to verify the developed concepts. (shrink)

The development of nuclear weapons during the Manhattan Project is one of the most significant scientific events of the twentieth century. This revised and updated 3rd edition explores the challenges that faced the scientists and engineers of the Manhattan Project. It gives a clear introduction to fission weapons at the level of an upper-year undergraduate physics student by examining the details of nuclear reactions, their energy release, analytic and numerical models of the fission process, how critical masses can be estimated, (...) how fissile materials are produced, and what factors complicate bomb design. An extensive list of references and a number of exercises for self-study are included. Links are given to several freely-available spreadsheets which users can use to run many of the calculations for themselves. (shrink)

By the late nineteenth century, science was well established in the public mind as the primary method by which useful knowledge of the material universe is obtained. Surely, it was thought, if science can discover cathode rays and radio waves, then it should easily authenticate a phenomenon that is far more widely experienced: the supernatural power of the human mind. Non-physical, “psychic” energy appeared to be everywhere, as an integral part of human experience. Indeed, psychic forces are seemingly built (...) into the cores, the souls, of each of us. It should be just a matter of securing the evidence with the hard cement of scientific procedure. At least this was the view of many Victorian scientists, and so was begun a program to verify psychic phenomena scientifically, a task that has continued without success until the current day. By the time the fourth decade of the twentieth century was underway, the search for psychic energy had stalled. The huge database of anecdotal human testimony proved too unreliable, too easy to explain away as subjective desire, fakery, or delusion. Whenever serious attempts were made to gather objective data under controlled conditions, plausible explanations such as trickery or simple coincidence were readily found--if not by the investigators, then by their critics. Although these plausibilities were not always conclusively proven, they were never conclusively ruled out. And, as long as ordinary explanations for reports of suggested psychic phenomena.. (shrink)

Transfusion is a highly original book that tries to radicalize our ways of 'critical thinking' across disciplines. The book, refreshingly, brings into play critical philosophy, literary criticism, studies in mathematics, physics, chemistry and developmental biology, and various other disciplines and epistemes to set up a tenure and tenor of 'critical thinking'. The book is an exclusive intervention in how thinking across traditions and systems of thought can generate distinct interpretive experiences. It questions, in a unique transcultural and transversal bind, our (...) ways of hermeneutic and literary-cultural thinking. Transfusion resets the dialectics between text and theory. (shrink)

In recent decades, phenomenology has been utilized not only as a conceptual framework from which to understand medical encounters in healthcare settings, but also to guide medical professionals in providing care. In the realm of physical therapy, phenomenology has been touted as a philosophically-based avenue to aid in helping to understand what it means to be a patient. The works of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger have been utilized as paths to approach phenomenologically-informed care in physical therapy. However, (...) to our knowledge, no significant connection has been made in regard to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s phenomenology and hermeneutics in the realm of physical therapy. The authors aim to close that gap by showing the ways in which Gadamer’s philosophy can help physical therapists provide phenomenologically-informed patient care. They begin by outlining some of the touchpoints between phenomenology and healthcare and then introduce Gadamer as a figure who deserves attention in the question of how to apply phenomenology to healthcare settings. Upon analyzing Gadamer’s account of what it means to experience an altered body, they outline Gadamer’s understanding of tact, practical knowledge, and good sense in order to show how to understand at a conceptual level what it means to empathize with patients on the path to building therapeutic alliance, that is, a cooperative working relationship. They then look closely at Gadamer’s hermeneutics and particularly his comments on how to cultivate a fusion of horizons in order to attempt to help guide physical therapists in theoretically understanding how to empathize with their patients. Ultimately, they argue that physical therapists who practice phenomenologically-informed care, which they call “hermeneutical healing,” are positioned well to form strong working relationships with their patients. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn the controversy in 1989 over the reported achievement of cold nuclear fusion, parts of the physics and chemistry communities were opposed in both a theoretic and a professional competition. Physicists saw the chemists' announcement as an incursion into territory allocated to their own discipline and strove to restore the interdisciplinary boundaries that had previously held. The events that followed throw light on the manner in which scientists' knowledge claims and metascientific beliefs are affected by their membership of (...) disciplinary communities. In particular, the controversy offers evidence for a constructivist reinterpretation of the “division of nature into levels,” which is customarily held to underpin the division of science into disciplines. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn the controversy in 1989 over the reported achievement of cold nuclear fusion, parts of the physics and chemistry communities were opposed in both a theoretic and a professional competition. Physicists saw the chemists' announcement as an incursion into territory allocated to their own discipline and strove to restore the interdisciplinary boundaries that had previously held. The events that followed throw light on the manner in which scientists' knowledge claims and metascientific beliefs are affected by their membership of (...) disciplinary communities. In particular, the controversy offers evidence for a constructivist reinterpretation of the “division of nature into levels,” which is customarily held to underpin the division of science into disciplines. (shrink)

This paper discusses the emergence of the concepts of fusion as an energy source and of the controlled fusion reactor. These concepts are shown to have arisen from the bringing together of several different branches of physics, notably nuclear physics, astrophysics, and gas discharge physics, in the period between the two world wars. By the late 1930s, enough information had become available for the possibility of a controlled fusion device to be explored, and a number of physicists (...) seem to have recognized this independently. Such a possibility was the subject of discussion at Los Alamos during and immediately after the war, but the first detailed proposals to be recorded seem to be those of G. P. Thomson and P. C. Thonemann, both working in Britain in the middle to late 1940s. These proposals, which led to the setting up in Britain of the first coherent programme of controlled fusion research, are outlined and discussed. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue against unrestricted mereological hybridism, the view that there are absolutely no constraints on wholes having parts from many different logical or ontological categories, an exemplar of which I take to be ‘mixed fusions’. These are composite entities which have parts from at least two different categories – the membered (as in classes) and the non-membered (as in individuals). As a result, mixed fusions can also be understood to represent a variety of cross-category summation such as (...) the abstract with the concrete, the physical with the non-physical, and the possible with the impossible, just to name a few. -/- Proposed by David Lewis (1991) alongside his defence of classical mereology (the major theory of parthood which permits such transcategorial composites through its principle of unrestricted composition) it is my contention that mixed fusions are an under-examined consequence of indiscriminate mereological fusion which harbour a multitude of complications. In my attempt to discern their substantive character, throughout this thesis I make a case study of mixed fusions and uncover several problematic consequences which I think follow from their most plausible assessment. -/- These include: (1) that mixed fusions’ probable membership relations may lead to dubious foundational loops in the mereological Universe, or (2) otherwise that mixed fusions oblige an implausible ontological priority of the mereological Universe as a whole; (3) that mixed fusions contradict the reductive account of set theory they are proposed within, by plausibly being seen to have the same members as their class parts, and (4) that mixed fusions therefore confound a mereological thesis of Composition as Identity, which some (including Lewis) use to support classical mereology – a consequence which is potentially self-defeating; (5) that mixed fusions as sums of abstract and concrete entities both subvert Lewis’s (1986) system of modal realism, while (6) also undermining less expansive theories of possible worlds; and finally, (7) that even where some of the foregoing is resisted, it remains implausible that mixed fusions are ontologically innocent, because their supposed distinction from their parts in this case ensures that they need to be counted as additional entities in one’s ontology. -/- To be clear, I do not advance a theory of mereological hybrid nihilism in the sense of denying all cases of transcategorial composition. (I only cover a few select instances of mereological hybridism via mixed fusions after all.) Rather, I deny that mereological hybridism is plausible in full generality, by demonstrating that any cases of it are at least limited by the constraints that I identify. This in turn vindicates a call for a restriction on parthood theories and composition principles which allow certain types of categorially mixed entities – including restricting classical mereology with its principle of unrestricted composition. -/- Although theories of parthood like the standard classical mereology are not ordinarily developed for the sake of mereological hybrids like mixed fusions, these and other transcategorial composites are still among the logical consequences of such parthood systems operating with sufficient generality. The significance of my thesis, then, comes from showcasing how some of these kinds of entities do not conform to the systems in which they are included as required, and hence I argue for the rejection of unrestricted mereological hybridism as well as any mereological principles which support it. (shrink)

It is discerned what light can bring the recent historical reconstructions of maxwellian optics and electromagnetism unification on the following philosophical/methodological questions. I. Why should one believe that Nature is ultimately simple and that unified theories are more likely to be true? II. What does it mean to say that a theory is unified? III. Why theory unification should be an epistemic virtue? To answer the questions posed genesis and development of Maxwellian electrodynamics are elucidated. It is enunciated that the (...) Maxwellian Revolution is a far more complicated phenomenon than it may be seen in the light of Kuhnian and Lakatosian epistemological models. Correspondingly it is maintained that maxwellian electrodynamics was elaborated in the course of the old pre-maxwellian programmes’ reconciliation: the electrodynamics of Ampére-Weber, the wave theory of Young-Fresnel and Faraday’s programme. To compare the different theoretical schemes springing from the different language games James Maxwell had constructed a peculiar neutral language. Initially it had encompassed the incompressible fluid models; eventually – the vortices ones. The three programmes’ encounter engendered the construction of the hybrid theory at first with an irregular set of theoretical schemes. However, step by step, on revealing and gradual eliminating the contradictions between the programmes involved, the hybrid set is “put into order” (Maxwell’s term). A hierarchy of theoretical schemes starting from ingenious crossbreeds (the displacement current) and up to usual hybrids is set up. After the displacement current construction the interpenetration of the pre-maxwellian programmes begins that marks the commencement of theoretical schemes of optics, electricity and magnetism real unification. Maxwell’s programme surpassed that of Ampére-Weber because it did absorb the ideas of the Ampére-Weber programme, as well as the presuppositions of the programmes of Young-Fresnel and Faraday properly co-ordinating them with each other. But the opposite statement is not true. The Ampére-Weber programme did not assimilate the propositions of the Maxwellian programme. Maxwell’s victory over his rivals became possible because the gist of Maxwell’s unification strategy was formed by Kantian epistemology looked in the light of William Whewell and such representatives of Scottish Enlightenment as Thomas Reid and Sir William Hamilton. Maxwell did put forward as basic synthetic principles the ideas that radically differed from that of Ampére-Weber approach by their open, flexible and contra-ontological, genuinly epistemological, Kantian character. For Maxwell, ether was not the ultimate building block of physical reality, from which all the charges and fields should be constructed. “Action at a distance”, “incompressible fluid”, “molecular vortices”, etc. were contrived analogies for Maxwell, capable only to direct the researcher at the “right” mathematical relations. Key words: J.C. Maxwell, unification of optics and electromagnetism, I. Kant, T. Reid, W. Hamilton . (shrink)

This thesis studies collider phenomenology of physics beyond the Standard Model at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). It also explores in detail advanced topics related to Higgs boson and supersymmetry - one of the most exciting and well-motivated streams in particle physics. In particular, it finds a very large enhancement of multiple Higgs boson production in vector-boson scattering when Higgs couplings to gauge bosons differ from those predicted by the Standard Model. The thesis demonstrates that due to the loss of (...) unitarity, the very large enhancement for triple Higgs boson production takes place. This is a truly novel finding. The thesis also studies the effects of supersymmetric partners of top and bottom quarks on the Higgs production and decay at the LHC, pointing for the first time to non-universal alterations for two main production processes of the Higgs boson at the LHC-vector boson fusion and gluon-gluon fusion. Continuing the exploration of Higgs boson and supersymmetry at the LHC, the thesis extends existing experimental analysis and shows that for a single decay channel the mass of the top quark superpartner below 175 GeV can be completely excluded, which in turn excludes electroweak baryogenesis in the Minimal Supersymmetric Model. This is a major new finding for the HEP community. This thesis is very clearly written and the introduction and conclusions are accessible to a wide spectrum of readers. (shrink)

This article proposes a basic logic for application in physics dispensing with the Principle of Excluded Middle. It is based on the article “Matrix Based Logics for Application in Physics (RMQ) which appeared 2009. In his article with Stachow on the Principle of Excluded Middle in Quantum Logic (QL), Peter Mittelstaedt showed that for some suitable QLs, including their own, the Principle of Excluded Middle can be added without any harm for QL; where ‘without any harm for QL’ means that (...) the basic desiderata and the basic results (theorems) of those QLs remain satised in the sense that they avoid the well known difficulties with commensurability and distributivity.In the following article I want to show that the basic desiderata and results (theorems) of RMQ (of avoiding the well-known difficulties with commensurability, distributivity, fusion and Bell’s inequalities) remain satised if by introducing a strong negation (or strong negation and disjunction) the resulting weak intuitionist system RMQI dispenses with the Principle of Excluded Middle; it becomes either invalid or not strictly valid. (shrink)

In the late eighteenth century Newton's Principia was studied in the Scottish universities under the influence of the local school of ‘Common Sense’ philosophy. John Robison, holding the key chair of natural philosophy at Edinburgh from 1774 to 1805, provided a new conception of ‘mechanical philosophy’ which proved crucial to the emergence of physics in nineteenth century Britain. At Cambridge the emphasis on ‘mixed mathematics’ was taken to a new level of refinement and application by the introduction of analytical methods (...) in the 1820s. The fusion of these two schools, with emphasis on conceptual unity on the one hand, and mathematisation on the other, came about from the 1830s onwards, and reached full expression in the new framework of a unified mathematical physics based on the energy principle. (shrink)

The thesis that follows proffers a solution to the mind-matter problem, the problem as to how mind and matter relate. The proposed solution herein is a variant of panpsychism – the theory that all (pan) has minds (psyche) – that we name pansentient monism. By defining the suffix 'psyche' of panpsychism, i.e. by analysing what 'mind' is (Chapter 1), we thereby initiate the effacement of the distinction between mind and matter, and thus advance a monism. We thereafter critically examine the (...) prevalent view, antithetical to a pansentient monism, that mind is not identical to matter but emergent therefrom (Chapter 2). This anti-emergentist critique acts also as a fortification of the Genetic Argument for panpsychism: if mind is not emergent (nor distinct) from matter, mind must always have existed with matter. But what is 'matter'? Chapter 3 investigates what we understand by 'matter', or 'the physical', and exposes it as a highly deficient concept and percept that in concreto points to its identity with that denoted by 'mind'. This also acts as a fortification of the Abstraction Argument for panpsychism, employing a new taxonomy of physicalism and a new taxonomy of the varieties of abstraction. Thus do we reach a monism that is a parsimonious psycho-physical identity theory. But here we face what can be called The Identity Problem for Panpsychism: if our panpsychism is a psycho-physical identity theory, how can it respond to the powerful objections that beset the identity theory of the twentieth century? In Chapter 4 it will be argued that, like emergentism, this psycho-neural identity theory presupposed a deficient concept of 'matter', down to which mind was reduced away, let alone identified. But to identify down phenomena to what is actually an abstraction is to commit failure of explanation. When the theory is amended accordingly, we move from a psycho-neural identity theory to a genuine psycho-physical identity theory that as such can overcome the aforementioned identity problem. Furthermore, as Chapter 5 clarifies, our pansentient monism has, in addition to parsimony, the explanatory power to resolve the problem of mental causation that afflicts both the reductive physicalism of psycho-neural identity theory and the non-reductive physicalism of emergentism, by genuinely identifying physical and mental causation. Jaegwon Kim considers the place of consciousness in a physical world and the nature of mental causation to be the two key components of the mind-matter problem. Through the critical analysis of our prosaic understanding of mind and matter in this thesis, which incorporates the thought of both classical and contemporary thinkers through a novel fusion, it is hoped that both components are addressed and redressed. That is to say that I present this pansentient monism as a plausible, parsimonious, explanatory, and thus, I think, powerful position towards this ever-perplexing mind-matter mystery. -/- [This thesis was passed in January 2019 with viva examination from Galen Strawson and Joel Krueger. (shrink)

In all the Alien films, the environments are gloomy settings originally inspired by Gothic architecture, but it's the creature design, which leaves the most profound mark on us. The interaction between these art‐horror monsters and the sterileturned‐ grotesque environments of the Alien films can produce disgust or revulsion in the viewer. In Alien a fair amount of time is spent on the relationships between the crew members. One of the most horrific moments of the series is the cry of “kill (...) me” that emerges from the half‐conscious hosts as the space Marines explore the former colony of Hadley's Hope. Central to Carroll's theory on art‐horror is revulsion at the suggestion of physical contact with the fusion‐figures. At the end of Alien: Resurrection, Ripley lies in the middle of the Queen's huge mass. It is the most striking image in an otherwise cartoonish film. (shrink)

The present essay provides a new metaphysical interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) in terms of mereological bundle theory. The essential idea is to claim that a physical system in RQM can be defined as a mereological fusion of properties whose values may vary for different observers. Abandoning the Aristotelian tradition centered on the notion of substance, I claim that RQM embraces an ontology of properties that finds its roots in the heritage of David Hume. To this regard, (...) defining what kind of concrete physical objects populate the world according to RQM, I argue that this theoretical framework can be made compatible with (i) a property-oriented ontology, in which the notion of object can be easily defined, and (ii) moderate structural realism, a philosophical position where relations and relata are both fundamental. Finally, I conclude that under this reading relational quantum mechanics should be included among the full-fledged realist interpretations of quantum theory. (shrink)

The exocyst is a conserved octameric complex that physically tethers a vesicle to the plasma membrane, prior to membrane fusion. It is important not only for secretion and membrane delivery but also, in mammalian cells, for cytokinesis, ciliogenesis, autophagy, tumorigenesis, and host defense. The combination of genome editing and advanced light microscopy of exocyst subunits in living cells has recently shown the complex to be much more dynamic than previously appreciated, and exposed how little we still know about its (...) function and regulation. (shrink)

Variable particle masses have sometimes been invoked to explain observed anomalies in low energy nuclear reactions (LENR). Such behavior has never been observed directly, and is not considered possible in theoretical nuclear physics. Nevertheless, there are covariant off-mass-shell theories of relativistic particle dynamics, based on works by Fock, Stueckelberg, Feynman, Greenberger, Horwitz, and others. We review some of these and we also consider virtual particles that arise in conventional Feynman diagrams in relativistic field theories. Effective Lagrangian models incorporating variable mass (...) particle theories might be useful in describing anomalous nuclear reactions by combining mass shifts together with resonant tunneling and other effects. A detailed model for resonant fusion in a deuterium molecule with off-shell deuterons and electrons is presented as an example. Experimental means of observing such off-shell behavior directly, if it exists, is proposed and described. Brief explanations for elemental transmutation and formation of micro-craters are also given, and an alternative mechanism for the mass shift in the Widom–Larsen theory is presented. If variable mass theories were to find experimental support from LENR, then they would undoubtedly have important implications for the foundations of quantum mechanics, and practical applications may arise. (shrink)

Revisionary ontologists are making a comeback. Quasi-nihilists, like Peter van Inwagen and Trenton Merricks, insist that the only composite objects that exist are living things. Unrestriced universalists, like W.V.O. Quine, David Lewis, Mark Heller, and Hud Hudson, insist that any collection of objects composes something, no matter how scattered over time and space they may be. And there are more besides. The result, says Eli Hirsch, is that many commonsense judgments about the existence or identity of highly visible physical (...) objects are a priori necessarily false. In a “last ditch effort” to bring revisionary ontologists back to their senses, Hirsch marshalls what he calls the Argument from Charity. We can be sure that there are tables and chairs and that there are no fusions of Plato’s nose and the Eiffel Tower, says Hirsch, because these commonsense platitudes are a logical consequence of the well-known principle of interpretive charity applied to natural languages, like English. In what follows, I assess the Argument from Charity. My conclusion is that if this is the best we can do to save revisionary ontologists, they are surely lost forever. (shrink)

Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of ?straightforwardly shared? emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of (...) emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants? shared concerns of different degree of collectivity, on the one hand, and the synchronization of their emotional responses, on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism of emotions, while the question about ?straightforward sharing? is argued to be of secondary importance. (shrink)

Mathematically, the fusion of space and time may be explained as follows. In pre-relativity physics, space was envisaged as a three-dimensional Euclidean continuum. Such a continuum is homogeneous and isotropic, and its metrical character can be specified by the definition of the distance between any two points in the continuum: s2 = 2 + 2 + 2. Now, while it is possible to speak of a four-dimensional continuum in pre-relativity physics by adding the time-coordinate to the three space-coordinates, there (...) is no way, corresponding to the definition of s, to define the spatio-temporal "separation" or "interval" between any two points in this new four-dimensional continuum. Thus, while it makes sense from the classical point of view to ask for the distance between two points in space, it does not make sense to ask for the spatio-temporal interval between two events occurring in different places at different times. The spatio-temporal interval between non-simultaneous, spatially separated events is simply not defined in pre-relativity physics. Another way of putting it is that in classical physics space and time are measured in entirely disparate units and no method is provided for making these units comparable with one another. In relativity physics, on the other hand, light--or rather the velocity of light--provides the means for making the results of spatial and temporal measurement comparable quantities: one simply multiplies the time-like intervals by c, the fixed velocity of light, in order to obtain space-like intervals. The interval between any two events is defined as: s2 = 2 + 2 + 2 - c22. Interval, so defined, is an invariant, whereas spatial and temporal "separation" are now relative to the state of motion of the observer. The geometry of the four-dimensional continuum characterized by this formula is called "semi-Euclidean". (shrink)

Th e con fusion a nd b arren ness o f psycho logy is no t to be e xplain ed b y calling it a “yo ung science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the oth er case, con cep tual co nfusion and m ethod s of pro (...) of.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by. (PI p. 232). (shrink)

Several important physical implications left out in The Five Dimension Space-Time Universe: A creation and grand unified field theory model. Book, are presented under rigorous mathematical theorems. It was found that Temperature, a classical variable, must be added as an imaginary component to time, under the Quantum uncertainty dt∙dE = h/2π, so that the Gell-Mann Quark model can be verified, with gauge invariance, to form hadrons at the Bethe Fusion Temperature. Accordingly from the corresponding uncertainty dp∙dr = h/2π. (...) Pairs of Diagonal Long Range Ordered gravitons, with continuous frequency spectrum together with those represented by magnetic monopoles must be formed within the space r, of the homogenous 5D manifold, without the presents of photons, thus defines the 5D as a Black Hole. Then from which we can derive the classical Newtonian Law of attractive Gravity, as the 5D manifold is mapped by Perelmann Ricci-flow entropy mapping and the DLRO graviton pair symmetry is broken and converted into two masses, with motions satisfying Special Relativity in the doughnut shape Lorentz manifold, thus indirectly verifies the principle of Covariant Riemannian curvatures and General Relativity theory. (shrink)

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...) with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory. (shrink)

Panpsychism is the view that every concrete and unified thing has some form of phenomenal consciousness or experience. It is an age-old doctrine, which, to the surprise of many, has recently taken on new life. In philosophy of mind, it has been put forth as a simple and radical solution to the mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996, 2003;Strawson 2006; Nagel 1979, 2012). In metaphysics and philosophy of science, it has been put forth as a solution to the problem of accounting for (...) the intrinsic nature of the physical itself (Strawson 2006, Seager 2006). In this thesis, I show that panpsychism can also be defended on the basis of an argument from our (arguable) acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency. This argument has made frequent appearances throughout the history of philosophy, with philosophers such as Leibniz, Schopenhauer and James, and I construct and defend an updated version of it. Furthermore, I offer a solution to the combination problem: how can complex (human and animal-type) consciousness result from simple (fundamental particle-type) consciousness? This is generally regarded as the most serious problem facing contemporary panpsychism. I propose that mental combination can be construed as kind causal process culminating in a fusion, and show how this avoids the main difficulties with accounting for mental combination. (shrink)

Les concepts de la physique ont été élaborés jusqu'ici par ajustement de la théorie à l'expérience. Désormais l'exploration de la matière nécessite une approche plus fine, où les concepts soient chargés de sens. Ici, les auteurs proposent de fonder la physique sur la "symbiose" entre une logique nouvelle et des principes métaphysiques qui structurent le concept de réalité. Les entités connues de la physique se déduisent directement de ces fondements, d'autres se révèlent et leur détection constitue un nouveau défi pour (...) les expérimentateurs. La microphysique y est dominée par la présence constitutive de non-ordre. Les phénomènes quantiques et l'espace-temps s'en trouvent réinterprétés. Diverses questions très actuelles sont examinées: matière noire, fusion froide, atomes hypercondensés, monopôles magnétiques... Cet ouvrage constitue un bouleversement épistémologique majeur car il fournit un modèle de pensée efficace dont les structures s'appliquent à tous les domaines de la science. (shrink)

Background and assumptions. Persistence and philosophy of time ; Atomism and composition ; Scope ; Some matters of methodology -- Persistence, location, and multilocation in spacetime. Endurance, perdurance, exdurance : some pictures ; More pictures ; Temporal modification and the "problem of temporary intrinsics" ; Persistence, location and multilocation in generic spacetime ; An alternative classification -- Classical and relativistic spacetime. Newtonian spacetime ; Neo-Newtonian (Galilean) spacetime ; Reference frames and coordinate systems ; Galilean transformations in spacetime ; Special relativistic (...) spacetime ; Length contraction and time dilation ; Invariant properties of special relativistic spacetime -- Persisting objects in classical spacetime. Enduring, perduring, and exduring objects in Galilean spacetime ; The argument from vagueness ; From minimal D-fusions to temporal parts ; Motivating a sharp cutoff ; Some objections and replies ; Implications -- Persisting objects in Minkowski spacetime. Enduring, perduring, and exduring objects in Minkowski spacetime ; Flat and curved achronal regions in Minkowski spacetime ; Early reflections on persisting objects in Minkowski spacetime : Quine and Smart ; "Profligate ontology"? ; Is achronal universalism tenable in Minkowski spacetime? ; "Crisscrossing" and immanent causation -- Coexistence in spacetime. The notion of coexistence ; Desiderata ; Coexistence in Galilean spacetime ; Coexistence in Minkowski spacetime : CASH ; Alexandrov-Stein present and Alexandrov-Stein coexistence ; AS-Coexistence v. CASH : symmetry, multigrade, and objectivity ; As-coexistence v. CASH : relevance ; The mixed past of coexistence ; No need in the extended now -- Strange coexistence? Coexistence and existence@ ; The asymmetry thesis ; The absurdity thesis ; Collective CASH value of coexistence ; Collective existence@ and coexistence in classical spacetime ; Collective existence@ and coexistence in Minkowski spacetime ; Contextuality ; Chronological incoherence ; Some objections -- Shapes and other arrangements in Minkowski spacetime. How rigid is a granite block? ; Perspectives in space ; Perspectives in spacetime ; Are shapes intrinsic to objects? ; The causal objection ; The micro-reductive objection ; Pegs, boards, and shapes ; Perduring objects exist. (shrink)

The exploration of chemical periodicity over the past 250 years led to the development of the Periodic System of Elements and demonstrates the value of vague ideas that ignored early scientific anomalies and instead allowed for extended periods of normal science where new methodologies and concepts are developed. The basic chemical element provides this exploration with direction and explanation and has shown to be a central and historically adaptable concept for a theory of matter far from the reductionist frontier. This (...) is explored in the histories of Prout’s hypothesis, Döbereiner Triads, element inversions necessary when ordering chemical elements by atomic weights, and van den Broeck’s ad-hoc proposal to switch to nuclear charges instead. The development of more accurate methods to determine atomic weights, Rayleigh and Ramsey’s gas separation and analytical techniques, Moseley’s X-ray spectroscopy to identify chemical elements, and more recent accelerator-based cold fusion methods to create new elements at the end of the Periodic Table point to the importance of methodological development complementing conceptual advances. I propose to frame the crossover from physics to chemistry not as a loss of accuracy and precision but as an increased application of vague concepts such as similarity which permit classification. This approach provides epistemic flexibility to adapt to scientific anomalies and the continued growth of chemical compound space and rejects the Procrustean philosophy of reductionist physics. Furthermore, it establishes chemistry with its explanatory and operational autonomy epitomized by the periodic system of elements as a gateway to other experimental sciences. (shrink)

Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental (...) rather than material continuity. But mental continuity comes in different forms. Most of Locke's contemporary followers agree that our continued existence is secured by psychological continuity, which they take to be made up of memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and the like. Dainton argues that that a better and more believable account can be framed in terms of the sort of continuity we find in our streams of consciousness from moment to moment. Why? Simply because provided this continuity is not lost - provided our streams of consciousness flow on - we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic psychological alterations. Phenomenal continuity seems to provide a more reliable guide to our persistence than any form of continuity. The Phenomenal Self is a full-scale defence and elaboration of this premise. The first task is arriving at an adequate understanding of phenomenal unity and continuity. This achieved, Dainton turns to the most pressing problem facing any experience-based approach: losses of consciousness. How can we survive them? He shows how the problem can be solved in a satisfactory manner by construing ourselves as systems of experiential capacities. He then moves on to explore a range of further issues. How simple can a self be? How are we related to our bodies? Is our persistence an all-or-nothing affair? Do our minds consist of parts which could enjoy an independent existence? Is it metaphysically intelligible to construe ourselves as systems of capacities? The book concludes with a novel treatment of fission and fusion. (shrink)

In these five chapters we introduce, with significant details, the core fundamental notions of (1) deformability, (2) sound and hearing, (3) permeability and porosity, (4) viscosity, (5) immiscibility, (6) wettability, (7) gravity and geodesy, and (8) heat and thermodynamics. We then illustrate, with applications across disciplines, the importance of these notions in our lives and in understanding the world around us. These applications include the description of skyquakes and limnic eruptions, the origin of hydrocarbon accumulations underground, the description of the (...) interiors of our Moon and of Jupiter's core, the differences between near- and far-side of our Moon, vortices in oceans, gravity anomalies of Antarctica and Mars, lateral and vertical plate motions, the absence of induced earthquakes in the Bakken shale play, self-cleaning surfaces including oil spills, human thermoregulation, thermal diagnostics and therapies, bone and muscles losses during space travels, and nuclear fusion by gravitational confinement. (shrink)

Humeans and non-Humeans reasonably agree that there may be necessary connections between entities that are identical or merely partly distinct—between, e.g., sets and their individual members, fusions and their individual parts, instances of determinates and determinables, members of certain natural kinds and certain of their intrinsic properties, and (especially among physicalists) certain physical and mental states. Humeans maintain, however, that as per “Hume’s Dictum”, there are no necessary connections between entities that are wholly distinct;1 and in particular, no necessary (...) causal connections between such entities (even when the background conditions requisite for causation are in place). The Humean’s differential treatment appears principled, in reflecting that commonly accepted necessary connections involve constitutional relations, whereas wholly distinct entities (notably, causes and effects) do not constitute each other. I’ll argue, however, that the appearance of principle is not genuine, as per the following conditional: Constitutional→Causal: If one accepts certain constitutional necessities, one should accept certain causal necessities. This result provides needed leverage in assessing the two main frameworks in the metaphysics of science, treating natural kinds, causes, laws of nature, and the like. These frameworks differ primarily on whether Hume’s Dictum is taken as a working constraint on theorizing; and it has proved difficult for either side to criticize the other without presupposing their preferred stance on the dictum, hence talking past one another. The arguments for Constitutional→Causal are based, however, in general and independent considerations about what facts in the world might plausibly warrant our beliefs in certain constitutional necessities involving broadly scientific entities. The Humean can respond to these arguments, which reveal a deep tension in their view, at attendant costs of implausibilty and adhocery. The non-Humean framework doesn’t face any such tension between constitutional and causal necessities, however, and so in this respect comes out ahead. (shrink)

In a recent article Humphreys has developed an intriguing proposal for making sense of emergence. The crucial notion for this purpose is what he calls "fusion" and his paradigm for it is quantum nonseparability. In what follows, we will develop this position in more detail, and then discuss its ramifications and limitations. Its ramifications are quite radical; its limitations are substantial. An alternative approach to emergence that involves quantum physics is then proposed.

The present paper constitutes a development of the position that illness, whether bodily or mental, should be analyzed as an incapacitating failure of bodily or mental capacities, respectively, to realize their functions. The paper undertakes this development by responding to two critics. It addresses first Szasz’s continued claims that (1) physical illness is the paradigm concept of illness and (2) a philosophical analysis of mental illness does not shed any light on the social and legal role of the idea. (...) Then, in reply to Wakefield, the aim is to defend the account as an interpretation of Aristotle and to argue that this Aristotelian view of mental illness is preferable to one that rests on a supposed value free account of human function. More generally the discussion points to the fact that both Wakefield and Szasz rely on a number of metaphysical assumptions about the supposedly empirical nature of medical diagnosis, about the relation between facts and values, and about mind and body (among others), which are open to challenge. In particular the paper indicates an aristotelian approach to the fusion, in the natural world, of so-called facts and values, and the relevance of this fusion to the analysis of the concept of illness. This suggests the debate over distinct conceptions of that concept must both illumine and be illuminated by these deeper metaphysical questions. (shrink)

There is much to be said for a diachronic or interpersonal individuation of singular modes of presentation (MOPs) in terms of a criterion of epistemic transparency between thought tokens. This way of individuating MOPs has been discussed recently within the mental files framework, though the issues discussed here arise for all theories that individuate MOPs in terms of relations among tokens. All such theories face objections concerning apparent failures of the transitivity of the ‘same MOP’ relation. For mental files, these (...) transitivity failures most obviously occur because mental files can merge or undergo fission. In this paper I argue that this problem is easily resolved once mental files are properly construed as continuants, whose metaphysics is analogous to that of persons or physical objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, leading to similar transitivity problems, but there are well-established theories of persistence that accommodate this. I suggest that, in particular, the stage theory best suits the purposes of a continuant theory of MOPs. (shrink)

Today, Yoga has acquired global recognition and an exalted status as an ancient health-building system. It is true that Yoga is powerful and contains the solutions for all the global problems. Yoga as a complete medical science and philosophy of life and accepts its scientific reasoning and basis. Yoga is not just a physical exercise but a holistic medical science; it is a philosophy of life, a spiritual knowledge. It is a profound philosophical thought process, but it is also (...) about having a simple, easy and balanced life-style. It is the path to gain eternal wisdom, ultimate truth and to unite the inner soul with the supreme soul through self-realization. It is a tradition in which sages have attained immeasurable bliss, indescribable happiness and inexplicable peace by entering the supreme consciousness which is present beyond mind. It is the science that inhibits the agitations of the mind and takes it to its highest level. Yoga is the spiritual journey from ignorance to knowledge, mortality to immortality, obvious to hidden and peace to ultimate tranquillity. It is the inner journey from thoughtfulness to emptiness, subjective to objective concentration, determinate to indeterminate samadhi and extrovertedness to introvertedness and being firm in judgement. This book is an humble attempt in this direction. We are determined to obtain more scientific evidence and build a science perspective not only for Yoga and Ayurveda but for the entire Vedic knowledge and wisdom. We shall lead the world in finding solutions for complex problems besetting humanity through the fusion of science and spiritualism. This book is the outcome of meticulous work put in by us in order to present various scientific standards used to test and validate this ancient system of Yoga, demographic study and personal experiences of several hundred people along with sufficient supporting proofs and documents. This is our first attempt to present Yoga backed by currently available scientific evidence, the goal is far more ambitious and the task of scientific documentation and research is an ongoing process. We will continue with the research and shall present new facts as they become available. (shrink)

As digital and immersive architectural installations and augmented reality applications generate new sensations, new digital dimensions and boundaries create new perceptions of our built environment. Digital architectural installations as immersive environments make data visible and tangible and give access to data as an experiential flow. Like the works of Refik Anadol, TeamLab or Universal Everything, digital architectural installations point to a neuroarchitectural and neurophenomenological atmosphere that refers to the understanding and measurement of embodied human experience, and how spaces affect people (...) and how they behave in a given setting. The objectivity of the screen allows viewers to observe through screens, and the screen as an ambivalent object provides a physical interface that transcends the shadow of its materiality, transforming the viewer’s environmental perception. Therefore, this article examines digital architectural environments that reveal the boundaries of architectural space, with particular consideration given to neuroaesthetics. In these data-driven environments, the human body is at the centre of multimodal perception. Therefore, these environments open the door to understanding the boundaries of architecture and invite the viewers to explore the boundaries of art and architecture that have become a fusion in the digital environment. (shrink)

Primary object of interest of mathematicians can be identified as a „mathematical matter”, the concept analogous to „physical matter” or „biological matter”. The „mathematical matter” is the soil upon which mathematics grows. One can distinguish three levels of it: some abstract but not necessarily clear conceptions, operational notions (like number) but not necessarily openly defined, theories not necessarily axiomatic. The „mathematical matter” originates in the abstract reflection upon events and forms in time and space. Its important elements are notions (...) formed mostly in the process of idealization and/or abstraction. Once formed, notions usually evolve being, e.g., simplified or complexified. Mathematics is a mirror of the world, most abstract and therefore fundamental. Although it is a free activity of human mind, mathematics reflects some deep ideas (beauty, simplicity etc.) while most interesting notions come up in tension fields between pairs of poles: the notion of a function can be seen as a bridge connecting variability and immutability, while that of a limit – connecting finiteness and infinity. A fusion of freedom and internal restrictions leads to mathematics which is simple, beautiful and effective. (shrink)

A comprehensible model is proposed aimed at an analysis of the reasons for theory change in science. According to the model the origins of scientific revolutions lie not in a clash of fundamental theories with facts, but of “old” fundamental theories with each other, leading to contradictions that can only be eliminated in a more general theory. The model is illustrated with reference to physics in the early 20th century, the three “old” theories in this case being Maxwellian electrodynamics, statistical (...) mechanics and thermodynamics. Modern example, referring to general relativity and quantum field theory fusion, is highlighted. Key words: Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Stepin, Bransky,Mamchur, mature theory, structure, Einstein, Lorentz, , Boltzmann, Planck, Hawking, De Witt. (shrink)

When in doubt, for the embryo. New arguments on the moral status of human embryos. - In the first part of our essay we distinguish the philosophical from the legal and political level of the embryo debate and describe our indirect justification strategy. It consists in renouncing a determination of the dignity-giving φ-properties and instead starting from premises that are undoubted by all discussion partners. In the second part we reconstruct and criticize the species, continuum, identity and potentiality arguments. The (...) species argument only has a certain plausibility, if at all, as a critical argument. From the continuum argument and identity argument we take over the idea of numerical identity (NI) and link it with the core idea of the potentiality argument (P). So we come to the NIP argument: -/- (NIP) -/- (1) Every living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ-properties has dignity. (2) Every viable human embryo is a living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ properties. Therefore, (3) Every viable human embryo has dignity. -/- Reversibly comatose people and newborns are protected because they have the potential to have actual personal characteristics in the future; our thesis is that embryos that are capable of development also have the same potential in moral terms. The basic idea of numerical identity, with which we support the second premise, is that every human being, from embryonic existence to adulthood, forms a physical unity. In a detailed part, we deal with the crown princess, gametes, parthenogenesis, somatic cell, pronuclear stage, biological heteronome early embryo, multiple, fusion, Siamese twin, hydatidiform mole and finally trophoblast problems. In a third part, the indirect argument is supplemented by a metatheoretical cautionary argument. It states that in situations where there is doubt as to whether a being falls within the scope of a moral norm, but there are sufficiently strong reasons for this subsumption, it must be assumed that this is the case if the contrary assumption and the positive effects it may have are in no acceptable proportion to the moral harm that would result if that subsumption were not made. The main result of our considerations is therefore: When in doubt, for the embryo. (shrink)