Results for 'Quasi-Realism'

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Bibliography: Quasi-Realism in Meta-Ethics
  1. There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):185-212.
    This paper seeks to clarify and defend the proposition that moral realism is best elaborated as a moral doctrine. I begin by upholding Ronald Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean critique of the error theory against some strictures by Michael Smith, and I then briefly suggest how a proponent of moral realism as a moral doctrine would respond to Smith’s defense of the Archimedeanism of expressivism. Thereafter, this paper moves to its chief endeavor. By differentiating clearly between expressivism and quasi-realism, the paper highlights (...)
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  2.  49
    Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise (...)
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  3. Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement.Robert Hopkins - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
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  4.  14
    Kant, Quasi‐Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement.Robert Hopkins - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166-189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one’s mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
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  5.  94
    22 Ethics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Intuitions and Quasi-Realism.Matt Bedke - 2013 - In Matthew C. Haug (ed.), Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? Routledge. pp. 416.
    You know the story. You have a few intuitions. You propose a few theories that fit them. It’s a living. Of course, things are more complicated than this. We are sensitive to counterexamples raised by others and wish to accommodate or explain away an ever-wider base of intuitive starting points. And a great deal of the action occurs in rational reflection that can alter what is intuitive, and in theorizing that overturns formerly justified beliefs and moves us to new justified (...)
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  6.  62
    Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):392–409.
    Simon Blackburn defends a 'quasi-realist' view intended to preserve much of what realists want to say about moral discourse. According to error theory, moral discourse is committed to indefensible metaphysical assumptions. Quasi-realism seems to preserve ontological frugality, attributing no mistaken commitments to our moral practices. In order to make good this claim, quasi-realism must show that (a) the seemingly realist features of the 'surface grammar' of moral discourse can be made compatible with projectivism; and (b) certain realist-sounding statements (...)
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  7. Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
    This volume collects some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn, one of our leading philosophers, explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgments relate to the world. This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that (...)
  8. Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism.Simon Blackburn - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 322--338.
  9. Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism.Gideon Rosen - 1998 - Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
  10. Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism.David Lewis - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Moral Fictionalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 314-321.
  11. Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.
    A common first reaction to expressivist and quasi-realist theories is the thought that, if these theories are right, there's some objectionable sense in which we can't be wrong about morality. This worry turns out to be surprisingly difficult to make stick - an account of moral error as instability under improving changes provides the quasi-realist with the resources to explain many of our concerns about moral error. The story breaks down, though, in the case of fundamental moral error. This is (...)
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  12.  15
    Quasi-Realism, Negation, and the Frege-Geach Problem.Nicholas Unwin - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):337-352.
    Every expressivist theory of moral language requires a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, i.e., the problem of explaining how moral sentences retain their meaning in unasserted contexts. An essential part of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realist project’, i.e., the project of showing how we can earn the right to treat moral sentences as if they have ordinary truth-conditions, is to provide a sophisticated solution. I show, however, that simple negated contexts provide a fundamental difficulty, since accepting the negation of a sentence is easily (...)
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  13. Truth and A Priori Possibility: Egan's Charge Against Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, (...)
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  14. Antirealist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 146--162.
    Expressivism is the view that the function of normative sentences is not to represent a kind of fact, but to avow attitudes, prescribe behavior, or the like. The idea can be found in David Hume. In the 20th century, G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument provided important support for the view. Elizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “direction of fit,” which helped distinguish expressivism from a kind of naive subjectivism. The central advantage of expressivism is that it easily explains the motivational (...)
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  15.  82
    Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances.Edward Harcourt - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):249-275.
    The paper develops an attack on quasi-realism in ethics, according to which expressivism about ethical discourse—understood as the thesis that the states that discourse expresses are non-representational—is consistent with some of the discourse's familiar surface features, thus ‘saving the ethical appearances’. A dilemma is posed for the quasi-realist. Either ethical discourse appears, thanks to those surface features, to express representational states, or else there is no such thing as its appearing to express such states. If the former then, by (...)
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  16.  94
    Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and the Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement.Cain Samuel Todd - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
    My primary aim in this paper is to outline a quasi-realist theory of aesthetic judgement. Robert Hopkins has recently argued against the plausibility of this project because he claims that quasi-realism cannot explain a central component of any expressivist understanding of aesthetic judgements, namely their supposed ‘autonomy’. I argue against Hopkins’s claims by contending that Roger Scruton’s aesthetic attitude theory, centred on his account of the imagination, provides us with the means to develop a plausible quasi-realist account of aesthetic (...)
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  17. Lewis and Blackburn on Quasi-Realism and Fictionalism.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):315–319.
    Lewis has argued that quasi-realism is fictionalism. Blackburn denies this, offering reasons which rely on a descriptive reading of quasi-realism. This note offers a different, more general argument against Lewis's claim, available to prescriptive as well as descriptive quasi-realists.
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  18.  15
    Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism.Graham Bex-Priestley - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1051-1063.
    If ethical expressivism is true, then moral judgements are motivational desire-like states and do not robustly represent reality. This gives rise to the problem of how to understand moral error. How can we be mistaken if there is no moral reality to be mistaken about? The standard expressivist explanation of moral doubt is couched in terms of our fear that our judgements may not survive improvements to our epistemic situation. There is a debate between Egan :205–219, 2007), Blackburn :201–213, 2009), (...)
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  19. Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 96-120.
    The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism,on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other,seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgmentswould be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, andmoral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way inmaking sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and itsindependence (...)
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  20.  22
    Sellars’ Metaethical Quasi-Realism.Griffin Klemick - forthcoming - Synthese:1-29.
    In this article, I expound and defend an interpretation of Sellars as a metaethical quasi-realist. Sellars analyzes moral discourse in non-cognitivist terms: in particular, he analyzes “ought”-statements as expressions of collective intentions deriving from a collective commitment to provide for the general welfare. But he also endorses a functional-role theory of meaning, on which a statement’s meaning is grounded in its being governed by semantical rules concerning language entry, intra-linguistic, and language departure transitions, and a theory of truth as correct (...)
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  21. Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory, and Ethical Relativism.Simon Kirchin - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):413 – 427.
    This paper is a reply to Simon Blackburn's 'Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation?' Inquiry 42, pp. 213-28. Blackburn attempts to show how his version of non-cognitivism - quasi-realist projectivism - can evade the threat of ethical relativism, the thought that all ways of living are as ethically good as each other and every ethical judgment is as ethically true as any other. He further attempts to show that his position is superior in this respect to, amongst (...)
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  22.  29
    Quasi‐Realism and Relativism.A. W. Moore - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150-156.
    1. If it is true that ‘an ethic is the propositional reflection of the dispositions and attitudes, policies and stances, of people,’ as Simon Blackburn says in summary of the quasi-realism that he champions in this excellent and wonderfully provocative book, then it seems to follow that different dispositions, attitudes, policies and stances—different conative states, for short—will issue in different ethics, each with an equal claim to truth; and this in turn seems to be one thing that could be (...)
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  23.  74
    Quasi-Realism and Relativism. [REVIEW]A. W. Moore - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):150–156.
    1. If it is true that ‘an ethic is the propositional reflection of the dispositions and attitudes, policies and stances, of people,’ as Simon Blackburn says in summary of the quasi-realism that he champions in this excellent and wonderfully provocative book, then it seems to follow that different dispositions, attitudes, policies and stances—different conative states, for short—will issue in different ethics, each with an equal claim to truth; and this in turn seems to be one thing that could be (...)
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  24. Minimalism and Quasi-Realism.Alan Thomas - manuscript
    Expressivism's problem in solving the Frege/Geach problem concerning unasserted contexts is evaluated in the light of Blackburn's own methodological commitment to assessing philosophical theories in terms of costs and benefits, notably quasi-realism's aim of minimising the ontological commitments of a broadly naturalistic worldview. The problem emerges when a competitor theory can explain the same phenomena at lower cost: the minimalist about truth has no problem with unasserted contexts whereas the quasi-realist/expressivist package does. However, this form of projectivism is supposed (...)
     
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  25.  72
    Minimalism Versus Quasi-Realism: Why the Minimalist has a Dialectical Advantage.Alan Thomas - 1997 - Philosophical Papers 26 (3):233-239.
    Minimalist and quasi-realist approaches to problematic discourses such as the causal, moral and modal are compared and contrasted. The problem of unasserted contexts demonstrates that while quasi-realism can meet the challenge of reconstructing a logic of "commitment" to cover both "projected" and "detected" discourses, it can only do so at an unacceptable cost. The theory must globally revise logic, in spite of its implicit commitment to a substantial notion of truth for "detected" discourses. Thus, quasi-realism fails to meet (...)
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  26. The Realism in Quasi-Realism.Deborah K. Heikes - 1996 - Southwest Philosophy Review 12 (1):75-83.
  27.  5
    Essays in Quasi-Realism.James C. Klagge & Simon Blackburn - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):139.
  28. Pragmatism, Quasi-Realism, and the Global Challenge.Huw Price - 2007 - In Cheryl Misak (ed.), New Pragmatists. Oxford University Press. pp. 91.
    William James said that sometimes detailed philosophical argument is irrelevant. Once a current of thought is really under way, trying to oppose it with argument is like planting a stick in a river to try to alter its course: “round your obstacle flows the water and ‘gets there just the same’”. He thought pragmatism was such a river. There is a contemporary river that sometimes calls itself pragmatism, although other titles are probably better. At any rate it is the denial (...)
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  29.  7
    Towards Cognitive Moral Quasi-Realism.Eduardo García-Ramírez - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (1):5-0.
    There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones. However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with enough resources (...)
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  30.  23
    Essays in Quasi-Realism[REVIEW]Michael Tooley - 1995 - Review of Metaphysics 48 (3):643-645.
    Issues surrounding the choice between realism and antirealism have recently been the focus of intense discussion in a number of areas of philosophy, including ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. One of the more interesting contributors to these discussions has been Simon Blackburn, and the present book is a collection of his essays in this area.
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  31. Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem.Nicholas Unwin - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):337-352.
    Expressivists, such as Blackburn, analyse sentences such as 'S thinks that it ought to be the case that p' as S hoorays that p'. A problem is that the former sentence can be negated in three different ways, but the latter in only two. The distinction between refusing to accept a moral judgement and accepting its negation therefore cannot be accounted for. This is shown to undermine Blackburn's solution to the Frege-Geach problem.
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  32. Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi‐Realism. Gareth Evans Memorial Lecture, Delivered in Oxford on June 2, 1987.Crispin Wright - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):25-49.
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  33. Essays on Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):96-99.
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  34. Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence.Jamie Dreier - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):269-287.
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  35.  9
    Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Ethics 105 (3):646-648.
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  36. Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?Simon Blackburn - 1999 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):213 – 227.
    This essay juxtaposes the position in metaethics defended, expressivism with quasirealistic trimmings, with the ancient problem of relativism. It argues that, perhaps surprisingly, there is less of a problem of normative truth on this approach than on others. Because ethics is not in the business of representing aspects of the world, there is no way to argue for a plurality of moral truths, simply from the existence of a plurality of moral opinions. The essay also argues that other approaches, which (...)
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  37. Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist.Simon Blackburn - 1996 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong Mark Timmons (ed.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 82--100.
     
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  38.  23
    Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):965-968.
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  39.  34
    Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation.Angela Coventry - 2006 - Continuum Books.
    Presents an interpretation of David Hume's account of what a 'cause' is. This book emphasises on the connections between Hume's theories of cause, space and time, morals, and aesthetics.
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  40.  7
    Quasi−Realism, Acquaintance, and The Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement.S. Davies, R. Hopkins, J. Robinson & C. Samuel Todd - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
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  41.  13
    Erratum To: There’s Nothing Quasi About Quasi-Realism: Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine.Matthew Kramer - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):213-214.
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  42. Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Noûs 32 (3):386-405.
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  43.  76
    Hume’s Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation. [REVIEW]P. J. E. Kail - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):190-192.
  44.  5
    Can One Be A Quasi-Realist About The Aesthetic?Christopher Dowling - 2006 - Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 3 (3):100-109.
    For ordinary judgements it is often the case that it may be justifiable to change one's mind given that others agree in holding an opposing view. In the case of judgements of beauty this is never the case; these are autonomous. Robert Hopkins has discussed the following (familiar) explanation: Judgements of beauty are not genuine assertions at all; rather they are expressions of some response or experience. Since to acknowledge the disagreement of others is not to respond to objects as (...)
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  45. Scientific Quasi-Realism.Jennifer Trusted - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):109-111.
  46.  68
    Quasi-Realism and Mind-Dependence.Alstrup Stig Rasmussen - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (39):185.
  47.  56
    Quasi-Realism in Mathematics.Per Lindström - 2000 - The Monist 83 (1):122-149.
    It is one of the tasks of the philosophy of mathematics to explain in a Kantian way, how and to what extent, mathematics as we know it, is possible. It should be clear, however, that, as things stand at present, a philosophical theory of mathematics can in this respect, it seems, be little more than a declaration of faith or the lack of it.
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  48. Quasi-Quasi-Realism.Nick Zangwill - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):583-594.
    I. Projcctivism, Subjcctivism, and Error (i) According to Simon Blackburn, somconc who wants t0 avoid a ‘rcalistic’ account of our motal thought faces a choice} Thc choicc is bctwccn his non-rcductionist ‘projcctivism’ and rcductionist ‘subjcctivism’. Thc foymcr is thc vicw that moral judgments cxprcss attitudcs (approval, disapproval, liking or disliking, for example), which wc ‘projcct’ or ‘sprcad’ onto thc world, while thc latter is thc vicw that moral judgments arc bclicfs about attitudes. Blackburn bcratcs philosophers for not sccing thc diffcrcncc, (...)
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  49. Projection, Quasi-Realism, and Sophisticated Realism.Allan Gibbard - 1996 - Mind 105 (418):331-335.
  50.  18
    Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and the Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement.C. Samuel Todd - 2004 - British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):277-296.
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