Results for 'intentions'

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  1. Diana Baumrind This article continues Baumrind's development of argu-ments against the use of deception in research. Here she presents three ethical rules which proscribe deceptive practices and examines the costs of such deception to.Intentional Deception - forthcoming - Bioethics: Basic Writings on the Key Ethical Questions That Surround the Major, Modern Biological Possibilities and Problems.
     
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    Charles R. Johnson.Humean Intentions - 1998 - American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (2).
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    Paisley Livingston.O. F. Intentions - 2003 - In Jerrold Levinson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics. Oxford University Press. pp. 275.
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  4. Australasian Journal of Philosophy Contents of Volume 91.Present Desire Satisfaction, Past Well-Being, Volatile Reasons, Epistemic Focal Bias, Some Evidence is False, Counting Stages, Vague Entailment, What Russell Couldn'T. Describe, Liberal Thinking & Intentional Action First - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4).
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  5. Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
  6. Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make (...)
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  7. Joint intention, we-mode and I-mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
    The central topic of this paper is to study joint intention to perform a joint action or to bring about a certain state. Here are some examples of such joint action: You and I share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan, we sing a duet together, we clean up our backyard together, and I cash a check by acting jointly with you, a bank teller, and finally we together elect a new president for (...)
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  8. Intention and the Basis of Meaning.Ray Buchanan - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    I argue that if intentions are what Grice, and most contemporary action theorists, take them to be, they are inessential for acts of speaker meaning. More specifically, my primary aim is to show that the consensus view of speaker meaning is in deep tension with certain plausible, and widely accepted, cognitive constraints on rational intention pertaining to an agent’s assessment of her prospects of achieving her goal. My secondary aim is to offer an initial case for thinking that the (...)
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    Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Oxford,: Blackwell.
    Intention is one of the masterworks of twentieth-century philosophy in English. First published in 1957, it has acquired the status of a modern philosophical classic. The book attempts to show in detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  10. Intention.Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell. pp. 75-89.
    This chapter presents Davidson’s account of intentional action and intention. Davidson initially discusses intentional action in relation to the explanation and the ontology of action. His earlier view equates acting intentionally with being caused to act by a pair of appropriately related mental states (a pro-attitude and an instrumental belief) and denies the existence of intentions as distinct mental states. Later, in his account of weakness of will, Davidson offers a more complex account of practical deliberation in terms of (...)
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  11. Control, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
    Skill or control is commonly regarded as a necessary condition for intentional action. This received wisdom is challenged by experiments conducted by Joshua Knobe and Thomas Nadelhoffer, which suggest that moral considerations sometimes trump considerations of skill and control. I argue that this effect (as well as the Knobe effect) can be explained in terms of the role normative reasons play in the concept of intentional action. This explanation has significant advantages over its rivals. It involves at most a conservative (...)
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  12.  9
    Intentional Fallacy.Nicolas Michaud - 2018-05-09 - In Robert Arp, Steven Barbone & Michael Bruce (eds.), Bad Arguments. Wiley. pp. 357–359.
    This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'intentional fallacy (IF)'. The IF is an odd kind of fallacy. Rather than being a fallacy focused on logic and argumentation, it is a fallacy that focuses on art, relating to how we judge art and engage in literary criticism. The IF focuses on the fact that we often think that there is one right interpretation of a work of art. According to David Fenner, the IF “states that (...)
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    We-Intentions and Social Action.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1985 - Analyse & Kritik 7 (1):26-43.
    In the paper “We-intentions and Social Action” conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents’ I-intentions and beliefs. The need and indispensability of we-intentions and we-attitudes in general (...)
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  14. The Intentional Stance.[author unknown] - 1987 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (2):350-351.
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  15.  11
    Intention reports and eventuality abstraction in a theory of mood choice.Thomas Grano - 2024 - Linguistics and Philosophy 47 (2):265-315.
    Recent work on mood choice considers fine-grained semantic differences among desire predicates (notably, ‘want’ and ‘hope’) and their consequences for the distribution of indicative and subjunctive complement clauses. In that vein, this paper takes a close look at ‘intend’. I show that cross-linguistically, ‘intend’ accepts nonfinite and subjunctive complements and rejects indicative complements. This fact poses difficulties for recent approaches to mood choice. Toward a solution, a broad aim of this paper is to argue that—while ‘intend’ is loosely in the (...)
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    Intention.Alfred R. Mele - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 108–113.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Intentions and Related States of Mind Intention's Functions and Constitution Intentions and Reasons References Further reading.
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  17. The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  18.  79
    Corporate intention and corporate action.Raimo Tuomela - 1993 - Analyse & Kritik 15 (1):11-21.
    This paper comments on Coleman's account of group action , and his view is compared with the present author's largely complementary view . Some criticisms concerning Coleman's linear system of action are presented. One of the main points made is that a viable theory of social action must make use of a notion of joint intention and that Coleman's theory is deficient on this score.
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  19. The Arithmetic of Intention.Anton Ford - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):129-143.
    Anscombe holds that a proper account of intentional action must exhibit “a ‘form’ of description of events.” But what does that mean? To answer this question, I compare the method of Anscombe’s Intention with that of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic—another classic work of analytic philosophy that consciously opposes itself to psychological explanations. On the one hand, positively, I aim to identify and elucidate the kind of account of intentional action that Anscombe attempts to provide. On the other hand, negatively, I (...)
     
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  20.  22
    Authorial intention and the varieties of intentionalism.Paisley Livingston - 2007 - In Garry Hagberg & Walter Jost (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 399–419.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Intention Authorial Intention Varieties of Intentionalism The Utterance Model Hypothetical Intentionalism Hypothetical Intentionalism and Actualist Intentionalism Compared Success Conditions and the Dilemma Argument.
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  21.  67
    Intentions, ends and joint action.Seumas Miller - 1995 - Philosophical Papers 24 (1):51-66.
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  22.  5
    Die Intention betriebswirtschaftlicher Hochschullehrer zur Beeinflussung von Werten: Konzeptionelle Entwicklung und globale empirische Überprüfung.Dirk C. Moosmayer - 2013 - Frankfurt am Main: Pl Academic Research.
    Aus den wirtschaftlichen Turbulenzen des vergangenen Jahrzehnts leitet sich die Frage nach der Verantwortung fur die Gestaltung der Wirtschaftslandschaft ab. Die Arbeit untersucht daher, ob betriebswirtschaftliche Hochschullehrer die Werte ihrer Studierenden beeinflussen wollen und entwickelt ein detailliertes konzeptionelles Modell. Zur Modellvalidierung werden deskriptive Analysen, Strukturgleichungsmodelle und Clusteranalysen auf Daten aus einer weltweiten Befragung von 1.741 betriebswirtschaftlichen Hochschullehrern angewendet. Die Analysen zeigen weltweit eine starke Intention zur Wertebeeinflussung, mit besonderer Werteskepsis in Deutschland. Die Unterstutzung von Kollegen und Verbanden erwies sich als (...)
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  23.  42
    Interpretation, Intentions, and Responsibility.Peter Alward - 2018 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 55 (2):135-154.
    In this paper, I defend a contextualist account of the role of authors’ intentions in interpretation, according to which their role depends on readers’ interpretive interests. In light of a general discussion of intentions and responsibility, I argue that insofar as readers are interested in attributing authorial responsibility for interpretations of fictional works, authors’ intentions need to play a central role in those interpretations. And I investigate the implications of this account for ‘accidental authorship’, cases in which (...)
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  24. We-Intentions and How One Reports Them.Kyle Ferguson - 2023 - In Jeremy Randel Koons & Ronald Loeffler (eds.), Ethics, practical reasoning, agency: Wilfrid Sellars's practical philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 37–61.
    In this chapter, Kyle Ferguson argues for an individualist account of Sellarsian we-intentions. According to the individualist account, we-intentions’ intersubjective form renders them shareable rather than requiring that they be shared. Contrary to collectivist accounts, one may we-intend independently of whether and without presupposing that one's community shares one's we-intentions. After providing textual support, Ferguson proposes and implements a strategy of reportorial ascent, which strengthens the case for the individualist account. Reportorial ascent involves reflecting on the sentences (...)
     
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  25.  10
    Acts, intentions, and moral evaluation: a dialogue.Craig M. White - 2023 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    This book argues that the moral quality of an act comes from the agent's inner states. By arguing for the indispensable relevance of intention in the moral evaluation of acts, the book moves against a mainstream, 'objective' approach in normative ethics. It is commonly held that the intentions, knowledge, and volition of agents are irrelevant to the moral permissibility of their acts. This book stresses that the capacities of agency, rather than simply the label 'agent', must be engaged during (...)
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  26. Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical studies.Hugh J. McCann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.
    Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called Simple View that an agent who A’s intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in (...)
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  27. Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. (...)
  28. Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is (...)
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  29.  21
    Intentional Social Action and We-Intentions.Marvin Belzer - 1986 - Analyse & Kritik 8 (1):86-95.
    In his recent book Professor Tuomela presents a philosophical account of social action that relies upon the presuppositions of his purposive-causal theory of individual action. In particular, the concept of “we-intention” plays as central a role in the new theory as does that of intention in the earlier one. This article examines Tuomela’s concept of “we-intention”. Tuomela’s introduction of the concept into social action theory is motivated by the assumption that theories of individual actions and social actions are analogous relative (...)
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  30. Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues that a popular account of intentions can be extended to beliefs. Beliefs are stable all-out states that allow for planning and coordination in a way that is tractable for cognitively limited creatures like human beings. Scepticism is expressed that there is really anything like credences as standardly understood.
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  31. Conditional Intentions and Shared Agency.Matthew Rachar - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):271-288.
    Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads (...)
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  32. Proximal intentions intentionalism.Victor Tamburini - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):879-891.
    According to a family of metasemantics for demonstratives called intentionalism, the intentions of speakers determine the reference of demonstratives. And according to a sub-family I call proximal intentions (PI) intentionalism, the intention that determines reference is one that occupies a certain place—the proximal one—in a structure of intentions. PI intentionalism is thought to make correct predictions about reference where less sophisticated forms of intentionalism make the wrong predictions. In this article I argue that this is an illusion: (...)
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    Intention and side effects.John Finnis & Elizabeth Anscombe - 2013 - In John Keown & Robert P. George (eds.), Reason, morality, and law: the philosophy of John Finnis. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 93.
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  34. Intention.[author unknown] - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):362-362.
     
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  35. Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
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  36. Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; (...)
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  37. Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):41-56.
    ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the (...)
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  38. Essays on Anscombe's Intention.Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.) - 2011 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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  39. Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  40.  59
    Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle, Louis J. Moses & Dare A. Baldwin (eds.) - 2001 - MIT Press.
    Highlights the roles of intention and intentionality in social cognition.
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  41. Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation.Joshua Knobe - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis (...)
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  42. Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together.Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256.
    What are the most detailed descriptions under which subjects intend to perform bodily actions? According to Pacherie (2006), these descriptions may be found by looking into motor representations—action representations in the brain that determine the movements to be performed. Specifically, for any motor representation guiding an action, its subject has an M‐intention representing that action in as much detail. I show that some M‐intentions breach the constraints that intentions should meet. I then identify a set of intentions—motor (...)
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  43. Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction.Patrick Haggard & Sam Clark - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally (...)
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    Employee turnover intention among Millennials: The role of psychological well-being and experienced workplace incivility.Reny Yuniasanti, Nurul Ain Hidayah Binti Abas & Hazalizah Hamzah - 2019 - Humanitas: Indonesian Psychological Journal 16 (2):74-85.
    High turnover intention is a problem in the workforce today. The purpose of this study is to determine the relationship between experienced workplace incivility and psychological well-being on turnover intention. The subjects of this study were 46 millennial employees who had worked for at least three months. Data were collected with turnover intention scale, experienced workplace incivility scale, and psychological well-being scale. Partial Least Square PLS-SEM analysis was used to analyze the data. Findings indicate that experienced workplace incivility is positively (...)
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  45. Shared intention and personal intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...)
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  46.  40
    Intention is choice with commitment.Philip R. Cohen & Hector J. Levesque - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 42 (2-3):213-261.
    This paper explores principles governing the rational balance among an agent's beliefs, goals, actions, and intentions. Such principles provide specifications for artificial agents, and approximate a theory of human action (as philosophers use the term). By making explicit the conditions under which an agent can drop his goals, i.e., by specifying how the agent is committed to his goals, the formalism captures a number of important properties of intention. Specifically, the formalism provides analyses for Bratman's three characteristic functional roles (...)
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  47. Effective intentions: the power of conscious will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that (...)
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  48. Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
  49. Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of (...)
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  50. Intentional logic..Henry Babcock Veatch - 1952 - [Hamden, Conn.]: Archon Books.
     
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