Search results for 'Ascription' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Miri Albahari (2014). Alief or Belief? A Contextual Approach to Belief Ascription. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.score: 18.0
    There has been a surge of interest over cases where a subject sincerely endorses P while displaying discordant strains of not-P in her behaviour and emotion. Cases like this are telling because they bear directly upon conditions under which belief should be ascribed. Are beliefs to be aligned with what we sincerely endorse or with what we do and feel? If belief doesn’t explain the discordant strains, what does? T.S. Gendler has recently attempted to explain all the discordances by introducing (...)
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  2. Philip J. Nickel (2007). Trust and Obligation-Ascription. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):309 - 319.score: 18.0
    This paper defends the view that trust is a moral attitude, by putting forward the Obligation-Ascription Thesis: If E trusts F to do X, this implies that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X. I explicate the idea of obligation-ascription in terms of requirement and the appropriateness of blame. Then, drawing a distinction between attitude and ground, I argue that this account of the attitude of trust is compatible with the possibility of amoral trust, that is, (...)
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  3. David R. Olson (2007). Self-Ascription of Intention: Responsibility, Obligation and Self-Control. Synthese 159 (2):297 - 314.score: 18.0
    In the late preschool years children acquire a "theory of mind", the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children's ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children's developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability to (...)
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  4. Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate whether Stalnaker’s semantic (...)
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  5. Natasha Alechina & Brian Logan (2010). Belief Ascription Under Bounded Resources. Synthese 173 (2):179 - 197.score: 18.0
    There exists a considerable body of work on epistemic logics for resource-bounded reasoners. In this paper, we concentrate on a less studied aspect of resource-bounded reasoning, namely, on the ascription of beliefs and inference rules by the agents to each other. We present a formal model of a system of bounded reasoners which reason about each other’s beliefs, and investigate the problem of belief ascription in a resource-bounded setting. We show that for agents whose computational resources and memory (...)
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  6. James M. Dow, Shoegenstein on Self-Ascription, Immunity to Error and I-as-Subject.score: 18.0
    Contemporary accounts of the self-ascription of experiences are wedded to two basic dogmas. The first is that self-ascription is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM). The second dogma is that there is distinction between awareness of oneself qua subject and awareness of oneself qua object (the SCS/SCO distinction). In this paper, I urge that these dogmas are groundless. First, I illustrate that claims about immunity to error through misidentification are usually based upon claims (...)
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  7. Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self‐Ascription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-219.score: 15.0
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  8. Michael Devitt (1984). Thoughts and Their Ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.score: 15.0
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  9. Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.score: 15.0
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The (...)
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Belief Ascription and the Illusion of Depth. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):183-201.score: 15.0
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  11. Nick Chater & Martin J. Pickering (2003). Two Realms of Mental Life: The Non-Overlap of Belief Ascription and the Scientific Study of Mind and Behavior. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):335-353.score: 15.0
     
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  12. M. Frank (1995). Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. Common Knowledge 4:30--50.score: 15.0
  13. Mitchell Ginsberg (1972). Mind And Belief: Psychological Ascription And The Concept Of Belief. Ny: Humanities Press.score: 15.0
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  14. George Graham (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press. 89.score: 15.0
  15. Dilip Ninan (2010). De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.score: 12.0
    This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.
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  16. Stephan Torre (2010). Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.score: 12.0
    I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two (...)
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  17. Bryan Frances (2002). A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription. Analysis 62 (2):116–125.score: 12.0
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the (...)
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  18. Richard Holton (forthcoming). Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se. In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell.score: 12.0
    There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription (...)
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  19. Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude Ascription's Affinity to Measurement. International Journal Of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.score: 12.0
    The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate (...)
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  20. Nancy S. Jecker (1987). The Ascription of Rights in Wrongful Life Suits. Law and Philosophy 6 (2):149 - 165.score: 12.0
    Wrongful life is an action brought by a defective child who sues to recover for pecuniary or emotional damages suffered as a result of being conceived or born with deformities. In such cases, plaintiff alleges that the negligence of a responsible third party,1 such as physician, hospital, or medical laboratory, is the proximate cause of plaintiff's being born or conceived and thus being compelled to suffer the debilitating effects of a deformity. The child does not sue to recover for the (...)
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  21. James Russell (2007). Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children. Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.score: 12.0
    The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as 'the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts' [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432—451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes the form of three (...)
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  22. Daniel Wegner, On the Feeling of Doing: Dysphoria and the Implicit Modulation of Authorship Ascription.score: 12.0
    The experience of authorship arises when we feel that observed effects (e.g., the onset of a light) are caused by our own actions (e.g., pushing a switch). This study tested whether dysphoric persons’ authorship ascription can be modulated implicitly in a situation in which the exclusivity of the cause of effects is ambiguous. In line with the idea that depressed individuals’ self-schemata include general views of uncontrollability, in a subliminal priming task we observed that dysphoric (compared with nondysphoric) participants (...)
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  23. Mark Coeckelbergh (2012). Growing Moral Relations: Critique of Moral Status Ascription. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 12.0
    Machine generated contents note: -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction - The Problem of Moral Status -- PART I: MORAL ONTOLOGIES: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO RELATIONAL DOGMAS -- Individual Properties -- Appearance and Virtue -- Relations: Communitarian and Metaphysical -- Relations: Natural and Social -- Relations: Hybrid and Environmental -- Conclusion Part I: Diogenes's Challenge -- PART II: MORAL STATUS ASCRIPTION AND ITS CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY: A TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT -- Words and Sentences: Forms of Language Use -- Societies and Cultures (1): Forms (...)
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  24. Stuart Silvers (1989). Representational Capacity, Intentional Ascription, and the Slippery Slope. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):463-473.score: 12.0
    A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor (1986) suggests, if the objection holds, we should have no good reason for withholding (...)
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  25. Dingmar van Eck & Erik Weber (forthcoming). Function Ascription and Explanation: Elaborating an Explanatory Utility Desideratum for Ascriptions of Technical Functions. Erkenntnis:1-23.score: 12.0
    Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: (i) why was artifact x produced?, (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity (...)
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  26. Stephen Mumford (1999). Intentionality and the Physical: A New Theory of Disposition Ascription. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):215-25.score: 10.0
    This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we (...)
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  27. David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.score: 9.0
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  28. Jennifer Nagel (2010). Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.score: 9.0
    Do we apply higher epistemic standards to subjects with high stakes? This paper argues that we expect different outward behavior from high-stakes subjects—for example, we expect them to collect more evidence than their low-stakes counterparts—but not because of any change in epistemic standards. Rather, we naturally expect subjects in any condition to think in a roughly adaptive manner, balancing the expected costs of additional evidence collection against the expected value of gains in accuracy. The paper reviews a body of empirical (...)
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  29. Stephen Schiffer (1992). Belief Ascription. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.score: 9.0
  30. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 9.0
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, or other intentional (...)
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  31. Charles Wallis (2008). Consciousness, Context, and Know-How. Synthese 160 (1):123 - 153.score: 9.0
    In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394–409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87–96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use (...)
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  32. H. L. A. Hart (1951). The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights. In Gilbert Ryle & Antony Flew (eds.), Logic and Language (First Series): Essays. B. Blackwell. 171 - 194.score: 9.0
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  33. Mark E. Richard (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.score: 9.0
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important (...)
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  34. Robert M. Gordon (2007). Ascent Routines for Propositional Attitudes. Synthese 159 (2):151 - 165.score: 9.0
    An ascent routine (AR) allows a speaker to self-ascribe a given propositional attitude (PA) by redeploying the process that generates a corresponding lower level utterance. Thus, we may report on our beliefs about the weather by reporting (under certain constraints) on the weather. The chief criticism of my AR account of self-ascription, by Alvin Goldman and others, is that it covers few if any PA’s other than belief and offers no account of how we can attain reliability in identifying (...)
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  35. Sean Crawford (2012). De Re and De Dicto Explanation of Action. Philosophia 40 (4):783-798.score: 9.0
    This paper argues for an account of the relation between thought ascription and the explanation of action according to which de re ascriptions and de dicto ascriptions of thought each form the basis for two different kinds of action explanations, nonrationalizing and rationalizing ones. The claim that de dicto ascriptions explain action is familiar and virtually beyond dispute; the claim that that de re ascriptions are explanatory of action, however, is not at all familiar and indeed has mostly been (...)
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  36. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987). Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing. Philosophical Perspectives 1:405-454.score: 9.0
  37. Daniel Whiting (2008). Meaning Holism and de Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 575-599.score: 9.0
    According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.
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  38. Ron Mallon, Differences Between Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Belief Ascription: A Problem with Block's Argument for Holism.score: 9.0
    instead he argues for a conditional: "if there is such a thing as narrow content, it is holistic," where holism is taken to be "the doctrine that any _substantial_ difference in W-beliefs, whether between two people or between one person at two times, requires a difference in the meaning or content of W" (153, 152).
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  39. Massimiliano Carrara & Elisabetta Sacchi (2007). Cardinality and Identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):539 - 556.score: 9.0
    P.T. Geach has maintained (see, e.g., Geach (1967/1968)) that identity (as well as dissimilarity) is always relative to a general term. According to him, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz's Law - which says that if two objects are identical they have the same properties - does not hold. For Geach relative identity is at least as good as Frege's cardinality thesis which he takes to (...)
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  40. Joseph L. H. Cruz (1998). Mindreading: Mental State Ascription and Cognitive Architecture. Mind and Language 13 (3):323-340.score: 9.0
    The debate between the theory-theory and simulation has largely ignored issues of cognitive architecture. In the philosophy of psychology, cognition as symbol manipulation is the orthodoxy. The challenge from connectionism, however, has attracted vigorous and renewed interest. In this paper I adopt connectionism as the antecedent of a conditional: If connectionism is the correct account of cognitive architecture, then the simulation theory should be preferred over the theory-theory. I use both developmental evidence and constraints on explanation in psychology to support (...)
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  41. Jennifer M. Saul (1998). The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):363-389.score: 9.0
  42. Jennifer M. Saul (1999). The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.score: 9.0
  43. Stephen Schiffer (1993). Belief Ascription and a Paradox of Meaning. Philosophical Issues 3:89-121.score: 9.0
  44. Tillmann Vierkant (2005). Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507 - 534.score: 9.0
    The article argues that there is a specific role for narrative consciousness in our understanding of justified responsibility ascription. Starting from a short review of empirical findings that suggest that we do not consciously control our actions, the article proceeds to spell out a concept of willed actions that does justice to the scientific results, conceptual requirements, and our most important intuitions on the ascription of responsibility. In order to do this, the article develops a concept of how (...)
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  45. Daniel Whiting (2009). Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-599.score: 9.0
    According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression.1 Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.
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  46. Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2007). An Anomaly in Intentional Action Ascription: More Evidence of Folk Diversity. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society.score: 9.0
  47. Mark B. Okrent (1990). Individuation and Intentional Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (3):461-480.score: 9.0
  48. Kim Davies (1982). Intentionality: Spontaneous Ascription and Deep Intuition. Analysis 42 (June):169-171.score: 9.0
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  49. David Hunter (2011). Belief Ascription and Context Dependence. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):902-911.score: 9.0
  50. Paul Saka (2007). Spurning Charity. Axiomathes 17 (2):197-208.score: 9.0
    The principle of charity (“Charity”), in one form or other, is held by many and for various reasons. After cataloging discernible kinds of Charity, I focus on the most familiar versions as found in Davidson, Dennett, Devitt, Lewis, Putnam, Quine, Stich, and others. To begin with, I argue that such versions of Charity are untenable because beliefs cannot be counted, and even if they could be counted there is reason to believe that true beliefs need not outnumber false beliefs. Next (...)
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