Search results for 'Ascription' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  37
    Philip J. Nickel (2007). Trust and Obligation-Ascription. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):309 - 319.
    This paper defends the view that trust is a moral attitude, by putting forward the Obligation-Ascription Thesis: If E trusts F to do X, this implies that E ascribes an obligation to F to do X. I explicate the idea of obligation-ascription in terms of requirement and the appropriateness of blame. Then, drawing a distinction between attitude and ground, I argue that this account of the attitude of trust is compatible with the possibility of amoral trust, that is, (...)
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  2. Bryan Frances (2002). A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription. Analysis 62 (2):116–125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the (...)
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  3.  86
    Miri Albahari (2014). Alief or Belief? A Contextual Approach to Belief Ascription. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.
    There has been a surge of interest over cases where a subject sincerely endorses P while displaying discordant strains of not-P in her behaviour and emotion. Cases like this are telling because they bear directly upon conditions under which belief should be ascribed. Are beliefs to be aligned with what we sincerely endorse or with what we do and feel? If belief doesn’t explain the discordant strains, what does? T.S. Gendler has recently attempted to explain all the discordances by introducing (...)
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  4.  27
    Natasha Alechina & Brian Logan (2010). Belief Ascription Under Bounded Resources. Synthese 173 (2):179 - 197.
    There exists a considerable body of work on epistemic logics for resource-bounded reasoners. In this paper, we concentrate on a less studied aspect of resource-bounded reasoning, namely, on the ascription of beliefs and inference rules by the agents to each other. We present a formal model of a system of bounded reasoners which reason about each other’s beliefs, and investigate the problem of belief ascription in a resource-bounded setting. We show that for agents whose computational resources and memory (...)
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  5.  28
    Karolina Krzyżanowska (2013). Belief Ascription and the Ramsey Test. Synthese 190 (1):21-36.
    In this paper, I analyse a finding by Riggs and colleagues that there is a close connection between people’s ability to reason with counterfactual conditionals and their capacity to attribute false beliefs to others. The result indicates that both processes may be governed by one cognitive mechanism, though false belief attribution seems to be slightly more cognitively demanding. Given that the common denominator for both processes is suggested to be a form of the Ramsey test, I investigate whether Stalnaker’s semantic (...)
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  6.  3
    Dale Jacquette (forthcoming). Semantics and Pragmatics of Referentially Transparent and Referentially Opaque Belief Ascription Sentences. Philosophia:1-23.
    This essay takes a critical look at Jonathan Berg’s theory of direct belief. Berg’s analysis of the concept of direct belief is considered insightful, but doubts are raised concerning his generalization of the purely extensional truth conditional semantics of direct belief ascription sentences to the truth conditional semantics of all belief ascription sentences. Difficulties are posed that Berg does not discuss, but that are implied by the proposal that the truth conditional semantics of belief ascription sentences generally (...)
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  7.  39
    David R. Olson (2007). Self-Ascription of Intention: Responsibility, Obligation and Self-Control. Synthese 159 (2):297 - 314.
    In the late preschool years children acquire a "theory of mind", the ability to ascribe intentional states, including beliefs, desires and intentions, to themselves and others. In this paper I trace how children's ability to ascribe intentions is derived from parental attempts to hold them responsible for their talk and action, that is, the attempt to have their behavior meet a normative standard or rule. Self-control is children's developing ability to take on or accept responsibility, that is, the ability to (...)
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  8. James M. Dow, Shoegenstein on Self-Ascription, Immunity to Error and I-as-Subject.
    Contemporary accounts of the self-ascription of experiences are wedded to two basic dogmas. The first is that self-ascription is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM). The second dogma is that there is distinction between awareness of oneself qua subject and awareness of oneself qua object (the SCS/SCO distinction). In this paper, I urge that these dogmas are groundless. First, I illustrate that claims about immunity to error through misidentification are usually based upon claims (...)
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  9. Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly, Is Goal Ascription Possible in Minimal Mindreading?
    In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.
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  10.  81
    Sanford C. Goldberg (1997). Self‐Ascription, Self‐Knowledge, and the Memory Argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-219.
    is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as.
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  11.  18
    Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Belief Ascription and the Illusion of Depth. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):183-201.
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  12.  24
    Michael Devitt (1984). Thoughts and Their Ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
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  13. M. Frank (1995). Mental Familiarity and Epistemic Self-Ascription. Common Knowledge 4:30--50.
  14.  15
    Bradley Franks (1992). Realism and Folk Psychology in the Ascription of Concepts. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390.
    This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The (...)
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  15. George Graham (2004). Self-Ascription: Thought Insertion. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford University Press 89.
  16. Nick Chater & Martin J. Pickering (2003). Two Realms of Mental Life: The Non-Overlap of Belief Ascription and the Scientific Study of Mind and Behavior. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):335-353.
     
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  17.  4
    Mitchell Ginsberg (1972). Mind And Belief: Psychological Ascription And The Concept Of Belief. Ny: Humanities Press.
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  18.  7
    Mark Coeckelbergh (2012). Growing Moral Relations: Critique of Moral Status Ascription. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction - The Problem of Moral Status -- PART I: MORAL ONTOLOGIES: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO RELATIONAL DOGMAS -- Individual Properties -- Appearance and Virtue -- Relations: Communitarian and Metaphysical -- Relations: Natural and Social -- Relations: Hybrid and Environmental -- Conclusion Part I: Diogenes's Challenge -- PART II: MORAL STATUS ASCRIPTION AND ITS CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY: A TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT -- Words and Sentences: Forms of Language Use -- Societies and Cultures (1): Forms (...)
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  19. Dilip Ninan (2010). De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):551-567.
    This paper concerns two points of intersection between de se attitudes and the study of natural language: attitude ascription and communication. I first survey some recent work on the semantics of de se attitude ascriptions, with particular attention to ascriptions that are true only if the subject of the ascription has the appropriate de se attitude. I then examine – and attempt to solve – some problems concerning the role of de se attitudes in linguistic communication.
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  20.  4
    Dingmar van Eck & Erik Weber (2014). Function Ascription and Explanation: Elaborating an Explanatory Utility Desideratum for Ascriptions of Technical Functions. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1367-1389.
    Current philosophical theorizing about technical functions is mainly focused on specifying conditions under which agents are justified in ascribing functions to technical artifacts. Yet, assessing the precise explanatory relevance of such function ascriptions is, by and large, a neglected topic in the philosophy of technical artifacts and technical functions. We assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions in the following three explanation-seeking contexts: why was artifact x produced?, why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to ϕ?, (...)
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  21.  72
    David Liebesman (2015). Predication as Ascription. Mind 124 (494):517-569.
    I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for predication. The condition is that a term or term-occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its designatum, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favour the ascription view. I then develop the view and elicit a number of its virtues.
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  22.  4
    Marjorie McShane (2014). Parameterizing Mental Model Ascription Across Intelligent Agents. Interaction Studies 15 (3):404-425.
    Mental model ascription – also called mindreading – is the process of inferring the mental states of others, which happens as a matter of course in social interactions. But although ubiquitous, mindreading is presumably a highly variable process: people mindread to different extents and with _different results._ We hypothesize that human mindreading ability relies on a large number of personal and contextual features: the inherent abilities of specific individuals, their current physical and mental states, their knowledge of the domain (...)
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  23.  64
    Richard Holton (forthcoming). Primitive Self-Ascription: Lewis on the De Se. In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell
    There are two parts to Lewis's account of the de se. First there is the idea that the objects of de se thought (and, by extension of de dicto thought too) are properties, not propositions. This is the idea that is center-stage in Lewis's discussion. Second there is the idea that the relation that thinkers bear to these properties is that of self-ascription. It is crucial to LewisÕs account that this is understood as a fundamental, unanalyzable, notion: self-ascription (...)
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  24.  37
    David Hunter (2011). Belief Ascription and Context Dependence. Philosophy Compass 6 (12):902-911.
    This article considers the question whether belief ascriptions exhibit context dependence. I first distinguish two potential forms of context dependence in belief ascription. Propositional context dependence concerns what the subject believes, whereas attitudinal context dependence concerns what it is to believe a proposition. I then discuss three potential sources of PCD and two potential sources of ACD. Given the nature of this article, my discussion will provide only an overview of these various forms and sources of context dependence. Along (...)
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  25.  22
    James Russell (2007). Controlling Core Knowledge: Conditions for the Ascription of Intentional States to Self and Others by Children. Synthese 159 (2):167 - 196.
    The ascription of intentional states to the self involves knowledge, or at least claims to knowledge. Armed with the working definition of knowledge as 'the ability to do things, or refrain from doing things, or believe, or want, or doubt things, for reasons that are facts' [Hyman, J. Philos. Quart. 49:432—451], I sketch a simple competence model of acting and believing from knowledge and when knowledge is defeated by un-experienced changes of state. The model takes the form of three (...)
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  26.  86
    Stephan Torre (2010). Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
    I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two (...)
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  27.  47
    Mitchell S. Green (1999). Attitude Ascription's Affinity to Measurement. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.
    The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate (...)
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  28.  26
    Nancy S. Jecker (1987). The Ascription of Rights in Wrongful Life Suits. Law and Philosophy 6 (2):149-165.
    Wrongful life is an action brought by a defective child who sues to recover for pecuniary or emotional damages suffered as a result of being conceived or born with deformities. In such cases, plaintiff alleges that the negligence of a responsible third party,1 such as physician, hospital, or medical laboratory, is the proximate cause of plaintiff's being born or conceived and thus being compelled to suffer the debilitating effects of a deformity. The child does not sue to recover for the (...)
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  29. Daniel Wegner, On the Feeling of Doing: Dysphoria and the Implicit Modulation of Authorship Ascription.
    The experience of authorship arises when we feel that observed effects (e.g., the onset of a light) are caused by our own actions (e.g., pushing a switch). This study tested whether dysphoric persons’ authorship ascription can be modulated implicitly in a situation in which the exclusivity of the cause of effects is ambiguous. In line with the idea that depressed individuals’ self-schemata include general views of uncontrollability, in a subliminal priming task we observed that dysphoric (compared with nondysphoric) participants (...)
     
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  30.  6
    Stuart Silvers (1989). Representational Capacity, Intentional Ascription, and the Slippery Slope. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):463-473.
    A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor (1986) suggests, if the objection holds, we should have no good reason for withholding (...)
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  31. Andrew J. Pierce (2012). Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription. Lexington Books.
    Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription argues that groups have an irreducibly collective right to determine the meaning of their shared group identity, and that such a right is especially important for historically oppressed groups. It provides a novel approach to issues of identity politics, group rights, and racial identity, one which combines and develops the insights of contemporary critical theory and race theory, and will thus be of special interest to scholars in these fields.
     
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  32. Andrew J. Pierce (2013). Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription. Lexington Books.
    Collective Identity, Oppression, and the Right to Self-Ascription argues that groups have an irreducibly collective right to determine the meaning of their shared group identity, and that such a right is especially important for historically oppressed groups. It provides a novel approach to issues of identity politics, group rights, and racial identity, one which combines and develops the insights of contemporary critical theory and race theory, and will thus be of special interest to scholars in these fields.
     
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  33.  4
    Elisa Back & Ian A. Apperly (2010). Two Sources of Evidence on the Non-Automaticity of True and False Belief Ascription. Cognition 115 (1):54-70.
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  34. Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2007). An Anomaly in Intentional Action Ascription: More Evidence of Folk Diversity. In Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society.
  35. Stephen Schiffer (1992). Belief Ascription. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.
  36. Stephen P. Stich (1982). On the Ascription of Content. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press
     
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  37. Johannes Haag (2010). Personhood, Bodily Self-Ascription, and Resurrection: An Kantian Approach. In Gasser G. (ed.), Personal Identity ans Resurrection. How do we survive our death. Ashgate 127-143.
  38. Andreas Kemmerling (2006). Kripke's Principle of Disquotation and the Epistemology of Belief Ascription. Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):119-143.
    among philosophers and therefore a short reminder will do. Pierre was a normal speaker of French, before he moved to London and learnt English without ever using any dictionary or similar devices. During his time in France he had heard about London, and because of what he..
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  39. David J. Chalmers (1993). Self-Ascription Without Qualia: A Case-Study. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.
    In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to (...)
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  40. Marjorie McShane (2014). Parameterizing Mental Model Ascription Across Intelligent Agents. Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 15 (3):404-425.
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  41.  10
    Marcel Scheele (2006). Function and Use of Technical Artefacts: Social Conditions of Function Ascription. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):23-36.
    It is argued that we cannot understand the notion of proper functions of artefacts independently of social notions. Functions of artefacts are related to social facts via the use of artefacts. The arguments in this article can be used to improve existing function theories that look to the causal history of artefacts to determine the function. A view that takes the intentions of designers into account to determine the proper function is both natural and often correct, but it is shown (...)
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  42.  9
    Pierre Jacob (2013). How From Action-Mirroring to Intention-Ascription? Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):1132-1141.
  43.  2
    William S. Robinson (1985). "Intentionality, Ascription, and Understanding: Remarks on Professor Hocutt's" Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms". Behaviorism 13 (2):157-162.
  44.  67
    Jennifer M. Saul (1998). The Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):363-389.
  45. H. L. A. Hart (1951). The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights. In Gilbert Ryle & Antony Flew (eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. B. Blackwell 171 - 194.
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  46. Kim Davies (1982). Intentionality: Spontaneous Ascription and Deep Intuition. Analysis 42 (June):169-171.
  47.  47
    Theodore Sider (1995). Three Problems for Richard's Theory of Belief Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):487 - 513.
    Some contemporary Russellians, defenders of the view that the semantic content of a proper name, demonstrative or indexical is simply its referent, are prepared to accept that view’s most infamous apparent consequence: that coreferential names, demonstratives, indexicals, etc. are intersubstitutable salva veritate, even in intentional contexts. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames argue that our recalcitrant intuitions with respect to the famous apparent counterexamples are not semantic intuitions, but rather pragmatic intuitions. Strictly and literally speaking, Lois Lane believes, and even knows (...)
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  48.  40
    Stephen Mumford (1999). Intentionality and the Physical: A New Theory of Disposition Ascription. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):215-25.
    This paper has three aims. First, I aim to stress the importance of the issue of the dispositional/categorical distinction in the light of the evident failure of the traditional formulation, which is in terms of conditional entailment. Second, I consider one radical new alternative on offer from Ullin Place: intentionality as the mark of the dispositional. I explain the appeal of physical intentionality, but show it ultimately to be unacceptable. Finally, I suggest what would be a better theory. If we (...)
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  49.  26
    Quassim Cassam (1995). Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press 311--336.
  50. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, or other intentional (...)
     
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