Este artículo tiene por objetivo ampliar la reflexión crítica sobre el ocio y la interculturalidad en América Latina. La discusión fue basada en una investigación bibliográfica y tiene como telón de fondo el repensar la modernidad, la ideología de progreso y las dicotomías que limitan las concepciones de ser humano y de mundo. El texto propone, además, discutir el potencial del ocio para enriquecer las prácticas educativas a partir de distintos lenguajes, teniendo en vista el caminar en dirección de una (...) educación intercultural que sea también problematizadora, crítica y transformadora. En cuanto una dimensión de la cultura, el ocio puede ser un tiempo/espacio social de resignificación y empoderamiento, contribuir para agudizar sensibilidades y ayudar a la comprensión de los contextos latinoamericanos en la perspectiva de la interculturalidad, estimulando el pensamiento crítico sobre las sociedades para la transformación social en búsqueda de un mundo más humano y solidario. (shrink)

Los vínculos sociales históricamente construidos entre trabajo, tiempo libre y ocio vienen, desde el final del siglo XIX, estimulando estudios y reflexiones por parte de algunos autores, siendo las investigaciones y pesquisas intensificadas con el paso del siglo XX, evidenciando que el asunto tiene gran complejidad y dinamismo. Así, este artículo tiene como objetivo comprender algunas dimensiones de las temáticas de trabajo, tiempo libre y ocio en la contemporaneidad, destacando algunas de las contradicciones y desafíos verificados en nuestra sociedad. Para (...) contextualizar la discusión, el texto empieza con una relectura del pensamiento de algunos autores que analizan la categoría trabajo. En seguida, cuestiona la tesis de que el tiempo libre está siendo progresivamente ampliado, propone repensar la cuestión de la centralidad del trabajo en la sociedad actual y del papel que el ocio logra desarrollar en nuestra vida social. Estas discusiones son consideradas importantes para la comprensión de las relaciones entre trabajo, tiempo libre y ocio en nuestro contexto, especialmente en las sociedades latinoamericanas de hoy. (shrink)

This article was compiled from a bibliographic review and aims to: analyze what a concept is; present the two main approaches by which leisure and recreation are understood in Latin America, expanding thus the possibilities for new meanings to these concepts; and discuss the alternatives that these concepts -from a new perspective- can provide to the construction of participative, solidary and sustainable societies. In conclusion, it's emphasized that most of the concepts of leisure and recreation widespread in Latin America , (...) were formulated in other contexts, showing to be insufficient and inappropriate to the problems, contradictions and potentialities of this region. That is why they need new approaches and resignificances. Understanding leisure as a dimension of culture outlines the need to promote a critical/creative education by and for a non-hegemonic leisure, which rescues and appreciates cultural diversity as one of the key elements for social transformation. (shrink)

Este libro registra, sistematiza, difunde y amplía el intercambio de experiencias sobre el tiempo libre, el ocio y la recreación, en América Latina. Ha sido elaborado en Brasil en colaboración con Colombia y Chile, países donde diversas personas e instituciones actuales aúnan esfuerzos en el sentido de fomentar los diálogos, incentivar estudios, compartir conocimientos y prácticas socioculturales sobre el tiempo libre, el ocio y la recreación en el contexto latinoamericano.Presenta la realid..

La co-autora del libro es Post-doctora en Ciencias Sociales por la Universidad Nacional de Cuyo/Argentina, Doctora en Educación, Magister en Ciencias del Deporte y Especialista en Lazer (Ocio) por la Universidad Federal de Minas Gerais de Brasil (UFMG). El co-autor es Post-doctorando en Geografía Humana en la UFMG, Doctor y Magister en Educación con mención en Aprendizaje Transformacional por la Universidad Bolivariana de Chile (UB), Especialista en Educación Ambiental, Globalización y Desarr..

Big, stomping elephants. Small, colorful birds. Tall, spotted giraffes. Short, waddling penguins. Opposites are all around at the zoo! This picture book brings opposites from the zoo to young children with interactive, rhyming text and bright photographs.

James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests (...) an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary. (shrink)

Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...) perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The resultant view is middle way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant, holding that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding. (shrink)

For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a (...) question about the pure forms of the understanding. Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? We argue that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions and examine whether Kant thinks that the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected constraints. The result would be an important difference between what Kant says about discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility and what he is in a position to say about discursive cognizers with other forms of understanding. Kantian humility here takes on a distinctive character. (shrink)

An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...) for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness. (shrink)

Libet's (2000) arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review (Gomes, 2008) do not suffer with his new statements.

Seven informants , aged between 32 and 42, who had experienced at least one career change in their lives were interviewed about the history of their career trajectories. The interviews were analyzed according to the systematic and systemic reflexivity proposed by the phenomenological tradition: description, reduction and interpretation. The findings point to the need for professional guidance practice giving attention not only to professional information but also to a reflection of individual and work-related values. This would help both young people (...) and adults to see their own objectives more clearly and to be capable of formulating their own career plans and following them through. (shrink)

Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in (...) all cases. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott, we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead than (...) to PVS patients. There is no reason to think that people perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.

1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological (...) facts compatible with the belief that free will determines our voluntary acts? What is the role of consciousness in voluntary action? In this paper I will discuss these questions and the answers that Libet gave to them. (shrink)

John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.

Resumo Palavras-chave Keywords : Narrative production. Authorship. Language. Memory. Identity. : This article comprises a detailed report on a project of narrative production, which is being conducted, every semester, with students entering the Languages course, on the Portuguese Language subject.The project consists of a process of production, reading, and rewriting of small narratives, which, at the end of the term, are gathered and organized by each student in order to assemble their own book craftily. The proposal came forth as a (...) strategy to try to solve problems related to the little familiarity with writing and to the lack of authorship marks. The engagement in the production of contextualized and guided narratives for a determined purpose has disclosed, at the end of each semester, similar results: pleasure to write, read and expose the produced texts for group discussions; concern with the interlocutor; presence of authorship marks; perception of discursive qualities on the text itself and on the text of others; concern with the adequacy of the writing to linguistic conventions; confidence on the writing process; perception of oneself as part of a history and as a result of multiple intersubjectivities; praise of one’s own life history and of one’s ancestors. The project finds itself based on enunciation theories. : Produção de narrativa. Autoria. Linguagem. Memória. Identidade. : Este artigo constitui-se do relato de um projeto de produção de narrativa que vem sendo desenvolvido, semestralmente, com alunos ingressantes no curso de Letras, na disciplina de Língua Portuguesa. O projeto consiste em um processo de produção, leitura e reescritura de pequenas narrativas com as quais, ao fim do semestre, cada aluno organiza e confecciona artesanalmente o seu próprio livro. A proposta surgiu como estratégia para tentar solucionar problemas relacionados à pouca familiaridade com a escrita e à ausência de marcas de autoria. O enfoque na produção de narrativas contextualizadas e orientadas para um determinado fim tem revelado, no fim de cada semestre, resultados semelhantes: prazer de escrever, de ler e de submeter à discussão do grupo os textos produzidos; preocupação com o interlocutor; presença de marcas de autoria; percepção de qualidades discursivas no próprio texto e no texto do outro; preocupação com a adequação da escrita às convenções linguísticas; segurança em relação à escrita; percepção de si como parte de uma história e como fruto de intersubjetividades múltiplas; valorização da própria história de vida e da de seus antepassados. O trabalho encontra suporte em teorias da linguística da enunciação. (shrink)

Este ensaio aborda o conceito de amizade em Kant, e procura relacioná-lo com amoral, o direito e a política kantianos. Como forma de introduzir a temática, começa otexto com uma abordagem do conceito e dos tipos de amizade apresentados por Aristóteles.Após isso, aborda o conceito e os tipos de amizade apresentados por Kant, tanto naDoutrina da Virtude (A Metafísica dos Costumes) quanto nas Preleções sobre Ética. O textotrata então dos problemas e das vantagens que o conceito kantiano de amizade representa,para, (...) por fim, procurar, sob inspiração de Aristóteles, aproximar a temática da amizadeem Kant de suas filosofias moral, jurídica e política. (shrink)

Can the experience of great art play a role in our coming to understand the ethical framework of another person? In this article I draw out three themes from Iris Murdoch’s ‘The Sovereignty of Good’ in order to show the role that communal attention to works of art can play in our ethical lives. I situate this role in the context of Murdoch’s wider philosophical views.

In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...) if we are to self-ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity. (shrink)

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full (...) resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character. (shrink)

We review three broadly geometrodynamical---and in part, Machian or relational---projects, from the perspective of spacetime functionalism. We show how all three are examples of functionalist reduction of the type that was advocated by D. Lewis, and nowadays goes by the label `the Canberra Plan’. The projects are: the recovery of geometrodynamics by Hojman et al. ; the programme of Schuller and collaborators to deduce a metric from the physics of matter fields; the deduction of the ADM Hamiltonian by Gomes (...) and Shyam. We end by drawing a positive corollary about shape dynamics: namely, it has a good rationale for the Hamiltonian it postulates. (shrink)

In the essays which make up The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch gives us a picture of moral life in which ‘the metaphor of vision [is] almost irresistibly suggested’. This chapter aims to clarify the role played by the metaphor of vision in Murdoch’s philosophical thinking. I’ll examine two different things which might be meant by the term ‘moral vision’: vision of moral things or vision which is itself moral. The suggestion will be that whilst both capture something important about (...) Murdoch’s work, each may mislead about what is distinctive in her views. For Murdoch, I shall suggest, there is no distinctively moral vision. There is only vision: a loving gaze directed upon the reality of others. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether 'even if A, B' is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive conditional may have 'even if', and whether concessive conditionals, pragmatically defined, can fail to have 'even if' or a non-temporal 'still'. Different paraphrases are used to help elucidate pragmatic meanings. A theory of the pragmatic meanings of concessive and implicative conditionals is presented. The semantic meaning of 'even if' and the question of whether concessive conditionals imply the truth of their consequents are also discussed.

In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.

Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an answer to Hume’s problem (...) about our entitlement to use a priori concepts when thinking about the objects of empirical intuition. If the Deduction is to provide a response to Hume, Allais’s interpretation must be rejected. (shrink)

A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...) favored, but her explanation of peripheral–lemniscal couplings is found to be unconvincing. Trevena and Miller's article unsuccessfully tries to rescue a dualist interactionist view. Libet's method of timing intentions is thoroughly criticized. (shrink)

Anil Gomes considers Murdoch's view that morality is real and that, with the right conceptual resources, we can perceive it.

ABSTRACT The paper details Heidegger’s phenomenological exam of religious consciousness. In The Phenomenology of Religious Life, the Heideggerian analysis of the Pauline Epistles serves, above all, as a way to demonstrate the proper use of the phenomenological method. In this case, Heidegger clarifes the primordial characteristics of religious life by detailing Paul of Tarsus’s existential stance. Therefore, we explain the Heideggerian methodological stance regarding the study of religion and demonstrate that the phenomenological description of the Christian mystical-religious experience serves as (...) a crucial moment in Heidegger’s philosophy because it precedes that which is found in Being and Time (1927). (shrink)

It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed (...) in the contrapositive without them. A distinction is made between adding new meaning and adding new words to preserve existing meaning. For concessive conditionals and relevance conditionals, however, no valid contrapositive can be found. They do not belong to the class of contraposable conditionals, which can be independently defined. Difficult cases are also discussed in which the contradictory of the consequent semantically entails the truth of the antecedent. In such cases the content of the antecedent is implicit in the meaning of the consequent. Contraposition becomes possible if what is implicit in the original consequent is made explicit in the contrapositive antecedent. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.

Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.

What is the status of the claims which make up Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason? This question seemed to Kant’s contemporaries to require a metacritique. Strawson’s criticisms of Kant should be understood in this context: as raising a metacritical challenge about Kant’s grounds for the claims which make up his arguments. What about the claims which make up Strawson’s own arguments in The Bounds of Sense? I argue in this chapter, against what I take to be the (...) general consensus, that Strawson did not and should not have understood these claims to be analytic. Rather he is somewhat puzzlingly committed to our possessing non-analytic but still a priori knowledge of his claims. What could such knowledge consist in? I’ll extract from G.E. Moore’s early writings on Kant a model for understanding such knowledge, one which enables us to better appreciate the way in which Strawson’s methodology dovetails with Kant’s own. (shrink)

The eliminative view of gauge degrees of freedom—the view that they arise solely from descriptive redundancy and are therefore eliminable from the theory—is a lively topic of debate in the philosophy of physics. Recent work attempts to leverage properties of the QCD $$\theta _{\text {YM}}$$ θ YM -term to provide a novel argument against the eliminative view. The argument is based on the claim that the QCD $$\theta _{\text {YM}}$$ θ YM -term changes under “large” gauge transformations. Here we review (...) geometrical propositions about fiber bundles that unequivocally falsify these claims: the $$\theta _{\text {YM}}$$ θ YM -term encodes topological features of the fiber bundle used to represent gauge degrees of freedom, but it is fully gauge-invariant. Nonetheless, within the essentially classical viewpoint pursued here, the physical role of the $$\theta _{\text {YM}}$$ θ YM -term shows the physical importance of bundle topology (or superpositions thereof) and thus counts against (a naive) eliminativism. (shrink)

Peter Goldie has argued for a virtue theory of art, analogous to a virtue theory of ethics, one in which the skills and dispositions involved in the production and appreciation of art are virtues and not simply mere skills. In this note I highlight a link between the appreciation of art and its production, and explore the implications of such a link for a virtue theory of art.

In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.

O presente ensaio visa apresentar de forma breve e modesta uma introdução à filosofia da mente, deste modo, abordaremos os seguintes tópicos: I) a relevância e a contribuição do dualismo para a filosofia da mente, posteriormente surgindo a reflexão sobre mente-cérebro; e, finalmente, II) o argumento do zumbi filosófico. A partir desta apresentação conclui-se que os tópicos levantados sobre a relevância do dualismo para a filosofia da mente e debate em torno do argumento do zumbi filosófico contribua para a inquietação (...) e investigação sobre a mente. (shrink)

Barbour’s interpretation of Mach’s principle led him to postulate that gravity should be formulated as a dynamical theory of spatial conformal geometry, or in his terminology, “shapes.” Recently, it was shown that the dynamics of General Relativity can indeed be formulated as the dynamics of shapes. This new Shape Dynamics theory, unlike earlier proposals by Barbour and his collaborators, implements local spatial conformal invariance as a gauge symmetry that replaces refoliation invariance in General Relativity. It is the purpose of this (...) paper to answer frequent questions about (new) Shape Dynamics, such as its relation to Poincaré invariance, General Relativity, Constant Mean (extrinsic) Curvature gauge, earlier Shape Dynamics, and finally the conformal approach to the initial value problem of General Relativity. Some of these relations can be clarified by considering a simple model: free electrodynamics and its dual shift symmetric formulation. This model also serves as an example where symmetry trading is used for usual gauge theories. (shrink)

What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can avoid (...) this dilemma only if it commits to our possessing a capacity for imaginative reflection, one which is capable of identifying certain formal properties of experience.This result indicates some of the commitments which must be made if transcendental arguments are to be used in the philosophy of perception, and it has implications for those views that take the philosophy of perception to be autonomous of the empirical science of perception. (shrink)

A theory of necessary and sufficient conditions is presented, as well as a theory of necessary and sufficient causes and effects, viewed as a particular case of the former. Ambiguities of the terms 'condition' and 'necessary condition' are explored, and a neutral meaning for 'condition' is favoured. The relation between necessary and sufficient conditions and implicative conditionals (including counterfactuals) is also discussed. Two problems of counterfactual theories of causal explanation are indicated, concerning (i) how to account for causes that are (...) not necessary and (ii) how to interpret the counterfactual from the negation of the effect to the negation of the cause. Application of the theory of necessary and sufficient conditions to Euler’s explanation of the Königsberg bridge problem is discussed. The theory of necessary and sufficient causes and effects is then applied to the flagpole shadow explanation and to two biological explanations, one involving a sufficient but not necessary cause and the other a necessary but not sufficient cause. Causes that are neither sufficient nor necessary are also recognized. Finally, a probabilistic approach to causes that are either not sufficient or not necessary is explored, including its application to examples of such cases. (shrink)

A commentary is given on Trevena and Miller . The comparability of their experimental task and of the potential they recorded with those used and recorded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl is questioned. An interpretation is given for the similarity of event-related potentials recorded when subjects decided to move and when they decided not to move.

Resumo: O artigo enfoca duas questões abordadas pelo transhumanismo: imortalidade e longevidade. A primeira parte apresenta alguns contornos do programa transhumanista e a sua motivação. A segunda discute até que ponto a promessa de imortalidade não pode ser cumprida pela ideia de fazer o upload do cérebro na internet. A terceira parte se concentra na longevidade e mostra por que o programa transhumanista para idosos falha. Palavras-chave: Transhumanismo. Imortalidade. Longevidade. Upload de cérebro na internet.

Hodgson’s (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12 (1), 2005) defense of the plain person’s view that free will exists in conscious voluntary action is discussed. His position against the view that human action is automatically determined is favored, but his view that free will is incompatible with natural causation is countered. Eccles’ hypothesis to account for the presence of a readiness potential prior to a conscious decision to act now is discussed. It is argued that it is possible to preserve what (...) is good in a plain person’s concept of free will in a way that is compatible with natural causation. (shrink)