Ethical questions have traditionally been approached through conceptual analysis. Inspired by the rapid advance of modern brain imaging techniques, however, some ethical questions appear in a new light. For example, hotly debated trolley dilemmas have recently been studied by psychologists and neuroscientists alike, arguing that their findings can support or debunk moral intuitions that underlie those dilemmas. Resulting from the wedding of philosophy and neuroscience, neuroethics has emerged as a novel interdisciplinary field that aims at drawing conclusive relationships between neuroscientific (...) observations and normative ethics. A major goal of neuroethics is to derive normative ethical conclusions from the investigation of neural and psychological mechanisms underlying ethical theories, as well as moral judgments and intuitions. The focus of this article is to shed light on the structure and functioning of neuroethical arguments of this sort, and to reveal particular methodological challenges that lie concealed therein. We discuss the methodological problem of how one can—or, as the case may be, cannot—validly infer normative conclusions from neuroscientific observations. Moreover, we raise the issue of how preexisting normative ethical convictions threaten to invalidate the interpretation of neuroscientific data, and thus arrive at question-begging conclusions. Nonetheless, this is not to deny that current neuroethics rightly presumes that moral considerations about actual human lives demand empirically substantiated answers. Therefore, in conclusion, we offer some preliminary reflections on how the discussed methodological challenges can be met. (shrink)

Psychiatry as a discipline oscillates between the language of emotions and that of biology; ranging from the immersion into the subjective experience of another person to the objective approach of biomedical science. The tension between these different approaches may seem irreconcilable and confusing to some. This was not the case for Karl Jaspers who pioneered a systematic reflection on the concepts underlying psychiatric theory and practice. In this essay, we engage with Jaspers' thinking and create a dialogue with contemporary psychiatric (...) research and philosophy of mind. Jaspers' conception of erklären and verstehen and his position on research in the neuroscience of mental disorders is brought together with the thought of Thomas Nagel and John Searle. We argue for the compatibility of Jaspers' ideas with Nagel's and Searle's views on the mind/body problem. Furthermore, we look at current trends in biological research in psychiatry through the lens of Jaspers' General Psychopathology, from there we derive suggestions and insights for psychiatric theory and practice. (shrink)

Schizophrenia is a disturbance of the self, of which the attribution of agency is a major component. In this article, we review current theories of the Sense of Agency, their relevance to schizophrenia, and propose a novel framework for future research. We explore some of the models of agency, in which both bottom-up and top-down processes are implicated in the genesis of agency. We further this line of inquiry by suggesting that ongoing neurological activity (the brain’s resting state) in self-referential (...) regions of the brain can provide a deeper level of influence beyond what the current models capture. Based on neuroimaging studies, we suggest that aberrant activity in regions such as the default mode network of individuals with schizophrenia can lead to a misattribution of internally/externally generated stimuli. This can result in symptoms such as thought insertion and delusions of control. Consequently, neuroimaging can contribute to a more comprehensive conceptualization and measurement of agency and potential treatment implications. (shrink)

La Seconde Guerre mondiale venait à peine de s'achever quand le hasard fit de Frédéric de Towarnicki le premier visiteur de Heidegger dans l'Allemagne ne cendres, verrouillée de toute part. Quel " coup de dés " l'avait donc conduit dans Fribourg en ruine, à la recherche de ce philosophe dont on ne savait rien depuis des années? Le récit insolite, parfois drôle, de ses rencontres avec Heidegger dans sa maison de Zähringen ou sur les routes de la Forêt-Noire est (...) suivi de vingt-trois conversations avec Jean Beaufret qui fut, durant plus de trente ans, l'ami et l'interlocuteur du penseur le plus audacieux et le plus attaqué de notre temps. La passion qui anime ce livre pourrait bien, au-delà des polémiques, révéler au lecteur la surprenante simplicité à laquelle aboutissent les méditations de Heidegger. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIII, Number 1, April 1997, pp. 133-152 Hume and the 1763 Edition of His History of England: His Frame of Mind as a Revisionist FREDERIC L. VAN HOLTHOON A Quotation, and Three Questions I suppose you will not find one book in the English Language of that Size and Price so ill printed, and now since the publication of the Quarto, however small the sale of (...) the Quarto may be, it shows, by its corrections and additions, the Imperfection of the 8vo so visibly, that it must be totally discredited. (HL II 228)1 Question 1. Hume was referring to the 1763 octavo edition of his History of England. It was the first complete edition of the History to be published as a set. Why did he consider it such an "abominable" edition as he calls it in another letter? (HL II 457) Question 2. The quotation given above also makes clear that the 1770 quarto edition was much better in his judgment. Better in what respect? Question 3. Hume's verdict on the 1763 edition also involves a judgment on two other editions, a quarto and an octavo edition of 1767. Both of them are "title editions" in a way I shall explain. Yet these editions contain a cancel in the part dealing with the reign of Charles II which brought forth Hume's only documentary discovery: the secret provisions of the treaty of Dover. What did Hume think of the importance of these cancels relative to the sum total of his revisions? Frederic L. van Holthoon is at the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies, University of Groningen, Groningen, 9700 AS Netherlands, email: [email protected] 134 Frederic L. Van Holthoon In answering these three questions I will allow myself one digression. In a short compass I will provide an overall view of Hume's revisionary effort concerning all editions which were published between 1754 and 1778. This description together with the three answers will give us a clue to Hume's frame of mind as a revisionist. What were his motives for changing his text throughout the editions which appeared during his lifetime and shortly thereafter? Hume and the 1763 Edition of His History of England In October 1766 Hume wrote Andrew Millar, his publisher: I shall endeavour to render the next Edition of my History as correct as possible; tho' I do not expect to see it necessary for several Years. (HL II 105-106) What Hume probably did not know was that Strahan, Millar's printer, had already printed the title pages for a quarto and octavo "edition."2 The term "edition" should be put between quotation marks for the octavo edition was made with the old sheets of the 1763 edition and the quarto set was a rejuvenation of volumes printed in 1762. And we don't know what Millar had in mind while writing to Hume on November 2,1766 that he deplored the fact that he had printed so many octavos in 1763, otherwise Hume "might have had more frequent opportunity of correction."3 Did Hume know about these "upgraded" editions or was Millar less than honest? The correspondence between Millar and Hume reveals a tug of war between the publisher who wanted Hume to continue his History and the author who was very hesitant on this point, but who otherwise was keen on having the opportunity of a new edition for the purpose of correcting his text. So Millar wrote in November 1764 that 2,000 copies of the 1763 edition had already been sold and added, "Sure this is full encouragement for you to go on" (HL II 354). When Hume discovered that he had been deceived and that either Millar had ordered more copies or had been able to sell less than he told Hume, he was mortified. Even Strahan, who became Hume's friend, saw no way to pacify him. Writing to Strahan, Hume declared that he hoped that the new edition (the octavo edition of 1773) would take away the discredit caused "by that abominable Edition, which has given you and me so much Vexation, and has been one Cause why I have thrown... (shrink)

The following text is a translation of Semyon Frank’s “L’intuition fondamentale de Bergson” published in Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits, edited by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1941. In this article, Frank addresses Bergson’s notion of intuition, his anti-intellectualism, his mysticism, his closeness to Lebensphilosophie, the notion of lived experience, the distinction between intuition as pure contemplation and intuition as living knowledge, the distinction between cognition of the atemporal essence of reality and cognition of (...) the world of becoming, pragmatism, the disinterested and open intuitive spiritual attitude vs the utilitarian attitude of social groups closed in on themselves, the transrational vs the irrational, spiritual life, psychic life, the Absolute, and the temporal flux. The article contains criticisms of Bergson on the issues of time and intuition: the durée, the intuitive time, is incomprehensible without an atemporal foundation. Therefore, according to Frank, Plato was correct—contra Bergson—to define time as the moving image of eternity. And, if there is such an atemporal foundation, then, contrary to what Bergson seems to think, intuition as living knowledge cannot be the sole mode of intuition. Moreover, unlike what Bergson appears to think, an intuition of the Absolute would be an intuition of the transrational rather than of the irrational. The translation is preceded by an introduction tracing the genesis of the article, which was commissioned by the Swiss philosopher Pierre Thévenaz. (shrink)

Although an invasive medical intervention, Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) has been regarded as an efficient and safe treatment of Parkinson’s disease for the last 20 years. In terms of clinical ethics, it is worth asking whether the use of DBS may have unanticipated negative effects similar to those associated with other types of psychosurgery. Clinical studies of epileptic patients who have undergone an anterior temporal lobectomy have identified a range of side effects and complications in a number of domains: psychological, (...) behavioural, affective and social. In many cases, patients express difficulty adjusting from being chronically ill to their new status as ‘treated’ or ‘seizure free’. This postoperative response adjustment has been described in the literature on epilepsy as the ‘Burden of Normality’ (BoN) syndrome. Most of the discussion about DBS postoperative changes to self is focused on abnormal side effects caused by the intervention (ie, hypersexuality, hypomania, etc). By contrast, relatively little attention is paid to the idea that successfully ‘treated’ individuals might experience difficulties in adjusting to becoming ‘normal’. The purpose of this paper is (1) to articulate the postoperative DBS psychosocial adjustment process in terms of the BoN syndrome, (2) to address whether the BoN syndrome illustrates that DBS treatment poses a threat to the patient’s identity, and (3) to examine whether the current framework for rehabilitation after DBS procedures should be updated and take into account the BoN syndrome as a postoperative self-change response. (shrink)

Following Wallace’s suggestion, Darwin framed his theory using Spencer’s expression “survival of the fittest”. Since then, fitness occupies a significant place in the conventional understanding of Darwinism, even though the explicit meaning of the term ‘fitness’ is rarely stated. In this paper I examine some of the different roles that fitness has played in the development of the theory. Whereas the meaning of fitness was originally understood in ecological terms, it took a statistical turn in terms of reproductive success throughout (...) the 20th Century. This has lead to the ever-increasing importance of sexually reproducing organisms and the populations they compose in evolutionary explanations. I will argue that, moving forward, evolutionary theory should look back at its ecological roots in order to be more inclusive in the type of systems it examines. Many biological systems can only be satisfactorily accounted for by offering a non-reproductive account of fitness. This argument will be made by examining biological systems with very small or transient population structures. I argue this has significant consequences for how we define Darwinism, increasing the significance of survival over that of reproduction. (shrink)

Ecological fitness has been suggested to provide a unifying definition of fitness. However, a metric for this notion of fitness was in most cases unavailable except by proxy with differential reproductive success. In this article, I show how differential persistence of lineages can be used as a way to assess ecological fitness. This view is inspired by a better understanding of the evolution of some clonal plants, colonial organisms, and ecosystems. Differential persistence shows the limitation of an ensemblist noncausal understanding (...) of evolution. Causal explanations are necessary to understand the evolution by natural selection of these biological systems. †To contact the author write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, P.O. Box 6128, Station Centre‐Ville, Montreal, Quebec, H3C 3J7 Canada; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

This is _the_ leading introduction 200to professional values and ethics in social work. Frederic G. Reamer provides social workers with a succinct and comprehensive overview of the most critical issues relating to professional values and ethics, including the nature of social work values, ethical dilemmas, and professional misconduct. Conceptually rich and attuned to the complexities of ethical decision making, _Social Work Values and Ethics_ is unique in striking the right balance between history, theory, and practical application. For the third edition, (...) Reamer has updated the content and strengthened the relevance of the case material. Also new to the third edition: o Discussion of the moral dialogue between practitioner and cliento Coverage of virtue ethicso Practical discussion of concepts underlying social work ethicso Expanded application of the National Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics to ethical dilemmas in the professiono A look at the historical evolution of ethical standards in social worko New vignettes, illustrating difficult ethical decisionso More guidance on informed consent and termination of serviceso Discussion questions at the end of each chaptero A section on how to conduct a social work ethics audit. (shrink)

The idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS) induces changes to personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy and self (PIAAAS) is so deeply entrenched within neuroethics discourses that it has become an unchallenged narrative. In this article, we critically assess evidence about putative effects of DBS on PIAAAS. We conducted a literature review of more than 1535 articles to investigate the prevalence of scientific evidence regarding these potential DBS-induced changes. While we observed an increase in the number of publications in theoretical neuroethics (...) that mention putative DBS-induced changes to patients’ postoperative PIAAAS, we found a critical lack of primary empirical studies corroborating these claims. Our findings strongly suggest that the theoretical neuroethics debate on putative effects of DBS relies on very limited empirical evidence and is, instead, reliant on unsubstantiated speculative assumptions probablyin lieuof robust evidence. As such, this may reflect the likelihood of a speculative neuroethics bubble that may need to be deflated. Nevertheless, despite the low number of first-hand primary studies and large number of marginal and single case reports, potential postoperative DBS changes experienced by patients remain a critical ethical concern. We recommend further empirical research in order to enhance theoretical neuroethics work in the area. In particular, we call for the development of better instruments capable of capturing potential postoperative variations of PIAAAS. (shrink)

At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...) in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness. (shrink)

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)

In this book Frederic Schick develops his challenge to standard decision theory. He argues that talk of the beliefs and desires of an agent is not sufficient to explain choices. To account for a given choice we need to take into consideration how the agent understands the problem, how he sees in a selective way the options open to him. The author applies his new logic to a host of common human predicaments. Why do people in choice experiments act so (...) often against expectations? Why do people cooperate in situations where textbook logic predicts that they won't? What exactly is weakness of will? What are people reporting when they say their lives have no meaning for them? This book questions the foundations of technical and philosophical decision theory and will appeal to all those who work in that field, be they philosophers, economists and psychologists. (shrink)

The phenomenological effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS) on the self of the patient remains poorly understood and under described in the literature, despite growing evidence that a significant number of patients experience postoperative neuropsychiatric changes. To address this lack of phenomenological evidence, we conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews with 17 patients with Parkinson's disease who had undergone DBS. Exploring the subjective character specific to patients' experience of being implanted gives empirical and conceptual understanding of the potential phenomenon of DBS-induced self-estrangement. (...) Our study concluded that (1) the more patients preoperatively felt alienated by their illness, the more they experienced postoperative self-estrangement, and (2) the notion of self-estrangement seems to exist in association with certain common qualitative characters, namely, loss of control, which reflects a deteriorative estrangement, and distorted perception of capacities, which reveals a restorative estrangement. These findings indicate that subjective self-reports help us to understand some aspects of the potential phenomenon of DBS-induced self-estrangement. (shrink)

This is an important new book about human motivation, about the reasons people have for their actions. What is distinctively new about it is its focus on how people see or understand their situations, options, and prospects. By taking account of people's understandings, Professor Schick is able to expand the current theory of decision and action. The author provides a perspective on the topic by outlining its history. He defends his new theory against criticism, considers its formal structure, and shows (...) at length how it resolves many currently debated problems: the problems of conflict and weakness of will, Allais' problem, Kahneman and Tversky's problems, Newcomb's problem, and others. The book will be of special interest to philosophers, psychologists, and economists. (shrink)

De la fin du XVIIIe siècle à 1830, l’Amérique hispanique est entrée dans l’ère des révolutions atlantiques. Sur les côtes du Venezuela, dans les années 1790, les échos des révolutions de France, de Saint-Domingue et d’autres îles des Antilles ont contribué à la floraison de révoltes et de conspirations aux mots d’ordre nouveaux. Les demandes de liberté des esclaves et d’égalité des métis s’inscrivaient désormais dans un nouvel horizon d’attente révolutionnaire. Cependant, la monarchie hispanique était toujours capable de mobiliser des (...) troupes pour défendre l’ordre établi. À partir de 1806, le Vénézuélien Francisco de Miranda, ancien général de la Révolution française, tenta de coordonner, d’abord sans succès, les efforts des premiers indépendantistes. La première indépendance fut proclamée à Caracas en 1811 dans un contexte de dislocation de la monarchie hispanique, à la suite de l’invasion des troupes napoléoniennes et des conflits entre péninsulaires et hispano-américains. Les patriotes proclamèrent l’égalité civile en mettant fin aux catégories socio-raciales d’Ancien Régime, mais maintinrent l’esclavage. Ce n’est que progressivement qu’ils incorporèrent des esclaves aux armées en échange de la liberté. Malgré ces libérations par les armes, l’alliance avec Haïti et les tentatives de Simón Bolívar, l’indépendance ne coïncida pas avec l’abolition de l’esclavage, qui fut finalement proclamée au Venezuela en 1854. (shrink)

One of intuitions driving the acceptance of a neat structured tree of life is the assumption that organisms and the lineages they form have somewhat stable spatial and temporal boundaries. The phenomenon of symbiosis shows us that such ‘fixist’ assumptions does not correspond to how the natural world actually works. The implications of lateral gene transfer (LGT) have been discussed elsewhere; I wish to stress a related point. I will focus on lateral function transfer (LFT) and will argue, using examples (...) of what many would call ‘superorganisms’, that the emergence of symbiotic individuals revives the importance of functional and adaptationist thinking in how we conceptualize the lineages of biological individuals. The consequence of the argument is that, if we really want to hold onto tree of life thinking, we had better accept that new saplings appear and disappear all the time. (shrink)

This book is a unique introductory overview of decision theory. It is completely non-technical, without a single formula in the book. Written in a crisp and clear style it succinctly covers the full range of philosophical issues of rationality and decision theory, including game theory, social choice theory, prisoner's dilemma and much else. The book aims to expand the scope and enrich the foundations of decision theory. By addressing such issues as ambivalence, inner conflict, and the constraints imposed upon us (...) by our attachments to others, Frederic Schick reveals that our thinking is often more subtle than standard theories of rationality allow. Only a theory that respects that subtlety can illumine what is otherwise puzzling. The book contains many examples drawn from history and literature dealing with subjects such as love, war, friendship, and crime. (shrink)

The editors' main objective with this selection of texts is to show that Hermann Cohen (1842–1918) was, throughout most of his career, driven by a desire to provide an interpretation of Kant consistent with Judaism. The editors believe that, just as Moses Maimonides had combined Judaism with Aristotle in the Middle Ages, Cohen endeavored to combine it with Kant. Cohen lived his whole life as an observant Jew and, according to the editors, he always wished to synthesize Judaism and Kantianism. (...) Not only this, but the editors also claim that Cohen held that Kant drew from the wellspring of Judaism and that Kant and Judaism headed in the same direction, namely, towards socialism. Moreover, since materialism and naturalism are inimical to religious Judaism, Cohen attacked them and argued that only Kantian idealism could provide the epistemological foundation that the natural sciences require. Cohen has oftentimes been approached with the assumption that his Neo-Kantianism could be understood independently of his religious faith and as if the latter had no significant implication for his philosophy. But this collection of texts demonstrates the contrary and puts to rest any interpretation of Cohen as an impartial philosopher. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to shed light on Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) postoperative suicidality risk factors within Treatment Resistant Depression (TRD) patients, in particular by focusing on the ethical concern of enrolling patient with history of self-estrangement, suicide attempts and impulsive–aggressive inclinations. In order to illustrate these ethical issues we report and review a clinical case associated with postoperative feelings of self-estrangement, self-harm behaviours and suicide attempt leading to the removal of DBS devices. Could prospectively identifying and excluding (...) patients with suicidality risk factors from DBS experimental trials—such as history of self-estrangement, suicide attempts and impulsive–aggressive inclinations—lead to minimizing the risk of suicidality harm? (shrink)

Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms emerge and why these ones in particular? Such questions belong to the ‘problem of the emergence of norms’, which consists of an inquiry into the production of norms in social collectives. I address this question through the ethnographic study of the emergence of ‘norms against violence’ in the political collective Occupy Geneva. I do this, first, empirically, with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically, by discussing my findings. In consequence (...) of two episodes categorized as sexual assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct in order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate ‘facts’ of ‘unjustified violence’. During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated and consensually adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation over the sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions. Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms prohibiting violence, allowing punishment and exclusion of wrongdoers, and prescribing collective intervention against an aggressor to neutralize the threat represented. These findings prompt me to hypothesize that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the latters’ internal structure; and that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations for this emergence. Thus, emotions allow us to answer the questions: ‘Why do norms emerge?’ and ‘Why do they have their specific forms?’ In short, I argue that social norms have emotional foundations. (shrink)