This is a draft of a chapter for the Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by David Plunkett and Tristram McPherson. I offer an overview of hybrid views in metaethics, with main focus on hybrid cognitivist views such as those defended by Daniel Boisvert and David Copp, and on hybrid expressivist views such as those defended by Michael Ridge and myself.

What if the Big Bang was an exodus of non-existing reality into existence? In this book a theory of the reality is started from the principle that 'existing takes time' but in states of the universe there are pre-things in moments, thus non-existing, which realize in strings over specific time intervals as existing phenomena. Causality must be reviewed now and new paradigms for reality follow. The existing and observed universe are discontinuous and "limits" in mathematical models do not correspond to (...) reality. New interpretations in evolution theory and the human condition are being investigated. (shrink)

A provoking new approach to how we understand metaphors thoroughly comparing and contrasting the claims made by relevance theorists and cognitive linguists. The resulting hybrid theory shows the complementarity of many positions as well as the need and possibility of achieving a broader and more realistic theory of our understanding.

This chapter surveys hybrid theories of well-being. It also discusses some criticisms, and suggests some new directions that philosophical discussion of hybrid theories might take.

ABSTRACT When does a state of affairs constitute a harm to someone? Comparative accounts say that being worse off constitutes harm. The temporal version of the comparative account is seldom taken seriously, due to apparently fatal counterexamples. I defend the temporal version against these counterexamples, and show that it is in fact more plausible than the prominent counterfactual version of the account. Non-comparative accounts say that being badly off constitutes harm. However, neither the temporal comparative account nor the non-comparative account (...) can correctly classify all harms. I argue that we should combine them into a hybrid account of harm. The hybrid account is extensionally adequate and presents a unified view on the nature of harm. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of recent ‘hybrid’ approaches to metaethics, according to which moral sentences, in some sense or other, express both beliefs and desires. I try to show what kinds of theoretical issues come up at the different choice points we encounter in developing such a view, to raise some problems and explain where they come from, and to begin to get a sense for what the payoff of such views can be, and what they will need to (...) do in order to earn that payoff. (shrink)

Hybrid languages have both modal and first-order characteristics: a Kripke semantics, and explicit variable binding apparatus. This paper motivates the development of hybrid languages, sketches their history, and examines the expressive power of three hybrid binders. We show that all three binders give rise to languages strictly weaker than the corresponding first-order language, that full first-order expressivity can be gained by adding the universal modality, and that all three binders can force the existence of infinite models and have undecidable satisfiability (...) problems. (shrink)

The theory of collective agency and intentionality is a flourishing field of research, and our understanding of these phenomena has arguably increased greatly in recent years. Extant theories, however, are still ill-equipped to explain certain aspects of collective intentionality. In this article we draw attention to two such underappreciated aspects: the failure of the intentional states of collectives to supervene on the intentional states of their members, and the role of non-human factors in collective agency and intentionality. We propose a (...) theory of collective intentionality which builds on the ‘interpretationist’ tradition in metasemantics and the philosophy of mind as initiated by David Lewis and recently developed further by Robbie Williams. The collective-level analogue of interpretationism turns out to look different in some ways from the individual-level theory, but is well-suited to accommodating phenomena such as hybrid collective intentionality. Complemented with Kit Fine’s theory of variable embodiment, such a theory also provides a diachronic account of intentional collectives. (shrink)

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of (...) moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability. (shrink)

Hybrid logics are a principled generalization of both modal logics and description logics, a standard formalism for knowledge representation. In this paper we give the first constructive version of hybrid logic, thereby showing that it is possible to hybridize constructive modal logics. Alternative systems are discussed, but we fix on a reasonable and well-motivated version of intuitionistic hybrid logic and prove essential proof-theoretical results for a natural deduction formulation of it. Our natural deduction system is also extended with additional inference (...) rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations expressed by so-called geometric theories. Thus, we give natural deduction systems in a uniform way for a wide class of constructive hybrid logics. This shows that constructive hybrid logics are a viable enterprise and opens up the way for future applications. (shrink)

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of (...) moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of “functional value,” which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being’s identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability. (shrink)

Hybrid languages are expansions of propositional modal languages which can refer to worlds. The use of strong hybrid languages dates back to at least [Pri67], but recent work has focussed on a more constrained system called $\mathscr{H}$. We show in detail that $\mathscr{H}$ is modally natural. We begin by studying its expressivity, and provide model theoretic characterizations and a syntactic characterization. The key result to emerge is that $\mathscr{H}$ corresponds to the fragment of first-order logic which is invariant for generated (...) submodels. We then show that $\mathscr{H}$ enjoys interpolation, provide counterexamples for its finite variable fragments, and show that weak interpolation holds for the sublanguage $\mathscr{H}$. Finally, we provide complexity results for $\mathscr{H}$ and other fragments and variants, and sharpen known undecidability results for $\mathscr{H}$. (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...) hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project. (shrink)

The recent resurgence of extreme-right movements and the nationalist turn of many governments across the world have reignited the relevance of discussions within educational philosophy about the teaching of national identity in schools. However, the conceptualisation of national identity in previous iterations of these debates have been largely Western and Eurocentric, making the past theoretical literature about these questions less relevant for post-colonial settings. In this paper, I imagine a new approach for teaching national identity in post- colonial contexts, founded (...) on postcolonial conceptions of identity and in particular, the concept of hybridity. I first develop a postcolonial account of national identity by drawing on Homi Bhabha’s thinking about cultural identity, drawing on his concepts of liminality, splitting, and ambivalence. Then, building on Bhabha’s notion of hybridity, I propose a distinction between national identity portrayals as either fixed or malleable. Finally, I demonstrate the implications of such a conceptual distinction on the way that national identity is taught in post-colonial schools; by way of an example, I envision a concrete approach to teaching national identity that views national identity as malleable rather than fixed, set in a hypothetical postcolonial school in the Philippines. By beginning from postcolonial assumptions about national identity, I hope to indicate new directions that the debates about the teaching of national identity in schools might proceed. (shrink)

In this paper, the authors present a presuppositional account for a class of evaluative terms that encode both a descriptive and an evaluative component: slurs and thick terms. The authors discuss several issues related to the hybrid nature of these terms, such as their projective behavior, the ways in which one may reject their evaluative content, and the ways in which evaluative content is entailed or implicated (as the case may be) by the use of such terms.

The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union is shaped by the language in which it is drafted—i.e. French. However, because French is rarely the mother tongue of those drafting that case law, the texts produced are often stilted and awkward. In addition, those drafting such case law are constrained in their use of language and style of writing. These factors have led to the development of a ‘Court French’ which necessarily shapes the case law produced (...) and has implications for its development, particularly insofar as it inevitably leads to a type of precedent in that case law. That case law also undergoes many permutations of translation into and out of up to 23 different languages. The resultant texts that make up the case law are hybrid in nature—consisting of a blend of cultural and linguistic patterns, constrained by a rigid formulistic drafting style and put through many permutations of translation. The present paper investigates the production of the Court’s multilingual case law and considers whether the hybrid nature of that case law can actually aid the presentation of a ‘uniform’ EU case law. (shrink)

The recent resurgence of extreme-right movements and the nationalist turn of many governments across the world have reignited the relevance of discussions within educational philosophy about the teaching of national identity in schools. However, the conceptualisation of national identity in previous iterations of these debates have been largely Western and Eurocentric, making the past theoretical literature about these questions less relevant for post-colonial settings. In this paper, I imagine a new approach for teaching national identity in post-colonial contexts, founded on (...) postcolonial conceptions of identity and in particular, the concept of hybridity. I first develop a postcolonial account of national identity by drawing on Homi Bhabha’s thinking about cultural identity, drawing on his concepts of liminality, splitting, and ambivalence. Then, building on Bhabha's notion of hybridity, I propose a distinction between national identity portrayals as either fixed or malleable. Finally, I demonstrate the implications of such a conceptual distinction on the way that national identity is taught in post-colonial schools; by way of an example, I envision a concrete approach to teaching national identity that views national identity as malleable rather than fixed, set in a hypothetical postcolonial school in the Philippines. By beginning from postcolonial assumptions about national identity, I hope to indicate new directions that the debates about the teaching of national identity in schools might proceed. (shrink)

: In recent literature supporting a hybrid view between metaethical cognitivism and noncognitivist expressivism, much has been made of an analogy between moral terms and pejoratives. The analogy is based on the plausible idea that pejorative slurs are used to express both a descriptive belief and a negative attitude. The analogy looks promising insofar as it encourages the kinds of features we should want from a hybrid expressivist view for moral language. But the analogy between moral terms and pejorative slurs (...) is also problematic. In this paper, I argue for two main ways in which we should distinguish between two different types of pejorative terms: slurs, on the one hand, and what I call general pejorative terms, on the other. I examine the problems with the analogy between slurs and moral terms and conclude that general pejorative terms like ‘jerk’ are a better candidate on which to model the potential dual-use behavior of moral terms. So if hybrid theorists are looking for a dual-use model for moral language, they should be careful to base their analogies on general pejoratives, rather than slurs. (shrink)

This essay characterizes the perception of the visual hybrid as nonconceptual, introducing the terminology of nonconceptual content theory to aesthetics. The visual hybrid possesses a radical but nonetheless exemplary aesthetic composition and is well established in culture, art, and even design. The essay supplies a philosophical analysis of the results of cross-cultural experiments, showing that while categorization or conceptual hierarchization kicks in when the visual hybrids are juxtaposed with linguistic descriptions, no conceptual scheme takes effect when participants are presented with (...) mere visual hybrids. In isolation, the hybrids do not lend themselves to classification. I draw four conclusions from these experimental outcomes: 1. The perception of visual hybrids follows the structure of a nonconceptual mental content, because the original categories or concepts of the hybrids’ components are not combined into one, and their properties are not applied to one another, therefore none of the components reconstructs the other such that it is introduced to a new category. 2. Language freezes the hybridity of the visual hybrid into conceptuality. 3. Given that language has a freezing effect in the case of an extreme visual phenomenon such as the hybrid, it is all the more restraining in moderate artistic compositions, such as visual metaphors, in which properties of one component (the source) are applied to the other (the target). In those, nonconceptuality emerges from relatively organized compositions, forms, and relations, and from the dependence of objects and their properties on perceptual context. 4. Thus, the nonconceptualist terminology is suitable for the analysis of aesthetic perception in general and aesthetic perception’s relation to language. Keywords aesthetics, perception, nonconceptual content, hybrids, visual metaphors. (shrink)

Sometimes logical support for a conclusion is provided exclusively by premises which are independently relevant to that conclusion. At other times, support is provided exclusively by independently irrelevant premises. On still other occasions, relevant and irrelevant premises may collectively offer a distinctive pattern of support. This paper provides a rigorous account of some of these differences in terms of a tripartite classification of convergent, linked and hybrid arguments. These various arguments are defined, diagrammed, and some of their logical properties are (...) explored. (shrink)

Prompted by recent recognitions of the omnipresence of horizontal gene transfer among microbial species and the associated emphasis on exchange, rather than isolation, as the driving force of evolution, this essay will reflect on hybridization as one of the central concerns of nineteenth-century biology. I will argue that an emphasis on horizontal exchange was already endorsed by ‘biology’ when it came into being around 1800 and was brought to full fruition with the emergence of genetics in 1900. The true (...) revolution in nineteenth-century life sciences, I maintain, consisted in a fundamental shift in ontology, which eroded the boundaries between individual and species, and allowed biologists to move up and down the scale of organic complexity. Life became a property extending both ‘downwards’, to the parts that organisms were composed of, as well as ‘upwards’, to the collective entities constituted by the relations of exchange and interaction that organisms engage in to reproduce. This mode of thinking was crystallized by Gregor Mendel and consolidated in the late nineteenth-century conjunction of biochemistry, microbiology and breeding in agro-industrial settings. This conjunction and its implications are especially exemplified by Wilhelm Johannsen’s and Martinus Beijerinck’s work on pure lines and cultures. An understanding of the subsequent constraints imposed by the evolutionary synthesis of the twentieth century on models of genetic systems may require us to rethink the history of biology and displace Darwin’s theory of natural selection from that history’s centre. (shrink)

The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties task have exactly the same underlying logical structure. (...) We also consider the Sally-Anne task, having a more complicated logical structure, presupposing a “principle of inertia” saying that a belief is preserved over time, unless there is belief to the contrary. (shrink)

Hybridization is a method invented by Arthur Prior for extending the expressive power of modal languages. Although developed in interesting ways by Robert Bull, and by the Sofia school , the method remains little known. In our view this has deprived temporal logic of a valuable tool.The aim of the paper is to explain why hybridization is useful in temporal logic. We make two major points, the first technical, the second conceptual. First, we show that hybridization gives (...) rise to well-behaved logics that exhibit an interesting synergy between modal and classical ideas. This synergy, obvious for hybrid languages with full first-order expressive strength, is demonstrated for a weaker local language capable of defining the Until operator; we provide a minimal axiomatization, and show that in a wide range of temporally interesting cases extended completeness results can be obtained automatically. Second, we argue that the idea of sorted atomic symbols which underpins the hybrid enterprise can be developed further. To illustrate this, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a simple hybrid language which can quantify over paths. (shrink)

This paper revisits two fundamental issues in question semantics—what does a question mean, and how is this meaning compositionally derived? Drawing on observations with the distribution of wh-words in questions and free relatives as well as quantificational variability effects in question-embeddings, I argue that the nominal meanings of short answers must be derivable from question denotations, which therefore calls for a categorial approach to defining questions, including embedded questions. I provide a novel hybrid categorial approach to compose questions. This approach (...) overcomes the problems with traditional categorial approaches in defining bare wh-indefinites, composing multi-wh questions, and accounting for coordinations of questions. (shrink)

This paper presents a theory of reasoning with evidence in order to determine the facts in a criminal case. The focus is on the process of proof, in which the facts of the case are determined, rather than on related legal issues, such as the admissibility of evidence. In the literature, two approaches to reasoning with evidence can be distinguished, one argument-based and one story-based. In an argument-based approach to reasoning with evidence, the reasons for and against the occurrence of (...) an event, e.g., based on witness testimony, are central. In a story-based approach, evidence is evaluated and interpreted from the perspective of the factual stories as they may have occurred in a case, e.g., as they are defended by the prosecution. In this paper, we argue that both arguments and narratives are relevant and useful in the reasoning with and interpretation of evidence. Therefore, a hybrid approach is proposed and formally developed, doing justice to both the argument-based and the narrative-based perspective. By the formalization of the theory and the associated graphical representations, our proposal is the basis for the design of software developed as a tool to make sense of the evidence in complex cases. (shrink)

Psychologists of concepts’ traditional assumption that there are many properties common to all concepts has been subject to devastating critiques in psychology and in the philosophy of psychology. However, it is currently unclear what approach to concepts is best suited to replace this traditional assumption. In this article, we compare two competing approaches, the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and the hybrid theories of concepts, and we present an empirical argument that tentatively supports the former over the latter.

‘Hybrid’ theories of personal good, defended by e.g. Parfit, Wolf, and Kagan, equate it, not with a subjective state such as pleasure on its own, nor with an objective state such as knowledge on its own, but with a whole that supposedly combines the two. These theories apply Moore's principle of organic unities, which says the value of a whole needn't equal the sum of the values its parts would have by themselves. This allows them, defenders say, to combine the (...) attractions of purely subjective and purely objective views. This common understanding of the theories is, however, mistaken. At the most fundamental level they don't combine a subjective and an objective element but two objective ones. Once this is understood, their attraction as hybrid theories diminishes: the value in their wholes may be just the sum of the values in their parts. (shrink)

This is an extended version of the lectures given during the 12-thConference on Applications of Logic in Philosophy and in the Foundationsof Mathematics in Szklarska Poręba. It contains a surveyof modal hybrid logic, one of the branches of contemporary modal logic. Inthe first part a variety of hybrid languages and logics is presented with adiscussion of expressivity matters. The second part is devoted to thoroughexposition of proof methods for hybrid logics. The main point is to showthat application of hybrid logics (...) may remarkably improve the situation inmodal proof theory. (shrink)

This study contributes to the growing interest in how hybrid organizations manage paradoxical social–business tensions. Our empirical case is “impact sourcing”—hybrids in global supply chains that hire staff from disadvantaged communities to provide services to business clients. We identify two major growth orientations—“community-focused” and “client-focused” growth—their inherent tensions and ways that hybrids manage them. The former favors slow growth and manages tensions through highly integrated client and community relations; the latter promotes faster growth and manages client and community relations separately. (...) Both growth orientations address social–business tensions in particular ways, but also create latent constraints that manifest when entrepreneurial aspirations conflict with the current growth path. In presenting and discussing our findings, we introduce preempting management practices of tensions, and the importance of geographic embeddedness and distance to the paradox literature. (shrink)

Contextualist accounts of aesthetic predicates have difficulties explaining why we feel that speakers are disagreeing when they make true and compatible but superficially contradictory aesthetic judgments. One possible way to account for the disagreement is hybrid expressivism, which holds that the disagreement happens at the level of pragmatically conveyed, clashing contents about the speakers’ conative states. Marques defends such a strategy, combining dispositionalism about value, contextualism, and hybrid expressivism. This paper critically evaluates the plausibility of the suggested pragmatic mechanisms in (...) conveying the kind of contents Marques takes to explain disagreements. The positive part suggests an alternative account of how aesthetic judgments are sources of information about speakers’ conative aesthetic states. (shrink)

Structural problems are examined with pairing two chambers, one selected by election and the other by sortition, into a traditional bicameral system. It is argued that an all-purpose legislative chamber modeled on existing elected chambers is a mismatch for sortition and that purported benefits of maintaining partisan elections alongside sortition are illusory. Alleged benefits of a hybrid bicameral system are shown to be outweighed by a variety of harmful effects. Furthermore, even if those harms are not substantiated, the continued existence (...) of an elected chamber will likely result in the delimitation of the sortition chamber. Combining many different sorts of minipublics with different characteristics and functions is preferable, and a possible multibody sortition legislative system is presented. Finally, an alternative way forward for sortition is proposed by peeling away individual topic areas from elected bodies and transferring them to sortition bodies. (shrink)

A hybrid theory is any moral theory according to which different classes of individuals ought to be treated according to different principles. We argue that some hybrid theories are able to meet standards of psychological plausibility, by which we mean that it’s feasible for ordinary human beings to understand and act in accord with them. Insofar as psychological plausibility is a theoretical virtue, then, such hybrid theories deserve more serious consideration. To make the case for this view, we explain what (...) psychological plausibility is and why we might value it, why the human/animal divide appears to be an entrenched feature of human psychology, and why Robert Nozick’s hybrid theory doesn’t go far enough. Finally, we make the case that a more promising psychologically plausible hybrid theory, with respect to humans and animals, will be (at least) at tribrid theory—that is, positing three domains rather than two. (shrink)

We characterize the modal logics of elementary classes of Kripke frames as precisely those modal logics that are axiomatized by modal axioms synthesized in a certain effective way from "quasi-positive" sentences of hybrid logic. These are pure positive hybrid sentences with arbitrary existential and relativized universal quantification over nominals. The proof has three steps. The first step is to use the known result that the modal logic of any elementary class of Kripke frames is also the modal logic of the (...) closure of this class under disjoint unions, generated subframes, bounded morphic images, and ultraroots. This latter class can be defined by the first-order sentences of a special syntactic form (called pseudo-equations by Goldblatt) that are valid in the former class. The second step is to translate these pseudo-equations into equivalent quasi-positive hybrid sentences. In the third and main step, we show that any quasi-positive sentence S generates an infinite set of modal formulas called "approximants," which together axiomatize a canonical modal logic that is sound and complete for the class of frames validating S. The proof is analogous to standard proofs of Sahlqvist's theorem. It generalizes to sets of quasi-positive sentences. The main result now follows. (shrink)

This article examines G. A. Cohen’s endorsement of a hybrid ethical theory and its relationship to his critique of John Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism. Cohen claimed that Rawls’s appeal to special incentives was a distortion of his own difference principle. I argue that Cohen’s acceptance of a personal prerogative (the central element of Samuel Scheffler’s version of a hybrid ethical theory) has several untoward consequences. First, it illuminates how any reasonable challenge to Rawls’s liberalism must recognise Thomas Nagel’s arguments concerning the (...) problems that arise when one attempts to implement a political theory analogous to a hybrid theory of ethics. Second, it undermines Cohen’s critique of Rawls. Third, it undermines the plausibility of Cohen’s ethos-driven social egalitarianism. The article concludes that, despite Nagel’s concerns, the most plausible form of egalitarianism—one that can accommodate the requirements of a hybrid ethical theory—will be Rawlsian, rather than Cohen’s ethos-based system. (shrink)

I examine the warrants we have in light of the empirical successes of a kind of model I call ‘ hybrid models ’, a kind that includes climate models among its members. I argue that these warrants ’ strengths depend on inferential virtues that are not just explanatory virtues, contrary to what would be the case if inference to the best explanation provided the warrants. I also argue that the warrants in question, unlike those IBE provides, guide inferences only to (...) model implications about which there is real uncertainty. My conclusion provides criteria of adequacy for epistemologies of climate and other hybrid models. (shrink)

In this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I raise several challenges for such a plenitudinous hybrid theory. My version of hybrid modal realism builds impossible worlds as set-theoretic constructions out of genuine individuals and sets of them, that is, as set-theoretic (...) constructions from parts and sets of parts of genuine Lewisian worlds. _Structured worlds_ are defined as sets of tuples: structured entities built out of Lewisian ‘raw material’. These structured worlds are ersatz worlds, some of which are impossible. I claim that propositions must be sets of worlds rather than members of sets. Once the construction is in place, I evaluate the proposal and show that my hybrid account is able to supply a plenitude of impossibilities and thus giving the resources to make all the hyperintensional distinctions we are looking for, whilst remaining Lewisian-conservative. (shrink)

A common starting point for ‘going hybrid’ is the thought that moral discourse somehow combines belief and desire-like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. Hybrid meta-ethical theories aim to give an account of moral discourse that is sufficiently sensitive to both its cognitive and its affective, or descriptive and expressive, dimensions. They hold at least one of the following: moral thought: moral judgements have belief and desire-like aspects or elements; moral language: moral utterances both ascribe properties and express desire-like (...) attitudes. This entry concerns hybrid theories of moral language. The main division within such theories is between those treating the expression of desire-like attitudes as semantic and those treating it as pragmatic. This entry exclusively focuses on pragmatic forms of and examines the prospects for treating moral attitude expression as working via certain standard pragmatic mechanisms. I explain these mechanisms, outline the properties that standardly define them, and test to see whether moral attitude expression matches them. At the end, I briefly explain a more minimal pragmatic alternative. The main conclusions are that we should disregard presupposition and conventional implicature views and that the most plausible options for a pragmatic hybrid view are a generalised conversational implicature view and a more minimal pragmatic view. (shrink)

Bex analyzes the case with an informal version of his hybrid theory, which combines scenario construction and argumentation. Arguments based on evidence can be used to reason about alternative scenarios. Bex claims that his hybrid theory provides the best of both worlds by combining cognitively feasible story‐based reasoning with more detailed rational argumentation. However, like the argument‐based approach, the hybrid theory does not provide a systematic account of uncertainty.

Hybrid organisations combine different elements from the for-profit and non-profit domains, and they usually operate in a resource-scarce environment. For these reasons, they continuously face various resources constraints, yet their hybrid nature could be translated into an opportunity. The purpose of our study was to investigate how a hybrid organisation can overcome resource constraints in developing countries by exploiting their own hybrid nature. In the unique research setting offered by Kenyan social enterprises, we identified five creative approaches implemented by social (...) enterprises. Finally, we present a grounded model that clearly explains which hybrid harvesting strategies can be implemented to overcome resource constraints, exploiting their hybrid potential. Our work contributes to knowledge about resource constraints in the social entrepreneurship literature and extends social bricolage theory. Limitations and future research approaches are also presented. (shrink)

This paper points out a tension between Agustín Rayo's criteria for singulartermhood and his explicit views on the status of Hybrid Identities, that is, identity statements that use singular terms from two different Systems of Representation, such as "7=Julius Caesar" or more suggestively "I am b" where "b" is a singular term referring to my brain. It argues that non-trivial Hybrid Identities are common and important in philosophy and elsewhere, and it suggests a friendly alternative that involves treating Hybrid Identities (...) on the model of Rayo's "Just Is" statements. The last section of the paper points out that even this friendly alternative has counterintuitive consequences when combined with the metaphysical conventionalism that Rayo finds attractive, when it comes to questions of personal identity over time. (shrink)

How do promissory obligations get created? Some have thought that the answer to this question must make reference to our social practice of promising. Recently, however, T.M. Scanlon has argued (in his book What We Owe to Each Other) for a pure ‘expectation view’ of promising, according to which promissory obligations arise as a result of our producing certain expectations in others. He formulates a principle of fidelity (Principle F) that tells us when one has gained an obligation due to (...) producing expectations in another, and he maintains that breaking one's promise is merely a special instance of violation against Principle F. Though initially compelling, Scanlon’s account is ultimately unsatisfactory because it is subject to a vicious circularity. In order to get out of the circle, we are forced to resort back to elements of a social practice view of promising. Thus we arrive at a hybrid view of promissory obligation, which weds parts of Scanlon’s expectation view with parts of a social practice view. After briefly examining and rejecting Scanlon’s pure expectation view, I consider the hybrid view of Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace. I present a serious objection to the hybrid view as they formulate it and go on to construct a modified hybrid view. Finally, I defend my modified hybrid view from certain pressing objections. (shrink)

In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...) question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views. (shrink)

This article focuses on Latin American constitutionalism with two goals in mind. The first goal is to identify narratives of constitutional mixity or hybridity that have been influential in Latin America, something that habilitates a comparative analysis with references to mixed or hybrid constitutionalism in other scenarios. One narrative underlines the combination of U.S.-inspired constitutionalism with background civil law systems. Another narrative highlights the way classic regional constitutional designs feature a liberal-conservative hybridation that, some claim, continue to influence constitutional dynamics (...) up to this day. And the third narrative is associated with the establishment in regional countries of hybrid or mixed systems of judicial review. The second goal of the article, more methodological in kind, is to explore what do Latin American narratives on mixity teach in the way to clarifying the nature and implications of exercises constitutional taxonomy. As it emerges, constitutional taxonomy is a way of organizing and generating knowledge which is useful to describe, but most meaningful when addressed to provide an explanation, which is often just an antechamber to normative evaluation. Whether a particular exercise of constitutional taxonomy makes sense in a particular scenario, however, is a different matter, and the article suggests that describing, explaining and evaluating Latin American constitutions as hybrid is illuminating but also problematic in a number of ways. (shrink)