L’absence de déterminant sur un groupe nominal est une construction linguistique que l’on retrouve dans différentes langues à article, selon différentes contraintes, et avec différents effets sémantiques et/ou pragmatiques. En fonction de la langue considérée et du co-/contexte, l’absence soit de déterminant, soit de signe actualisateur au niveau du groupe nominal donne lieu à des effets de sens très variés : absence de localisation spatiotemporelle explicite, avec par exemple un sens génériq...

Cette étude contrastive français-allemand porte sur les structures constituées d’un groupe nominal – parfois seulement d’un lexème nominal – et d’un nom anthroponyme, comme Le capitaine Haddock / Kapitän Haddock ; l’oncle Charles /Onkel Karl ; Le poète Gottfried Benn /der Dichter Gottfried Benn. L’usage de l’article n’étant pas identique en français et en allemand, la comparaison de ces constructions donne des indications sur le fonctionnement différent de certains noms, notamment de fonction / statut / métier. L’étude ne porte donc (...) pas uniquement sur les GN sans déterminant, mais plutôt sur la présence ou l’absence du déterminant défini dans les constructions N1N2. Ces structures, traditionnellement appelées « appositions liées », sont comparées à des appositions et constructions détachées recourant aux mêmes classes sémantiques de noms, où le GN employant un nom commun peut être dépourvu de déterminant, et pour lesquelles l’emploi d’une virgule dépend de conditions co- et contextuelles qui seront mises en lumière. La comparaison des différents types d’apposition laisse apparaître la ténuité de leurs frontières et permet d’observer, entre autres, la différence entre emploi désignatif et emploi dénominatif de N1. (shrink)

La question du synthétique a priori définie par Husserl, malgré la critique adressée par le Cercle de Vienne, est réouverte. Plutôt que de fonder le concept à partir de l'intuition, l'auteur propose de le fonder à partir du concept. Il s'appuie sur la pensée de Bolzano, pour en faire le principe d'une lecture de Kant, Husserl, Schlick et Wittgenstein.

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. Does this make conceptual sense or is this merely political rhetoric? And what are the implications for these individuals within groups? Collins outlines a Tripartite Model of group duties that can target political demands at the right entities, in the right way and for the right reasons.

L'époque, selon certains, serait celle de l'espace, après l'effondrement des grandes eschatologies historiques. L'espace a, on l'oublie, une histoire. Quant à l'histoire, elle trouverait dans sa mise en relation avec les discours de la spatialité (architecture, écologie, géographie), les moyens de s'inscrire dans l'effectivité.

Les thèmes du messianisme et de la révolution sont constitutifs de l'interrogation sur la téléologie de l'histoire.

Les auteurs présentés attestent que le travail de la pensée a joué un rôle décisif dans l'histoire, entraînant des mutations bien différentes des révolutions bruyantes, des grandes explosions restées sans lendemain. De Heidegger à A. Koestler, de Goethe à G. Sorel, de Nietzsche à Montherlant, de Leo Strauss à Jean Baudrillard, diverses façons de voir et comprendre le monde et d'agir sur lui.

Argues that positive changes in perspective and deeper spiritual connections to things greater than oneself can influence the world for the better.

A comprehensive collection of classic texts, contemporary interpretations, guidelines for activists, issue-specific information, and materials for environmentally-oriented religious practice. Sources and contributors include Basho, the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, Gary Snyder, Chogyam Trungpa, Gretel Ehrlich, Peter Mathiessen, Helen Tworkov (editor of Tricycle ), and Philip Glass.

La theorie de la signification a joue un role central dans le developpement de la phenomenologie. Jocelyn Benoist essaye d'en donner un expose systematique, y decelant le paradoxe que represente l'influence decisive d'un auteur qui n'utilise pas le concept d'intentionalite (Bolzano), relu et reinterprete par Husserl au moyen de ce meme concept. L'oeuvre de Husserl se situe au croisement de Bolzano et de Brentano, d'une pensee du sens et d'une pensee de l'acte, de l'objectivisme logique et de la description (...) psychologique et pragmatique: c'est le principe de lecture adopte ici. Cette enquete sur la theorie de la signification de Husserl conduit a revisiter tous les lieux classiques de la philosophie du langage et de la logique contemporaine, mis en vedette depuis par la philosophie analytique: theorie du sens, de la grammaire, de la verite, de la proposition, du nom propre, de l'indexicalite, des performatifs, etc. On mesure ainsi le point auquel la pensee de Husserl etait deja installe de plain-pied dans ces problematiques, et ce qu'elles-memes ont, aujourd'hui, a gagner a un retour sur elle. (shrink)

"Plus qu'aucun autre pays européen, la France fait usage de ses forces armées, engagées sans relâche dans des «)opérations extérieures)» au long cours dont il est parfois difficile de discerner la cohérence d'ensemble. En tête des institutions préférées des Français, qui voient en elles une valeur refuge dans une société désorientée, les Armées ont vu disparaître le climat d'antimilitarisme des années 1970. Mais l'opprobre n'a pas été remplacé par une meilleure compréhension de ce qui guide l'action de guerre. Or la (...) remise en cause, violente, du cadre des relations entre les États, et désormais des structures mêmes de nos sociétés, nous impose de comprendre. Elle commande de penser la stratégie, et d'approcher ce que signifie être et agir en homme de guerre : pas seulement en militaire, mais bien en citoyen face aux périls menaçant sa Nation, en être humain face à l'inéluctable tragédie de la politique. Un monde nouveau émerge, dans les fracas du terrorisme et de la guerre économique, au rythme de «)crises)» protéiformes. Pour nous, Français, ce monde neuf nous projette paradoxalement vers des horizons anciens, où se pose la question de la survie, et où la victoire est parfois le seul chemin vers la paix. Mais pour y parvenir, il nous faudra toutefois nous montrer capables à nouveau de penser, et de faire la guerre.C'est l'ambition de ce bréviaire : donner accès aux mots de la guerre, les rendre familiers au travers d'articles courts et enlevés. Avec une conviction : la guerre est chose trop sérieuse pour ne pas être entendue" (ed.). (shrink)

L'idée d'une origine commune de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique commence à être bien admise. On essaie ici de lui donner quelque consistance en la mettant à l'épreuve d'une question, qui fut décisive pour les auteurs à la source de ces deux traditions, à la fin du XIXème siècle et au début du XXème : celle de la référence manquante ou des " objets inexistants ". On montre comment ce problème a pu orienter d'un côté les débats internes (...) à l'école brentanienne (Brentano lui-même, Twardowski, Meinong, le jeune Husserl), et de l'autre les réflexions des auteurs sources de la tradition dite analytique (Bolzano, Frege, Russell). Par opposition à d'autres études plus " syncrétiques ", il s'agit avant tout, dans la démarche adoptée, de mettre en avant des différences. D'abord au sein de l'école intentionaliste, beaucoup plus diversifiée et traversée de tensions qu'on ne le croit souvent. Puis, aussi et surtout, entre cette école et les auteurs qui ont choisi délibérément une autre voie : Frege et Russell, bien sûr, mais aussi déjà Bolzano. Il s'agit par là même de mesurer un écart qui devait s'avérer déterminant pour toute la philosophie du XXème siècle et de mieux définir le champ propre de cette philosophie. (shrink)

The ethics of care has flourished in recent decades yet we remain without a succinct statement of its core theoretical commitment. This book uses the methods of analytic philosophy to argue for a simple care ethical slogan: dependency relationships generate responsibilities. It uses this slogan to unify, specify and justify the wide range of views found within the care ethical literature.

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...) together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitive empathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion; empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

When making decisions on behalf of someone, is asking what they would have wanted a good way to respect their autonomy? Against prevalent assumptions, I argue that in decisions about the care and treatment of those with advanced dementia, the notion of ‘what one would have wanted’ is conceptually, epistemically, and practically problematic. The problem stems from the disparity between the first-person subjectivity of the past person and that of the present person. The transformative nature of dementia renders the very (...) meaning of ‘what the patient would have wanted’ problematic. When applied to those with advanced dementia, the subjunctive notion is either (i) incoherent, (ii) fundamentally indeterminate, or (iii) normatively irrelevant. (shrink)

Young children learn about the power of God's love and creation through simple text and illustrations.

A la lumière des recherches menées dans l'ouvrage complémentaire Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique, il s'agit ici de livrer une analyse détaillée des Recherches logiques de Husserl, centrée sur le concept d'intentionalité, sur ses usages et sa structure. L'intentionalité telle que la construit alors Husserl est étudiée dans sa détermination fondamentalement sémantique, et on interroge systématiquement le rapport qu'il y a, dans les Recherches, entre la théorie de l'intentionalité et la théorie de (...) la référence linguistique. Cette étude débouche sur une comparaison de fond entre les doctrines de Husserl et de Frege et leurs implications respectives pour la philosophie du langage aujourd'hui - jusqu'à la remise en question, à la lumière de Frege, des insuffisances d'une pensée de l'intentionalité. La question peut alors se poser de la possibilité d'inventer une autre phénoménologie (qui ne passerait plus primairement par le concept d'intentionalité), à élaborer dans une nécessaire confrontation avec les philosophies du langage contemporaines. J. B. (shrink)

Esteemed philosopher Jocelyn Benoist argues for a renewed realism that takes seriously the context in which intention occurs. "What there is"-the traditional subject of metaphysics-can be determined only in context, Benoist contends, carving out a new path that rejects acontextual ontologies and approaches to the mind.

Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...) to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief. (shrink)

On a Humean account, a person's reasons for action are determined by her desires---in the broadest sense of 'desires', that is, noncognitive pro-attitudes. In four essays, I defend this account against several prominent objections. The first essay addresses the concern that the Humean cannot account for rationalizing reasons . The next three essays concern justifying reasons : reasons for action that are more fully normative than those that merely make action intelligible. Instrumental reasons, prudential reasons, and intrinsic reasons are three (...) different sorts of reasons to which an agent can appeal in justifying her action. ;Each essay focuses on a specific attack against the Humean account. In the second essay I argue that the normatively of instrumental reasons is brute ; and that, contrary to the received view, this is compatible with Humeanism. In the third essay I consider prudential reasons and defend the Humean claim that all and only present concerns provide normative reasons for action. In the final essay I address the fundamental question considerations of deliberative relevance: what makes certain desires and considerations relevant to a specific decision-making context, that is, what puts them among a person's present active reasons. ;In addition to defending a broadly Humean account of practical reasons, I am concerned to expand the components of a plausible form of Humeanism. Specifically, I argue that desires alone are not always sufficient to ground an agent's reasons, and that affective states are sometimes also necessary. I call this view "thick Humeanism". In essays one and four especially, I urge that a central place be given to affective states in determining practical reasons. I also invoke recent studies in cognitive psychology to support my claims about the role of the emotions in practical deliberation. (shrink)

In this collected volume, the authors analyze the deficiencies of existing theory and present alternate explanations of Third World foreign policy behavior. The essays show how examining Third World experience can broaden our understanding of how and why states and non-state actors interact in the international system.

Organizations do moral wrong. States pursue unjust wars, businesses avoid tax, charities misdirect funds. Our social, political, and legal responses require guidance. We need to know what we’re responding to and how we should respond to it. We need a metaphysical and moral theory of wrongful organizations. This book provides a new such theory, paying particular attention to questions that have been underexplored in existing debates. These questions include: where are organizations located as material objects in the natural world? What’s (...) the metaphysical relation between organizations and their members? Can organizations be blameworthy for attitudes and character traits, as well as for actions? What about feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame—can organizations feel these emotions and why does this matter? How and why are members implicated in organizations’ wrongs? How should organizations’ reparative costs be apportioned among members? The book answers these questions. It argues that organizations are material objects with humans as material parts—much like how a pizza is a material object with slices as material parts. This picture helps us make sense of organizations’ blameworthiness, including blame for organization-level actions, attitudes, and character traits. The book argues that organizations can experience moral self-awareness—a crucial component of guilt, remorse, and shame. Members can be implicated in organizations’ actions in numerous ways—and, it is argued, members’ level of implication should determine their share of organizations’ reparative burdens. (shrink)

With the growth of precision medicine research on health data and biospecimens, research institutions will need to build and maintain long-term, trusting relationships with patient-participants. While trust is important for all research relationships, the longitudinal nature of precision medicine research raises particular challenges for facilitating trust when the specifics of future studies are unknown. Based on focus groups with racially and ethnically diverse patients, we describe several factors that influence patient trust and potential institutional approaches to building trustworthiness. Drawing on (...) these findings, we suggest several considerations for research institutions seeking to cultivate long-term, trusting relationships with patients: Address the role of history and experience on trust, engage concerns about potential group harm, address cultural values and communication barriers, and integrate patient values and expectations into oversight and governance structures. (shrink)

ExcerptDemocracy of opinion? Television democracy? Market democracy? Whether one studies them in the context of the crisis or evaluates them in relation to the dynamic of postmodernism, the pathologies affecting contemporary democracies are attracting more and more attention. The general opinion is that these pathologies, far from being inherent to democracy itself, are the result of a corruption of its principles. The most superficial observers attribute this corruption to external factors or phenomena (hence the ritualistic denunciations of fundamentalism, populism, communitarianism, (...) globalization, etc.), which amounts to questioning solely the changes in morals and the transformation of society. Yet this confuses…. (shrink)

Les sciences sociales, depuis le structuralisme, se sont développées en France sur fond d'ignorance ou de rejet déclaré de la philosophie de type phénoménologique. De son côté, celle-ci a pris un tour qui l'a de plus en plus éloignée des sciences positives en général et des sciences humaines en particulier. Pourtant, lorsque la sociologie, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui, cherche à cerner la figure de l'acteur social et à interroger les conditions de sa subjectivation - de sa constitution comme sujet (...) social - une confrontation avec cette philosophie pourrait s'avérer fructueuse. Et pour une phénoménologie qui n'a que trop tendance à se confondre avec la forme actuelle de la métaphysique, un retour sur l'inscription sociale de ce qu'elle décrit, et une mise à l'épreuve de la critique sociologique, pourrait en retour être salutaire. C'est dans cet esprit que les auteurs de ce collectif ont tenté de construire des liens, dans une réflexion croisée sur le caractère immédiatement social de la subjectivité et sur la nécessité de penser les conditions d'appropriation de l'espace social par des sujets. (shrink)

While popular cultural representations portray the “new father” of the past two decades as more involved, more nurturing, and capable of coparenting, many argue that actual fathering conduct has not kept pace. Others, however, question the extent to which the culture of fatherhood does indeed support involved fathering and, if so, what this involvement entails. This study aims to contribute to the exploration of the culture of fatherhood through an analysis of a yearlong Canadian newspaper series dedicated to family issues. (...) Findings suggest that through representations of parental guilt, parental responsibility, work—family balance issues, and hegemonic masculinity, mothers continue to be positioned as primary parents. Support for father involvement, to the extent that it exists, occurs within the framework of fathers as part-time, secondary parents whose relationship with children remains less important than mothers'. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain sui generis normative properties. This (...) is the only metaphysical explanation for supervenience on offer, the chapter argues, that can both clearly maintain the pre-theoretical commitments of non-naturalism, and provide a metaphysical explanation not just for supervenience, but for all metaphysical necessities involving natural and normative properties. (shrink)

Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the duties we typically take states to have come from (...) individuals having passed on certain individual duties? There are complications: states can discharge their duties by contracting fulfilment out to non-members; states seem able to dissolve the duties of non-members; and some of states' duties are not derived in this way. We demonstrate that these complicate, but do not undermine, the general account and its application to states. And the application has an interesting upshot: by asking which individuals robustly participate in this process of duty transfer-and-transformation with a given state, we can begin to get a grip on who counts as a member of that state. (shrink)

A surfeit of research confirms that people activate personal, affective, and conceptual representations when perceiving the states of others. However, researchers continue to debate the role of self–other overlap in empathy due to a failure to dissociate neural overlap, subjective resonance, and personal distress. A perception–action view posits that neural-level overlap is necessary during early processing for all social understanding, but need not be conscious or aversive. This neural overlap can subsequently produce a variety of states depending on the context (...) and degree of common experience and emotionality. We outline a framework for understanding the interrelationship between neural and subjective overlap, and among empathic states, through a dynamic-systems view of how information is processed in the brain and body. (shrink)

Growing interest in embedded research approaches—where research is incorporated into clinical care—has spurred numerous studies to generate knowledge relevant to the real-world needs of patients and other stakeholders. However, it also has presented ethical challenges. An emerging challenge is how to understand the nature and extent of investigators’ obligations to patient-subjects. Prior scholarship on investigator duties has generally been grounded upon the premise that research and clinical care are distinct activities, bearing distinct duties. Yet this premise—and its corresponding implications—are challenged (...) when research and clinical care are deliberately integrated. After presenting three case studies from recent pragmatic clinical trials, we identify six differences between explanatory trials and embedded research that limit the application of existing scholarship for ascertaining investigator duties. We suggest that these limitations indicate a need to account for the implications of usual care and to move beyond a narrow focus on the investigator-subject dyad, one that better reflects the team- and institution-based nature of contemporary health systems. (shrink)

Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue S1, Page 283-298, Spring 2022.

Noninvasive, prenatal whole genome sequencing may be a technological reality in the near future, making available a vast array of genetic information early in pregnancy at no risk to the fetus or mother. Many worry that the timing, safety, and ease of the test will lead to informational overload and reproductive consumerism. The prevailing response among commentators has been to restrict conditions eligible for testing based on medical severity, which imposes disputed value judgments and devalues those living with eligible conditions. (...) To avoid these difficulties, we propose an unrestricted testing policy, under which prospective parents could obtain information on any variant of known significance after a careful informed consent process that uses an interactive decision aid to deliver a mandatory presentation on the purposes, techniques, and limitations of genomic testing, as well as optional resources for reflection and consultation. This process would encourage thoughtful, informed deliberation... (shrink)

Classic statements of research ethics advise against permitting physician-investigators to obtain consent for research participation from patients with whom they have preexisting treatment relationships. Reluctance about “dual-role” consent reflects the view that distinct normative commitments govern physician–patient and investigator–participant relationships, and that blurring the research–care boundary could lead to ethical transgressions. However, several features of contemporary research demand reconsideration of the ethics of dual-role consent. Here, we examine three arguments advanced against dual-role consent: that it creates role conflict for the (...) physician-investigator; that it can compromise the voluntariness of the patient-participant’s consent; and that it promotes therapeutic misconceptions. Although these concerns have merit in some circumstances, they are not dispositive in all cases. Rather, their force—and the ethical acceptability of dual-role consent—varies with features of the particular study. As research participation more closely approximates usual care, it becomes increasingly acceptable, or even preferable, for physicians to seek consent for research from their own patients. It is time for a more nuanced approach to dual-role consent. (shrink)

Unconsented pelvic exams under anesthesia are assaults cloaked in defense of healthcare education. Preemptive linguistic qualifiers “presumed” or “implied” attempt to justify such violations with flippancy toward their oxymoronic implications: to suggest a priori that consent can be assumed undermines its otherwise standalone social, ethical, and medico-legal reverence. In this paper I conceptualize “medical sexual assault” and argue that presumed consent for intimate exams exemplifies its definition. By bluntly describing pelvic exams as “penetration,” this work aims to reify the intimate (...) reality of the clinical label “pelvic exam” and to call attention to cisheteronormative and androcentric assumptions involved in its practice. Additionally, this scholarship seeks to create a foundation toward broader work in conceptualizing clinical rape culture. Given recent national survey data indicating a surprising frequency of unconsented intimate exams, detailed language as to their problematics is necessary for ongoing legal and ethical efforts. Explicit consent for intimate exams must be the standard of care for conscious and unconscious patients. (shrink)

In the third Critique Kant details an aesthetic operation of judgment that is surprising considering how judgment functioned in the first Critique. In this book, I defend an understanding of Kant’s theory of Geschmacksurteil as detailing an operation of the faculties that does not violate the cognitive structure laid out in the first Critique. My orientation is primarily epistemological, elaborating the determinations that govern the activity of pure aesthetic judging that specify it as a "bestimmte" type of judgment without transforming (...) it into "ein bestimmendes Urteil". I focus on identifying how the logical functions from the table of judgments operate in the pure aesthetic judgment of taste to reveal "the moments to which this power of judgment attends in its reflection". In the course of doing so, a picture emerges of how the world is not just cognizable in a Kantian framework but also charged with human feeling, acquiring the inexhaustible, inchoate meaningfulness that incites "much thinking". The universal communicability of aesthetic pleasure serves as the foundation that grounds robust intersubjective relations, enabling genuine connection to others through a shared a priori feeling. (shrink)

There is currently little empirical information about attitudes towards cognitive enhancement - the use of pharmaceutical drugs to enhance normal brain functioning. It is claimed this behaviour most commonly occurs in students to aid studying. We undertook a qualitative assessment of attitudes towards cognitive enhancement by conducting 19 semi-structured interviews with Australian university students. Most students considered cognitive enhancement to be unacceptable, in part because they believed it to be unethical but there was a lack of consensus on whether it (...) was similar or different to steroid use in sport. There was support for awareness campaigns and monitoring of cognitive enhancement use of pharmaceutical drugs. An understanding of student attitudes towards cognitive enhancement is important in formulating future policy. (shrink)

Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps (...) do not exist on closer inspection, at least for some collectives and some of the time. (shrink)