An action is unratifiable when, on the assumption that one performs it, another option has higher expected utility. Unratifiable actions are often claimed to be somehow rationally defective. But in some cases where multiple options are unratifiable, one unratifiable option can still seem preferable to another. We should respond, I argue, by invoking a graded notion of ratifiability.

Sufficient conditions are given under which ratifiable acts exist.

In recent years, “deliberation” has become the byword of many political theorists, most of whom identify deliberation with reasoned conversation. Among the most forceful advocates of deliberation as conversation are Jürgen Habermas and, to a greater or lesser extent, his successors who style themselves “deliberative democrats.” For them, the more political decision‐making approximates the ideal of a reasoned public conversation among free and equal individuals, the more legitimate and rational it will be. “Outcomes,” they say are democratically legitimate if and (...) only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. Their deliberative model produces more rational decision‐making, they say, because it conveys information, impels individuals to order their preferences coherently, and by making persons articulate good reasons in public leads them “to think from the standpoint of all involved.”. (shrink)

Defenders of sophisticated evidential decision theory (EDT) have argued (1) that its failure to provide correct recommendations in problems where the agent believes himself asymmetrically fallible in executing his choices is no flaw of the theory, and (2) that causal decision theory gives incorrect recommendations in certain examples unless it is supplemented with an additional metatickle or ratifiability deliberation mechanism. In the first part of this paper, I argue that both positions are incorrect. In the second part of the (...) paper, I show how the agent's preferences involved in standard counterexamples to EDT, such as Newcomb's problem, violate the Jeffrey/Bolker preference axioms, specifically the Impartiality axiom. (shrink)

On "Revolutionary Road": A Proposal for Extending the Gricean Model of Communication to Cover Multiple Hearers The paper addresses the problem of multiple hearers in the context of the Gricean model of communication, which is based on speaker meaning and the Cooperative Principle, together with its subordinate maxims, legitimately flouted to yield implicatures. Grice appears to have conceived of the communicative process as taking place between two interlocutors, assuming that the speaker communicates meanings, while the hearer makes compatible inferences. A (...) thesis propounded here is that this dyadic account must undergo a number of fundamental modifications to cover a variety of hearer types, both ratified and unratified, partaking in polylogic interactions. (shrink)

Ratifying Haeckel and contradicting Kant’s negative prophesy, in this paper I try to show that Darwin was, really, the Newton of the blade of grass. Darwin showed how the configurations according to goals of the living beings, could be explained from a naturalistic point of view, without having to postulate the existence of an intentional agent that had arranged or prearranged then. This achievement, nevertheless, was obtained by a way that Kant could not foresee and that Haeckel could not understand: (...) Darwin came there showing that there was more natural science than that Newton, Kant and Haeckel could conceive. (shrink)

Constitutivism argues that the source of the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality lies in the constitutive features of agency. A systematic failure to be guided by these norms would amount to a loss or lack of agency. Since we cannot but be agents, we cannot but be unconditionally guided by these norms. The constitutivist strategy has been challenged by David Enoch. He argues that our participation in agency is optional and thus cannot be a source of (...) categorical demands. In this paper, I defend the viability of constitutivism by showing that agency is indeed a special ‘inescapable’ enterprise. Agency has the largest jurisdiction, and it is closed under rational assessment. This inescapability does not exempt constitutivism from raising the question whether agents have reason to be agents, but this question has to be taken up within agency. If this question is answered affirmatively, then—I argue—the criteria of practical correctness are self-ratifying in a non-circular way. This is sufficient to show the viability of the constitutivist strategy. Whether agents have conclusive reasons to be agents, however, is a matter to be addressed in the terms of particular versions of constitutivism. (shrink)

Andy Egan has recently produced a set of alleged counterexamples to causal decision theory in which agents are forced to decide among causally unratifiable options, thereby making choices they know they will regret. I show that, far from being counterexamples, CDT gets Egan's cases exactly right. Egan thinks otherwise because he has misapplied CDT by requiring agents to make binding choices before they have processed all available information about the causal consequences of their acts. I elucidate CDT in a way (...) that makes it clear where Egan goes wrong, and which explains why his examples pose no threat to the theory. My approach has similarities to a modification of CDT proposed by Frank Arntzenius, but it differs in the significance that it assigns to potential regrets. I maintain, contrary to Arntzenius, that an agent facing Egan's decisions can rationally choose actions that she knows she will later regret. All rationality demands of agents it that they maximize unconditional causal expected utility from an epistemic perspective that accurately reflects all the available evidence about what their acts are likely to cause. This yields correct answers even in outlandish cases in which one is sure to regret whatever one does. (shrink)

Torture used to be incompatible with American values. Our Bill of Rights forbids cruel and unusual punishment, and that has come to include all forms of corporal punishment except prison and death by methods purported to be painless. Americans and our government have historically condemned states that torture; we have granted asylum or refuge to those who fear it. The Senate ratified the Convention Against Torture, Congress enacted antitorture legislation, and judicial opinions spoke of "the dastardly and totally inhuman act (...) of torture.” Then came September 11. (shrink)

Mineral species are, at first glance, an excellent candidate for an ideal set of natural kinds somewhere beyond the periodic table. Mineralogists have a detailed set of rules and formal procedure for ratifying new species, and minerals are a less messy subject matter than biological species, psychological disorders, or even chemicals more broadly—all areas of taxonomy where the status of species as natural kinds has been disputed. After explaining how philosophers have tended to get mineralogy wrong in discussions of natural (...) kinds, I show how minerals species don’t behave like natural kinds. They are defined on the basis of human intentionality, not merely natural distinctions. They aren’t ideal grounds for inductive inference. And they don’t form a system that divides nature along a set of equivalent joints. While this is a regrettable outcome to those of us who like the idea of science relying on natural kinds, I contend that mineralogy is doing just fine without a natural kind-based taxonomy, and may in fact be better off without one. (shrink)

Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this (...) the ratification theory of uptake. Several philosophers have recently endorsed an alternative theory of uptake, according to which the hearer can determine the nature of the act the speaker performs. According to this theory, if the hearer regards an utterance as illocutionary act y, then it is act y, even if the speaker intended to perform act x. Call this the constitution theory of uptake. The purported advantage of this theory is that it identifies a common but underanalysed way in which speakers can be silenced. I argue that despite its initial intuitive pull, the constitution theory of uptake should be rejected. It is incompatible with ordinary intuitions about speech, it entails a conceptual impossibility, and it has unsavoury political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers barely qualify as agents. (shrink)

Saudi Arabia has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, it has made general reservations to the effect that where there is a conflict between a Convention article and Islamic Law principles, Islamic Law shall have precedence. The family law rights of women and children in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been criticised for not reaching the standards set by CEDAW and CRC. This (...) article looks at the internationally set standards of these rights and compares them with the Family Law rules of Islamic Law as applied in Saudi Arabia. The applications in Saudi Arabia are then examined by looking at certain practices, case judgments and recent developments in the country in this field. Amongst these developments are the first case in which a Saudi judge annuls a child's marriage, the first death sentence declared on a father who abused his daughter causing her death, and the Saudi Divorce Initiative which aims to educate women and call for the protection of their rights during marriage and after its dissolution. The article stresses that despite the many improvements, there remains a need for codifying the Islamic Law of Personal Status in Saudi Arabia as this measure would be the basis that defines and protects the rights of women and children in Family Law. (shrink)

Introduction -- Foundationalism versus coherentism : a dichotomy disclaimed -- Foundationalism undermined -- Coherentism discomposed -- Foundherentism articulated -- The evidence of the senses : refutations and conjectures -- Naturalism disambiguated -- The evidence against reliabilism -- Revolutionary scientism subverted -- Vulgar pragmatism : an unedifying prospect -- Foundherentism ratified -- Selected essays -- "Know" is just a four-letter word -- Knowledge and propaganda : reflections of an old feminist -- "The ethics of belief" reconsidered -- Epistemology legalized : or, (...) truth, justice, and the American way. (shrink)

Human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), COVID-19 and Ebola have exposed the magnitude of care-related tasks on women. Most often, because of the gendered nature of domestic and reproductive roles, women are expected to assume unpaid care-related, nurturing and domestic work. Despite the valuable duties, women are economically poor and othered. These unpaid care duties are exacerbated by pandemics and ratified even further by religion. For instance, in Nomiya Church (NC), the first African independent church in Kenya, (...) women’s experience narratives and biblical texts such as the story of the Proverbs 31 virtuous woman are used to glorify unpaid charitable work for women. Women’s virtuous personality, hard work and character are upheld in Christian spaces, thus obstructing sound work theologies. This article employed African Women’s theological lens in view of pointing out repressing and transformative tenets in charitable theologies of work for social and gender justice. While applying womanhood hermeneutics in the passage, the article points to valued behavioural postures of hard work in responding to God’s stewardship mandate. An affirmation of fair reward and accumulation of property is embraced as a familial complementary role, especially in pandemic contexts. The article amplifies the accumulation of property as a human right and the mandate of stewardship for all earth communities. Hence, charity work is a stewardship framework that all earth communities must engage in for replenishment and sustenance for all.Contribution: The article challenges literal biblical interpretations that glorify charity work. It advances a stewardship framework in understanding unpaid and charity work that all earth communities must engage in to replenish and sustain all creation. The framework affirms the dignity of all human persons through a transformational understanding of the theology of work as enabled by the African theological hermeneutics. (shrink)

La question animale se pose à notre siècle dans un contexte de déconstruction qui cependant côtoie la perduration d’une discrimination ontologique de l’animal, l’homme exerçant sur celui-ci une domination que les lois ratifient. Or l’éclairage que peut apporter la pensée de Plotin, nous suggère un nouveau paradigme capable de libérer la différence animale : en suspendant l’éthique à l’ontologie, Plotin propose à l’homme de « laisser-être » l’animal, en tant que désinence du vivant dont il lui importe d’assurer la sauvegarde.

Practically every contemporary mainstream scientist presumes that all aspects of mind are generated by brain activity. We demonstrate the inadequacy of this picture by assembling evidence for a variety of empirical phenomena which it cannot explain. We further show that an alternative picture developed by F. W. H. Myers and William James successfully accommodates these phenomena, ratifies the common sense view of ourselves as causally effective conscious agents, and is fully compatible with contemporary physics and neuroscience.

The disappearance of the late-Roman gesta municipalia, or municipal document registers, is one of the milestones along the road in Europe that leads from late antiquity to the early Middle Ages. While they survived, these registers apparently served two constituencies. The late-Roman state used the gesta municipalia to keep track of tax obligations as property changed hands. Citizens for their part validated and secured legal transactions by having the documents generated by their transactions ratified by the civic authorities and copied (...) into the gesta. (shrink)

On one influential view, a person acts autonomously, doing what she genuinely values, if she acts on a desire that is her own, which is (on this account) a matter of it being appropriately ratified at a higher level. This view faces two problems. It doesn’t generalize, as it should, to an account of when a belief is an agent’s own, and does not let one distinguish between desires (and beliefs) happening to be one's own and their being the ones (...) a person would need to have in order to be autonomous. The paper develops an alternative unified account of what it is for desires and beliefs to be one’s one, and argues that an account of acting autonomously should pay attention not to which desires and beliefs are one’s own, but to whether they are ones the agent has reason to have and to act on. (shrink)

The article discusses ways of developing bioethical guidance in the Orthodox Christian discourse. Here, “ethical” refers to what contributes to holiness, “un-ethical” refers to sin as what hinders man’s foundational calling to holiness. To explore the development of guidance for emerging bioethical issues, we use the “therapeutic” understanding of treatment for sin in two senses. (1) It refers to the spiritual means provided by the “hospital” of the Orthodox Church for healing the fallenness of human nature in general; and (2) (...) it helps identify in particular cases both what counts as transgression of unconditional boundaries (defining what is illicit for everyone) and what is advisable in order to help particular persons to choose rightly within the area of the “more or less licit” (or “permissible”). Sources of the Orthodox faith that frame the general understanding of the boundaries between the permissible and the impermissible reflect the work of the Holy Spirit in the Church framing her Sacred (Holy) Tradition. In Holy Tradition, prayers, as communion with God, occupy a central position. This is why Orthodox moral reasoning, and thus also Orthodox bioethics, takes the form of liturgical bioethics. Penalties of excommunication determine hard boundaries that believers should not overstep: when crossing such boundaries, they enter on a spiritually dangerous path that completely distracts them away from God. Many minor sins, by contrast, have not been codified in Canons. They are not taken to remove the sinner completely from contact with the Lord. Within this realm of actions, it depends on a person’s spiritual maturity whether such actions are classified as sinful. Thus, an act can be counted merely as a small offense if committed by a beginner, while that same act can become a grave sin for an advanced believer. Due to acceleration of the technological progress, Orthodox recourse to Holy Tradition encounters ever-new challenges. There are bioethical issues that had not surfaced at the time of the Fathers of the Church. Today, Bishops gathered at a local council can supply the guidance lacking on a newly emerging bioethical problem. Even if ratified only by such local councils, the resulting decrees can also be regarded as the expression of the Holy Spirit working within a local Church and conveying His guidance. The article illustrates this source of Christian bioethics by reference to how the Russian Orthodox Church orients and develops its position on the ethics of reproductive technologies. (shrink)

Citizens, political leaders, and scholars invoke the term 'democracy' to describe present-day states without grasping its roots or prospects in theory or practice. This book clarifies the political discourse about democracy by identifying that its primary focus is human activity, not consent. It points out how democracy is neither self-legitimating nor self-justifying and so requires critical, ethical discourse to address its ongoing problems, such as inequality and exclusion. Wallach pinpoints how democracy has historically depended on notions of goodness to ratify (...) its power. The book analyses pivotal concepts of democratic ethics such as 'virtue', 'representation', 'civil rightness', 'legitimacy', and 'human rights' and looks at them as practical versions of goodness that have adapted democracy to new constellations of power in history. Wallach notes how democratic ethics should never be reduced to power or moral ideals. Historical understanding needs to come first to highlight the potentials and prospects of democratic citizenship. (shrink)

Dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) is used in connexion with theories of belief revision. Here we try to show that languages of DDL are suitable also for discussing aspects of default logic. One ingredient of our analysis is a concept of coherence-as-ratifiability.

In this paper, I motivate a puzzle about epistemic rationality. On the one hand, there seems to be something problematic about frequently changing your mind. On the other hand, changing your mind once is often permissible. Why do one-off changes of mind seem rationally permissible, even admirable, while constant changes seem quintessentially irrational? The puzzle of fickleness is to explain this asymmetry. To solve the puzzle, I propose and defend the Ratifiable Reasoning Account. According to this solution, as agents redeliberate, (...) they gain two types of evidence. First, they gain inductive evidence that they will not stably settle their belief. Second, this inductive evidence affords higher-order evidence that they are unreliable at assessing the matter at hand. The fact that fickle agents gain this higher-order evidence explains why fickleness can be epistemically—not just practically—irrational. In addition to solving the puzzle, my account captures a wide range of contextual factors that are relevant for our judgments. (shrink)

Summary‘Among the fine arts, I clearly see something to say only about architecture, sculpture, painting. As for music, dance […], I see nothing’. Tocqueville's observation in the Rubish for the second volume of Democracy in America is not only startling, but theoretically important: it ratifies the liberal (and nowadays oft-assumed) separation between musical life and political constitution. This, however, should give us cause to wonder. While in America, Tocqueville and Beaumont had multiple occasions to hear music in public festivals and (...) private spaces. Though other European and highbrow observers also declared American music to be ‘in its infancy’, music nonetheless played a significant part in antebellum social and political life. Nor was Tocqueville insensitive to sound in his relation to others. Indeed, Tocqueville perhaps saw in the demise of music as the art of ‘making harmony’ a symptom of the democratic era. However, like Montesquieu, Tocqueville refused to consider music a constitutive principle of democratic regimes—including in the context of Ancient Greek political theory. In doing so, Tocqueville sharply dissociated himself from republican political theory, but failed to raise the question of music's contribution to the culture and exercise of freedom in the modern era. (shrink)

We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players’ capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We (...) show in particular that those beliefs need not be ratifiable, and therefore that rational players can form action-dependent beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the asymmetrical mediated communication of the broad democratic public sphere can profitably be understood through the lens of deliberative democracy only if we adopt a system approach to deliberation. A system approach, however, often introduces a division of labor between ordinary citizens and experts. Although this division of labor is unavoidable and I believe compatible with a deliberative principle of legitimacy, it flirts with elitist theories of democracy: epistemic elites come up with the agendas, (...) ideas, and policy positions and democratic publics ratify or repudiate the agendas but do not generate or really engage with them. This I argue would violate an essential defining feature of deliberative democracy, namely that epistemic quality and equal participation are tightly linked. I turn to Habermas and his idea of a feedback loop as a possible solution to this dilemma. (shrink)

In his book Truth and Justification Habermas replaces his long-held discourse-theoretic conception of truth with what he calls a pragmatic theory of truth. Instead of taking truth to originate in the communicative interactions between subjects, this new theory ties truth to the action contexts of the lifeworld, contexts where the existence of the world is ratified in practice. This, Habermas argues, overcomes the relativism and contextualism endemic to the linguistic turn. This article has two goals: (1) to chart in detail (...) how Habermas’ new theory of truth overcomes relativism and contextualism; and (2) to argue for the thesis that Habermas’ specific way of meeting this objective is flawed insofar as he resists relativism and contextualism by yoking truth to a concept of objectivity that is not consistent with the larger pragmatic transformation of his thought. (shrink)

Newman remains an ecumenical figure held in high esteem by Roman Catholics and Anglicans. His ecumenical hermeneutics is observable in Tract No. 90. This Tract is a re-reading of the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion ratified in 1571 as the fundamentals of the Anglican faith. This tract is the product of the Oxford Movement that returned to the Antiquity in view of resolving the Anglican faith crises epitomized by erastianism. This return to the Fathers of the Church had a lot of (...) implications for the Anglican faith. Influenced by Antiquity, Newman rediscovered the common grounds between the Anglican faith and the church Catholic that inheres in the Roman Church. Thus, Tract No. 90 demonstrated that more things united the Nineteenth Anglicans and the Roman Catholics than what separated them. (shrink)

Seeking a decision theory that can handle both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory, some philosophers recently have turned to ‘graded ratifiability’. However, the graded ratifiability approach to decision theory is, despite its virtues, unsatisfactory; for it conflicts with the platitude that it is always rationally permissible for an agent to knowingly choose their best option.

Children are young human beings. Some children are very young human beings. As human beings children evidently have a certain moral status. There are things that should not be done to them for the simple reason that they are human. At the same time children are different from adult human beings and it seems reasonable to think that there are things children may not do that adults are permitted to do. In the majority of jurisdictions, for instance, children are not (...) allowed to vote, to marry, to buy alcohol, to have sex, or to engage in paid employment. What makes children a special case for philosophical consideration is this combination of their humanity and their youth, or, more exactly, what is thought to be associated with their youth. One very obvious way in which the question of what children are entitled to do or to be or to have is raised is by asking, Do children have rights? If so, do they have all the rights that adults have and do they have rights that adults do not have? If they do not have rights how do we ensure that they are treated in the morally right way? Most jurisdictions accord children legal rights. Most countries—though not the United States of America—have ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which was first adopted in 1989. The Convention accords to children a wide range of rights including, most centrally, the right to have their ‘best interests’ be ‘a primary consideration’ in all actions concerning them, the ‘inherent right to life’, and the right of a child “who is capable of forming his or her own views … to express these views freely in all matters affecting the child”. However it is normal to distinguish between ‘positive’ rights, those that are recognised in law, and ‘moral’ rights, those that are recognised by some moral. (shrink)

Responsibility, Complexity, and Abortion: Toward a New Image of Ethical Thought draws from feminist theory, post-structuralist theory, and complexity theory to develop a new set of ethical concepts for broaching the thinking challenges that attend the experience of unwanted pregnancy. Author Karen Houle does not only argue for these concepts; she enacts a method for working with them, a method that brackets the tendency to take positions and to think that position-taking is what ethical analysis involves. This book thus provides (...) concrete evidence of a theoretically-grounded, compassionate way that people in all walks of life, academic or otherwise, could come to a better understanding of, and more complex relationship to, difficult ethical issues. On the one hand, this is a meta-ethical book about how people can conceive and communicate moral ideas in ways that are more constructive than position-taking; on the other hand, it is also a book about abortion. It testifies from a first-person female perspective about the life-long complexity that attends fertility, sexuality and reproduction. But it does not do so in order to ratify abortion as a woman’s issue or a private matter or as feminist work. Rather, its aim is to excavate the ethical richness of the situation of unwanted pregnancy showing that it connects to everyone, affects everyone, and thus gives everyone something unique and new to think. (shrink)

Despite its long history of refugee crises, Asia lacks effective refugee protection mechanisms. Most Asian states resist ratification of the international refugee laws, and many international organizations are ineffective and lack concrete legal and political approaches to protecting refugees. Asian civil society, particularly Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, collaborates to protect refugees by employing alternative frameworks. This paper argues that Asian civil society aims to challenge the nature of refugee protection in Asia. Instead of encouraging states to ratify the 1951 (...) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, APRRN stimulates national-level implementation of refugee protection principles and practices from below. It engages its members in global decision-making by mobilizing and sharing resources with them. APRRN frames refugee protection as international human rights issue instead of as a national security concern. (shrink)

Joint practical deliberation is the activity of deciding together what to do. In this dissertation, I argue that several speech acts that we can use to alter our moral obligations – promises, offers, requests, demands, commands, and agreements – are moves within joint practical deliberation. -/- The dissertation begins by investigating joint practical deliberation. The resulting account implies that joint deliberation is more flexible than we usually recognize, in two ways. First, we can make joint decisions not only about what (...) we will do together, but also about what you or I will do alone. Second, we can deliberate by means of two distinct methods: propose-and-ratify, in which a proposed joint decision must be explicitly accepted to come into effect, and propose-and-challenge, in which a proposed joint decision comes into force unless it is explicitly challenged. -/- Varying these parameters generates a botany of different kinds of proposals we can make within joint deliberation. When we look at these proposals more closely, we make a surprising discovery: for each kind of proposal we can make in joint practical deliberation, there is an everyday speech act with the very same properties. A certain kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding one’s own actions has the same normative effects, under the same conditions, as a promise. One kind of proposal to make a joint decision regarding one’s addressee’s actions has all the essential features of a command; another kind of deliberative proposal – with the same content but a different method of evaluation – looks exactly like a request. And so on. -/- These similarities are too systematic to be coincidental. The only explanation, I argue, is that these ordinary speech acts are identical to their doppelgängers within joint practical deliberation. Promises and offers are proposals to make joint decisions about what I will do. Commands, demands, and requests are proposals to make joint decisions about what you will do. And agreements are joint decisions about what we will do. Call this the deliberative theory of these speech acts. -/- Considering each speech act in turn, I defend the deliberative theory by arguing that it provides a uniquely powerful explanation of its targets’ social and moral significance. Once we see how naturally these speech acts fall out of our practice of joint deliberation, theories that treat them as sui generis – as many moral philosophers now do – will come to seem redundant and nonexplanatory. Conversely, thinking of promises, offers, commands, demands, requests, and agreements as moves within joint practical deliberation allows us to give an elegant and generative theory of these phenomena that have confounded moral philosophers for so long. (shrink)

A substância deste artigo consiste na leitura de alguns autores que tratam do mito e do imaginário sem acatar as propostas que se fundamentam no racionalismo cartesiano e no influente positivismo do século XIX. Tais autores, como Eliade e Durand, desenvolveram no século XX um estudo do mito e da imagem com a perspectiva de uma orientação epistemológica que surgira na intenção de se constituir como uma nova abordagem científica, levando o elemento imaginativo e mítico ao encontro da realidade imediata. (...) O argumento principal dessa nova abordagem, que aqui tentamos minimamente apresentar, em torno do mito e da imagem, opõe-se ao dualismo filosófico que coloca em extremos o materialismo e o subjetivismo; dessa forma, tais autores chegaram a uma conclusão que ratifica a retórica da imagem simbólica e reafirma a força diretiva dos mitos, deixando o ditame imaginário de ser uma simples abstração ou engano, uma vez que segue regras mais profundas e é significativamente responsável pela dinâmica social ou pelas produções individuais representativas da cultura, no tempo e no espaço. Palavras-chave: Mito; Imaginário; Nova epistemologia; Século XX. ABSTRACT This article resentats some authors who treat myth and the imaginary without taking into consideration the proposals based on Cartesian rationalism and on 19th-century influent positivism. Those authors, such as Eliade and Durand, developed a study of myth and image in the perspective of an epistemological orientation aimed at elaborating a new scientific approach, promoting the encounter between imaginative and mythical elements and immediate reality. The main point in this approach in terms of myth and image, which we attempt to briefly present here, is opposed to the philosophical dualism that sets materialism and subjectivism distantly apart. Thus, those authors eventually reached a conclusion that ratifies the rhetoric of symbolic image and reaffirms the guiding strength of myths, releasing the imaginary from the restriction of being just an abstraction or a mistake, once it follows much deeper rules and is significantly responsible for social dynamics or for the individual’s culturally representative prductions in time and space. Key words: Myth; The imaginary; New epistemology; 20th century. (shrink)

In _Civilization and Its Discontents_ Freud extends and clarifies his analysis of religion; analyzes human unhappiness in contemporary civilization; ratifies the critical importance of the death drive theory; and contemplates the significance of guilt and conscience in everyday life. The result is Freud’s most expansive work, one wherein he discusses mysticism, love, interpretation, narcissism, religion, happiness, technology, beauty, justice, work, the origin of civilization, phylogenetic development, Christianity, the Devil, communism, the sense of guilt, remorse, and ethics. A classic, important, accessible (...) work, Freud reminds us again why we still read and debate his ideas today. Todd Dufresne’s introduction expands on why, according to the late Freud, psychoanalysis is the key to understanding individual and collective realities or, better yet, collective truths. The Appendices include related writings by Freud, contemporary reviews, and scholarly responses from Marcuse, Rieff, and Ricoeur. (shrink)

Jeffry H. Morrison offers readers the first comprehensive look at the political thought and career of John Witherspoon--a Scottish Presbyterian minister and one of America's most influential and overlooked founding fathers. Witherspoon was an active member of the Continental Congress and was the only clergyman both to sign the Declaration of Independence and to ratify the federal Constitution. During his tenure as president of the College of New Jersey at Princeton, Witherspoon became a mentor to James Madison and influenced many (...) leaders and thinkers of the founding period. He was uniquely positioned at the crossroads of politics, religion, and education during the crucial first decades of the new republic. Morrison locates Witherspoon in the context of early American political thought and charts the various influences on his thinking. This impressive work of scholarship offers a broad treatment of Witherspoon's constitutionalism, including his contributions to the mediating institutions of religion and education, and to political institutions from the colonial through the early federal periods. This book will be appreciated by anyone with an interest in American political history and thought and in the relation of religion to American politics. (shrink)

Book description:* Contributions from leading scholars in the field * Timely and important contribution to the moral and political debate about the status of children * Hot Topic The book contains contributions from thirteen distinguished moral and political philosophers on the subject of children. These are new essays and are devoted to a subject that until recently has not been extensively discussed by philosophers. Too often philosophers restrict themselves to the consideration only of the relations between adults. Yet the topic (...) of children is an important one for moral and political philosophy. Recent years have seen an increased concern with the needs and interests of young people. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which accords a wide range of fundamental rights to children was adopted in 1989 and many states have subsequently ratified the Convention. In this context it is timely and appropriate to ask various questions. If children do not have rights what exactly is their moral status? If they do have rights do they have all the rights that adults have? What rights if any do parents have over children and what is their justification? What duties do parents have towards their own children and towards others in society? How should we educate those who will be the future citizens and workers of our society? What values and what dispositions of character is it appropriate to instil in children? Is the family an obstacle to the realisation of full social justice? Can we in pursuit of justice contemplate the abolition of the family? The book covers the themes of children's rights, parental rights and duties, the family and justice, and civic education. (shrink)

This study investigates the determinants of the ratification of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). To do so, it proposes an explanation that postulates that states employ treaty ratification as a device to signal their resolve to implement polices required by the treaty at issue in order to appease demanding domestic constituencies, predicting that states with lower compliance capacity tend to commit faster than states with higher compliance capacity. Applying this explanation to the ICESCR leads to two (...) expectations. First, the larger government spending a proxy of high compliance capacity is hypothesized to delay the ratification process. Second, states with the unitary system are expected to ratify the ICESCR more promptly because the centralized power structure in unitary states significantly restricts the pursuit of the policy autonomy by minorities at local level that the right to self-determination entails. The Cox proportional hazard analysis lends support to both hypotheses. (shrink)

This essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues that the key framers, while aware of (...) the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate. (shrink)

“[A]ny truly neutral state,” writes George Sher in this important and timely new book, “must needlessly cut its citizens off from important goods”. For that reason, he argues, liberal neutrality, the view that government must remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good life, is indefensible. There is, moreover, a uniquely best, rationally defensible conception of the good life—not a subjective view that insists that all value depends on satisfying actual or hypothetical desires, but an objective view that recognizes that (...) some value depends on the realization of certain broad capacities that humans share. However, this objective or perfectionist view, as Sher calls it, is not communitarian, since it rejects the idea that society’s history or conventions must ratify its values or that civic participation or engagement in common projects must be among its recommendations. It is a liberal perfectionism, since it requires procedural and substantive liberal rights and recognizes that there are many different ways of realizing the human capacities whose exercise generates value. Hence, although government may legitimately promote the good, “the ability to promote the good is not all-or-nothing”. (shrink)

The proper treatment of correlation in evolutionary game theory has unexpected connections with recent philosophical discussions of the theory of rational decision. The Logic of Decision (Jeffrey 1983) provides the correct framework for correlated evolutionary game theory and a variant of "ratifiability" is the appropriate generalization of "evolutionarily stable strategy". The resulting theory unifies the treatment of correlation due to kin, population viscosity, detection, signaling, reciprocal altruism, and behavior-dependent contexts. It is shown that (1) a strictly dominated strategy may (...) be selected, and (2) under conditions of perfect correlation a strictly efficient strategy must be selected. (shrink)

Causal decision theory produces decision instability in cases such as Death in Damascus where a decision itself provides evidence concerning the utility of options. Several authors have proposed ways of handling this instability. William Harper (1985 and 1986) advances one of the most elegant proposals. He recommends maximizing causal expected utility among the options that are causally ratifiable. Unfortunately, Harper's proposal imposes certain restrictions; for instance, the restriction that mixed strategies are freely available. To obtain a completely general method of (...) handling decision instability, I step outside the confines of pure causal decision theory. I introduce a new kind of backtracking expected utility and propose maximizing it among the options that are causally ratifiable. In other words, I propose a hierarchical maximization of (1) conditional causal expected utility and (2) the new backtracking expected utility. I support this proposal with some intuitive considerations concerning the distinction between optimality and conditional optimality. And I prove that the proposal yields a solution in every finite decision problem. (shrink)