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  1. David Archard (2000). Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus by George Klosko Oxford University Press, 2000, £27.50. Philosophy 75 (4):613-626.
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  2. Mark P. Aulisio & Robert M. Arnold (1999). Commentary: A Consensus About "Consensus"? Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 27 (4):328-331.
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  3. A. Boyce Gibson (1951). Nature and Convention in the Democratic State. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):1 – 20.
  4. Mark Haugaard (1997). The Consensual Basis of Conflictual Power: A Critical Response to "Using Power, Fighting Power" by Jane Mansbridge. Constellations 3 (3):401-406.
  5. James Johnson (1997). Communication, Criticism, and the Postmodern Consensus: An Unfashionable Interpretation of Michel Foucault. Political Theory 25 (4):559-583.
    A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought, the practices that we accept rest.... Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted (...)
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  6. Linda J. Nicholson (2001). A Response to My "Critics". Hypatia 16 (2):86-90.
    : Abstract: This essay is a response to comments made by Shane Phelan, Cheshire Calhoun, and Naomi Scheman on my book The Play of Reason: From the Modern to the Postmodern (1999). I reiterate my belief that we best approach the issue of consensus and dissension in second-order justifications of social and political claims not philosophically but sociologically, politically, historically. I suggest similar approaches for dealing with the question of meaning. This move signals an endorsement not of indifference but rather (...)
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  7. Nicholas Rescher (1993). Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus. Oxford University Press.
    Nicholas Rescher presents a critical reaction against two currently influential tendencies of thought. On the one hand, he rejects the facile relativism that pervades contemporary social and academic life. On the other hand, he opposes the rationalism inherent in neo-contractarian theory--both in the idealized communicative-contract version promoted in continental European political philosophy by J;urgen Habermas, and in the idealized social contract version of the theory of political justice promoted in the Anglo-American context by John Rawls. Against such tendencies, Rescher's pluralist (...)
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  8. Enzo Rossi (2013). Consensus, Compromise, Justice and Legitimacy. Critical Review of Social and International Political Philosophy 16 (4):557-572.
    Could the notion of compromise help us overcoming – or at least negotiating – the frequent tension, in normative political theory, between the realistic desideratum of peaceful coexistence and the idealistic desideratum of justice? That is to say, an analysis of compromise may help us moving beyond the contrast between two widespread contrasting attitudes in contemporary political philosophy: ‘fiat iustitia, pereat mundus’ on the one side, ‘salus populi suprema lex’ on the other side. More specifically, compromise may provide the backbone (...)
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  9. Enzo Rossi (2010). Modus Vivendi, Consensus, and (Realist) Liberal Legitimacy. Public Reason 2 (2):21-39.
    A polity is grounded in a modus vivendi (MV) when its main features can be presented as the outcome of a virtually unrestricted bargaining process. Is MV compatible with the consensus-based account of liberal legitimacy, i.e. the view that political authority is well grounded only if the citizenry have in some sense freely consented to its exercise? I show that the attraction of MV for consensus theorists lies mainly in the thought that a MV can be presented as legitimated through (...)
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  10. Gary Shiffman (2002). Construing Disagreement: Consensus and Invective in "Constitutional" Debate. Political Theory 30 (2):175-203.
    The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by interesting too strongly the public passions is a still more serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society. —James Madison, Federalist 49At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed.—Frederick Douglass, “What to the Slave is the 4th of July?”.
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  11. Italo Testa (2012). The Respect Fallacy: Limits of Respect in Public Dialogue. In Christian Kock & Lisa Villadsen (ed.), Rhetorical Citizenship and Public Deliberation (pp. 77-92). Penn State University Press.
  12. Justin Tiwald (2008). A Right of Rebellion in the Mengzi? Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 7 (3):269-282.
    Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of (...)
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