The debate on moral generalizations predominantly focuses on their nature, scope and function. In this way it is partially parallel to discussion between moral generalism and moral particularism but also goes beyond this issue that debates plausibility of a principled approach to morality. The central topic is whether and how it is possible to capture morally relevant aspects of actions and situation into generalizations. Do moral generalizations cover the whole field of morality or merely a part of it. Can we then state such generalizations merely pro tanto or prima facie or are they exceptionless? Next issue is, what function such generalizations serve. Are they to be understood as regulative principles, a mere guides or do they play no significant role in moral decision-making?
|Key works||Dancy 1983 discusses the relationship between morally relevant features of situations and moral principles and argues against the possibility of moral generalizations. Lance & Little 2004 develops the theory of defeasible moral generalizations, while Väyrynen 2008 argues for a model of hedged moral generalizations and in a similar vein Holton 2002 argues for "that’s it" model of moral principles.|
|Introductions||For a general introduction to the debate on moral generalizations see Hooker & Little 2000 and chapter I of McKeever 2006.|
- Moral Generalism (37)
- Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives (35)
- Moral Particularism (159)
- Moral Principles, Misc (35)
- Moral Universalizability (16)
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