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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2014-09-15
    Kristina Musholt (forthcoming). Review of S. Prosser & F. Recanati (Eds) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. CUP. [REVIEW] Mind.
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  2. added 2014-09-15
    Kristina Musholt (forthcoming). Thinking About Oneself. MIT Press.
  3. added 2014-09-14
    Peter B. Todd, The Entangled State of God and Humanity. Asheville Jung Center Webinar Series, 22.
    As the title, The Entangled State of God and Humanity suggests, this webinar dispenses with the pre-Copernican, patriarchal, anthropomorphic image of God while presenting a case for a third millennium theology illuminated by insights from archetypal depth psychology, quantum physics, neuroscience and evolutionary biology. It attempts to smash the conceptual barriers between science and religion. The published work of C.G. Jung, Wolfgang Pauli, David Bohm and Teilhard de Chardin outline a process whereby matter evolves in increasing complexity from sub-atomic particles (...)
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  4. added 2014-09-13
    Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  5. added 2014-09-11
    E. Sonny Elizondo (forthcoming). More Than a Feeling. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...)
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  6. added 2014-09-11
    Fabrice Teroni (forthcoming). Emotion et moi, et moi, et moi. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger.
    Ma discussion est structurée autour de l’examen de trois thèses concernant le rapport entre émotions et moi. J’examine d'abord la thèse selon laquelle toute émotion renferme une forme de réflexivité en ce qu’elle est intentionnellement dirigée vers le sujet qui la ressent. Le moi est ici considéré être l’objet particulier de toute émotion. Je me consacre à l’examen d’une deuxième thèse, plus subtile, qui considère que les émotions sont réflexives en ce qu’elles portent toujours sur d’autres états psychologiques du sujet. (...)
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  7. added 2014-09-11
    Rupert Brown, Jesse Allpress, Roger Giner Sorolla, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2014). Two Faces of Shame: Moral Shame and Image Shame Differently Predict Positive and Negative Responses to Ingroup Wrongdoing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (10):1270-1284.
    This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms (...)
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  8. added 2014-09-10
    Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process. Frontiers in Psychology.
    Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (...)
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  9. added 2014-09-10
    Timothy Lane & Owen Flanagan (forthcoming). Neuroexistentialism, Eudaimonics, and Positive Illusions. In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Mind and Society: Cognitive Science Meets the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. SYNTHESE Philosophy Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, & Philosophy of Science. Springer Science+Business.
    There is a distinctive form of existential anxiety, neuroexistential anxiety, which derives from the way in which contemporary neuroscience provides copious amounts of evidence to underscore the Darwinian message—we are animals, nothing more. One response to this 21st century existentialism is to promote Eudaimonics, a version of ethical naturalism that is committed to promoting fruitful interaction between ethical inquiry and science, most notably psychology and neuroscience. We argue that philosophical reflection on human nature and social life reveals that while working (...)
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  10. added 2014-09-10
    Todd Moody (2014). Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: The State of the Argument. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (3-4):177-190.
  11. added 2014-09-10
    Anna-Mari Rusanen & Samuli Poyhonen (2012). Concepts in Change. Science and Education 22 (6):1389–1403.
    In this article we focus on the concept of concept in conceptual change. We argue that (1) theories of higher learning must often employ two different notions of concept that should not be conflated: psychological and scientific concepts. The usages for these two notions are partly distinct and thus straightforward identification between them is unwarranted. Hence, the strong analogy between scientific theory change and individual learning should be approached with caution. In addition, we argue that (2) research in psychology and (...)
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  12. added 2014-09-09
    David Liggins (2014). Constructive Methodological Deflationism, Dialetheism and the Liar. Analysis:anu087.
    Thanks to the work of Kendall Walton, appeals to the notion of pretence (or make-believe) have become popular in philosophy. Now the notion has begun to appear in accounts of truth. My aim here is to assess one of these accounts, namely the ‘constructive methodological deflationism’ put forward by Jc Beall. After introducing the view, I argue that Beall does not manage to overcome the problem of psychological implausibility. Although Beall claims that constructive methodological deflationism supports dialetheism, I argue that (...)
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  13. added 2014-09-07
    Daniel Brunson (2007). Memory and Peirce's Pragmatism. Cognitio-Estudos 4 (2):71-80.
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  14. added 2014-09-06
    T. Parent, Externalist Self-Knowledge and Self-Blind Equivocation.
    This paper evaluates Boghossian’s inference argument against externalist introspective self-knowledge. Boghossian’s objection is that such knowledge does not prevent (what I call) “self-blind equivocation,” i.e., equivocation that is introspectively undetectable. Such equivocation is allowed, since externalism implies that the content of ‘water’ (and of the concept it expresses) might change from premise to premise, owing to “slow switches” between twin environments. Moreover, because the change owes to environmental differences, the resulting equivocation would not be introspectively discernible. In reply I argue (...)
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  15. added 2014-09-05
    Emar Maier, Parasitic Attitudes.
    Karttunen observes that a presupposition triggered in an x hopes that complement, can be filtered out by a seemingly inaccessible antecedent under the scope of a preceding x believes that ascription. I show that the problem evaporates once we enrich our semantics of attitude ascriptions with some independently argued assumptions on the structure and interpre- tation of mental states. In particular, I argue that mental states consist of acquaintance-based mental files and variously labeled attitude compartments, laid out in a DRT-like (...)
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  16. added 2014-09-05
    Birgitta Dresp & Jean Durup (2009). A Plastic Temporal Brain Code for Conscious State Generation. Neural Plasticity 2009:1-15.
    Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.’s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran’s remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg’s Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model (...)
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  17. added 2014-09-04
    Drew McDermott, The Logic of Qualia.
    Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that is, to include the formulas of (...)
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  18. added 2014-09-04
    Laureano Luna (forthcoming). Minds Vs. Machines. On Saka's Basic Blindspot Theorem. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence.
    Under the name of ‘Basic Blindspot Theorem’, Paul Saka has proposed in the special issue on mind and paradox of this journal a Gödelian argument to the effect that no cognitive system can be complete and correct. We show that while the argument is successful as regards mechanical and formal systems, it may fail with respect to minds, so contributing to draw a boundary between the former and the latter. The existence of such a boundary may lend support to Saka’s (...)
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  19. added 2014-09-04
    Annalisa Coliva (2004). I concetti: Teorie ed esercizi. Carocci.
  20. added 2014-09-03
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Pritchard's Reasons. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    My contribution to the author meets critics discussion of Pritchard's _Epistemological Disjunctivism_. In this paper, I examine some of the possible motivations for epistemological disjunctivism and look at some of the costs associated with the view. While Pritchard's view seems to be that our visual beliefs constitute knowledge because they're based on reasons, I argue that the claim that visual beliefs are based on reasons or evidence hasn't been sufficiently motivated. In the end I suggest that we'll get all the (...)
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  21. added 2014-09-03
    Daniel Lim & Hao Wang (2014). Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal? Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.
    Frank Jackson (1982) famously argued, with his so-called Knowledge Argument (KA), that qualia are non-physical. Moreover, he argued that qualia are epiphenomenal. Some have objected that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA. One way of developing this objection, following Neil Campbell (2003; 2012), is to argue that epiphenomenalism is at odds with the kind of behavioral evidence that makes the soundness of KA plausible. We argue that Campbell’s claim that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA is (...)
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  22. added 2014-09-02
    T. Parent, Neo-Sellarsian Metaphilosophy.
    Science often conflicts with our everyday experience. For instance, we typically assume the existence of agency, norms, etc.—yet such things are absent from scientific theory. For Sellars, philosophy’s aim is to resolve these discrepancies between the “manifest” and “scientific” images. However, some might protest that philosophers should not “negotiate” ontology with science—the scientific image should instead claim hegemony. I defend the Sellarsian by arguing that we are simply unable to jettison central parts of the “manifest image.” That is so, even (...)
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  23. added 2014-09-02
    T. Parent, The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
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  24. added 2014-09-02
    Michael Madary (2014). Visual Experience. In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge. 263-271.
  25. added 2014-09-02
    Michael Madary (2014). Perceptual Presence Without Counterfactual Richness. Cognitive Neuroscience 5:131-133.
    In this commentary, I suggest that non-visual perceptual modalities provide counterexamples to Seth’s claim that perceptual presence depends on counterfactual richness. Then I suggest a modification to Seth’s view that is not vulnerable to these counterexamples.
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  26. added 2014-09-02
    Aidan McGlynn (2014). On Epistemic Alchemy. In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. 173-189.
    Crispin Wright has proposed that one has entitlements to accept certain propositions that play a foundational role within one’s body of belief. Such an entitlement is a kind of warrant that does not require the possessor to have acquired evidence speaking in favor of the proposition in question. The proposal allows Wright to concede much of the force of the most powerful arguments for scepticism, while avoiding the truly sceptical conclusion that one lacks warrant for most of one’s beliefs. Here (...)
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  27. added 2014-09-02
    B. Mitchell-Yellin & J. M. Fischer (2014). The Near-Death Experience Argument Against Physicalism: A Critique. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):158-183.
    Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, including the mind. One argument against physicalism appeals to neardeath experiences (NDEs), conscious experiences during episodes, such as cardiac arrest, when one's normal brain functions are severely impaired. The core contention is that NDEs cannot be physically explained, and so we have reason to appeal to the non-physical in explaining them. In this paper, we consider in detail a recent article by Pim van Lommel in which he appeals to NDEs in arguing (...)
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  28. added 2014-09-02
    Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  29. added 2014-09-01
    Kenneth L. Pearce, Arnauld's Verbal Distinction Between Ideas and Perceptions.
    In his dispute with Malebranche about the nature of ideas, Arnauld endorses a form of direct realism. This appears to conflict with views put forward by Arnauld and his collaborators in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic where the distinction between verbs and nouns is based on a distinction between mental acts and their (internal, mind-dependent) objects. I show that, although Arnauld identifi es perceptions with ideas, he recognizes a distinction in meaning between the words `perception' and `idea,' and this distinction (...)
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  30. added 2014-09-01
    Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). The Significance of Boredom: A Sartrean Reading. In Daniel Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou & Walter Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. Routledge.
  31. added 2014-08-31
    Dietrich Franz & Christian List, From Degrees of Belief to Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and (all-or-nothing) beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former, without running into paradoxes? We reassess this “belief-binarization” problem from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the literature contains no general study of the implications of aggregation-theoretic impossibility and possibility results for belief binarization. We seek to fill this gap. At the centre of this paper is (...)
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  32. added 2014-08-31
    Jason Leddington (2011). A Nonrepresentational Approach to Perception. In Georg Bertram, Robin Celikates, Christophe Laudou & David Lauer (eds.), Expérience et Réflexivité. L'Harmattan. 45-54.
    This paper challenges the common assumption that perceptual episodes are bearers of representational content by developing a naïve realist theory of perception that can account for a number of central perceptual phenomena.
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  33. added 2014-08-29
    Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Introduction to Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception. In , Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Perception is the ultimate source of our knowledge about contingent facts. It is an extremely important philosophical development that starting in the last quarter of the twentieth century, philosophers have begun to change how they think of perception. The traditional view of perception focussed on sensory receptors; it has become clear, however, that perceptual systems radically transform the output of these receptors, yielding content concerning objects and events in the external world. Adequate understanding of this process requires that we think (...)
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  34. added 2014-08-29
    Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan (2014). Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP. Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
  35. added 2014-08-28
    Neil Van Leeuwen (forthcoming). Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief. Cognition.
    I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (...)
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  36. added 2014-08-28
    Anthony Cunningham (2005). Great Anger. The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  37. added 2014-08-27
    Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Shared Goals and Development. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a role in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  38. added 2014-08-27
    Gabriel Gottlieb (forthcoming). “Know-How, Procedural Knowledge, and Choking Under Pressure”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and (...)
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  39. added 2014-08-27
    Martin F. Fricke (2004). Identifying, Discriminating or Picking Out an Object: Some Distinctions Neglected in the Strawsonian Tradition. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 12:106-107.
    In "Individuals", Peter Strawson talks about identifying, discriminating and picking out particular objects, regarding discriminating and picking out as ways of identifying. I object that, strictly speaking, identification means to say of two things that they are the same. In contrast, discriminating an object from all others can be done by just ascribing some predicate to it that does not apply to the others. Picking out an object does not even seem to require to distinguish it from all others. The (...)
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  40. added 2014-08-26
    Ian Proops (forthcoming). Russellian Acquaintance Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    In Bertrand Russell’s writings during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century there occur two rather different distinctions that involve his much-discussed, technical notion of acquaintance. The first is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the second, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This article examines the nature and philosophical purpose of these two distinctions, while also tracing the evolution of Russell’s notion of acquaintance. It argues that, when he first expressly (...)
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  41. added 2014-08-26
    Anders Nes (forthcoming). Review of T. Bayne and M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: OUP, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind.
  42. added 2014-08-26
    Adam Morton (2014). Lockhart's Problem. The Philosophers' Magazine 25 (30).
    If we had more powerful minds would we be puzzled by less - because we could make better theories - or by more - because we could ask more difficult questions? This paper focuses on clarifying the question, with an emphasis on comparisons between actual and possible species of thinker.
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  43. added 2014-08-25
    Timothy Lane (2015). Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  44. added 2014-08-25
    Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  45. added 2014-08-25
    L. Doughney (2013). Folk, Theory, and Feeling: What Attention Is. Dissertation, La Trobe University
    In this thesis three independent answers to the question ‘what is attention?’ are provided. Each answer is a description of attention given through one of the perspectives that people have on the mental phenomenon. The first answer is the common-sense answer to the question, and is an account of the folk psychology of attention. The understanding of attention put forward here is of attention as a limited, divisible resource that is used in mental acts. The second answer is the empirical (...)
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  46. added 2014-08-24
    Kim Davies (2014). Emergence From What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6):10-32.
    This paper argues that the standard formulations of the question of how consciousness emerges, both synchronically and diachronically, from the physical world necessarily use a concept of the physical without either a clear grasp of the concept or an understanding of the necessary conditions of its possibility. This concept will be elucidated and some of the necessary conditions of its possibility explored, clarifying the place of the mental and the physical as abstractions from the totality of an agent engaged in (...)
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  47. added 2014-08-23
    J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC (...)
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  48. added 2014-08-23
    Martin F. Fricke (2014). Transparency or Opacity of Mind? Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
    Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...)
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  49. added 2014-08-23
    Georg Theiner & John Sutton (2014). The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, "The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits&Quot;. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-278.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
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  50. added 2014-08-22
    José Ortega Y. Gasset (2004). Consciousness, Object and Its Three Distances. In Dermot Moran & Lester E. Embree (eds.), Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy Volume 2. Routledge. 24-29.
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