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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2014-07-23
    Alejandro Pérez Carballo (2014). Structuring Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1).
  2. added 2014-07-21
    John Cooper (1998). Pleasure and Desire in Epicurus. In Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton University Press. 485–514.
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  3. added 2014-07-20
    Ben Bronner, Maps and Absent Symbols (Extended Version).
    This is the extended version of a paper forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  4. added 2014-07-20
    Ben Bronner (forthcoming). Maps and Absent Symbols. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    [The pre-print of this article has been removed by its author at the request of Taylor & Francis. Individuals interested in obtaining a personal copy of the pre-print may contact the author at ben.bronner@rutgers.edu.] -/- ABSENCE is the claim that if a symbol appears on a map, then absence of the symbol from some map coordinate signifies absence of the corresponding property from the corresponding location. This claim is highly intuitive and widely endorsed. And if it is true, then cartographic (...)
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  5. added 2014-07-19
    Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.) (2014). Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Springer.
    Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. -/- Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the (...)
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  6. added 2014-07-18
    Danny Frederick, Ethical Intuitionism: A Structural Critique.
    I present a structural critique of ethical intuitionism. Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian mutual recrimination. Intuitionists try to avoid this by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. (...)
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  7. added 2014-07-18
    Kristina Musholt (2014). Review of "The Self in Question" by Andy Hamilton. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014 (7).
  8. added 2014-07-17
    Stan Klein (forthcoming). What Memory Is. WIREs Cognitive Science.
    I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term “memory” to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the “received view”, is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical and conceptual considerations to make (...)
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  9. added 2014-07-17
    Panos Theodorou (forthcoming). Pain, Pleasure, and the Intentionality of Emotions as Experiences of Values: A New Phenomenological Perspective. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    The article starts with a brief overview of the kinds of approaches that have been attempted for the presentation of Phenomenology’s view on the emotions. I then pass to Husserl’s unsatisfactory efforts to disclose the intentionality of emotions and their intentional correlation with values. Next, I outline the idea of a new, “normalized phenomenological” approach of emotions and values. Pleasure and pain, then, are first explored as affective feelings (reell lived-experiences). In the cases examined, it is shown that, primordially, pleasure (...)
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  10. added 2014-07-17
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Against Constitutive Russellian Monism. In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
  11. added 2014-07-17
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem. In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
  12. added 2014-07-17
    Brian Epstein (2015). The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford.
    We live in a world of crowds and corporations, artworks and artifacts, legislatures and languages, money and markets. These are all social objects — they are made, at least in part, by people and by communities. But what exactly are these things? How are they made, and what is the role of people in making them? In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. Epstein explains (...)
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  13. added 2014-07-17
    Brian Epstein (2010). The Diviner and the Scientist: Revisiting the Question of Alternative Standards of Rationality. Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78 (4):1048-1086.
    Are the standards of reasoning and rationality in divination, religious practice, and textual exegesis different from those in the sciences? Can there be different standards of reasoning and rationality at all? The intense “rationality debate” of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s focused on these questions and the related problems of relativism across cultures and systems of practice. Although philosophers were at the center of these debates at the time, they may appear to have abandoned the question in recent years. On (...)
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  14. added 2014-07-16
    Mohan Matthen, Representationalism Defended.
    This is a comment on Frances Egan's paper, "How to Think About Mental Content." Egan distinguishes mathematical and cognitive content; she accepts the former and rejects the latter. In this comment, which was delivered at the Oberlin Colloquium in 2012, I defend cognitive content.
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  15. added 2014-07-15
    B. Cutter & M. Tye (forthcoming). Pains and Reasons: Why It is Rational to Kill the Messenger. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If (...)
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  16. added 2014-07-13
    Emar Maier, Why My I is Your You: On the Communication of de Se Attitudes.
    The communication of de se attitudes poses a problem for “participant- neutral” analyses of communication in terms of propositions expressed or proposed updates to the common ground: when you tell me “I am an idiot”, you express a first person de se attitude, but as a result I form a different, second person attitude, viz. that you are an idiot. I argue that when we take seriously the asymmetry between speaker and hearer in semantics this problem disappears. To prove this (...)
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  17. added 2014-07-13
    Paul Bernier (2014). Diversité du représentationnalisme de la conscience. Philosophiques 41 (1):37-56.
    This article discusses various versions of Consciousness Representationalism. Its main purpose is to defend an interpretation of the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness (SRTC) according to which the content of a conscious state is a de re proposition which is constituted, in part, by the very conscious state itself. I first undescore some important problems for the Representational Theory of Consciousness (RTC), which is one of the most influential approach in the literature. I argue that the main rival theory, the Higher-Order (...)
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  18. added 2014-07-12
    Benjamin D. Young (2014). Smelling Phenomenal. Frontiers in Psychology 5 (713):doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00713.
    Qualitative-consciousness arises at the sensory level of olfactory processing and pervades our experience of smells to the extent that qualitative character is maintained whenever we are aware of undergoing an olfactory experience. Building upon the distinction between Access and Phenomenal Consciousness the paper offers a nuanced distinction between Awareness and Qualitative-consciousness that is applicable to olfaction in a manner that is conceptual precise and empirically viable. Mounting empirical research is offered substantiating the applicability of the distinction to olfaction and showing (...)
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  19. added 2014-07-11
    Chris Tucker (forthcoming). Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification. In Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.), Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.
    Classical acquaintance theory is any version of classical foundationalism that appeals to acquaintance in order to account for non-inferential justification. Such theories are well suited to account for a kind of infallible non-inferential justification. Why am I justified in believing that I’m in pain? An initially attractive (partial) answer is that I’m acquainted with my pain. But since I can’t be acquainted with what isn’t there, acquaintance with my pain guarantees that I’m in pain. What’s less clear is whether, given (...)
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  20. added 2014-07-07
    Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Unwitting Self-Awareness? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  21. added 2014-07-07
    Lisa Botolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett (2014). Review of New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure by Nikolaj Nottelmann. [REVIEW] Dialectica 68 (1):141-146.
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  22. added 2014-07-06
    Assaf Weksler, Visual Perspective: A Philosophical Challenge to Vision Science.
    According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view” (RPV), “2D” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Vision scientists typically hold that 2D properties are properties of patterns of light striking the retina (or of regions in the retina). Call this view RET. RET conflicts with RPV. The present paper has two objectives. The first is to argue that there is no genuine conflict between vision science and (...)
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  23. added 2014-07-03
    Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Noetic feelings, like the feeling of certainty and the tip-of-the-tongue state, have an interesting place in our cognitive economy. Joelle Proust’s account of these feelings emphasizes the procedural guidance they supply, while arguing that this guidance does not depend on any conceptual ability to attribute mental states. I argue that she has made a strong case for their procedural value but hasn’t conclusively shown that they work in a way that is independent of our capacities for mental state attribution.
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  24. added 2014-07-02
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Two.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Do multisensory percepts involve emergent features?
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  25. added 2014-07-02
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop Full Report.
    This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the multisensory integration workshop at the University of Toronto on May 9th and 10th, 2014: 1. What Is Multisensory Integration? 2. Do Multisensory Percepts Involve Emergent Features? 3. What Can Multisensory Processing Tell Us about Multisensory Awareness? 4. Is Language Processing a Special Kind of Multisensory Integration? 5. What Is the Purpose of Multisensory Integration?
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  26. added 2014-07-02
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Five.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is the purpose of multisensory integration?
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  27. added 2014-07-02
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Three.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What can multisensory processing tell us about multisensory awareness?
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  28. added 2014-07-02
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question One.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: What is multisensory integration?
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  29. added 2014-07-02
    Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin & Andrew MacGregor, Multisensory Integration Workshop: Question Four.
    This is an excerpt from a report on the workshop on multisensory integration at the University of Toronto, on May 9th and 10th, 2014, written by Kevin Connolly, Aaron Henry, Zoe Jenkin, and Andrew MacGregor, and available at: http://networksensoryresearch.utoronto.ca/Events_%26_Discussion.html This excerpt explores the question: Is language processing a special kind of multisensory integration?
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  30. added 2014-07-02
    Luca Moretti (forthcoming). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis.
    I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.
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  31. added 2014-07-01
    John Sutton (2014). The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, “The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-78.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
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  32. added 2014-06-30
    Nicholas Shea (forthcoming). Exploitable Isomorphism and Structural Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64 (2).
    An interesting feature of some sets of representations is that their structure mirrors the structure of the items they represent. Founding an account of representational content on isomorphism, homomorphism or structural resemblance has proven elusive, however, largely because these relations are too liberal when the candidate structure over representational vehicles is unconstrained. Furthermore, in many cases where there is a clear isomorphism, it is not relied on in the way the representations are used. That points to a potential resolution: that (...)
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  33. added 2014-06-28
    Brian Gordon & Georg Theiner (forthcoming). Scaffolded Joint Action as a Micro–Foundation of Organizational Learning. In Charles B. Stone & Lucas Bietti (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past. Psychology Press.
    Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the experientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron–Spektor, 2011). In this chapter, we examine routines and capabilities as an important micro–foundation for organizational learning. Adopting a micro–foundational approach in line with Barney and Felin (2013), we propose a new model for explaining how routines and (...)
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  34. added 2014-06-27
    Katharina Nieswandt & Ulf Hlobil (eds.) (forthcoming). G. E. M. Anscombe: Aufsätze. Suhrkamp.
    Die Wittgenstein-Schülerin Elizabeth Anscombe zählt zu den einflussreichsten Philosophinnen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Mit der Monographie Absicht begründete sie die analytische Handlungstheorie, viele ihrer Abhandlungen gelten als Klassiker, aber nur wenige liegen bislang in deutscher Übersetzung vor. Der vorliegende Band füllt diese Lücke: Er versammelt zwölf von Anscombes wichtigsten Aufsätzen, die thematisch von der praktischen Philosophie über die Metaphysik und die Philosophie des Geistes bis hin zu Aristoteles- und Wittgenstein-Interpretationen reichen, also das ganze Spektrum ihres Denkens repräsentieren. Die Anmerkungen und Erläuterungen (...)
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  35. added 2014-06-27
    Jordi Fernández (forthcoming). Memory and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the (...)
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  36. added 2014-06-27
    Casey O'Callaghan (2013). Hearing, Philosophical Perspectives. In H. Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE. 388-390.
    Hearing and auditory perception are rapidly developing topics in the philosophy of perception. Recent work has focused on characterizing what we hear and on similarities and differences between audition and other modalities. Future work should address how theorizing about audition impacts theorizing about perception more generally. This entry concerns questions about the objects and contents of hearing. It includes discussion of the spatial content of audition, of the role of time and pitch in the individuation of auditory objects, and of (...)
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  37. added 2014-06-26
    William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others' Minds. Philosophical Studies.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
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  38. added 2014-06-26
    Reinaldo Bernal Velasquez (2013). Pourquoi la conscience phénoménale doit avoir une nature physique. In Marc Silverstein (ed.), Matériaux scientifiques et philosophiques pour un matérialisme contemporain. Éditions Matériologiques. 755-800.
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  39. added 2014-06-26
    Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2013). Merleau-Ponty and the Transcendental Problem of Bodily Agency. In Rasmus Thybo Jensen Dermot Moran (ed.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. 43-61.
    I argue that we find the articulation of a problem concerning bodily agency in the early works of the Merleau-Ponty which he explicates as analogous to what he explicitly calls the problem of perception. The problem of perception is the problem of seeing how we can have the object given in person through it perspectival appearances. The problem concerning bodily agency is the problem of seeing how our bodily movements can be the direct manifestation of a person’s intentions in the (...)
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  40. added 2014-06-26
    Adam Morton (1982). Review of Paul Churchland The Plasticity of Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 91 (2):299-303.
    I assess Churchland's views on folk psychology and conceptual thinking, with particular emphasis on the connection between these topics.
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  41. added 2014-06-25
    James Russell (forthcoming). Episodic Memory as Re-Experiential Memory: Kantian, Developmental, and Neuroscientific Currents. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    Recent work on the early development of episodic memory in my laboratory has been fuelled by the following assumption: if episodic memory is re-experiential memory then Kant’s analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development. The idea is that re-experiential memory will “inherit” these spatiotemporal features. On the basis of this assumption, Russell and Hanna (Mind and Language 27(1):29–54, 2012) proposed that (a) the spatial element of re-experience is egocentric and (b) (...)
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  42. added 2014-06-24
    Heidi Savage, Against False Pretences.
    Any plausible account of the act of pretending, either by presupposition or constitution, involves an assumption that the facts are other than what they are. An examination of various accounts of pretence shows this to be the feature that distinguishes it from other actions such as imagining, fantasizing, creating, or hypothesizing. This discovery has implications for standard analyses of the nature of fiction. To wit, whatever is occurring when engaged in reading a work of fiction, it is not an act (...)
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  43. added 2014-06-24
    Neil Mehta (forthcoming). The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience. Journal of Philosophy.
    By considering imaginative experiences, radically different experiences of a single object, and other data, I argue that external particulars are sometimes parts of experience but are never parts of phenomenal character.
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  44. added 2014-06-23
    Ned Block (forthcoming). Seeing-As in the Light of Vision Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Argues that philosophers have underestimated the extent to which the following are empirical issues to which psychological experiments are relevant: Whether all seeing is seeing-as; whether seeing-as is conceptual; whether seeing is exhausted by seeing “low level properties”: shape, spatial relations, motion, texture, brightness, color; what the distinction is between perception and perceptual judgment. Presents evidence that some high level properties—namely faces and emotional facial expressions are perceptually represented. Burge's reply is available at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Burge.reply.pdf.
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  45. added 2014-06-22
    Kourken Michaelian (2014). Individual and Collective Memory Consolidation: Analogous Processes on Different Levels. [REVIEW] Memory Studies 7 (2):254-264.
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  46. added 2014-06-22
    Jan Almäng (2014). Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments. Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23.
    It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive (...)
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  47. added 2014-06-21
    Christoph Hoerl (forthcoming). Remembering Events and Remembering Looks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    I describe and discuss one particular dimension of disagreement in the philosophical literature on episodic memory. One way of putting the disagreement is in terms of the question as to whether or not there is a difference in kind between remembering seeing x and remembering what x looks like. I argue against accounts of episodic memory that either deny that there is a clear difference between these two forms of remembering, or downplay the difference by in effect suggesting that the (...)
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  48. added 2014-06-21
    Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (forthcoming). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-11.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts (e.g., judging that p) leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states (e.g., believing that p). First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails (...)
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  49. added 2014-06-21
    Inga Römer (forthcoming). Steven Crowell: Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl Studies:1-9.
    In seinem neuen Buch vertieft Steven Crowell seine Auffassung der Phänomenologie als Transzendentalphilosophie, die es mit dem normativen Raum des Sinnes (space of meaning) zu tun habe (vgl. Crowell 2001). Sowohl Husserl als auch Heidegger führen aus seiner Sicht innerhalb der Phänomenologie die kantische Tradition der Transzendentalphilosophie weiter, indem sie der Frage nach den „transzendentalen Bedingungen der Konstitution oder Enthüllung des Sinnes“ (S. 1) nachgehen.Vgl. auch den von Steven Crowell mit herausgegebenen Band Transcendental Heidegger (2007). Da der Sinn aber Crowell (...)
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  50. added 2014-06-21
    Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Cognitive Phenomenology. Routledge.
    Phenomenology is the study of the raw, non-cognitive, subjective aspects of the mind, such as vision and touch, and those conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person or phenenomenological 'feel' to them. They are often taken to be radically different to or in some sense prior to thought itself. This is the first book to fully the question of cognitive phenomenology, applying phenomenology to the study of thought (...)
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