Bookmark and Share

Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
Most recently added entries found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 179
  1. added 2015-07-03
    Gary Lupyan (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems Are Penetrable Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at multiple (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. added 2015-07-02
    Sabine Döring & Bahadir Eker (forthcoming). Desires Without Guises: Why We Need Not Value What We Want. In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. added 2015-07-01
    Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Phenomenal Knowledge, Introspection, and Inner Awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of commonsense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that (i) they are typically based on introspection and (ii) introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue against (ii). Central to our case is a pair of distinctions: one between what we call fact-introspection (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. added 2015-07-01
    Christoph C. Pfisterer (2015). Ryle on Perception. In David Dolby (ed.), Ryle on Mind and Language. Palgrave Macmillan. 146-164.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. added 2015-06-29
    Aaron Smuts (forthcoming). The Ethics of Imagination and Fantasy. In Amy Kind (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination.
    The "ethics of imagination" or the "ethics of fantasy" encompasses the various ways in which we can morally evaluate the imagination. This topic covers a range of different kinds of imagination: (1) fantasizing, (2) engaging with fictions, and (3) dreaming. The clearest, live ethical question concerns the moral value of taking pleasure in undeserved suffering, whether willfully imagined, represented, or dreamed. Much of this entry concerns general theoretical considerations and how they relate to the ethics of fantasy. In the final (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. added 2015-06-29
    Aaron Smuts (forthcoming). L'Humor. In Julien Deonna Emma Tieffenbach (ed.), Petite Dictionnaire des Valeurs.
    Most everything one might think about humor is in dispute. Only a few negative claims are fairly clear. Does humor always involve feelings of superiority? Probably not. But what properties do objects need in order to be amusing? Most plausibly, humorous objects present non-threatening incongruities. However, not all such incongruities are amusing. So there must be something more. -/- What is the connection between feelings of amusement and laughter? Amusement typically leads to laughter, but not always. And we often laugh (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. added 2015-06-29
    Richard Kraut (2007). Good, Conation, and Pleasure. In What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being. Harvard University Press. 66-130.
  8. added 2015-06-26
    David Bourget (forthcoming). The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    One sometimes believes that P without grasping that P. For example, a complete achromat might believe that ripe tomatoes are red without grasping this fact. My aim in this paper is to shed light on the difference between merely believing a fact or proposition and grasping it. I focus on two possible theories of grasping: the inferential theory, which explains grasping in terms of inferential role, and the phenomenal theory, which explains grasping in terms of phenomenal consciousness. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. added 2015-06-25
    Elanor Taylor (forthcoming). Explanation and the Explanatory Gap. Acta Analytica:1-12.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. added 2015-06-25
    Makoto Kureha (2015). The Unbounded Mind and the Socially Distributed Cognition: Dewey on the “Boundary of Mind” Question. In Tetsuya Kono, Shogo Tanaka & Toji Kamata (eds.), Proceedings of the Kyoto Conference 2015: Beyond the Extended Mind: Different Bodies, Dolls, Female Soul and Eastern Spirit. 59-70.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. added 2015-06-24
    Koshy Tharakan (1999). Husserl and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. In MenonSangeetha (ed.), Scientific and Philosophical Studies on Consciousness. National Institute of Advanced Studies. 182-192.
    The idea that science explains or ought to explain every phenomenon finds Cartesian dualism of mind and body to be an unsatisfactory thesis. Consequently we have a variety of materialist theories regarding mind and consciousness. In recent times, we come across many philosophers who are committed to the scientific world picture, trying to locate mind within a world that is essentially physical.The central problems these philosophers have to tackle consist of consciousness and mental causation. In what follows we discuss how (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. added 2015-06-23
    Clas Weber (forthcoming). Being at the Centre: Self-Location in Thought and Language. In M. Garcia-Carpintero & S. Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.
    Self-locating attitudes and assertions provide a challenge to the received view of mental and linguistic intentionality. In this paper I try to show that the best way to meet this challenge is to adopt relativistic, centred possible worlds accounts for both belief and communication. First, I argue that self-locating beliefs support a centred account of belief. Second, I argue that self-locating utterances support a complementary centred account of communication. Together, these two claims motivate a unified centred conception of belief and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. added 2015-06-23
    Inga Nayding (2015). Names of Attitudes and Norms for Attitudes. Disputatio 7 (40):1-24.
    Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philosophers object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called. They (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. added 2015-06-23
    Manolo Martínez (2015). Disgusting Smells and Imperativism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (5-6):191-200.
    I sketch and defend an imperativist treatment of the phenomenology associated with disgusting smells. This treatment, I argue, allows us to make better sense than other intentionalist alter-natives both of the neuroanatomy of olfaction, and of a natural pre-theoretical stance regarding the sense of smell.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. added 2015-06-22
    Peter Langland-Hassan, Frank R. Faries, Michael J. Richardson & Aimee Dietz (2015). Inner Speech Deficits in Aphasia. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (528):1-10.
    Despite the ubiquity of inner speech in our mental lives, methods for objectively assessing inner speech capacities remain underdeveloped. The most common means of assessing inner speech is to present participants with tasks requiring them to silently judge whether two words rhyme. We developed a version of this task to assess the inner speech of a population of patients with aphasia and corresponding language production deficits. Patients’ performance on the silent rhyming task was severely impaired relative to controls. Patients’ performance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. added 2015-06-22
    Ashley E. Walton, Michael J. Richardson, Peter Langland-Hassan & Anthony Chemero (2015). Improvisation and the Self-Organization of Multiple Musical Bodies. Frontiers in Psychology 6 (313):1-9.
  17. added 2015-06-21
    Marina Folescu (2015). Thinking About Different Nonexistents of the Same Kind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):n/a-n/a.
    How is it that, as fiction readers, we are nonplussed by J. K. Rowling's prescription to imagine Ronan, Bane, and Magorian, three different centaurs of the Forbidden Forrest at Hogwarts? It is usually held in the philosophical literature on fictional discourse that singular imaginings of fictional objects are impossible, given the blatant nonexistence of such objects. In this paper, I have a dual purpose: on the one hand, to show that, without being committed to Meinongeanism, we can explain the phenomenon (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. added 2015-06-21
    Marina Folescu, Thomas Reid: Philosophy of Mind. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This is an encyclopedia entry that can be accessed following this link: http://www.iep.utm.edu/reidmind/ -/- In philosophy of mind, Reid is most celebrated today for the arguments he gave in support of the position known as direct realism, which, at its most basic, states that the primary objects of sense perception are physical objects, not ideas in human minds. However, Reid’s philosophy of mind neither begins nor ends with perception. In addition to arguing for direct realism and, consequently, against “the way (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. added 2015-06-20
    Robert D. Rupert, Embodied Functionalism and Inner Complexity: Simon’s 21st-Century Mind.
    This chapter argues that Simon anticipated what has emerged as the consensus view about human cognition: embodied functionalism. According to embodied functionalism, cognitive processes appear at a distinctively cognitive level; types of cognitive processes (such as proving a theorem) are not identical to kinds of neural processes, because the former can take various physical forms in various individual thinkers. Nevertheless, the distinctive characteristics of such processes — their causal structures — are determined by fine-grained properties shared by various, often especially (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. added 2015-06-20
    Ulf Hlobil (forthcoming). Anti-Normativism Evaluated. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. added 2015-06-20
    Benjamin D. Young (2015). Formative Non-Conceptual Content. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (5-6).
    The olfactory system processes smells in a structural manner that is unlike the composition of thoughts or language, suggesting that some of the content of our olfactory experiences are represented in a format that does not involve concepts. Consequently, formative non-conceptual content is offered as an alternative theory of non-conceptual content according to which the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual states is simply a matter of the format of their structural parts and relations within a system of representations. Aside from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. added 2015-06-19
    Bence Nanay (2015). Aesthetic Attention. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22:960118.
    The aim of this paper is to give a new account of the way we exercise our attention in some paradigmatic cases of aesthetic experience. I treat aesthetic experience as a specific kind of experience and like in the case of other kinds of experiences, attention plays an important role in determining its phenomenal character. I argue that an important feature of at least some of our aesthetic experiences is that we exercise our attention in a specific, distributed, manner: our (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. added 2015-06-19
    Bence Nanay (2015). Cognitive Penetration and the Gallery of Indiscernibles. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Danto's Gallery of Indiscernibles thought experiment only works if we make assumptions about the cognitive impenetrability of perception, which we have strong empirical reasons to reject.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. added 2015-06-19
    Andreas Elpidorou (2014). The Bright Side of Boredom. Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  25. added 2015-06-18
    René Jagnow (2015). Can We See Natural Kind Properties? Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):183-205.
    Which properties can we visually experience? Some authors hold that we can experience only low-level properties such as color, illumination, shape, spatial location, and motion. Others believe that we can also experience high-level properties, such as being a dog or being a pine tree. On the basis of her method of phenomenal contrast, Susanna Siegel has recently defended the latter view. One of her central claims is that we can best account for certain phenomenal contrasts if we assume that we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. added 2015-06-17
    Joachim Horvath (forthcoming). Conceptual Analysis and Natural Kinds: The Case of Knowledge. Synthese:1-18.
    There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith’s argument from the causal–explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against the method (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. added 2015-06-17
    Harry Smit (2014). The Social Evolution of Human Nature: From Biology to Language. Cambridge University Press.
    This book sheds new light on the problem of how the human mind evolved. Harry Smit argues that current studies of this problem misguidedly try to solve it by using variants of the Cartesian conception of the mind, and shows that combining the Aristotelian conception with Darwin's theory provides us with far more interesting answers. He discusses the core problem of how we can understand language evolution in terms of inclusive fitness theory, and investigates how scientific and conceptual insights can (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. added 2015-06-16
    Marc Champagne (2015). Poinsot Versus Peirce on Merging with Reality by Sharing a Quality. Versus: Quaderni di Studi Semiotici 120:31–43.
    C. S. Peirce introduced the term “icon” for sign-vehicles that signify their objects in virtue of some shared quality. This qualitative kinship, however, threatens to collapse the relata of the sign into one and the same thing. Accordingly, the late medieval philosopher of signs John Poinsot held that, “no matter how perfect, a concept [...] always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself signifying.” Poinsot is touted by his present-day advocates as a realist, but I believe that, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. added 2015-06-15
    Franz Knappik (2015). Self-Knowledge About Attitudes: Rationalism Meets Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):183-198.
    Recently influential “rationalist” views of self-knowledge about our rational attitudes hold that such self-knowledge is essentially connected to rational agency, and therefore has to be particularly reliable, immediate, and distinct from third-personal access. This approach has been challenged by “theory theory” or “interpretationist” views of self-knowledge: on such views, self-knowledge is based on the interpretation of information about ourselves, and this interpretation involves the same mindreading mechanisms that we use to access other persons’ mental states. Interpretationist views are usually dismissed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. added 2015-06-15
    Ray Scott Percival (2012). THE NECESSITY OF EXOSOMATIC KNOWLEDGE FOR CIVILIZATION AND A REVISION TO OUR EPISTEMOLOGY. In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), LE NÉANT DANS LA PENSÉE CONTEMPORAINE. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. This located knowledge within the person's mind. I argue that due to the explosive growth of what I like to call "exosomatic knowledge," knowledge outside the mind, the traditional conception has outlived its relevance. On the other hand, Karl Popper's (1934) Falsificationism, with its emphasis on the objective character of knowledge, is not only a sounder, but also a more appropriate theory of knowledge for understanding the nature and growth of civilization. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. added 2015-06-15
    Ray Scott Percival (2012). The Necessity of Exosomatic Knowledge for Civilization and a Revision to Our Epistemology. In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), LE NÉANT DANS LA PENSÉE CONTEMPORAINE. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. This located knowledge within the person's mind. I argue that due to the explosive growth of what I like to call "exosomatic knowledge," knowledge outside the mind, the traditional conception has outlived its relevance. On the other hand, Karl Popper's (1934) Falsificationism, with its emphasis on the objective character of knowledge, is not only a sounder, but also a more appropriate theory of knowledge for understanding the nature and growth of civilization. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. added 2015-06-15
    Ray Scott Percival (2012). THE NECESSITY OF EXOSOMATIC KNOWLEDGE FOR CIVILIZATION AND A REVISION TO OUR EPISTEMOLOGY. In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), LE NÉANT DANS LA PENSÉE CONTEMPORAINE. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. This located knowledge within the person's mind. I argue that due to the explosive growth of what I like to call "exosomatic knowledge," knowledge outside the mind, the traditional conception has outlived its relevance. On the other hand, Karl Popper's (1934) Falsificationism, with its emphasis on the objective character of knowledge, is not only a sounder, but also a more appropriate theory of knowledge for understanding the nature and growth of civilization. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. added 2015-06-15
    Ray Scott Percival (2004). Persons and Popper's World 3: Do Humans Dream of Electric Sheep? In Jeffrey A. Schaler (ed.), Szasz Under Fire: The Psychiatric Abolitionist Faces His Critics. Open Court Publishers. 119-130.
    In the film classic Blade Runner, the story explores the notion of personal identity through that of carefully crafted androids. Can an android have a personality; can androids be persons? The title of the original story by Philip K. Dick is Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? The story suggests that our sense of being a person depends on our having memories that connect us with our childhood. In the movie, the androids are only a couple of years old, but (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. added 2015-06-14
    Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing it, a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. added 2015-06-14
    Ray Scott Percival (forthcoming). Does the New Classicism Need Evolutionary Theory? In Elizabeth Millán (ed.), After the Avant-Gardes. Open Court Publishers. 109-125.
    In what way might the new classicism gain support from evolutionary theory? My rough answer is that evolutionary theory can help defend a return to more classical artistic standards and also explain why classical standards are not simply imposed by social conditioning or by powerful elites, but arise naturally from something more fundamental in the human constitution. Classical standards and themes are an expression of our evolutionary history. The mind can be seen as a biological organ or function, produced by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. added 2015-06-14
    Ray Scott Percival (2015). Descartes' Model of Mind. In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) is considered the founder of modern philosophy. Profoundly influenced by the new physics and astronomy of Kepler and Galileo, Descartes was a scientist and mathematician whose most long-lasting contributions in science were the invention of Cartesian coordinates, the application of algebra to geometry, and the discovery of the law of refraction, what we now call Snell’s law.His most important books on philosophy were The discourse on method(1637) and The meditations(1642). Descartes’ writings display an exemplary degree (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. added 2015-06-12
    Tim Klaassen, Nature's Providence: The Representational Role of Vision.
    In this paper, I propose that visual perception is a straightforward case of (mental) representation. The phenomenology of vision is key here: as we see, we are directly presented with aspects of the environment that are at various distances away from us. Through the process of vision, aspects of the environment that would otherwise still be unavailable or “absent”, are made (quasi-)available, or (quasi-)present. This already by itself makes vision deserving of the name ‘representational’. Moreover, all of this holds true, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. added 2015-06-12
    Tim Klaassen, On Gilbert Harman's The Intrisic Quality of Experience.
    I propose that there are two kind's of qualia realism, and that Harman's observations about the transparency of experience pose a threat to only one of these.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. added 2015-06-12
    William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Seeing What You Want. Consciousness and Cognition.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. added 2015-06-12
    William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Seeing What You Want. Consciousness and Cognition.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. added 2015-06-12
    Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2015). Photographic Phenomenology as Cognitive Phenomenology. British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):71-89.
    Photographic pictorial experience is thought to have a peculiar phenomenology to it, one that fails to accompany the pictorial experiences one has before so-called ‘hand-made’ pictures. I present a theory that explains this in terms of a common factor shared by beliefs formed on the basis of photographic pictorial experience and beliefs formed on the basis of ordinary, face-to-face, perceptual experience: the having of a psychologically immediate, non-inferential etiology. This theory claims that photographic phenomenology has less to do with photographs (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. added 2015-06-11
    Adrien Barton & Till Grüne-Yanoff (forthcoming). From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. added 2015-06-11
    Ted Everett (2014/2015). Other Minds and the Origins of Consciousness. Anthropology and Philosophy 11.
    Why are we conscious? What does consciousness enable us to do that cannot be done by zombies in the dark? This paper argues that introspective consciousness probably co-evolved as a "spandrel" along with our more useful ability to represent the mental states of other people. The first part of the paper defines and motivates a conception of consciousness as a kind of "double vision" – the perception of how things seem to us as well as what they are – along (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. added 2015-06-09
    Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (forthcoming). Color Relationalism and Relativism. Topics in Cognitive Science.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. added 2015-06-09
    Alex Byrne (2013). Review of Kriege (Ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:xx-yy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. added 2015-06-08
    Robert Briscoe (2014). Do Intentions for Action Penetrate Visual Experience? Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-2.
  47. added 2015-06-08
    Christoph Jäger (1999). Selbstreferenz und Selbstbewusstsein (Self-Reference and Self-Knowledge). mentis.
  48. added 2015-06-07
    Lucia Foglia & J. Kevin O’Regan (forthcoming). A New Imagery Debate: Enactive and Sensorimotor Accounts. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    Traditionally, the “Imagery Debate” has opposed two main camps: depictivism and descriptivism. This debate has essentially focused on the nature of the internal representations thought to be involved in imagery, without addressing at all the question of action. More recently, a third, “embodied” view is moving the debate into a new phase. The embodied approach focuses on the interdependence of perception, cognition and action, and in its more radical line this approach promotes the idea that perception is not a process (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. added 2015-06-07
    José Gusmão Rodrigues (2014). There Are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism. Philosophy 89 (02):199-222.
    This article aims to review the standard objections to dualism and to argue that will either fail to convince someone committed to dualism or are flawed on independent grounds. I begin by presenting the taxonomy of metaphysical positions on concrete particulars as they relate to the dispute between materialists and dualists, and in particular substance dualism is defined. In the first section, several kinds of substance dualism are distinguished and the relevant varieties of this kind of dualism are selected. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. added 2015-06-06
    Daniel Gregory (forthcoming). Inner Speech, Imagined Speech, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    A theory which has had significant influence seeks to explain auditory verbal hallucinations as utterances in inner speech which are not properly monitored and are consequently misattributed to some external source. This paper argues for a distinction between inner speech and imagined speech, on the basis that inner speech is a type of actual speech. The paper argues that AVHs are more likely instances of imagined speech, rather that inner speech, which are not properly monitored : 86–107, 2012), Cho and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 179