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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2016-04-28
    Leslie Allan, The Existence of Mind-Independent Physical Objects.
    The author challenges both the eliminative idealist's contention that physical objects do not exist and the phenomenalist idealist's view that statements about physical objects are translatable into statements about private mental experiences. Firstly, he details how phenomenalist translations are parasitic on the realist assumption that physical objects exist independently of experience. Secondly, the author confronts eliminative idealism head on by exposing its heuristic sterility in contrast with realism's predictive success.
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  2. added 2016-04-28
    Richard Heersmink (forthcoming). Distributed Selves: Personal Identity and Extended Memory Systems. Synthese:1-17.
    This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s diachronic self. To develop this claim, (...)
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  3. added 2016-04-28
    Dennis Schulting (forthcoming). On An Older Dispute: Hegel, Pippin, and the Separability of Concept and Intuition in Kant. In Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave Macmillan
    In this chapter, I am interested in how, following Hegel’s critique of Kant, recent Hegelians have interpreted Kant’s claims in the Transcendental Deduction (TD), in particular. Hegelians such as Robert Pippin think that in TD Kant effectively compromises or wavers on the strict separability between concepts and intuitions he stipulates at A51/B75. For if the argument of TD, in particular in its B-version, is that the categories are not only the necessary conditions under which I think objects, by virtue of (...)
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  4. added 2016-04-28
    Marie Guillot (forthcoming). Thinking of Oneself as the Thinker: The Concept of Self and the Phenomenology of Intellection. Philosophical Explorations.
    The indexical word “I” has traditionally been assumed to be an overt analogue to the concept of self, and the best model for understanding it. This approach, I argue, overlooks the essential role of cognitive phenomenology in the mastery of the concept of self. I suggest that a better model is to be found in a different kind of representation: phenomenal concepts or more generally phenomenally grounded concepts. I start with what I take to be the defining feature of the (...)
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  5. added 2016-04-28
    Marie Guillot (forthcoming). I Me Mine: On a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    In recent debates on phenomenal consciousness, a distinction is sometimes made, after Levine (2001) and Kriegel (2009), between the “qualitative character” of an experience, i.e. the specific way it feels to the subject (e.g. blueish or sweetish or pleasant), and its “subjective character”, i.e. the fact that there is anything at all that it feels like to her. I argue that much discussion of subjective character is affected by a conflation between three different notions. I (...)
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  6. added 2016-04-28
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation. In William Seager (ed.), Routledge Panpsychism Handbook. Routledge
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  7. added 2016-04-27
    Philip Goff (forthcoming). Is Realism About Consciousness Compatible with a Scientifically Respectable World View? Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  8. added 2016-04-26
    Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (2016). Neurosemantics Neural Processes and the Construction of Language Meaning. Springer.
    This book examines the concept of “ Neurosemantics”, a term currently used in two different senses: the informational meaning of the physical processes in the neural circuits, and semantics in its classical sense, as the meaning of language, explained in terms of neural processes. The book explores this second sense of neurosemantics, yet in doing so, it addresses much of the first meaning as well. Divided into two parts, the book starts with a description and analysis of the mathematics of (...)
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  9. added 2016-04-25
    David Miguel Gray (2014). Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we (...)
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  10. added 2016-04-23
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). No Need to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  11. added 2016-04-23
    Steven Gross (2016). Review of The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception (Zeimbekis and Raftopoulos, Eds.). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016:1-7.
  12. added 2016-04-21
    Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Pain and Incorrigibility. In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
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  13. added 2016-04-20
    Luca Forgione (2012). Self-Consciousness and Indexicality. The Ubiquity of the Self. Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 2.
    Henrich (1966) has contributed to the revival of philosophical debates on subjectivity and its irreducibility, starting from Fichte’s notion of "insight", and focusing his attention on the reflective model of self-consciousness. Subsequent studies have followed the same line from different perspectives, emphasizing the basic role of pre-reflective self-consciousness as the condition of possibility of conscious experience. The so-called ubiquity thesis has been developed through analysis of indexical thinking.
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  14. added 2016-04-19
    Luca Forgione (2012). Comunicazione, Mente E Scienza Cognitiva: Quadro di Problemi. In Stefano Gensini & Luca Forgione (eds.), Filosofie della comunicazione Tra semiotica, linguistica e scienze sociali. Carocci
    Recentemente Cellucci (2008) ha argomentato che la riflessione filosofica, per essere feconda, deve essere tra le altre cose un’indagine sul mondo che mira in primo luogo alla conoscenza. In questa indagine la filosofia è contigua alla scienza, entrambe non devono avere alcuna restrizione nei loro campi di applicazione, entrambe utilizzano sostanzialmente gli stessi metodi. Inoltre, e in ciò si misurerebbe il maggior valore della filosofia, questa batte vie ancora inesplorate dando origine, eventualmente, a nuove scienze.La scienza cognitiva, lo sfondo teorico (...)
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  15. added 2016-04-18
    David S. Oderberg (forthcoming). Finality Revived: Powers and Intentionality. Synthese:1-39.
    Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and (...)
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  16. added 2016-04-18
    Raimo Tuomela (2016). Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Social ontology, in its broadest sense, is the study of the nature of social reality, including collective intentions and agency. The starting point of Tuomela's account of collective intentionality is the distinction between thinking and acting as a private person versus as a "we-thinking" group member. The we-mode approach is based on social groups consisting of persons, which may range from simple task groups consisting of a few persons to corporations and even to political states. Tuomela extends the we-mode notion (...)
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  17. added 2016-04-18
    Uwe Peters (2016). Human Thinking, Shared Intentionality, and Egocentric Biases. Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):299-312.
    The paper briefly summarises and critiques Tomasello’s A Natural History of Human Thinking. After offering an overview of the book, the paper focusses on one particular part of Tomasello’s proposal on the evolution of uniquely human thinking and raises two points of criticism against it. One of them concerns his notion of thinking. The other pertains to empirical findings on egocentric biases in communication.
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  18. added 2016-04-18
    Luca Forgione (2015). Kant on de Re. Some Aspects of the Kantian Non-Conceptualism Debate. Kant Studies Online:32-64.
    In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). (...)
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  19. added 2016-04-18
    Dave Elder-Vass (2015). Collective Intentionality and Causal Powers. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2):251–269.
    Bridging two traditions of social ontology, this paper examines the possibility that the concept of collective intentionality can help to explain the mechanisms underpinning the causal powers of some social entities. In particular, I argue that a minimal form of collective intentionality is part of the mechanism underpinning the causal power of norm circles: the social entities causally responsible for social norms. There are, however, many different forms of social entity with causal power, and the relationship of collective intentionality to (...)
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  20. added 2016-04-18
    Benjamin Jarvis, Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide.
    More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these norms are not problematic in the (...)
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  21. added 2016-04-18
    Luca Forgione (2010). La Forma Vuota dell'Io. Kant E l'Autoriferimento Del Soggetto Autocosciente. In Gian Pietro Storari & Elisabetta Gola (eds.), Forme e formalizzazioni. Atti del 16º Congresso Nazionale della Società di Filosofia del Linguaggio. Cagliari, 10-12 settembre 2009. Cuec Editrice
    Presupponendo l’influenza di alcune tesi dell’idealismo di Kant su alcune tesi di Wittgenstein non solo attraverso la lettura di Schopenhauer, questo contributo prova a ripercorrere alcune contiguità e differenze tra il dispositivo autoreferenziale dell’appercezione trascendentale e certi aspetti emersi dal dibattito contemporaneo sul carattere irriducibile dell’autoascrizione dei pensieri che contengono un riferimento in prima persona, i cosiddetti I-thoughts, dibattito ispirato da Wittgenstein e dalla sua analisi filosofico-linguistica della grammatica del termine “Io”.
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  22. added 2016-04-18
    Luca Forgione (2004). From Transcendental Subject to Embodied Subject. Some Aspects of Contemporary Debates on Kant. Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 22 (64/65):195-207.
    Kant's theory of subjectivity postulates a common Subject of all representations which reduces them to the unity of conscience and refers to itself by using distinctive acts of reference. Contemporary philosophers such as Strawson, Evans, McDowell and Cassam, develop Kant's conception into a materialist theory of self-consciousness: a view of the Self as a physical object among physical objects that entails a transformation of Kant's transcendental Subject into an embodied one.
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  23. added 2016-04-17
    Declan Smithies (forthcoming). Belief and Self-Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Issues 26.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that what I call the simple theory of introspection can be extended to account for our introspective knowledge of what we believe as well as what we consciously experience. In section one, I present the simple theory of introspection and motivate the extension from experience to belief. In section two, I argue that extending the simple theory provides a solution to Moore’s paradox by explaining why believing Moorean conjunctions always involves some degree (...)
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  24. added 2016-04-17
    Lucas M. Bietti & John Sutton (2015). Multiple Timescales of Joint Remembering in the Crafting of aMemory-Scaffolding Tool During Collaborative Design. In G. Airenti, B. G. Bara & G. Sandini (eds.), roceedings of EuroAsianPacific Joint Conference on Cognitive Science. 60-65.
    Joint remembering relies on the successful interweaving of multiple cognitive, linguistic, bodily, social and material resources, anchored in specific cultural ecosystems. Such systems for joint remembering in social interactions are composed of processes unfolding over multiple but complementary timescales which we distinguish for analytic purposes with the terms ‘coordination’, ‘collaboration’, ‘cooperation’, and ‘culture’, so as better to study their interanimation in practice. As an illustrative example of the complementary timescales involved in joint remembering in a real-world activity, we present a (...)
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  25. added 2016-04-17
    John Sutton (2015). Scaffolding Memory: Themes, Taxonomies, Puzzles. In Lucas Bietti & Charlie Stone (eds.), Contextualizing Human Memory: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding how individuals and groups remember the past. Routledge 187-205..
    Through a selective historical, theoretical, and critical survey of the uses of the concept of scaffolding over the past 30 years, this chapter traces the development of the concept across developmental psychology, educational theory, and cognitive anthropology, and its place in the interdisciplinary field of distributed cognition from the 1990s. Offering a big-picture overview of the uses of the notion of scaffolding, it suggests three ways to taxonomise forms of scaffolding, and addresses the possible criticism that the metaphor of scaffolding (...)
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  26. added 2016-04-17
    Christian Helmut Wenzel (2009). 'Bedeutungserlebnis' and 'Lebensgefühl' in Kant and Wittgenstein: Responsibility and the Future. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 17:451-453.
    This essay is about the inner and the outer in Wittgenstein, in particular his notion of “meaning experience”. Wittgenstein reminds us that we should not think of the inner, psychological the way we think about the outer, physical world. Again and again he keeps returning to certain views about the soul and our mental states. I think that it is not only therapy he has in mind. I will contrast certain aesthetic and ethical aspects of his thoughts with views from (...)
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  27. added 2016-04-17
    Christian Helmut Wenzel (2008). Transcendental Philosophy and Mind-Body Reductionism. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 16:390-392.
    The notion of “representation” is central to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. But naturalism and mind-body reductionism tend to reduce talk of (first-person) representation to stories of (third-person) causality and evolution. How does Kant fare in this context?
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  28. added 2016-04-16
    Christian Helmut Wenzel (2013). Does Thought Happen in the Brain? Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 21:453-455.
    What is the nature of thought? Is thought linguistic and some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some kind of association of ideas and images in the mind? Does it happen in the brain? I will focus on the last question, but also say something about the other two. I will present a simple thought experiment to show that thought must somehow happen in the brain. But then I will soften the impression this might give by pointing (...)
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  29. added 2016-04-15
    Alex Grzankowski (forthcoming). Limits of Propositionalism. Inquiry:1-20.
    Propositionalists hold that, fundamentally, all attitudes are propositional attitudes. A number of philosophers have recently called the propositionalist thesis into question. It has been argued, successfully I believe, that there are attitudes that are of or about things but which do not have a propositional content concerning those things. If correct, our theories of mind will include non-propositional attitudes as well as propositional attitudes. In light of this, Sinhababu’s recent attack on anti-propositionalists is noteworthy. The present paper aims to sharpen (...)
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  30. added 2016-04-15
    Messay Kebede (2016). Action and Forgetting: Bergson’s Theory of Memory. Philosophy Today 60 (2):347–370.
    This paper is about the Bergsonian synchronization of the perpetual present or memory with the passing present or the body. It shows how forgetting narrows and focuses consciousness on the needs of action and how motor memory allows the imagining of the useful side of memory. The paper highlights the strength of Bergson’s analysis by respectively confronting classical theories of memory, the highly regarded perspective of the phenomenological school, Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergsonism, and Sartre’s theory of mental imagery.
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  31. added 2016-04-15
    Justin Tiehen (2015). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1).
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  32. added 2016-04-14
    Murat Aydede (forthcoming). Pain: Perception or Introspection? In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge
    [Penultimate draft] I present the perceptualist/representationalist theories of pain in broad outline and critically examine them in light of a competing view according to which awareness of pain is essentially introspective. I end the essay with a positive sketch of a naturalistic proposal according to which pain experiences are intentional but not fully representational. This proposal makes sense of locating pains in body parts as well as taking pains as subjective experiences.
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  33. added 2016-04-14
    Laureano Luna (forthcoming). Physicalism, Truth, and the Pinocchio Paradox. Mind and Matter.
    We develop an argument sketched by Luna (2011) based on the Pinocchio paradox, which was proposed by Eldridge-Smith and Eldridge- Smith (2010). We show that, upon plausible assumptions, the claim that mental states supervene on bodily states leads to the conclusion that some proposition is both paradoxical and not paradoxical. In order to show how the presence of paradoxes can be harnessed for philosophical argumentation, we present as well a couple of related arguments.
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  34. added 2016-04-14
    Erhan Demircioglu (forthcoming). Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel. Acta Analytica:1-8.
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism (the thesis that humans are cognitively closed with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem). Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
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  35. added 2016-04-11
    Lorenzo Sleakes, Scientific Animism.
    Conscious beings are efficacious and that is how we can know where they exist. They are able to sense their environment and interact with it in a dynamic flexible goal oriented way. They interact with their immediate surroundings in their own characteristic manner. They are self movers but require the use of energy to move. Where would we find such fundamental mental beings, monads or natural individuals? I use science to speculate as to the answer to that question and arrive (...)
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  36. added 2016-04-11
    Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn’t part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of (...)
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  37. added 2016-04-11
    Kevin Morris (forthcoming). The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms, as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a (...)
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  38. added 2016-04-11
    Mark Textor (forthcoming). Brentano on Consciousness. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge
    Consider a perceptual activity such as seeing a colour, hearing a tone, tasting a flavour. How are these activities related to one’s awareness of them? I will use Brentano’s struggle with this question to guide the reader through the development of his view on consciousness. My starting point will be Brentano’s book Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Brentano 1867), in which he developed an inner sense view of consciousness (§§1-2). Brentano’s early view is underexplored in the literature, but crucial for understanding (...)
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  39. added 2016-04-11
    Berit Brogaard & Chudnoff Elijah (forthcoming). Against Emotional Dogmatism. Philosophical Issues 26.
    It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other (...)
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  40. added 2016-04-10
    Dennis Schulting (forthcoming). In Defence of Reinhold's Kantian Representationalism. Aspects of Idealism in "Versuch Einer Neuen Theorie des Menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögen". Kant Yearbook 8.
  41. added 2016-04-10
    Arto Laitinen (2014). Collective Intentionality and Recognition From Others. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Contributions to Social Ontology. Springer 213-228.
    This paper approaches questions of collective intentionality by drawing inspiration from theories of recognition (e.g. Honneth 1995, Ricoeur 2005, Brandom 2007). After some remarks about recognition and groups, the paper examines whether the kind of dependence on recognition that holds of individual agents is equally true of group agents. In the debates on collective intentionality it is often stressed that the identity, existence, ethos, and membership-issues of the group are up to the group to decide (e.g. Tuomela 2007). The members (...)
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  42. added 2016-04-10
    Arto Laitinen (2014). Group Minds and the Problem of the First Belief. Balkan Journal of Philosophy 2014 (1):43-48.
    ABSTRACT. This article presents theories of group belief with a problem. It is conceptually and psychologically impossible for there to be a believer with just one belief. For conceptual reasons, a single belief could not have any content without the background of other beliefs. Or even if it could, it would for psychological reasons be impossible for the believer to know or understand the content of its sole belief. With certain plausible assumptions, however, groups would at some point of time (...)
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  43. added 2016-04-09
    Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Why Afterimages Are Metaphysically Mysterious. Think.
    A short essay for a popular audience on why afterimages are difficult to fit into any ontology.
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  44. added 2016-04-09
    Bryan Frances (forthcoming). The Ontology of Some Afterimages. In Manuel Curado & Steven Gouvei (eds.), Untitled Philosophy of Mind Book.
    A good portion of the work in the ontology of color focuses on color properties, trying to figure out how they are related to more straightforwardly physical properties. Another focus is realism: are ordinary material objects such as pumpkins really colored? A third emphasis is the nature of what is referred to by the terms ‘what it’s like’ or ‘phenomenal character’, as applied to color. In contrast, this essay is exclusively about select color tokens. I will be arguing that whether (...)
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  45. added 2016-04-08
    Matthew Owen (2015). Physicalism's Epistemological Incompatibility with A Priori Knowledge. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):123-139.
    The aim of the present work is to demonstrate that physicalism and a priori knowledge are epistemologically incompatible. The possibility of a priori knowledge on physicalism will be considered in the light of Edmund Gettier’s insight regarding knowledge. In the end, it becomes apparent that physicalism entails an unavoidable disconnect between a priori beliefs and their justificatory grounds; thus precluding the possibility of a priori knowledge. Consequently, a priori knowledge and physicalism are epistemologically incompatible.
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  46. added 2016-04-07
    Gavin Keeney (2014). Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture is a series of essays delineating the gray areas and black zones in present-day cultural production. Part One is an implicit critique of neo-liberal capitalism and its assault on the humanities through the pseudo-scientific and pseudo-empirical biases of academic and professional disciplines, while Part Two returns to apparent lost causes in the historical development of modernity and post-modernity, particularly the recourse to artistic production as both a form of mnemonics and periodic (and (...)
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  47. added 2016-04-06
    Cressida Gaukroger (forthcoming). Why Broad Content Can't Influence Behaviour. Synthese:1-16.
    This article examines one argument in favour of the position that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers over behaviour. This argument states that we establish that the relational properties of mental states do not have causal powers by considering cases where intrinsic properties remain the same but relational properties vary to see whether, under such circumstances, behaviour would ever vary. The individualist argues that behaviour will not vary with relational properties alone, which means that they (...)
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  48. added 2016-04-06
    Kevin Lynch (2016). Self‐Knowledge for Humans, by Quassim Cassam (Oxford University Press, 2014). [REVIEW] Dialectica 70 (1):113-119.
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  49. added 2016-04-06
    Andrei Moldovan (2015). Singular Thought: The Division of Explanatory Labor. Journal of Mind and Behavior 36 (1/2):83-99.
    A tacit assumption in the literature devoted to singular thought is that singular thought constitutes a unitary phenomenon, and so a correct account of it must encompass all instances. In this essay, I argue against such a unitary account. The superficial feature of singularity might result from ver y different deep-level phenomena. Following Taylor (2010) and Crane (2013), I distinguish between the referential fitness and the referential success of a thought. I argue that facts responsible for referential fitness (e.g., mental (...)
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  50. added 2016-04-06
    Andrei Moldovan (2015). Singular Thought Without Significance. Organon F 22 (1):53-70.
    The main purpose of this essay is critical. I focus on Robin Jeshion’s (2002; 2004; 2010) theory of singular thought, and I offer three objections to her Significance Condition for the creation of mental files. First of all, this condition makes incorrect predictions concerning singular thoughts about insignificant objects. Second, it conflicts with a theoretical aim mental file theories usually have, that of accounting for our ability to track discourse referents. And third, it appeals to a vague notion where a (...)
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