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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Steve Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2014-08-29
    Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan (2014). Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP. Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
  2. added 2014-08-28
    Neil Van Leeuwen (forthcoming). Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief. Cognition.
    I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (...)
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  3. added 2014-08-28
    Gabriel Gottlieb (forthcoming). “Know-How, Procedural Knowledge, and Choking Under Pressure”. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and (...)
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  4. added 2014-08-28
    Anthony Cunningham (2005). Great Anger. The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  5. added 2014-08-27
    Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Shared Goals and Development. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a role in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  6. added 2014-08-27
    Ian Proops (forthcoming). Russellian Acquaintance Revisited. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    In Bertrand Russell’s writings during the first two decades of the Twentieth Century there occur two rather different distinctions that involve his much-discussed, technical notion of acquaintance. The first is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the second, the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge of truths. This article examines the nature and philosophical purpose of these two distinctions, while also tracing the evolution of Russell’s notion of acquaintance. It argues that, when he first expressly (...)
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  7. added 2014-08-27
    Martin F. Fricke (2004). Identifying, Discriminating or Picking Out an Object: Some Distinctions Neglected in the Strawsonian Tradition. Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 12:106-107.
    In "Individuals", Peter Strawson talks about identifying, discriminating and picking out particular objects, regarding discriminating and picking out as ways of identifying. I object that, strictly speaking, identification means to say of two things that they are the same. In contrast, discriminating an object from all others can be done by just ascribing some predicate to it that does not apply to the others. Picking out an object does not even seem to require to distinguish it from all others. The (...)
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  8. added 2014-08-26
    Anders Nes (forthcoming). Review of T. Bayne and M. Montague (Eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: OUP, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind.
  9. added 2014-08-26
    Adam Morton (2014). Lockhart's Problem. The Philosophers' Magazine 25 (30).
    If we had more powerful minds would we be puzzled by less - because we could make better theories - or by more - because we could ask more difficult questions? This paper focuses on clarifying the question, with an emphasis on comparisons between actual and possible species of thinker.
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  10. added 2014-08-26
    L. Doughney (2013). Folk, Theory, and Feeling: What Attention Is. Dissertation, La Trobe University
    In this thesis three independent answers to the question ‘what is attention?’ are provided. Each answer is a description of attention given through one of the perspectives that people have on the mental phenomenon. The first answer is the common-sense answer to the question, and is an account of the folk psychology of attention. The understanding of attention put forward here is of attention as a limited, divisible resource that is used in mental acts. The second answer is the empirical (...)
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  11. added 2014-08-25
    Timothy Lane (2015). Self, Belonging, and Conscious Experience: A Critique of Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness: New essays on psychopathology and theories of consciousness. MIT Press.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain seemingly (...)
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  12. added 2014-08-25
    Timothy Lane (2014). When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model. In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  13. added 2014-08-24
    Martin F. Fricke (2014). Transparency or Opacity of Mind? Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 22:97-99.
    Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers’s (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs’. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency (...)
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  14. added 2014-08-24
    Kim Davies (2014). Emergence From What? A Transcendental Understanding of the Place of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (5-6):10-32.
    This paper argues that the standard formulations of the question of how consciousness emerges, both synchronically and diachronically, from the physical world necessarily use a concept of the physical without either a clear grasp of the concept or an understanding of the necessary conditions of its possibility. This concept will be elucidated and some of the necessary conditions of its possibility explored, clarifying the place of the mental and the physical as abstractions from the totality of an agent engaged in (...)
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  15. added 2014-08-23
    J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases’ (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC (...)
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  16. added 2014-08-23
    Georg Theiner & John Sutton (2014). The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, "The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits&Quot;. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-278.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
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  17. added 2014-08-22
    José Ortega Y. Gasset (2004). Consciousness, Object and Its Three Distances. In Dermot Moran & Lester E. Embree (eds.), Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy Volume 2. Routledge. 24-29.
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  18. added 2014-08-21
    Robert Briscoe, Virtual Representation in Pictorial Space.
    Philosophical theories of depiction are typically structured by two assumptions: first, that depiction is a form of representation and, second, that the vehicle of a picture’s representational content is the design visible on its 2D surface. In this paper, I introduce a novel, empirically motivated resemblance theory of depiction that rejects both structuring assumptions. According to what I call the deep resemblance theory, pictures work by presenting virtual models of objects in phenomenally 3D, pictorial space. The first structuring assumption, according (...)
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  19. added 2014-08-21
    Robert Briscoe & John Schwenkler (forthcoming). Conscious Vision in Action. Cognitive Science.
    Conscious visual experience is a source of fine-grained and highly accurate information about the spatial properties of nearby objects. It is thus natural to assume that the spatial information present in visual experience is often used for purposes of intentional, object-directed visuomotor control. Yet this assumption, which we here call the Control Thesis, has been criticized on empirical grounds by proponents of the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis (TVSH) [Clark 2007, 2009; Goodale & Milner 1992, 2004a, 2008; Milner & Goodale 1995/2006]. (...)
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  20. added 2014-08-20
    S. Orestis Palermos (2014). Loops, Constitution and Cognitive Extension. Cognitive Systems Research 27:25-41.
    The ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry, and the persisting theoretical confusion about the fundamental difference between the hypotheses of embedded (HEMC) and extended (HEC) cognition are three interrelated worries, whose common point—and the problem they accentuate—is the lack of a principled criterion of constitution. Attempting to address the ‘causal-constitution’ fallacy, mathematically oriented philosophers of mind have previously suggested that the presence of non-linear relations between the inner and the outer contributions is sufficient for cognitive extension. The abstract idea of (...)
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  21. added 2014-08-20
    John Schwenkler (2014). The First Sense, by Matthew Fulkerson. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  22. added 2014-08-20
    Spyrion Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (2013). Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (8):105-120.
    The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as well as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an ongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social epistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of individualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds that social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be given priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific aim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and (...)
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  23. added 2014-08-19
    J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Erkenntnis.
    Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are in principle incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the prima facie appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition nor the extended mind theses are in principle (...)
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  24. added 2014-08-18
    Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson, Theories of Sensory Affect: Compare and Contrast.
    Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...)
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  25. added 2014-08-18
    Jean-Pierre Cléro (forthcoming). On The Ambiguous Status of Pleasure in Bentham's Theory of Fictions. Utilitas:1-21.
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  26. added 2014-08-18
    Joseph McCaffrey (2013). Concepts in the Brain: Neuroscience, Embodiment, and Categorization. Protosociology 30:167-190.
  27. added 2014-08-18
    Joseph McCaffrey & Edouard Machery (2012). Philosophical Issues About Concepts. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 3:265-279.
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  28. added 2014-08-17
    Enrico Grube (2014). Atomism and the Contents of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):13-33.
    Diachronic perceptual atomism is the view that the contents of experience do not involve temporal relations between non-simultaneous events, such as motion, succession, or duration, but only ‘snapshots’of the world. Traditionally, atomism has not been a very popular view. Indeed, many philosophers think that it is obviously false and that the main debate about time consciousness takes place between models which reject atomistic commitments. This antiatomistic sentiment can be traced back to William James’s (1890, p. 628) slogan that ‘a succession (...)
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  29. added 2014-08-15
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment. In A. Raftopoulos J. Zeimbekis (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability. Oxford University Press.
    To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability of perception are messier than (...)
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  30. added 2014-08-15
    Jack C. Lyons (forthcoming). Experiential Evidence? Philosophical Studies.
    Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from running together two very difference conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, though not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a new and nonstandard reading of the Sellarsian dilemma.
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  31. added 2014-08-15
    Jack Lyons (forthcoming). Critical Notice: Seemings and Justification, Ed. Chris Tucker. [REVIEW] Analysis.
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  32. added 2014-08-12
    Andrew Sepielli (2014). Should You Look Before You Leap? The Philosophers' Magazine 66:89-93.
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  33. added 2014-08-11
    M. Steenhagen (forthcoming). Sehen lassen: Die Praxis des Zeigens. British Journal of Aesthetics:ayu016.
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  34. added 2014-08-11
    Daniel Nolan & Alexander Sandgren (forthcoming). Creationism and Cardinality. Analysis.
    Creationism about fictional entities requires a principle connecting what fictions say exist with which fictional entities really exist. The most natural way of spelling out such a principle yields inconsistent verdicts about how many fictional entities are generated by certain inconsistent fictions. Avoiding inconsistency without compromising the attractions of creationism will not be easy.
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  35. added 2014-08-11
    Martina Sauer (2014-03-15). Lambert Wiesing, Sehen lassen. Die Praxis des Zeigens, Berlin 2013. [REVIEW] Sehepunkte. Rezensionsjournal für Geschichtswissenschaften 14 (3).
  36. added 2014-08-11
    Lubomira Radoilska (2014). Belief and Agency. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):377-380.
  37. added 2014-08-10
    Jussi Suikkanen, Judgment Internalism and Self-Knowledge.
    Judgment internalism about evaluative judgments is the view that there is a necessary internal connection between evaluative judgments and motivation understood as desires. The debate about judgment internalism has reached a standoff some time ago. In this paper, I outline a new argument for judgment internalism. This argument does not rely on intuitions about cases, but rather it has the form of an inference to the best explanation. I argue that the best philosophical explanations of how we know what we (...)
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  38. added 2014-08-07
    Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Freud, S. In E. Neukrug (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Theory in Counselling and Psychotherapy. Sage.
    Brief description of Freud's life and work, emphasising the role of fictive belief and experience (phantasy) in his account of mental disorder.
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  39. added 2014-08-07
    Jessica Pepp (forthcoming). A Puzzle About Lying. In Eliot Michaelson Andreas Stokke (ed.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, and Ethics. OUP.
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  40. added 2014-08-07
    Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). The Significance of Consilience: Psychoanalysis, Attachment, Neuroscience, and Evolution. In L. Brakel & V. Talvete (eds.), Psychoanalysis and Philosophy of Mind: Unconscious mentality in the 21st century. Karnac.
    This paper considers clinical psychoanalysis together with developmental psychology (particularly attachment theory), evolution, and neuroscience in the context a Bayesian account of confirmation and disconfrimation. -/- In it I argue that these converging sources of support indicate that the combination of relatively low predictive power and broad explanatory scope that characterise the theories of both Freud and Darwin suggest that Freud's theory, like Darwin's, may strike deeply into natural phenomena. -/- The same argument, however, suggests that conclusive confirmation for Freudian (...)
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  41. added 2014-08-06
    Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier (forthcoming). Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett (2012; 1996, 2001; 1991) and Patricia Churchland (1996; 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no non-question begging argument for the (...)
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  42. added 2014-08-06
    Jim Hopkins (forthcoming). Kantian Neuroscience and Radical Interpretation. In Festschfrift for Mark Platts.
    This is an unedited version of a paper written in 2012 accepted for publication in a forthcoming Festschrift for Mark Platts. In it I argue that the Helmholtz/Bayes tradition of free energy neuroscience begun by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues, and now being carried forward by Karl Friston and his, can be seen as a fulfilment of the Quine/Davidson program of radical interpretation, and also of Quine’s conception of a naturalized epistemology. -/- This program, in turn, is rooted in Helmholtz’s (...)
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  43. added 2014-08-06
    Vincenzo Fano, Enrico Giannetto, Giulia Giannini & Pierluigi Graziani (2012). Complessità E Riduzionismo. ISONOMIA - Epistemologica Series Editor.
    The enormous increasing of connections between people and the noteworthy enlargement of domains and methods in sciences have augmented extraordinarily the cardinality of the set of meaningful human symbols. We know that complexity is always on the way to become complication, i.e. a non-tractable topic. For this reason scholars engage themselves more and more in attempting to tame plurality and chaos. In this book distinguished scientists, philosophers and historians of science reflect on the topic from a multidisciplinary point of view. (...)
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  44. added 2014-08-04
    Paul Silva Jr (forthcoming). On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One's Beliefs. Erkenntnis.
    According to the orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one's belief in P on one's source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work, John Turri (2010) argues that the orthodox view fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri's novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common (...)
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  45. added 2014-08-04
    J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. Philosophical Studies.
    According to robust virtue epistemology (RVE), knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the (alleged) grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We (...)
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  46. added 2014-08-04
    Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Recent Work on the Normativity of Belief. Analysis.
    This is a survey of recent debates concerning the normativity of belief. We explain what the thesis that belief is normative involves, consider arguments for and against that thesis, and explore its bearing on debates in metaethics.
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  47. added 2014-08-04
    Franck Lihoreau (2014). Revelation and The Essentiality of Essence. Symposion 1 (1):69-75.
    It is usually agreed that the Revelation Thesis about experience – the idea that the knowledge we gain by having an experience somehow “reveals” the essence, or nature, of this experience – only requires that we know the essence of the experience, not that we know, of this essence, that it is the essence of the experience. I contest this agreement. In the light of what I call the “Essentiality of Essence Principle”– the principle that whatever is in the essence (...)
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  48. added 2014-08-01
    Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). Grounding Causal Closure. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    What does it mean to say that mind-body dualism is causally problematic in a way that other mind-body theories, such as the psychophysical type identity theory, are not? After considering and rejecting various proposals, I advance my own, which focuses on what grounds the causal closure of the physical realm. A metametaphysical implication of my proposal is that philosophers working without the notion of grounding in their toolkit are metaphysically impoverished. They cannot do justice to the thought, encountered in every (...)
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  49. added 2014-07-31
    Joel Smith, Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value.
    I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
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  50. added 2014-07-31
    Joel Smith, Vision and the Ontology of Emotion and Expression.
    I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can see others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.
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