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Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Chalmers and David Bourget
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
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  1. added 2015-05-26
    Susanna Schellenberg, Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.
  2. added 2015-05-25
    Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Color Categorization. In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Colour. Routledge.
  3. added 2015-05-25
    Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim (forthcoming). Mental Files and Non-Transitive De Jure Coreference. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-24.
    Among other virtues, Mental Files Theory provides a straightforward explanation of de jure coreference, i.e. identity of referent guaranteed by meaning alone: de jure coreference holds between terms when these are associated with the same mental file from which they inherit their reference. In this paper, I discuss an objection that Angel Pinillos raises against Mental Files Theory and other similar theories: the theory predicts that de jure coreference should be transitive, just like identity. Yet there are cases, involving ‘slash-terms’, (...)
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  4. added 2015-05-25
    Robert B. Brandom (2015). From Empiricism to Expressivism. Harvard University Press.
  5. added 2015-05-25
    Guido Melchior (2014). Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail? Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol. 86-2012 90:335-346.
    Pritchard argues that epistemological disjunctivism seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, in (...)
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  6. added 2015-05-24
    Johannes Roessler (forthcoming). Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different accounts (...)
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  7. added 2015-05-23
    François Jaquet & Hichem Naar (forthcoming). Moral Beliefs for the Error Theorist? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    The moral error theory holds that moral claims and beliefs, because they commit us to the existence of illusory entities, are systematically false or untrue. It is an open question what we should do with moral thought and discourse once we have become convinced by this view. Until recently, this question had received two main answers. The abolitionist proposed that we should get rid of moral thought altogether. The fictionalist, though he agreed we should eliminate moral beliefs, enjoined us to (...)
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  8. added 2015-05-22
    Cass R. Sunstein (forthcoming). Nudges, Agency, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    This essay has three general themes. The first involves the claim that nudging threatens human agency. My basic response is that human agency is fully retained and that agency is always exercised in the context of some kind of choice architecture. The second theme involves the importance of having a sufficiently capacious sense of the category of nudges, and a full appreciation of the differences among them. Some nudges either enlist or combat behavioral biases but others do not, and even (...)
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  9. added 2015-05-21
    Andreas Kapsner & Barbara Sandfuchs (forthcoming). Nudging as a Threat to Privacy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
    Nudges can pose serious threats to citizens’ privacy. The essay discusses several examples of nudges that must appear problematic to anyone valuing privacy. The paper also re-draws a well established connection between privacy and autonomy and argues that insofar as nudges incur too great a loss of privacy, they are incompatible with the libertarianism that libertarian paternalism is committed to by virtue of its very name.
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  10. added 2015-05-21
    Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.) (2015). Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. Routledge.
    This book draws connections between recent advances in analytic philosophy of mind and insights from the rich phenomenological tradition concerning the nature of thinking. By combining both analytic and continental approaches, the volume arrives at a more comprehensive understanding of the mental process of "thinking" and the experience and manipulation of objects of thought. Contributors scrutinize aspects of thinking that have a common grounding in both the phenomenological and analytic tradition: perception, language, logic, embodiment and situatedness due to individual history (...)
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  11. added 2015-05-19
    Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Seeing the Impossible. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    I defend the view that it is not impossible to see the impossible. I provide two examples in which one sees the impossible and defend these examples from potential objections.
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  12. added 2015-05-19
    Arvid Båve, Conceptual Role Semantics. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Contents: 1. Introduction , 2. Overviews , 3.History and major works, 3.1 Gerhard Gentzen and proof-theory, 3.2 Wilfrid Sellars, 3.3 Gilbert Harman, 3.4 Christopher Peacocke, 3.5 Robert Brandom , 3.6 Paul Horwich, 3.7 Major works by other authors, 4. Mental content first vs. linguistic meaning first, 4.1 Content-first views, 4.2 Meaning-first views, 5. Wide vs. narrow CRS, 5.1 Overviews and major works about externalism/internalism, 5.2 Discussions about externalism within CRS, 6. Descriptive vs. normative CRS, 6.1 Overviews and major works about (...)
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  13. added 2015-05-19
    Jeff Kochan (2015). Objective Styles in Northern Field Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:1-12.
    Social studies of science have often treated natural field sites as extensions of the laboratory. But this overlooks the unique specificities of field sites. While lab sites are usually private spaces with carefully controlled borders, field sites are more typically public spaces with fluid boundaries and diverse inhabitants. Field scientists must therefore often adapt their work to the demands and interests of local agents. I propose to address the difference between lab and field in sociological terms, as a difference in (...)
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  14. added 2015-05-19
    Jeff Kochan (2015). Reason, Emotion, and the Context Distinction. Philosophia Scientiae 19 (1):35-43.
    Recent empirical and philosophical research challenges the view that reason and emotion necessarily conflict with one another. Philosophers of science have, however, been slow in responding to this research. I argue that they continue to exclude emotion from their models of scientific reasoning because they typically see emotion as belonging to the context of discovery rather than of justification. I suggest, however, that recent work in epistemology challenges the authority usually granted the context distinction, taking reliabilism as my example. Emotion (...)
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  15. added 2015-05-19
    Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum (2013). Hearing It Rain - Millikan on Language Learning. Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 20.
    In her ‘Spracherwerb’(2012) Ruth Millikan gives a compelling account of language acquisition based on our ability to track objects. I argue that, and how, it is undermined by her insistence on equating understanding language utterances and sense perception, point to idealist hazards, and plead against propositionality and for imagism in order to safeguard the account’s important potential for giving a comprehensive explication of meaning.
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  16. added 2015-05-19
    Viatcheslav Vetrov (2012). Zur Dekonstruktion des Un/Gesunden in philologischen Taxonomien: westlich-chinesischer Renaissance-Diskurs. Oriens Extremus 51:231-268.
  17. added 2015-05-18
    Gerd Gigerenzer (forthcoming). On the Supposed Evidence for Libertarian Paternalism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    Can the general public learn to deal with risk and uncertainty, or do authorities need to steer people’s choices in the right direction? Libertarian paternalists argue that results from psychological research show that our reasoning is systematically flawed and that we are hardly educable because our cognitive biases resemble stable visual illusions. For that reason, they maintain, authorities who know what is best for us need to step in and steer our behavior with the help of “nudges.” Nudges are nothing (...)
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  18. added 2015-05-18
    Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Hearing a Voice as One’s Own: Two Views of Inner Speech Self-Monitoring Deficits in Schizophrenia. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to explain experiences of auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia in terms of a failure on the part of patients to appropriately monitor their own inner speech. These self-monitoring accounts have recently been challenged by some who argue that AVHs are better explained in terms of the spontaneous activation of auditory-verbal representations. This paper defends two kinds of self-monitoring approach against the spontaneous activation account. The defense requires first making some important clarifications (...)
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  19. added 2015-05-17
    J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki (forthcoming). Extended Knowledge-How. Erkenntnis.
    According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how (e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011; Brogaard 2008; 2009) knowledge how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist (e.g. Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind (e.g. the extended mind thesis and the hypothesis of extended cognition), we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...)
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  20. added 2015-05-17
    Lisa Bortolotti & Kengo Miyazono (forthcoming). The Ethics of Delusional Belief. Erkenntnis.
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can (...)
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  21. added 2015-05-17
    Luis M. Augusto (2012). Teodorico de Freiberg. Tratado sobre a origem das coisas categoriais. 3. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 21 (42):607-648.
    Translation from the Latin into Portuguese, with extensive introduction and notes, of Dietrich of Freiberg's De origine rerum praedicamentalium, Chapter 5. This text, a late medieval treatise on reality and human cognition (or human cognition and reality), is a particularly hard nut to crack; hence my having translated it (O.K., I also enjoyed the Latin part).
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  22. added 2015-05-17
    Luis M. Augusto (2012). Teodorico de Freiberg. Tratado sobre a origem das coisas categoriais. 2. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 21 (41):297-330.
    Translation from the Latin into Portuguese, with extensive introduction and notes, of Dietrich of Freiberg's De origine rerum praedicamentalium, Chapters 3 and 4. This text, a late medieval treatise on reality and human cognition (or human cognition and reality), is a particularly hard nut to crack; hence my having translated it (O.K., I also enjoyed the Latin part).
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  23. added 2015-05-17
    Luis M. Augusto (2011). Teodorico de Freiberg. Tratado sobre a origem das coisas categoriais. 1. Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 20 (40):507-552.
    Translation from the Latin into Portuguese, with extensive introduction and notes, of Dietrich of Freiberg's De origine rerum praedicamentalium, Chapters 1 and 2. This text, a late medieval treatise on reality and human cognition (or human cognition and reality), is a particularly hard nut to crack; hence my having translated it (O.K., I also enjoyed the Latin part).
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  24. added 2015-05-16
    Andrea Sauchelli (forthcoming). Gendler on the Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance. Acta Analytica:1-9.
    Gendler reformulated the so-called imaginability puzzle in terms of authorial breakdown. The main idea behind this move was to isolate the essential features displayed by the alleged problematic cases and to specify a puzzle general enough to be applied to a variety of different types of imaginative resistance. I offer various criticisms of Gendler’s approach to imaginative resistance that also raises some more general points on the recent literature on the topic.
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  25. added 2015-05-16
    Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended. Philosophical Studies.
    This is part of a symposium on my paper “Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence”.
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  26. added 2015-05-13
    Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). Grief's Rationality, Backward and Forward. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Grief is our emotional response to the deaths of intimates, and so like many other emotional conditions, it can be appraised in terms of its rationality. A philosophical account of grief’s rationality should satisfy a contingency constraint, wherein grief is neither intrinsically rational nor intrinsically irrational. Here I provide an account of grief and its rationality that satisfies this constraint, while also being faithful to the phenomenology of grief experience. I begin by arguing against the best known account of grief’s (...)
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  27. added 2015-05-12
    Paweł Gładziejewski (forthcoming). Predictive Coding and Representationalism. Synthese:1-24.
    According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...)
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  28. added 2015-05-12
    Kengo Miyazono, Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2015). Prediction-Error and Two-Factor Theories of Delusion Formation: Competitors or Allies? In Niall Galbraith (ed.), Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning. Psychology Press. 34-54.
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  29. added 2015-05-12
    Krista Lawlor (2008). Knowing Beliefs, Seeking Causes. American Imago 65 (3):335-356.
    Knowing what one believes sometimes takes effort—it sometimes involves seeking to know one’s beliefs as causes. And when one gains self-knowledge of one’s belief this way—that is, through causal self-interpretation—one engages in a characteristically human kind of psychological liberation. By investigating the nature of causal self-interpretation, I discover some surprising features of this liberty. And in doing so, I counter a trend in recent philosophical theories, of discounting the value of self-knowledge in projects of human liberation.
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  30. added 2015-05-11
    Nat Hansen (forthcoming). A New Argument From Interpersonal Variation to Subjectivism About Color: A Response to Gómez-Torrente. Noûs.
    I describe a new, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation to subjectivism about color. The comparative version undermines a recent objectivist response to standard versions of that argument (Gómez-Torrente 2014).
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  31. added 2015-05-10
    Daniel C. Burnston & Jonathan Cohen (2015). Perceptual Integration, Modularity, and Cognitive Penetration. In A. Raftopoulos & J. Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Influences on Perception: Implications for Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press.
  32. added 2015-05-10
    Sebo Uithol, Daniel C. Burnston & Pim Haselager (2014). Why We May Not Find Intentions in the Brain. Neuropsychologia 56:129-139.
  33. added 2015-05-09
    Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
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  34. added 2015-05-08
    Reginald B. Adams Jr & Kestutis Kveraga (forthcoming). Social Vision: Functional Forecasting and the Integration of Compound Social Cues. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    For decades the study of social perception was largely compartmentalized by type of social cue: race, gender, emotion, eye gaze, body language, facial expression etc. This was partly due to good scientific practice , and partly due to assumptions that each type of social cue was functionally distinct from others. Herein, we present a functional forecast approach to understanding compound social cue processing that emphasizes the importance of shared social affordances across various cues . We review the traditional theories of (...)
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  35. added 2015-05-08
    Guilhem Lecouteux (forthcoming). In Search of Lost Nudges. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-12.
    This paper discusses the validity of nudges to tackle time-inconsistent behaviours. I show that libertarian paternalism is grounded on a peculiar model of personal identity, and that the argument according to which nudges may improve one’s self-assessed well-being can be seriously questioned. I show that time inconsistencies do not necessarily reveal that the decision maker is irrational: they can also be the result of discounting over the degree of psychological connectedness between our successive selves rather than over time . Time (...)
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  36. added 2015-05-08
    Francesco Marchi (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-4.
    Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments formed (...)
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  37. added 2015-05-08
    Christian Dahlman, Farhan Sarwar, Rasmus Bååth, Lena Wahlberg & Sverker Sikström (forthcoming). Prototype Effect and the Persuasiveness of Generalizations. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    An argument that makes use of a generalization activates the prototype for the category used in the generalization. We conducted two experiments that investigated how the activation of the prototype affects the persuasiveness of the argument. The results of the experiments suggest that the features of the prototype overshadow and partly overwrite the actual facts of the case. The case is, to some extent, judged as if it had the features of the prototype instead of the features it actually has. (...)
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  38. added 2015-05-08
    Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this *doxastic single end condition* captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  39. added 2015-05-08
    Josefa Toribio (forthcoming). Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-5.
    I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.
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  40. added 2015-05-08
    Fabrice Teroni & Florian Cova, Le paradoxe de la fiction: le retour. L'expression des Émotions: Mélanges En l'Honneur de Patrizia Lombardo.
    Tullmann et Buckwalter (2014) ont récemment soutenu que le paradoxe de la fiction tenait plus de l’illusion que de la réalité. D’après eux, les théories contemporaines des émotions ne fourniraient aucune raison d’adopter une interprétation du terme « existence » qui rende les prémisses du paradoxe incompatibles entre elles. Notre discussion a pour but de contester cette manière de dissoudre le paradoxe de la fiction en montrant qu’il ne prend pas sa source dans les théories contemporaines des émotions. Bien plutôt, (...)
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  41. added 2015-05-08
    Kourken MIchaelian (2014). La mémoire comme source de connaissances. In Connaître. Questions d’épistémologie contemporaine.
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  42. added 2015-05-06
    J. Adam Carter & S. Orestis Palermos (forthcoming). Active Externalism and Epistemology. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  43. added 2015-05-05
    Mitchell Herschbach (forthcoming). Direct Social Perception and Dual Process Theories of Mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition.
    The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 (...)
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  44. added 2015-05-05
    Mitchell Herschbach & William Bechtel (2014). Mental Mechanisms and Psychological Construction. In Lisa Feldman Barrett & James Russell (eds.), The Psychological Construction of Emotion. Guilford Press. 21-44.
  45. added 2015-05-04
    Dustin Stokes (forthcoming). Imagination and Creativity. In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of the Imagination. Routledge.
    This paper surveys historical and recent philosophical discussions of the relations between imagination and creativity. In the first two sections, it covers two insufficiently studied analyses of the creative imagination, that of Kant and Sartre, respectively. The next section discusses imagination and its role in scientific discovery, with particular emphasis on the writings of Michael Polanyi, and on thought experiments and experimental design. The final section offers a brief discussion of some very recent work done on conceptual relations between imagination (...)
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  46. added 2015-05-03
    Craig French & Anil Gomes (forthcoming). On the Particularity of Experience. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full (...)
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  47. added 2015-05-02
    Carlos Montemayor & Harry H. Haladjian (2015). Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention. MIT Press.
    In this book, Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haladjian consider the relationship between consciousness and attention. The cognitive mechanism of attention has often been compared to consciousness, because attention and consciousness appear to share similar qualities. But, Montemayor and Haladjian point out, attention is defined functionally, whereas consciousness is generally defined in terms of its phenomenal character without a clear functional purpose. They offer new insights and proposals about how best to understand and study the relationship between consciousness and attention by (...)
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  48. added 2015-05-02
    Ben Blumson & Weng Hong Tang (2015). A Note on the Definition of Physicalism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):10-18.
    Physicalism is incompatible with what is known as the possibility of zombies, that is, the possibility of a world physically like ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences. But it is compatible with what is known as the possibility of ghosts, that is, the possibility of a world which is physically like ours, but in which there are additional nonphysical entities. In this paper we argue that a revision to the traditional definition of physicalism designed to accommodate the (...)
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  49. added 2015-04-30
    Matthew Parrott (2015). Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 23:e19-e22.
  50. added 2015-04-29
    Matteo Bianchin (forthcoming). Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393115580267.
    I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making (...)
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