Bookmark and Share

Philosophy of Mind

Edited by David Bourget and David Chalmers
Assistant editor: Chang Liu (University of Western Ontario)
Most recently added entries found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 155
  1. added 2014-11-23
    Jakob Hohwy (forthcoming). Prediction Error Minimization, Mental and Developmental Disorder, and Statistical Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    This chapter seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition; this theory is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. added 2014-11-22
    Stan Klein & Cynthia Gangi (2010). The Multiplicity of Self: Neuropsychological Evidence and its Implications for the Self as a Construct in Psychological Research. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1191:1-15.
    This paper examines the issue of what the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research,which converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. added 2014-11-22
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2007). Estudio crítico: Martin Kusch A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein, Montreal and Kingston, Ithaca, McGuill-Queen's University Press, 2006. Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 42 (89):157-188.
    El presente trabajo es un estudio del libro de Martin Kusch acerca den las tesis sostenidas en "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (WRPL) por Saul Kripke examinado a la luz de la controversia desatada por la publicación del mismo en 1982, una de las más intensas que han ocurrido en los últimos 25 años en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En nuestro estudio procedemos en tres etapas. En la primera, presentaremos el desafío del Wittgenstein de Kripke de una (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. added 2014-11-20
    Jeffrey White (201?). Infosphere to Ethosphere Moral Mediators in the Nonviolent Transformation of Self and World. International Journal of Technoethics:1-19.
    This paper reviews the complex, overlapping ideas of two prominent Italian philosophers, Lorenzo Magnani and Luciano Floridi, with the aim of facilitating the nonviolent transformation of self and world, and with a focus on information technologies in mediating this process. In Floridi’s information ethics, problems of consistency arise between self-poiesis, anagnorisis, entropy, evil, and the narrative structure of the world. Solutions come from Magnani’s work in distributed morality, moral mediators, moral bubbles and moral disengagement. Finally, two examples of information technology, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. added 2014-11-20
    Pär Sundström (2014). Two Types of Qualia Theory. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.
  6. added 2014-11-18
    Matthew Parrott (forthcoming). Expressing First-Person Authority. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a novel agency-based account (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. added 2014-11-18
    Muḥammad ʻAlī Ṭāhirī (2011). .
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. added 2014-11-18
    Geert Keil (2001). Rorty und der Eliminative Materialismus – eine Mesalliance? In Thomas Schäfer Udo Tietz (ed.), Hinter den Spiegeln. Beiträge zur Philosophie Richard Rortys. 56-72.
    Im Beitrag von Geert Keil geht es um das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Der Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern Rortys frühes Eintreten für den Eliminativen Materialismus mit seinen entspannten Auffassungen zum Status der Wissenschaften vereinbar ist. Allgemein sieht Rorty die Wissenschaften als eine Reihe etablierter sozialer Praktiken an, als Werkzeuge, mit bestimmten Teilen der Welt zurechtzukommen. Dieses pragmatistisch-instrumentalistische Wissenschaftsverständnis steht in auffallendem Kontrast zu der Rolle, die den Naturwissenschaften im Rahmen des Eliminativen Materialismus zufallen soll. Dieser Lösungsvorschlag für (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. added 2014-11-16
    Jose L. Zalabardo (forthcoming). Wittgenstein's Nonsense Objection to Russell's Theory of Judgment. In Michael Campbell & Michael O’Sullivan (eds.), Wittgenstein and Perception. Routledge.
    I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that Russell's theory of judgment fails to show that it's not possible to judge nonsense.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. added 2014-11-16
    Gerald Alper (2013). The Incredible Shrinking Mind: What Happens When the Human Equation Gets Lost. Karnac.
    From the psychic rat to the gorilla in the room, from British double-agent Kim Philby to comedian Steve Martin, The Incredible Shrinking Mind not only offers a provocative and entertaining critique, but also a profound and practical ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. added 2014-11-16
    Shane Butler & Alex C. Purves (eds.) (2013). Synaesthesia and the Ancient Senses. Acumen.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. added 2014-11-16
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2011). La relevancia de Wittgenstein para una teoría materialista del discurso. In Actas de las VIII Jornadas de Investigación en Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación.
    En el presente trabajo intentaremos mostrar la relevancia del planteo filosófico wittgensteiniano para la fundamentación y el desarrollo de una teoría materialista del discurso. Tomaremos como punto de partida para examinar esta tesis la propuesta de una teoría materialista del discurso desarrollada por Michel Pêcheux (1938-1983). Pêcheux fue un pensador marxista, discípulo de Louis Althusser, a quien habitualmente se ubica en los orígenes de lo que se conoce como “Escuela francesa de Análisis del discurso”2. En nuestro trabajo nos concentraremos en (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. added 2014-11-15
    Valeria Giardino & Gabriel Greenberg (forthcoming). Introduction: Varieties of Iconicity. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    This introduction aims to familiarize readers with basic dimensions of variation among pictorial and diagrammatic representations, as we understand them, in order to serve as a backdrop to the articles in this volume. Instead of trying to canvas the vast range of representational kinds, we focus on a few important axes of difference, and a small handful of illustrative examples. We begin in Section 1 with background: the distinction between pictures and diagrams, the concept of systems of representation, and that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. added 2014-11-15
    Joëlle Proust (forthcoming). Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. added 2014-11-15
    Louise Richardson (2014). Space, Time and Molyneux's Question. Ratio 27 (4):483-505.
    Whatever the answer to Molyneux's question is, it is certainly not obvious that the answer is ‘yes’. In contrast, it seems clear that we should answer affirmatively a temporal variation on Molyneux's question, introduced by Gareth Evans. I offer a phenomenological explanation of this asymmetry in our responses to the two questions. This explanation appeals to the modality-specific spatial structure of perceptual experience and its amodal temporal structure. On this explanation, there are differences in the perception of spatial properties in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. added 2014-11-14
    Adrian Alsmith (forthcoming). Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. added 2014-11-14
    Matthew Stone & Una Stojnic (forthcoming). Meaning and Demonstration. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-29.
    In demonstration, speakers use real-world activity both for its practical effects and to help make their points. The demonstrations of origami mathematics, for example, reconfigure pieces of paper by folding, while simultaneously allowing their author to signal geometric inferences. Demonstration challenges us to explain how practical actions can get such precise significance and how this meaning compares with that of other representations. In this paper, we propose an explanation inspired by David Lewis’s characterizations of coordination and scorekeeping in conversation. In (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. added 2014-11-14
    Fabrice Teroni, Julien A. Deonna & Christine Tappolet (forthcoming). Emotions: Philosophical Issues About. WIREs Cognitive Science.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. added 2014-11-13
    Peter G. Jones, The Case of the Missing Ingredient.
    As a fan of Sherlock Holmes from a young age it occurred to me recently to wonder what the great detective would have made of the 'hard' problem of consciousness. Here is one possible scenario.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. added 2014-11-13
    Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (forthcoming). Color Matching and Color Naming: A Reply to Kuehni and Hardin. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-6.
    We recently conducted an experiment to show that a lot of the empirically measured disagreement cited to support the premise that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors, a premise often cited by philosophers, is due to conceptual factors. Kuehni and Hardin object to how we measured disagreement and to various aspects of our experimental design. In this reply, we defend our study.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. added 2014-11-13
    Stephen Barker (forthcoming). Expressivism About Reference and Quantification Over the Non-Existent Without Meinongian Metaphysics. Erkenntnis 79.
    Can we believe that there are non-existent entities without commitment to the Meinongian metaphysics? This paper argues we can. What leads us from quantification over non-existent beings to Meinongianism is a general metaphysical assumption about reality at large, and not merely quantification over the non-existent. Broadly speaking, the assumption is that every being we talk about must have a real definition. It’s this assumption that drives us to enquire into the nature of beings like Pegasus, and what our relationship as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. added 2014-11-13
    Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Comments on Gauker's Word and Image. Analysis Reviews.
    Christopher Gauker argues that no concept can be extracted from perceptual experience and that imagistic thought cannot draw boundaries between one kind and another. Here, it is argued, on the contrary, that images have extension and are consequently Fregean concepts. Hume’s theory of abstraction as indifference is offered as an account of extra-sensory concepts. Finally, it is argued that modern theories of sensory data processing run parallel to Kant’s idea of synthesis as a pre-condition for perception.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. added 2014-11-13
    Shaun Gallagher (forthcoming). Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. added 2014-11-13
    Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Unique Hues and Colour Experience. Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Colour.
    In this Handbook entry, I review how colour similarity spaces are constructed, first for physical sources of colour and secondly for colour as it is perceptually experienced. The unique hues are features of one of the latter constructions, due initially to Hering and formalized in the Swedish Natural Colour System. I review the evidence for a physiological basis for the unique hues. Finally, I argue that Tye's realist approach to the unique hues is a mistake.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. added 2014-11-13
    Fabrice Teroni (2014). Emotions et connaissance. In Jean-Marie Chevalier Benoît Gautier (ed.), Connaître: Questions de philosophie contemporaine. Ithaque.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. added 2014-11-13
    Simon van Rysewyk, Towards Raising Awareness of Qualitative Pain Research.
  27. added 2014-11-12
    Jose L. Zalabardo (forthcoming). Epistemic Disjunctivism and the Evidential Problem. Analysis.
    I argue that Epistemic Disjunctivism doesn’t sustain a successful anti-sceptical strategy. I contend, in particular, that the treatment of scepticism that Duncan Pritchard puts forward on behalf of Epistemic Disjunctivism is unsatisfactory.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. added 2014-11-12
    Abraham Sesshu Roth (2014). Team Reasoning and Shared Intention. In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Springer. 279-295.
  29. added 2014-11-12
    C. S. Sutton (2014). The Supervenience Solution to the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):619-639.
    Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. added 2014-11-12
    Abraham Sesshu Roth (2014). Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own. In Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 137-162.
  31. added 2014-11-11
    Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency (i.e. mental agency with the purpose to voluntarily produce certain mental representations), mind-wandering is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. added 2014-11-10
    Mark Eli Kalderon, Monism and Pluralism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. added 2014-11-10
    Lisa Shapiro (ed.) (forthcoming). Pleasure: A History. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. added 2014-11-10
    Bruno Mölder (2014). How Philosophical Models Explain Time Consciousness. Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 126:48-57.
    This paper analyses explanations provided by current philosophical models of time consciousness. These models attempt to explain temporal experience by describing the mechanisms of time consciousness in experiential terms. I criticize this practice on two grounds; firstly, it relies upon folk notions that have no clear individuation conditions and secondly because it often merely names, but does not explain the phenomena.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. added 2014-11-10
    Patrick J. Connolly (2014). Newton and God's Sensorium. Intellectual History Review 24 (2):185-201.
    In the Queries to the Latin version of the Opticks Newton claims that space is God’s sensorium. Although these passages are well-known, few commentators have offered interpretations of what Newton might have meant by these cryptic remarks. As is well known, Leibniz was quick to pounce on these passages as evidence that Newton held untenable or nonsensical views in metaphysics and theology. Subsequent commentators have largely agreed. This paper has two goals. The first is to offer a clear interpretation of (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. added 2014-11-10
    Bruno Mölder (2014). Constructing Time: Dennett and Grush on Temporal Representation. In Valtteri Arstila & Dan Lloyd (eds.), Subjective Time: Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience of Temporality. MIT Press. 217-238.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. added 2014-11-10
    Bruno Mölder (2012). Explaining the Gap Intuition. In Oliver Petersen, Dagmar Borchers, Thomas Spitzley & Manfred Stöckler (eds.), Proceedings von GAP.7 Nachdenken Und Vordenken – Herausforderungen an Die Philosophie. Universität Duisburg-Essen. 395-409.
    An explanatory gap ensues when the truths constituting the explanans do not entail the explanandum. Attempts to give a physicalist account of consciousness seem to generate an explanatory gap, which is special in the following psychological sense. In other cases, it is possible to bridge or close the gap by regimenting or eliminating the respective concepts. In the case of consciousness, however, there is a pervasive intuition that the gap remains even when one works out a notion of consciousness that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. added 2014-11-09
    Pedro Karczmarczyk (2013). Discurso y Subjetividad: Michel Pêcheux Hacia Una Teoría de Las Garantías Ideológicas. Décalages. An Althusser Studies Journal 1 (3):1-25.
    En su célebre artículo sobre la ideología y los aparatos ideológicos de estado, Althusser indicaba que las evidencias por las cuales una palabra “designa una cosa” o “posee una significación” se ubicaban, junto con la evidencia de ser sujetos, al nivel de los efectos ideológicos fundamentales. Por otra parte, Althusser destacaba la carencia de una teoría de la garantía ideológica. Con la primera observación, Althusser se limitaba a señalar un paralelo, sin establecer una conexión. Con la segunda, llegaba a fijar (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. added 2014-11-09
    Geert Keil (2010). Naturalismuskritik und Metaphorologie. In Michael Bölker Mathias Gutmann & Wolfgang Hesse (eds.), Information und Menschenbild. 155-171.
    In natürlicher Sprache formulierte Theorien über welchen Gegenstandsbereich auch immer zeichnen sich wesentlich durch ihre zentralen Begriffe aus. In der Begrifflichkeit einer Theorie spiegeln sich ihre Klassifikationen und gegebenenfalls die angenommenen natürlichen Arten wider. Da von den natürlichen Arten unter anderem abhängt, welche induktiven Schlüsse möglich sind, kann man ohne Übertreibung sagen, dass die zentralen Begriffe einer Theorie einen Teil ihrer Erklärungslast tragen. Eine naturalistische Theorie beansprucht, die von ihr behandelten Phänomene als Teile der natürlichen Welt verständlich zu machen, und (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. added 2014-11-08
    Marion Godman (forthcoming). The Special Science Dilemma and How Culture Solves It. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue that there is a tension between the claim that at least some kinds in the special sciences are multiply realized and the claim that the reason kinds are prized by science is that they enter into a variety of different empirical generalizations. Nevertheless, I show that this tension ceases in the case of ‘cultural homologues’–such as specific ideologies, religions, and folk wisdom. I argue that the instances of such special science kinds do have several projectable properties in common (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. added 2014-11-08
    Matteo Bianchin (forthcoming). From Joint Attention to Communicative Action Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science. Philosophy and Social Criticism:0191453714556693.
    In this article I consider the relevance of Tomasello’s work on social cognition to the theory of communicative action. I argue that some revisions are needed to cope with Tomasello’s results, but they do not affect the core of the theory. Moreover, they arguably reinforce both its explanatory power and the plausibility of its normative claims. I proceed in three steps. First, I compare and contrast Tomasello’s views on the ontogeny of human social cognition with the main tenets of Habermas’ (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. added 2014-11-07
    Cesare Cozzo (1994). Ruolo argomentativo immediato. Lingua E Stile:241-65.
    The author presents a theory of meaning centred upon the notion of "immediate argumental role", which distinguishes between understandability and correctness of a language. First, the theoretical and quasi-empirical criteria of adequacy and the relevant data for such a theory are described. Then the sense of a word is defined as given by a set of argumentation rules. The immediate argumental role of a sentence is determined by its syntactic structure and by the senses of the component words. The immediate (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. added 2014-11-06
    Rachel Goodman (forthcoming). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular (or de re) thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought (the MFC) claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. added 2014-11-06
    Ralph D. Ellis (2014). Enactivism and the New Teleology: Reconciling the Warring Camps. Avant (2):173-198.
    Enactivism has the potential to provide a sense of teleology in purpose-directed action, but without violating the principles of efficient causation. Action can be distinguished from mere reaction by virtue of the fact that some systems are self-organizing. Self-organization in the brain is reflected in neural plasticity, and also in the primacy of motivational processes that initiate the release of neurotransmitters necessary for mental and conscious functions, and which guide selective attention processes. But in order to flesh out the enactivist (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. added 2014-11-06
    Kenneth Aizawa (2014). The Enactivist Revolution. Avant (2):19-42.
    Among the many ideas that go by the name of “enactivism” there is the idea that by “cognition” we should understand what is more commonly taken to be behavior. For clarity, label such forms of enactivism “enactivismb.” This terminology requires some care in evaluating enactivistb claims. There is a genuine risk of enactivist and non-enactivist cognitive scientists talking past one another. So, for example, when enactivistsb write that “cognition does not require representations” they are not necessarily denying what cognitivists claim (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. added 2014-11-06
    J. C. Berendzen (2014). Motor Imagery and Merleau-Pontyian Accounts of Skilled Action. Ergo 1 (7):169-198.
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty is often interpreted as claiming that opportunities for action are directly present in perceptual experience. However, he does not provide much evidence for how or why this would occur, and one can doubt that this is an appropriate interpretation of his phenomenological descriptions. In particular, it could be argued the Merleau-Pontyian descriptions mistakenly attribute pre-perceptual or post-perceptual elements such as allocation of attention or judgment to the perceptual experience itself. This paper argues for the Merleau-Pontyian idea that opportunities (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. added 2014-11-06
    Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower (2014). Making Enactivism Even More Embodied. Avant (2):232-247.
    The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. added 2014-11-06
    Przemysław Nowakowski & Tomasz Komendziński (2014). Cognition as Shaking Hands with the World. Introduction. Avant (2):11-16.
    One of the most common questions in today’s cognitive studies is the one regarding embodied cognition. The answer to this question draws our attention to many factors, including bodily actions, which also work to embody cognition. With this in mind, enactivism is included in discussions of embodiment.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. added 2014-11-05
    Pierre Steiner (2014). Enacting Anti-Representationalism. The Scope and the Limits of Enactive Critiques of Representationalism. Avant (2):43-86.
    I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. added 2014-11-04
    Shamik Dasgupta (forthcoming). The Possibility of Physicalism. Journal of Philosophy.
    It has been suggested that many philosophical theses—physicalism, normative naturalism, phenomenalism, and so on—should be understood in terms of ground. Against this, Ted Sider (2011) has argued that ground is ill-suited for this purpose. Here I develop Sider’s objection and offer a response. In doing so I develop a view about the role of ground in philosophy, and about the content of these distinctively philosophical theses.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 155