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  1. Peter Brian Barry (2011). Saving Strawson: Evil and Strawsonian Accounts of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):5-21.
    Almost everyone allows that conditions can obtain that exempt agents from moral responsibility—that someone is not a morally responsible agent if certain conditions obtain. In his seminal Freedom and Resentment, Peter Strawson denies that the truth of determinism globally exempts agents from moral responsibility. As has been noted elsewhere, Strawson appears committed to the surprising thesis that being an evil person is an exempting condition. Less often noted is the fact that various Strawsonians—philosophers sympathetic with Strawson’s account of moral responsibility—at (...)
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  2. Elizabeth Lane Beardsley (1970). Moral Disapproval and Moral Indignation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (2):161-176.
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  3. Jonathan Bennett, Accountability.
    I shall present a problem about accountability, and its solution by Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Some readers of this don’t see it as a profound contribution to moral philosophy, and I want to help them. It may be helpful to follow up Strawson’s gracefully written discussion with a more staccato presentation. My treatment will also be angled somewhat differently from his, so that its lights and shadows will fall with a certain difference, which may make it serviceable even to the (...)
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  4. Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of (...)
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  5. Nicolas Bommarito (2011). Bile & Bodhisattvas: Śāntideva on Justified Anger. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 18:357-81.
    In his famous text the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the 8th century Buddhist philosopher Śāntideva argues that anger towards people who harm us is never justified. The usual reading of this argument rests on drawing similarities between harms caused by persons and those caused by non-persons. After laying out my own interpretation of Śāntideva's reasoning, I offer some objections to Śāntideva's claim about the similarity between animate and inanimate causes of harm inspired by contemporary philosophical literature in the West. Following this, I argue (...)
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  6. Michael E. Bratman (1997). Responsibility and Planning. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):27-43.
    We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson''s account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent''s degree of (...)
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  7. Brian Bruya (2001). Strawson and Prasad on Determinism and Resentment. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (3):198-216.
    P. F. Strawson's influential article "Freedom and Resentment" has been much commented on, and one of the most trenchant commentaries is Rajendra Prasad's, "Reactive Attitudes, Rationality, and Determinism." In his article, Prasad contests the significance of the reactive attitude over a precise theory of determinism, concluding that Strawson's argument is ultimately unconvincing. In this article, I evaluate Prasad's challenges to Strawson by summarizing and categorizing all of the relevant arguments in both Strawson's and Prasad's pieces. -/- Strawson offers four types (...)
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  8. Melvin Chen (2014). Strawson Contra Strawson: Moral Responsibility and Semi‐Compatibilism. Philosophical Forum 45 (1):1-15.
    This paper addresses the Basic Argument in favour of incompatibilism, both in its Strawsonian form and in its weakened form (the CDA). After examining the worries raised by this argument, I will defend a version of semi-compatibilism that is motivated by a narrative theory of the self, arguing that moral responsibility is possible even if the thesis of determinism is taken to be incompatible with the thesis of freedom of will. The semi-compatibilist argument that I provide lowers the standard of (...)
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  9. Randolph Clarke (2013). Some Theses on Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis about (...)
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  10. Randolph Clarke (1997). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):230-232.
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  11. Zac Cogley (2013). The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 205-224.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions—appraisal, communication, and sanction—that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  12. Zac Cogley (2012). Tamler Sommers: Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Reviewed By. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 7.
  13. Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch (2012). Blameworthiness and Time. Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.
    Reactive emotion accounts hold that blameworthiness should be analyzed in terms of the familiar reactive emotions. However, despite the attractions of such views, we are not persuaded that blameworthiness is ultimately a matter of correctly felt reactive emotion. In this paper, we draw attention to a range of little-discussed considerations involving the moral significance of the passage of time that drive a wedge between blameworthiness and the reactive emotions: the appropriateness of the reactive emotions is sensitive to the passage of (...)
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  14. R. S. Downie (1966). Objective and Reactive Attitudes. Analysis 26 (December):33-39.
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  15. Bob Fischer (forthcoming). Against Blaming the Blameworthy. In Ben Bramble & Bob Fischer (eds.), Stirring the Pot: The Moral Complexities of Meat-eating. Oxford University Press.
    We tend not to blame those who eat meat--even if they are blameworthy for so doing. Some think that this is a moral failure on the part of vegetarians and vegans. My aim here, however, is to argue that this isn't so. In short, I argue that if it would be unreasonable to demand that someone behave in a particular way, then we shouldn’t blame her for failing to behave in that way. But it would be unreasonable to demand that (...)
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  16. Christopher Franklin, Strawsonian Libertarianism: A Theory of Free Will and Moral Responsibility.
    My dissertation develops a novel theory of free will and moral responsibility, Strawsonian libertarianism, which combines Strawsonianism about the concept of moral responsibility with event-causal libertarianism concerning its conditions of application. I construct this theory in light of and response to the three main objections to libertarianism: the moral shallowness objection, the intelligibility objection, and the empirical plausibility objection.The moral shallowness objection contends that libertarianism seems plausible only in the absence of a robust understanding of the nature of moral responsibility. (...)
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  17. Espen Gamlund (2011). Forgiveness Without Blame. In Christel Fricke (ed.), The Ethics of Forgiveness. Routledge.
    It is widely recognised in moral philosophy that there is only something to forgive in cases of unexcused and unjustified wrongdoing. I will call this the standard view. According to this view, forgiveness presupposes that the person to be forgiven has done something that warrants blame and resentment. This standard view has not prompted much discussion in the literature on forgiveness. Most writers on forgiveness seem to accept that it only makes sense to speak of forgiveness in those cases where (...)
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  18. Peter A. Graham (2014). A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):388-409.
    In this paper I sketch an account of moral blame and blameworthiness. I begin by clarifying what I take blame to be and explaining how blameworthiness is to be analyzed in terms of it. I then consider different accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness and, in the end, settle on one according to which a person is blameworthy for φ-ing just in case, in φ-ing, she violates one of a particular class of moral requirements governing the attitudes we bear, and (...)
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  19. Patricia S. Greenspan (2003). Responsible Psychopaths. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.
    Psychopaths are agents who lack the normal capacity to feel moral emotions (e.g. guilt based on empathy with the victims of their actions). Evidence for attributing psychopathy at least in some cases to genetic or early childhood causes suggests that psychopaths lack free will. However, the paper defends a sense in which psychopaths still may be construed as responsible for their actions, even if their degree of responsibility is less than that of normal agents. Responsibility is understood in Strawsonian terms, (...)
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  20. Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Free Will and Reactive Attitudes – Michael McKenna and Paul Russell (Eds). Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):213-218.
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  21. Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.) (2013). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
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  22. Pamela Hieronymi, Research Overview.
    In this document I survey my work to date (i.e., to September 2010) and connect it to the larger themes that have been animating it.
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  23. Pamela Hieronymi (2008). Review: Sher's Defense of Blame. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):19 - 30.
    In his In Praise of Blame, George Sher aims to provide an analysis and defense of blame. In fact, he aims to provide an analysis that will itself yield a defense by allowing him to argue that morality and blame "stand or fall together." He thus opposes anyone who recommends jettisoning blame while preserving (the rest of) morality. In this comment, I examine Sher's defense of blame. Though I am much in sympathy with Sher's strategy of defending blame by providing (...)
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  24. Pamela Hieronymi (2004). The Force and Fairness of Blame. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.
    In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...)
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  25. Pamela Hieronymi (2001). Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):529-555.
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  26. Graham Hubbs (2013). Answerability Without Answers. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-15.
    The classical ethical questions of whether and to what extent moral criticism is a sort of rational criticism have received renewed interest in recent years. According to the approach that I refer to as rationalist, accounts of moral responsibility are grounded by explanations of the conditions under which an agent is rationally answerable for her actions and attitudes. In the sense that is relevant here, to answer for an attitude or action is to give reasons that at least purport to (...)
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  27. Elisa A. Hurley & Coleen Macnamara (2011). Beyond Belief: Toward a Theory of the Reactive Attitudes. Philosophical Papers 39 (3):373-399.
    Most moral theorists agree that it is one thing to believe that someone has slighted you and another to resent her for the insult; one thing to believe that someone did you a favor and another to feel gratitude toward her for her kindness. While all of these ways of responding to another's conduct are forms of moral appraisal, the reactive attitudes are said to 'go beyond' beliefs in some way. We think this claim is adequately explained only when we (...)
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  28. Leonard Kahn (2011). Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard's. In (...)
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  29. Robert Kane (2002). Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will: Reflections on Wallace's Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):693–698.
  30. Claire Katz & Linda Radzik (2010). The Ethical and Political Dimensions of Making Amends: A Dialogue. South Central Review 27 (3):144-161.
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  31. Lindsay Kelland (2011). Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' , Edited by Michael McKenna and Paul Russell. Philosophical Papers 39 (1):135-140.
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  32. Matt King, Symmetry and Responsibility.
    IN THIS PAPER, I observe a set of symmetries exposed by examining cases of excused blameworthiness and mitigated praiseworthiness, and argue that a prominent contemporary approach to explaining moral responsibility is ill-suited to explaining why the symmetry obtains. The view I have in mind has a distinctive explanatory strategy: an agent S’s being responsible, on this view, is to be explained in terms of the appropriateness of holding S responsible. This explanatory strategy, whatever its other merits, cannot adequately explain the (...)
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  33. Friderik Klampfer (2014). Consequentializing Moral Responsibility. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (40):121-150.
    In the paper, I try to cast some doubt on traditional attempts to define, or explicate, moral responsibility in terms of deserved praise and blame. Desert-based accounts of moral responsibility, though no doubt more faithful to our ordinary notion of moral responsibility, tend to run into trouble in the face of challenges posed by a deterministic picture of the world on the one hand and the impact of moral luck on human action on the other. Besides, grounding responsibility in desert (...)
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  34. Neil Levy (2013). Conversation and Responsibility, by Michael McKenna. [REVIEW] Mind 122 (486):fzt065.
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  35. Matthew Lister (2014). Review of Defeasibility in Philosophy: Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law; Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, and Marcus Willaschek (Eds.). [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2014.
    This volume is based on papers presented at a conference on defeasibility in ethics, epistemology, law, and logic that took place at the Goethe University in Frankfurt in 2010. The subtitle (“Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law”) better reflects the content than does the title of the original conference. None of the papers focuses directly or primarily on defeasible reasoning in logic, though a few touch on this indirectly. Nor are the papers evenly split among the topics. Six are primarily (...)
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  36. Paul Litton (2007). The Insignificance of Choice and Wallace's Normative Approach to Responsibility. Law and Philosophy 26 (1):67-93.
  37. J. E. Llewelyn (1966). The Inconceivability of Pessimistic Determinism. Analysis 26 (December):39-44.
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  38. Coleen Macnamara (2011). Holding Others Responsible. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.
    Theorists have spent considerable time discussing the concept of responsibility. Their discussions, however, have generally focused on the question of who counts as responsible, and for what. But as Gary Watson has noted, “Responsibility is a triadic relationship: an individual (or group) is responsible to others for something” (Watson Agency and answerability: selected essays, 2004 , p. 7). Thus, theorizing about responsibility ought to involve theorizing not just about the actor and her conduct, but also about those the actor is (...)
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  39. Chauncey Maher (2010). On Being and Holding Responsible. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):129-140.
    In his Responsibility and the moral sentiments , Wallace develops the idea that we should think of what it is to be morally responsible for an act in terms of norms for holding someone responsible for that act. Smith has recently claimed that Wallace's approach and those like it are 'fundamentally misguided'. She says that such approaches make the mistake of incorporating conditions for 'actively blaming' others into the basic conditions for being responsible, when in fact the conditions for active (...)
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  40. Elinor Mason (2005). Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Books 46 (4):343-353.
    In this account of recent work on moral responsibility I shall try to disen- tangle various different sorts of question about moral responsibility. In brief, the tangle includes questions about whether we have free will, questions about whether moral responsibility is compatible with free will, and questions about what moral responsibility involves. As far as possible I will ignore the first sort of question, be as brief as possible on the second sort of question, and focus on the third question. (...)
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  41. Michelle Mason (forthcoming). Reactivity and Refuge. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 143-162.
    P.F. Strawson famously suggested that employment of the objective attitude in an intimate relationship forebodes the relationship’s demise. Relatively less remarked is Strawson's admission that the objective attitude is available as a refuge from the strains of relating to normal, mature adults as proper subjects of the reactive attitudes. I develop an account of the strategic employment of the objective attitude in such cases according to which it denies a person a power of will – authorial power – whose recognition (...)
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  42. Bradford McCall (2011). Free Will and Reactive Attitudes. Edited by Michael McKenna and Paul Russell. Heythrop Journal 52 (2):340-341.
  43. Michael McKenna (2013). Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    In this paper, I defend the central arguments of my book Conversation and Responsibility in response to two critics, Dana Nelkin and Holly Smith.
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  44. Michael S. McKenna (2005). Where Frankfurt and Strawson Meet. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):163-180.
  45. Paul McNamara (2011). Praise, Blame, Obligation, and DWE: Toward a Framework for the Classical Conception of Supererogation and Kin. Journal of Applied Logic 9:153–170.
    Continuing prior work by the author, a simple classical system for personal obligation is integrated with a fairly rich system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic statuses such as obligatoriness and impermissibility. I focus on partitions of the normative statuses generated ("normative positions" but without explicit representation of agency). In addition to being able to model and explore fundamental questions in ethical theory about the connection between (...)
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  46. Paul McNamara (2011). Supererogation, Inside and Out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common Sense Morality. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume I. Oxford University Press. 202-235.
    The standard analysis of supererogation is that of optional actions that are praiseworthy to perform, but not blameworthy to skip. Widespread assumptions are that action beyond the call is at least necessarily equivalent to supererogation ("The Equivalence") and that forgoing certain agent-favoring prerogatives entails supererogation (“The Corollary”). I argue that the classical conception of supererogation is not reconcilable with the Equivalence or the Corollary, and that the classical analysis of supererogation is seriously defective. I sketch an enriched conceptual scheme, “Doing (...)
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  47. Alfred R. Mele (2000). Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447-452.
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  48. Alfred R. Mele (2000). Review: Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447 - 452.
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  49. Thomas Nagel (1989). Fredom and the View From Nowhere. In , The View From Nowhere. Oup.
    _The opening paragraphs of Nagel's book_ _The View from Nowhere_ _(the first five_ _paragraphs below) indicate the general distinction he proposes between an_ _individual's subjective view of things or subjective standpoint as against an objective_ _or external view of things that is nobody's in particular._.
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  50. Dana Kay Nelkin (2013). Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna's Conversation and Responsibility. Philosophical Studies:1-10.
    In this paper, I engage with several of the intriguing theses Michael McKenna puts forward in his Conversation and Responsibility. For example, I examine McKenna’s claim that the fact that an agent is morally responsible for an action and the fact that an agent is appropriately held responsible explain each other. I go on to argue that despite the importance of the ability to hold people responsible, an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is explanatorily fundamental, and in this (...)
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