Search results for 'Puzzle' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  98
    Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern (forthcoming). Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege's Puzzle? Journal of Philosophical Logic.
    In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege's puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege's puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  29
    John Pittard (2016). Evil and God's Toxin Puzzle. Noûs 50 (2):n/a-n/a.
    I show that Kavka's toxin puzzle raises a problem for the “Responsibility Theodicy,” which holds that the reason God typically does not intervene to stop the evil effects of our actions is that such intervention would undermine the possibility of our being significantly responsible for overcoming and averting evil. This prominent theodicy seems to require that God be able to do what the agent in Kavka's toxin story cannot do: stick by a plan to do some action at a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Boyd Millar (2015). Frege's Puzzle for Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2).
    According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Fenrong Liu & Yanjing Wang (2013). Reasoning About Agent Types and the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever. Minds and Machines 23 (1):123-161.
    In this paper, we first propose a simple formal language to specify types of agents in terms of necessary conditions for their announcements. Based on this language, types of agents are treated as ‘first-class citizens’ and studied extensively in various dynamic epistemic frameworks which are suitable for reasoning about knowledge and agent types via announcements and questions. To demonstrate our approach, we discuss various versions of Smullyan’s Knights and Knaves puzzles, including the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE) proposed by (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  5.  57
    Donovan Wishon (forthcoming). Russellian Acquaintance and Frege's Puzzle. Mind.
    In this paper, I argue that a number of recent Russell interpreters, including Evans, Davidson, Campbell, and Proops, mistakenly attribute to Russell what I call ‘the received view of acquaintance ’: the view that acquaintance safeguards us from misidentifying the objects of our acquaintance. I contend that Russell’s discussions of phenomenal continua cases show that he does not accept the received view of acquaintance. I also show that the possibility of misidentifying the objects of acquaintance should be unsurprising given underappreciated (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  45
    Ru Ye (forthcoming). Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  99
    Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz (2013). The New Tweety Puzzle: Arguments Against Monistic Bayesian Approaches in Epistemology and Cognitive Science. Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.
    In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  8. Gabriel Uzquiano (2010). How to Solve the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever in Two Questions. Analysis 70 (1):39-44.
    Rabern and Rabern (2008) have noted the need to modify `the hardest logic puzzle ever’ as presented in Boolos 1996 in order to avoid trivialization. Their paper ends with a two-question solution to the original puzzle, which does not carry over to the amended puzzle. The purpose of this note is to offer a two-question solution to the latter puzzle, which is, after all, the one with a claim to being the hardest logic puzzle ever.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  9.  21
    Chrisoula Andreou (2015). The Real Puzzle of the Self-Torturer: Uncovering a New Dimension of Instrumental Rationality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):562-575.
    The puzzle of the self-torturer raises intriguing questions concerning rationality, cyclic preferences, and resoluteness. Interestingly, what makes the case puzzling has not been clearly pinpointed. The puzzle, it seems, is that a series of rational choices foreseeably leads the self-torturer to an option that serves his preferences worse than the one with which he started. But this is a very misleading way of casting the puzzle. I pinpoint the real puzzle of the self-torturer and, in the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Brian Rabern & Landon Rabern (2008). A Simple Solution to the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever. Analysis 68 (2):105-112.
    We present the simplest solution ever to 'the hardest logic puzzle ever'. We then modify the puzzle to make it even harder and give a simple solution to the modified puzzle. The final sections investigate exploding god-heads and a two-question solution to the original puzzle.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  11. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2013). The Dogmatism Puzzle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (3):1-16.
    According to the Dogmatism Puzzle, knowledge breeds dogmatism: if a subject knows a proposition h, then she is justified in disregarding any future evidence against h, for she knows that such evidence is misleading. The standard, widely accepted, solution to the puzzle appeals to the defeasibility of knowledge. I argue that the defeat solution leaves intact a residual dogmatist puzzle. Solving this puzzle requires proponents of defeat to deny a plausible principle that the original puzzle (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  99
    Gregory Wheeler & Pedro Barahona (2012). Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less Than Three Questions. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):493-503.
    Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112 2 ) and Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44 4 ) have each presented increasingly harder versions of ‘the hardest logic puzzle ever’ (Boolos The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6:62–65 1 ), and each has provided a two-question solution to his predecessor’s puzzle. But Uzquiano’s puzzle is different from the original and different from Rabern and Rabern’s in at least one important respect: it cannot be solved in less than three questions. In this paper we (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13.  67
    Ru Ye (2014). Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):93-108.
    Richard Foley has presented a puzzle purporting to show that all attempts in trying to find a sufficient condition of rationality are doomed. The puzzle rests on two plausible assumptions. The first is a level-connecting principle: if one rationally believes that one's belief that p is irrational, then one's belief that p is irrational. The second is a claim about a structural feature shared by all promising sufficient conditions of rationality: for any such condition, it is possible that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Stavroula Glezakos (2009). Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle? In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be posed prior (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  57
    Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (1):95–108.
    I show, building on Warren Quinn's puzzle of the self-torturer, that destructive conduct with respect to the environment can flourish even in the absence of interpersonal conflicts. As Quinn's puzzle makes apparent, in cases where individually negligible effects are involved, an agent, whether it be an individual or a unified collective, can be led down a course of destruction simply as a result of following its informed and perfectly understandable but intransitive preferences. This is relevant with respect to (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  16. Ken Levy (2009). On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.
    Gregory Kavka's 'Toxin Puzzle' suggests that I cannot intend to perform a counter-preferential action A even if I have a strong self-interested reason to form this intention. The 'Rationalist Solution,' however, suggests that I can form this intention. For even though it is counter-preferential, A-ing is actually rational given that the intention behind it is rational. Two arguments are offered for this proposition that the rationality of the intention to A transfers to A-ing itself: the 'Self-Promise Argument' and David (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Jeffrey A. Barrett & Frank Arntzenius (2002). Why the Infinite Decision Puzzle is Puzzling. Theory and Decision 52 (2):139-147.
    Pulier (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 291) and Machina (2000, Theory and Decision 49: 293) seek to dissolve the Barrett–Arntzenius infinite decision puzzle (1999, Theory and Decision 46: 101). The proposed dissolutions, however, are based on misunderstandings concerning how the puzzle works and the nature of supertasks more generally. We will describe the puzzle in a simplified form, address the recent misunderstandings, and describe possible morals for decision theory.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  97
    Tim S. Roberts (2001). Some Thoughts About the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):609-612.
    "The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever" was first described by the late George Boolos in the Spring 1996 issue of the Harvard Review of Philosophy. Although not dissimilar in appearance from many other simpler puzzles involving gods (or tribesmen) who always tell the truth or always lie, this puzzle has several features that make the solution far from trivial. This paper examines the puzzle and describes a simpler solution than that originally proposed by Boolos.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  19. Lewis Powell (2012). How to Refrain From Answering Kripke's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.
    In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in A Puzzle About Belief poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence Londres est jolie, but not to the English sentence London is pretty, both of which he understands perfectly well. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  95
    Philip Atkins (2013). A Pragmatic Solution to Ostertag's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):359-365.
    Gary Ostertag has presented a new puzzle for Russellianism about belief reports. He argues that Russellians do not have the resources to solve this puzzle in terms of pragmatic phenomena. I argue to the contrary that the puzzle can be solved according to Nathan Salmon’s pragmatic account of belief reports, provided that the account is properly understood. Specifically, the puzzle can be solved so long as Salmon’s guises are not identified with sentences.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  69
    Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2010). The Puzzle of the Hats. Synthese 172 (1):57 - 78.
    The Puzzle of the Hats is a betting arrangement which seems to show that a Dutch book can be made against a group of rational players with common priors who act in the common interest and have full trust in the other players’ rationality. But we show that appearances are misleading—no such Dutch book can be made. There are four morals. First, what can be learned from the puzzle is that there is a class of situations in which (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22. Christoph Kelp (2008). Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-44.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs (namely, about the outcome of fair lotteries) that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regarded (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  3
    Wayne A. Davis (forthcoming). Berg’s Answer to Frege’s Puzzle. Philosophia:1-16.
    Berg seeks to defend the theory that the meaning of a proper name in a belief report is its reference against Frege’s puzzle by hypothesizing that when substituting coreferential names in belief reports results in reports that seem to have different truth values, the appearance is due to the fact that the reports have different metalinguistic implicatures. I review evidence that implicatures cannot be calculated in the way Grice or Berg imagine, and give reasons to believe that belief reports (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  82
    Jeremy Gwiazda (2010). The Lawn Mowing Puzzle. Philosophia 38 (3):629-629.
    In this brief paper, I present a puzzle for consideration.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  77
    Jerome J. Valberg (1992). The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford University Press.
    In examining the puzzle of experience, and its possible solutions, Valberg discusses relevant views of Hume, Kant, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Strawson, as well as ideas from the recent philosophy of perception. Finally, he describes and analyzes a manifestation of the puzzle outside philosophy, in everyday experience.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26.  33
    Duncan Pritchard (2001). A Puzzle About Warrant. Philosophical Inquiry 23 (1-2):59-71.
    A puzzle about warranted belief, often attributed to Kripke, has recently come to prominence. This puzzle claims to show that it follows from the possession of a warrant for one's belief in an empirical proposition that one is entitled to dismiss all subsequent evidence against that proposition as misleading. The two main solutions that have been offered to this puzzle in the recent literature - by James Cargile and David Lewis - argue for a revisionist epistemology which, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  42
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1998). The Puzzle of Attention, the Importance of Metaphors. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):331-351.
    I have two goals in this paper. First, I want to show by example that inferences about theoretical entities are relatively contingent affairs. Previously accepted conceptual metaphors in science set both the general form of new theories and our acceptance of the theories as plausible. In addition, they determine how we define the relevant parameters in investigating phenomena in the first place. These items then determine how we conceptualize things in the world. Second, and maybe more importantly, I want to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  72
    Stephan Krämer (2013). A Simpler Puzzle of Ground. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):85-89.
    Metaphysical grounding is standardly taken to be irreflexive: nothing grounds itself. Kit Fine has presented some puzzles that appear to contradict this principle. I construct a particularly simple variant of those puzzles that is independent of several of the assumptions required by Fine, instead employing quantification into sentence position. Various possible responses to Fine's puzzles thus turn out to apply only in a restricted range of cases.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  29. Clayton Littlejohn (2015). Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle About Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):n/a-n/a.
    In this paper, I present a puzzle about epistemic rationality. It seems plausible that it should be rational to believe a proposition if you have sufficient evidential support for it. It seems plausible that it rationality requires you to conform to the categorical requirements of rationality. It also seems plausible that our first-order attitudes ought to mesh with our higher-order attitudes. It seems unfortunate that we cannot accept all three claims about rationality. I will present three ways of trying (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  30. Jeff Speaks (2011). Frege's Puzzle and Descriptive Enrichment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):267-282.
    Millians sometimes claim that we can explain the fact that sentences like "If Hesperus exists, then Hesperus is Phosphorus" seem a posteriori to speakers in terms of the fact that utterances of sentences of this sort would typically pragmatically convey propositions which really are a posteriori. I argue that this kind of pragmatic explanation of the seeming a posterioricity of sentences of this sort fails. The main reason is that for every sentence like the above which (by Millian lights) is (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  59
    David Pineda (2002). The Causal Exclusion Puzzle. European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):26-42.
    In a series of influential articles (Kim 1989b, 1992b, 1993a and 1998), Jaegwon Kim has developed a strong argument against nonreductive physicalism as a plausible solution to mental causation. The argument is commonly called the ’causal exclusion argument’, and it has become, over the years, one of the most serious threats to the nonreductivist point of view. In the first part of this paper I offer a careful reconstruction and detailed discussion of the exclusion argument. In the second part I (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  32.  83
    Mark Siebel (2004). A Puzzle About Concept Possession. Grazer Philosophische Studien 68 (1):1-22.
    To have a propositional attitude, a thinker must possess the concepts included in its content. Surprisingly, this rather trivial principle refl ects badly on many theories of concept possession because, in its light, they seem to require too much. To solve this problem, I point out an ambiguity in attributions of the form 'S possesses the concept of Fs'. There is an undemanding sense which is involved in the given principle, whereas the theoretical claims concern a stronger sense which can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  4
    H. Schlosberg (1936). An "Apparent Movement" Puzzle. Journal of Experimental Psychology 19 (4):524.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  3
    T. R. Garth (1935). A Blind Puzzle-Box. Journal of Experimental Psychology 18 (2):280.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  83
    Joseph Levine (2001). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly influential ideas on the "explanatory gap," the fact that we can't (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   69 citations  
  36. Sergio Tenenbaum & Diana Raffman (2012). Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Ethics 123 (1):86-112.
    In this paper we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects”, i.e., projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by orthodox theories of rational choice.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  37. Andrea Iacona (2016). On the Puzzle of the Changing Past. Philosophia:1-6.
    In the intriguing article 'The puzzle of the changing past', Barlassina and Del Prete argue that, if one grants a platitude about truth and accepts a simple story that they tell, one is forced to conclude that the past has changed. I will suggest that there is a coherent way to resist that conclusion. The platitude about truth is in fact a platitude, but the story is not exactly as they tell it.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38. José Luis Bermúdez (2011). The Force-Field Puzzle and Mindreading in Non-Human Primates. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):397-410.
    What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. The (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  39. Adam Elga (2013). The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock and the New Rational Reflection Principle. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.
    The “puzzle of the unmarked clock” derives from a conflict between the following: (1) a plausible principle of epistemic modesty, and (2) “Rational Reflection”, a principle saying how one’s beliefs about what it is rational to believe constrain the rest of one’s beliefs. An independently motivated improvement to Rational Reflection preserves its spirit while resolving the conflict.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  40. Ryan Matthew Parker & Bradley Rettler (forthcoming). A Possible Worlds Solution to the Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
  41. Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  42. Sarah McGrath (2011). Skepticism About Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):111-137.
    In this paper, I develop a neglected puzzle for the moral realist. I then canvass some potential responses. Although I endorse one response as the most promising of those I survey, my primary goal is to make vivid how formidable the puzzle is, as opposed to offering a definitive solution.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  43. Corrado Sinigaglia & Stephen A. Butterfill (2015). On a Puzzle About Relations Between Thought, Experience and the Motoric. Synthese 192 (6):1923-1936.
    Motor representations live a kind of double life. Although paradigmatically involved in performing actions, they also occur when merely observing others act and sometimes influence thoughts about the goals of observed actions. Further, these influences are content-respecting: what you think about an action sometimes depends in part on how that action is represented motorically in you. The existence of such content-respecting influences is puzzling. After all, motor representations do not feature alongside beliefs or intentions in reasoning about action; indeed, thoughts (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. David J. Chalmers (2011). Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence. Mind 120 (479):587-635.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  45. Amy Kind (2011). The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):421-439.
    The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel mental states?what they call desire-like imaginings or i-desires. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the i-desire solution to the puzzle of imaginative desire. The introduction of i-desires is both (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  46.  16
    John Campbell & Quassim Cassam (2014). Berkeley's Puzzle: What Does Experience Teach Us? OUP Oxford.
    Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  47.  94
    Peter Langland-Hassan (2008). Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity. Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
    Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  48. Benjamin Schnieder (2010). A Puzzle About 'Because'. Logique Et Analyse 53.
    The essay is a partial investigation into the semantics of the explanatory connective ‘because’. After three independently plausible assumptions about ‘because’ are presented in some detail, it is shown how their interaction generates a puzzle about ‘because’, once they are combined with a common view on conceptual analysis. Four possible solutions to the puzzle are considered.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  49. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2015). Solving the Moorean Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.
    This article addresses and resolves an epistemological puzzle that has attracted much attention in the recent literature—namely, the puzzle arising from Moorean anti-sceptical reasoning and the phenomenon of transmission failure. The paper argues that an appealing account of Moorean reasoning can be given by distinguishing carefully between two subtly different ways of thinking about justification and evidence. Once the respective distinctions are in place we have a simple and straightforward way to model both the Wrightean position of transmission (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  50. T. Parent, A Puzzle About Kinds and Kind Terms.
    ‘The kind Dinosaur’ denotes a kind. Yet many generics are thought to denote kinds also, like the subject-terms in ‘Dinosaurs are extinct’, ‘Liquor causes cirrhosis’, and ‘The mosquito carries malaria’. This view may be an adequate view for the linguist’s purposes--however, it raises a puzzle for the ontologist. The problem is that what is often claimed about kinds is never claimed about dinosaurs, liquor, and the mosquito. Thus, kinds are sometimes said to be abstract objects, immanent universals, nominal essences, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000