Predictive processing is often presented as a unifying framework for perception, action, and cognition, being able to explain most mental phenomena : with regard to perception, the brain harbours a generative model issuing top-down expectations that are matched against bottom-up sensory feedback. Mismatches lead to error messages and model updates until the brain is 'getting it right'. The core notion of prediction error minimization commits the framework to a specification of accuracy conditions. We therefore turn to issues related to the (...) determination of satisfaction conditions discussed in the philosophy of perception. In particular, we rely on work by Recanati who shows that the accuracy conditions of perceptual content are partly determined by the intentional mode and the perceiver. It is important to notice that the self can enter the specification of accuracy conditions in two ways, namely as subject or as object. Even if we do not perceive ourselves explicitly as an object, we always implicitly represent ourselves as subject. We discuss whether and how these two ways of self-representation can be respected in the predictive processing framework. (shrink)

In diesem Buch wird eine Strategie gegen zwei skeptische Tendenzen entwickelt, deren eine den Sonderstatus von Personen bestreitet und deren andere" wahr"für ein Prädikat ausgibt, das schlicht gewissen Verwendungsregeln unterworfen und instrumentalistisch zu interpretieren sei. Die antiskeptische Strategie soll dadurch zum Erfolg führen, dass die beiden von der Skepsis bedrohten Sachverhalte sich gegenseitig stützen. Gezeigt wird, dass die Aufgabe des Sonderstatus von Personen die Leugnung der Bedeutung von" wahr"impliziert und umgekehrt. Positiv gewendet: Die Bedeutung von" wahr"ist in Beziehung auf (...) Subjektivität zu explizieren, und Subjektivität erschließt sich theoretisch durch die Beziehung auf Wahrheit. Die Vorgehensweise ist im wesentlichen negativ; ihr positiver Aspekt besteht in der systematischen Zuordnung der negativen Ergebnisse. Zu Gegenständen der Kritik werden dabei der Naturalismus in der reduktiven wie der eliminationistischen Variante sowie ontologisierende Ansätze, d. h. Versuche, philosophische Probleme durch das Postulat von Entitäten sui generis zu lösen. In der Ablehnung von Ontologisierungen und im negativen Charakter der philosophischen Tätigkeit ergeben sich Berührungspunkte mit dem späten Wittgenstein. Die Differenz liegt in der erwähnten Zuordnung der Resultate der Kritik, die es erlaubt, die intendierte Position als eine transzendentalphilosophische zu charakterisieren. (shrink)

Der Kerngedanke der politischen Theorie des Wilhelm von Humboldt ist äußerst schlicht und übersichtlich: In seinen "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen" heißt es, dass die Funktion des Staats auf die Erhaltung der inneren und auswärtigen Sicherheit beschränkt werden soll. Diese Staatsauffassung findet ihre Begründung in einer Anthropologie, die dem Menschen das Recht und zugleich die Aufgabe zuweist, durch das spontane Zusammenwirken mit den anderen seine Potenzialitäten zur Entfaltung zu bringen. Schlicht und (...) übersichtlich wie diese Staats- und Menschenlehre auch scheinen mag, ist es an ihr außerordentlich interessant, einerseits welche Leitgedanken ihr zugrunde liegen, und andererseits welche theoretischen Neuigkeiten sie erzielt. Hier möchte ich insbesondere vier Aspekte hervorheben: 1- Individualismus: Der Angelpunkt der gesamten Philosophie Humboldts ist das Individuum, aus dem allerdings nie ein selbstgenügsames Subjekt wird; 2- Liberalismus: Humboldt formuliert als erster den Katalog der Motive des Liberalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts; 3- Gesetzmäßigkeitsprinzip: im Sinne seiner Ausformulierung des Rechts- und Freiheitsbegriffs erarbeitet Humboldt ein Gesetzmäßigkeitsprinzip anthropologischen Charakters; 4- Legitimationsprinzip: in Anlehnung an die Prämissen, aus denen sich das neue Gesetzmäßigkeitsprinzip ergibt, setzt Humboldt ein neues Legitimationsprinzip, das unserem Begriffspaar „materielle Verfassung-formelle Verfassung“ sehr ähnelt. (shrink)

Kein Begriff, der nicht seine Geschichte hätte, keine Geschichte, die nicht aus vielen anderen Geschichten zusammengesetzt wäre. Deshalb geht es bei der Darstellung von Wort- und Begriffskarrieren, wie sie die Historische Semantik unternimmt, nicht darum, einen definitiven Sinn zu eruieren und akkurat abzubilden. Es geht vielmehr darum, die Bedürfnisse, Ansprüche und Motive zu entdecken, die hinter den Begriffen und ihren Geschichten stehen. Philosophische Texte sind dann nicht schlicht 'gegeben', so wenig wie die Probleme, denen sie sich widmen - Ihre (...) Aktualität ist oft Teil einer langen Geschichte von Anverwandlungen, Variationen und Gegenversionen. Solchen Geschichten spürt die Historische Semantik nach, indem sie Kontexte vergegenwärtigt und Deutungstraditionen heranzieht. Sie führt vor Augen, wie Begriffen und Erzählungen im Horizont der Geschichte Bedeutsamkeit zuwächst. Und sie erinnert daran, daß Philosophie von jeher mit elementaren Orientierungen befaßt ist - mit ihrer Bereitstellung, Untersuchung und Prüfung - Es geht um die Klärung der Herkunft und Tragweite theoretischer Ansprüche. (shrink)

T. A. Cavanaugh's Hippocrates' Oath and Asclepius' Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession articulates the Oath as establishing the medical profession's unique internal medical ethic - in its most basic and least controvertible form, this ethic mandates that physicians help and not harm the sick. Relying on Greek myth, drama, and medical experience (e.g., homeopathy), the book shows how this medical ethic arose from reflection on the most vexing medical-ethical problem -- injury caused by a physician -- and argues (...) that deliberate iatrogenic harm, especially the harm of a doctor choosing to kill (physician assisted suicide, euthanasia, abortion, and involvement in capital punishment), amounts to an abandonment of medicine as an exclusively therapeutic profession. The book argues that medicine as a profession necessarily involves stating before others what one stands for: the good one seeks and the bad one seeks to avoid on behalf of the sick, and rejects the view that medicine is purely a technique lacking its own unique internal ethic. It concludes noting that medical promising (as found in the White Coat Ceremony through which U. S. medical students matriculate) implicates medical autonomy which in turn merits respect, including honoring professional conscientious objections. (shrink)

At the very beginning of L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie claims that Leibnizians with their monads have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul”; a few years later Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, conceived of living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence,” in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés. This text first (...) appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système de la nature. Now, it is clear that Maupertuis was a kind of Leibnizian; and that his molecule possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties. In that sense he falls under the first category described by La Mettrie. But he was also involved in a debate on this issue with Diderot, who put forth a sustained critique of Maupertuis’ theory of the molecule in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these properties are ‘organizational’, i.e., they can only be properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)

_Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_ attempts to solve a grave problem about critical self-reflection. Psychological studies indicate not just that we are bad at detecting our own "ego-threatening" thoughts; they also suggest that we are ignorant of even our ordinary thoughts. However, self-reflection presupposes an ability to know one’s own thoughts. So if ignorance is the norm, why attempt self-reflection? While admitting the psychological data, this book argues that we are infallible in a limited range of self-discerning judgments—that in some (...) cases, these judgments are self-fulfilling or self-verifying. Even so, infallibility does not imply indubitability, and the author does not wish to provide a "foundation" for empirical knowledge. The point is rather to explain how self-reflection as a rational activity is possible. The book will be of interest to scholars working on the issue of self-reflection across a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of Right concerns ideas on justice, moral responsibility, family life, economic activity, and the political structure of the state. It shows how human freedom involves living with others in accordance with publicly recognized righs and laws. This edition combines a revised translation with a cogent introduction to Hegel's work.

Ist uns eine Person wichtig, möchten wir häufig zwei Haltungen zugleich an den Tag legen, die sich jedoch in einem Spannungsverhältnis zueinander befinden: einerseits eine tolerante Haltung und andererseits eine paternalistische. Zum einen sind wir üblicherweise der Überzeugung, dass andere und insbesondere uns Nahestehende ein Recht darauf haben, in ihren eigenen Angelegenheiten auch ihre eigenen Entscheidungen zu treffen. Dies gilt selbst dann, wenn uns diese Entscheidungen fragwürdig vorkommen. Wir haben diese dann zu tolerieren. Zum anderen neigen wir häufig erneut gerade (...) bei nahestehenden Personen zugleich zu einer paternalistischen Haltung, wenn wir glauben, dass die Person nicht die für sie beste Entscheidung trifft. Wir wollen eben doch das Beste für diejenigen, die uns etwas bedeuten, und wir halten es in manchen Fällen durchaus für angebracht oder gar geboten, auch gegen den aktuellen Willen der uns Nahestehenden zu ihrem eigenen Wohl einzugreifen oder sie von vornherein in die „richtige“ Richtung zu beeinflussen. In diesem Aufsatz diskutiere ich das konstatierte Spannungsverhältnis und weise zunächst die Auffassung zurück, dass schlicht die eine Haltung zugunsten der anderen aufzugeben ist. Anschließend diskutiere ich einen naheliegenden liberalen Vereinbarkeitsvorschlag, dem zufolge Toleranz im Wesentlichen Priorität genießt und Paternalismus nur in einer sehr eingeschränkten Variante möglich und akzeptabel ist. Demgegenüber argumentiere ich, dass der engere soziale Nahbereich nach einem umfassenderen Einbezug der paternalistischen Haltung und paternalistischer Eingriffsmöglichkeiten verlangt. Ich komme deshalb zu dem Schluss, dass, obwohl die praktische Frage, wie in der jeweiligen Situation zu handeln ist, stets eine der konkreten Abwägung bleibt, die beiden Haltungen sich jedoch letztlich als ein jeweils zu einseitiger Ausdruck einer einzigen, umfassenderen Haltung verstehen lassen, nämlich einer um das Wohl und das selbstbestimmte Gelingen des Lebens der nahestehenden Person besorgten und unterstützenden Haltung. (shrink)

Siehe hierzu auch Käthe Trettins Artikel: "Wider allzu schlichte Theoriekonzepte. Probleme des Reduktionismus - ein Blick in philosophische Zeitschriften" in der FAZ vom 20. Januar 1998!Dieser Aufsatz analysiert praktische Kohärenz auf zwei Ebenen: auf der Ebene der konativen Einstellungen und auf der Ebene handlungsleitender Überzeugungen. Der erste Teil befaßt sich mit der Kohärenz konativer Einstellungen und der zweite mit der Kohärenz handlungsleitender Überzeugungen. Die sich ergebende Konzeption praktischer Kohärenz ist gradualistisch und holistisch.Konative Einstellungen und handlungsleitende Überzeugungen sind eng miteinander verwoben, (...) da unser Handeln durch Gründe bestimmt ist. Die Ethik rekonstruiert diese Gründe. Daher kann es Ethik ohne Anwendung nicht geben. Die ethische Theorie bewährt sich in ihren Anwendungen. (shrink)

Ce livre étudie, à travers une série d'épisodes allant de la philosophie des Lumières à notre époque, le problème du matérialisme dans l'histoire de la philosophie et l’histoire des sciences. Comment comprendre les spécificités de l’histoire du matérialisme, des Lumières à nos jours, au sein de la grande histoire de la philosophie et de l’histoire des sciences ? Quelle est l’actualité de l’opposition classique entre le corps et l’esprit ? Qu’est-ce que le rire ou le rêve peuvent nous apprendre du (...) matérialisme ? En traversant l’histoire de ce concept jusqu’à l’émergence d’un « nouveau matérialisme » contemporain, l’ouvrage vise à revitaliser le matérialisme et sa lecture. -/- . (shrink)

J. Willard Gibbs derived the following equation to quantify the maximum work possible for a chemical reaction$${\text{Maximum work }} = \, - \Delta {\text{G}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} = \, - \left( {\Delta {\text{H}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} {-}{\text{ T}}\Delta {\text{S}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} } \right) {\text{ constant T}},{\text{P}}$$ Maximum work = - Δ G rxn = - Δ H rxn - T Δ S rxn constant T, P ∆Hrxn is the enthalpy change of reaction as measured in a reaction calorimeter and ∆Grxn the change in Gibbs energy as measured, if (...) feasible, in an electrochemical cell by the voltage across the two half-cells. To Gibbs, reaction spontaneity corresponds to negative values of ∆Grxn. But what is T∆Srxn, absolute temperature times the change in entropy? Gibbs stated that this term quantifies the heating/cooling required to maintain constant temperature in an electrochemical cell. Seeking a deeper explanation than this, one involving the behaviors of atoms and molecules that cause these thermodynamic phenomena, I employed an “atoms first” approach to decipher the physical underpinning of T∆Srxn and, in so doing, developed the hypothesis that this term quantifies the change in “structural energy” of the system during a chemical reaction. This hypothesis now challenges me to similarly explain the physical underpinning of the Gibbs–Helmholtz equation$${\text{d}}\left( {\Delta {\text{G}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} } \right)/{\text{dT}} = - \Delta {\text{S}}_{{{\text{rxn}}}} \left( {\text{constant P}} \right)$$ d Δ G rxn / dT = - Δ S rxn constant P While this equation illustrates a relationship between ∆Grxn and ∆Srxn, I don’t understand how this is so, especially since orbital electron energies that I hypothesize are responsible for ∆Grxn are not directly involved in the entropy determination of atoms and molecules that are responsible for ∆Srxn. I write this paper to both share my progress and also to seek help from any who can clarify this for me. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRational agents have consistent beliefs. Bayesianism is a theory of consistency for partial belief states. Rational agents also respond appropriately to experience. Dogmatism is a theory of how to respond appropriately to experience. Hence, Dogmatism and Bayesianism are theories of two very different aspects of rationality. It's surprising, then, that in recent years it has become common to claim that Dogmatism and Bayesianism are jointly inconsistent: how can two independently consistent theories with distinct subject matter be jointly inconsistent? In this (...) essay I argue that Bayesianism and Dogmatism are inconsistent only with the addition of a specific hypothesis about how the appropriate responses to perceptual experience are to be incorporated into the formal models of the Bayesian. That hypothesis isn't essential either to Bayesianism or to Dogmatism, and so Bayesianism and Dogmatism are jointly consistent. That leaves the matter of how experiences and credences are related, a... (shrink)

Der Streit um die Wahrheit richtet sich vor allem gegen die Fassung der Urteilswahrheit als einer "Übereinstimmung mit den Sachen". Eine kritische Analyse der Einwände verschiedenster alternativer Wahrheitstheorien (Evidenztheorie, Kohärenztheorie, Konsens- und Diskurstheorie, pragmatische Wahrheitstheorien, existentialistisch-heideggerianische, Jasper'sche, wittgensteinianische und andere) überwindet die Einwände gegen die klassische Korrespondenztheorie durch einen vertieften Begriff des Sachverhalts. Auch in der Verteidigung der Korrespondenztheorie durch Tarski, Popper, Albert und andere neuere Verfechter müssen diverse Mängel überwunden werden, um zu erkennen, daß sich jene schlichte Urgegebenheit der (...) Urteilswahrheit aus keinem Teilbereich der nicht-formalisierten Sprache und des unermeßlichen Reiches des Seins, ja nicht einmal aus der Sphäre des Nichts verdrängen oder durch etwas von Korrespondenz (Adäquatio) Verschiedenes ersetzen läßt. (shrink)

This is a condensed description of the contents and overarching argument found in Hippocrates’ Oath and Asclepius’ Snake: The Birth of the Medical Profession. In that work, I maintain that the basic medical ethical problem concerns iatrogenic harm. I focus particularly on what I refer to as ‘role-conflation’. This most egregious form of iatrogenic harm occurs when a physician deliberately adopts the role of wounder. A contemporary practice such as physician-assisted suicide exemplifies a doctor’s deliberate wounding. I argue that the (...) author of the Hippocratic Oath – aware of the chronic risk of role-conflation – responds to this threat by having the oath-taker specifically forswear signal acts that wound the sick, such as giving a deadly drug even if asked, giving an abortifacient, sexual predation, and gossiping. I argue that by means of the Oath, Hippocrates founds medicine as a profession, a practice intimately involving promising. (shrink)

Partial grounding is often thought to be formally analogous to proper parthood in certain ways. Both relations are typically understood to be asymmetric and transitive, and as such, are thought to be strict partial orders. But how far does this analogy extend? Proper parthood is often said to obey the weak supplementation principle. There is reason to wonder whether partial grounding, or, more precisely, proper partial grounding, obeys a ground-theoretic version of this principle. In what follows, I argue that it (...) does not. The cases that cause problems for the supplementation principle for grounding also serve as counterexamples to another principle, minimality, defended by Paul Audi. (shrink)

A very clear and powerfully argued defence of a most important and surprisingly neglected view."--Derek Parfit, All Souls College, Oxford. "If Dr. Olson is right, we are living animals and what goes on in our minds is wholly irrelevant to questions about our persistence through time....[Should] transform philosophical thinking about personal identity."--Peter van Inwagen, University of Notre Dame.

The most pressing issues of the twenty-first century—climate change and persistent hunger in a world of food surpluses, to name only two—are not problems that can be solved from within individual disciplines, nation-states, or cultural perspectives. They are predicaments that can only be resolved by generating sustained and globally robust coordination across value systems. The scale of the problems and necessity for coordinated global solutions signal a world historical transit as momentous as the Industrial Revolution: a transition from the predominance (...) of technical knowledge to that of ethical deliberation. This volume brings together leading thinkers from around the world to deliberate on how best to correlate worth (value) with what is worthwhile (values), pairing human prosperity with personal, environmental, and spiritual flourishing in a world of differing visions of what constitutes a moral life. Especially in the aftermath of what is now being called the Great Recession, awareness has mounted of the imperative to question the modern divorce of economics from ethics. While the domains of economics and ethics were from antiquity through at least the eighteenth century understood in many cultures to be coterminous and mutually entailing, the modern assumption has been that the goal of maximizing human prosperity and the aim of justly enhancing our lives as persons and as communities were functionally and practically distinct. Working from a wide array of perspectives, the contributors to this volume offer a set of challenges to the assumed independence of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of human and planetary well-being. Reflecting on the complex interrelationship among economics, justice, and equity, the book resists "one size fits all" approaches and struggles to revitalize the marriage of economics and ethics by activating cultural differences as the basis of mutual contribution to shared human flourishing. The publication of this important collection will stimulate or extend critical debates among scholars and students working in a number of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, including philosophy, history, environmental studies, economics, and law. Contributors: Roger T. Ames, James Behuniak Jr., Steve Bein, Nalini Bhushan, Purushottama Bilimoria, Steven Burik, Amita Chatterjee, Baoyan Cheng, Gordon Davis, Jay L. Garfield, Steven F. Geisz, Peter D. Hershock, Larry A. Hickman, Kathleen M. Higgins, Heidi M. Hurd, Thomas P. Kasulis, Workineh Kelbessa, Lori Keleher, Oliver Leaman, James McRae, Jin Y. Park, James Peterman, Naoko Saito, May Sim, Robert Smid, Paul Standish, Kenneth W. Stikkers, Karsten J. Struhl, Meera Sushila Viswanathan, Wu Shiu- Ching, Xu Di, T. Yamauchi, Yang Liuxin. (shrink)

This is the introduction to the Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments.

It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an (...) exception to the prohibition against killing or the requirement to give aid. The difference between this explanation and one appealing to intention is easily overlooked if one fails to distinguish between the prospective use of a moral principle to guide action and its retrospective use to appraise the way an agent governed him or herself. Even if this explanation is accepted, however, it remains an open question whether and how an agent's intention may be relevant to the permissibility of actions in other cases. \\\ [Jonathan Dancy] My first four sections concentrate on the second section of Professor Scanlon's contribution, where he lays out his conception of moral principles and of the role they play in theory and practice. I will raise questions on the following issues: 1. Scanlon's initial introduction of the notion of a principle. 2. His rejection of the standard view that principles are concerned with the forbidding, permitting and requiring of actions. 3. His rejection of pro tanto conceptions of principles in favour of a conception of them as conclusive. 4. The resulting account of what it is for a principle to face and survive exceptions. Scanlon's discussion of these matters here both appeals to and is in some respects more detailed than the relevant section of his recent What We Owe to Each Other. The topic is interesting both for the role played by principles in Scanlon's present discussion of intention and permissibility, and more generally because of his account of wrongness: an act is wrong iff it is ruled out by principles that nobody could reasonably reject. The remainder of my contribution is concerned with the ostensible focus of IP, namely the relevance of agent-intentions to the permissibility of what is done. (shrink)

While philosophers hold that it is patently absurd to blame robots or hold them morally responsible [1], a series of recent empirical studies suggest that people do ascribe blame to AI systems and robots in certain contexts [2]. This is disconcerting: Blame might be shifted from the owners, users or designers of AI systems to the systems themselves, leading to the diminished accountability of the responsible human agents [3]. In this paper, we explore one of the potential underlying reasons for (...) robot blame, namely the folk's willingness to ascribe inculpating mental states or "mens rea" to robots. In a vignette-based experiment (N=513), we presented participants with a situation in which an agent knowingly runs the risk of bringing about substantial harm. We manipulated agent type (human v. group agent v. AI-driven robot) and outcome (neutral v. bad), and measured both moral judgment (wrongness of the action and blameworthiness of the agent) and mental states attributed to the agent (recklessness and the desire to inflict harm). We found that (i) judgments of wrongness and blame were relatively similar across agent types, possibly because (ii) attributions of mental states were, as suspected, similar across agent types. This raised the question - also explored in the experiment - whether people attribute knowledge and desire to robots in a merely metaphorical way (e.g., the robot "knew" rather than really knew). However, (iii), according to our data people were unwilling to downgrade to mens rea in a merely metaphorical sense when given the chance. Finally, (iv), we report a surprising and novel finding, which we call the inverse outcome effect on robot blame: People were less willing to blame artificial agents for bad outcomes than for neutral outcomes. This suggests that they are implicitly aware of the dangers of overattributing blame to robots when harm comes to pass, such as inappropriately letting the responsible human agent off the moral hook. (shrink)

T. J. Smiley; XII.—Entailment and Deducibility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 233–254, https://doi.org/10.1093.

Kit Fine (2000) breaks with tradition, arguing that, pace Russell (e.g., 1903: 228), relations have neither directions nor converses. He considers two ways to conceive of these new "neutral" relations, positionalism and anti-positionalism, and argues that the latter should be preferred to the former. Cody Gilmore (2013) argues for a generalization of positionalism, slot theory, the view that a property or relation is n-adic if and only if there are exactly n slots in it, and (very roughly) that each slot (...) may be occupied by at most one entity. Slot theory (and with it, positionalism) bears the full brunt of Fine's (2000) symmetric completions and conflicting adicities problems. I fully develop an alternative, plural slot theory (or pocket theory), which avoids these problems, key elements of which are first considered by Yi (1999: 168 ff.). Like the slot theorist, the pocket theorist posits entities (pockets) in properties and relations that can be occupied. But unlike the slot theorist, the pocket theorist denies that at most one entity can occupy any one of them. As a result, she must also deny that the adicity of a property or relation is equal to the number of occupiable entities in it. By abandoning these theses, however, the pocket theorist is able to avoid Fine's problems, resulting in a stronger theory about the internal structure of properties and relations. Pocket theory also avoids a serious drawback of anti-positionalism. (shrink)

Can the issue of how important it is whether or not there is a God be decided prior to deciding whether or not there is a God? In this paper, I explore some difficulties that stand in the way of answering this question in the affirmative and some of the implications of these difficulties for that part of the Philosophy of Religion which concerns itself with assessing arguments for and against the existence of God, the implications for how its importance (...) may best be defended within secular academe. (shrink)

The following abbreviations are used to reference Berkeley’s works: PC “Philosophical Commentaries‘ Works 1:9--104 NTV An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision Works 1:171--239 PHK Of the Principles of Human Knowledge: Part 1 Works 2:41--113 3D Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous Works 2:163--263 DM De Motu, or The Principle and Nature of Motion and the Cause of the Communication of Motions, trans. A.A. Luce Works 4:31--52.

What is the highest good actually good for in Kant’s third Critique? While there are well-worked out answers to this question in the literature that focus on the highest good’s practical importance, this paper argues that there is an important function for the highest good that has to do exclusively with contemplation. This important function becomes clear once one notices that coherent [konsequent] thinking, for Kant, was synonymous with "bündiges" thinking, and that both are connected with the highest good in (...) the third Critique’s moral proof for God’s existence. I show that the original meaning of "bündig," which is from the carpentry trade and has been forgotten, illuminates the stakes of the highest good in Kant’s system. For us, as proverbial carpenters of reason, coherence is essential for the intellectual activity of constructing a philosophical worldview in his transcendental idealism. I motivate the reading further by showing how this function can neatly reconstruct Kant’s proof for God’s existence in the third Critique. I conclude by sketching Kant’s reasons for why the project of creating a coherent worldview grounded in the highest good is worth the labor costs. (shrink)

It is generally wrong to manipulate. One leading reason is because manipulation interferes with autonomy, in particular the component of autonomy called ‘independence’, that is, freedom from intentional control by others. Manipulative health promotion would therefore seem wrong. However, manipulative techniques could be used to counter-manipulation, for example, playing on male fears of impotence to counter ‘smoking is sexy’ advertisements. What difference does it make to the ethics of manipulation when it is counter-manipulation? This article distinguishes two powerful defences of (...) counter-manipulative health promotion: that the counter-manipulation would prevent manipulation occurring, leaving people unmanipulated; and that the counter-manipulation would make people healthier without being any more manipulated than they would otherwise be. The article explains how counter-manipulation might work and the limits to its scope. The upshot is that counter-manipulative health promotion could respect the independence people are owed in virtue of their autonomy. However, autonomy is not the only consideration, and the article discusses further potential problems. Counter-manipulative health promotion might be misapplied, it might undermine trust, it might infringe on some norms for role behaviour and it might encourage a regrettable social practice. These objections are likely to be decisive against the counter-manipulation in some but not all cases. (shrink)

The variety DMM of De Morgan monoids has just four minimal subvarieties. The join-irreducible covers of these atoms in the subvariety lattice of DMM are investigated. One of the two atoms consisting of idempotent algebras has no such cover; the other has just one. The remaining two atoms lack nontrivial idempotent members. They are generated, respectively, by 4-element De Morgan monoids C4 and D4, where C4 is the only nontrivial 0-generated algebra onto which finitely subdirectly irreducible De Morgan monoids may (...) be mapped by noninjective homomorphisms. The homomorphic preimages of C4 within DMM constitute a proper quasivariety, which is shown to have a largest subvariety U. The covers of the variety within U are revealed here. There are just ten of them. In exactly six of these ten varieties, all nontrivial members have C4 as a retract. In the varietal join of those six classes, every subquasivariety is a variety—in fact, every finite subdirectly irreducible algebra is projective. Beyond U, all covers of [or of ] within DMM are discriminator varieties. Of these, we identify infinitely many that are finitely generated, and some that are not. We also prove that there are just 68 minimal quasivarieties of De Morgan monoids. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to advance understanding of intellectually virtuous honesty, by examining the relationship between a recent account of intellectual honesty and a recent account of intellectual transparency. The account of intellectual honesty comes from Nathan King, who adapts the work of Christian Miller on moral honesty, while the account of intellectual transparency comes from T. Ryan Byerly. After introducing the respective accounts, I identify four potential differences between intellectual honesty and intellectual transparency as understood by these (...) accounts. I then turn to the question of how to think about the relationship between these traits in light of these potential differences. I make the case that intellectual transparency can either be regarded as an exceptionally strong or ideal variety of intellectual honesty, or it can be regarded as a distinct virtue from intellectual honesty which is a more cardinal virtue than the latter. Along the way, I also note some places where a case can be made that Miller's and King's accounts of honesty and intellectual honesty are in need of refinement or clarification. (shrink)