RÉSUMÉ: La Philosophie de la nature de Hegel élabore une théorie complexe et systématique du monde naturel, qui est passée presque inaperçue dans la littérature secondaire. Selon cette théorie, la nature passe progressivement d'une division originale entre ses deux éléments constitutifs, la pensée et la matière, à leur unification finale, par une séquence rationnellement nécessaire d'étapes dans le processus. Cette progression naturelle présente une structure identique à celle de la progression que Hegel discerne parmi lesformes de la conscience subjective. Une (...) comparaison attentive entre les formes de la conscience et les étapes du développement naturelpeut dès lors servir à élucider cette théorie de la nature et à la dégager des longues discussions sur la science contemporaine auxquelles Hegel l'a inutilement associée. (shrink)

Pieper distinguishes between Platonic stones in which Plato crystallizes mythical fragments from the mere stories which contain them, and Platonic myths, in which he purifies the proper mythical elements, freeing them of the non-mythical elements which tend to obscure them.

The Decalogue is the ten commandments which are a covenant between God and His people. Written on two tablets of stone, this Decalogue is apodictive (unconditional command and prohibition). It expresses the love between God and His people and between members of the people. This article shows that in the Pentateuch there are two versions of the Decalogue (Ex. 20:1-17 and Deut. 5:6-21) with some differences between them. Deuteronomy 5:6-21 contains additions to Exodus 20:1-17. Ex. 20:1-17 was spoken by God (...) himself to the Israelites at Mount Sinai; Deut. 5:6-21 by Moses in the plains of Moab when quoting Ex. 20:1-17. The commandment to keep the Sabbath day holy in Ex. 20:8-11 is motivated by God’s rest on the seventh day of creation; in Deut. 5:12-15 it is motivated by Israel’s liberation from slavery in the land of Egypt. Ex. 20:13-17 contains fi ve social commandments in no apparent order; Deut. 5:17-21 contains six social commandments inparallel arrangement. The Decalogue, as a law does not guarantee its implementation. And the Israelites repeatedly violated or disobeyed the law. Therefore, God Himself takes the initiative and intervenes toensure its implementation. After the destruction of the city of Jerusalem as an outward sign of the end of the Old Covenant, the prophet Jeremiah prophesied the New Covenant at the initiative of God to bewritten in the hearts, so that previously impossible loyalty would now become a reality (Jer. 31:31-34). Thus, the New Covenant is not different from the Sinai Covenant, but rather a renewal of YHWH’s faithfulnesswhich is rebuilt and deepened continuously so that it becomes a “covenant without end” (Lam. 3:22-23). Abstrak Dekalog adalah sepuluh fi rman yang merupakan pernjanjian antara Allah dengan umat-Nya, tertulis dalam dua loh batu. Dekalog yang bersifat apodiktif (perintah dan larangan tanpa syarat) mengungkapkankasih antara Allah dengan umat-Nya dan antarumat Allah. Artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa dalam Pentateukh terdapat dua versi Dekalog (Kel. 20:1-17 dan Ul. 5:6-21) dengan beberapa perbedaan. Ul. 5:6-21 memuat beberapa tambahan yang tidak terdapat dalam Kel. 20:1-17. Kel. 20:1-17 diucapkan sendiri oleh YHWH kepada bangsa Israel di gunung Sinai; Ul. 5:6-21 diucapkan oleh Musa di dataran Moab dengan mengutip isi Kel. 20:1-17. Perintah kuduskanlah hari Sabat dalam Kel. 20:8-11 bermotifkan istirahat Allah pada hari ketujuh saat penciptaan; dalam Ul. 5:12-15 bermotifkan pembebasan bangsa Israel dari perbudakan di tanah Mesir. Kel. 20:13-17 memuat lima perintah sosial tanpa urutan yang jelas; Ul. 5:17-21 memuat enam perintah sosial yang disusun paralel. Dekalog sebagai undang-undang tidak menjamin pelaksanaannya. Berulangkali bangsa Israel telah melanggar atau tidak setia pada penjanjian tersebut. Maka, Allah sendiri yang berinisiatif dan campur tangan demi terjaminnya pelaksanaan perjanjian-Nya. Sesudah penghancuran kota Yerusalem sebagai tanda lahiriah berakhirnya Perjanjian Lama, Nabi Yeremia menubuatkan Perjanjian Yang Baru atas prakarsa Allah yang akan ditulis dalam hati manusia, sehingga kesetiaan yang tadinya mustahil akan menjadi kenyataan (Yer. 31:31-34). Dengan demikian Perjanjian Yang Baru itu tidak berbeda dengan Perjanjian Sinai, tetapi lebih berupa pembaruan kesetiaan YHWH yang dibangun kembali dan diperdalam terus-menerus sehingga menjadi “perjanjian yang tak berkesudahan” (Rat. 3:22-23). (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est un recueil d’études rassemblées en l’honneur de Christopher Rowe et consacrées à différents aspects des dialogues de Platon par quelques-uns des spécialistes les plus importants de ce philosophe. Dans ses très nombreux travaux consacrés à Platon, dont la liste impression­nante figure en fin de volume (p. 312-324), Christopher Rowe a développé une approche originale et extrêmement féconde des Dialogues, qui tranche avec ce que l’on appelait encore il y a quelques années une lec...

Didier Méhu | : Le sermon 163 d’Augustin d’Hippone aurait été prononcé à l’occasion de la dédicace de la basilica Honoriana de Carthage, le 23 septembre 417. Ancré dans le commentaire du verset 5,16 de l’épître aux Galates, Spiritu ambulate et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis, il propose une comparaison entre le processus du salut humain et l’édification de l’église. Les deux aboutissent à la « dédicace », celle du temple de pierres que l’on célèbre alors et celle des élus réunis (...) auprès de Dieu. Nous cherchons à discerner les implications historiques de la dialectique aedificatio-dedicatio qui traverse le sermon, en regard de l’évolution du discours sur le lieu de culte chrétien et de la mise en place d’une structure sociale polarisée par les églises au tournant des ive et ve siècles. | : Augustine of Hippo’s Homily 163 is supposed to have been delivered on the occasion of the dedication of the basilica Honoriana in Carthage, September 23, 417. Rooted in the commentary of Galatians 5:16, Spiritu ambulate et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis, it proposes a comparison between the process of human salvation and the building of a church. Both achieve in the “dedication”, that of the temple of stones, that is then celebrated, and that of the elected gathered with God. We seek to discern the historical implications of the dialectic aedificatio-dedicatio that appears throughout the sermon, in relation to the evolution of the discourse on the Christian place of worship and the establishment of a social structure polarized by the churches, at the turn of the 4th and the 5th centuries. (shrink)

On a book-keeping error in the accounts of Dion. This article proposes a solution to an incoherent calculation identified on lines 8 and 9 of the famous Account of Dion relative to the Pythia (CID II, 139/ CID IV, 57), where a list of expenses occasioned by the preparation of the Pythian games of 246 B. C. are recorded. In effect, 270 medimnoi of earth sold at 1 ¾ obols per medimnos do not equal 43 staters and a half-obol, as (...) is inscribed on the stone, but 39 staters and 4 ½ obols, according to the Aeginetan system used by the accountants of the Delphic Amphictyony. We propose a solution that may explain the inscribed amounts without needing to correct the numbers that can be read on the stone ; it is the accountant of the Amphictyony who should be charged with this miscalculation of which Agazalos, the master-mason who provided the earth for the xystos, took advantage. (shrink)

Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated.

... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...

For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...) - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano. (shrink)

It is always risky to make sweeping statements about the development of philosophy, but if one were nevertheless asked to describe 20th century philosophy in broad strokes, one noteworthy feature might be the following: Whereas important figures at the beginning of the century, figures such as Frege and Husserl, were very explicit in their rejection of naturalism (both are known for their rejection of the attempt to naturalize the laws of logic, i.e., for their criticism of psychologism), the situation has (...) changed considerably. Today many philosophers – not the least within analytical philosophy – would subscribe to some form of naturalism. In fact, naturalism is seen by many as the default metaphysical position. If you don’t subscribe to naturalism you must be subscribing to some form of Cartesian substance dualism. Thus, whereas 20 or 30 years ago one might have been inclined to characterize the development of 20th century philosophy in terms of a linguistic turn, a turn from a philosophy of subjectivity to a philosophy of language, it might today be more apt to describe the development in terms of a turn from anti-naturalism to naturalism. (shrink)

Reviews the history of teaching in the United States over three hundred years, and describes aspects of recruitment, organization, and logic particular to the profession.

In Moran, D. (ed.): Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge, 2008.

We demonstrate that an unlexicalized PCFG can parse much more accurately than previously shown, by making use of simple, linguistically motivated state splits, which break down false independence assumptions latent in a vanilla treebank grammar. Indeed, its performance of 86.36% (LP/LR F1) is better than that of early lexicalized PCFG models, and surprisingly close to the current state-of-theart. This result has potential uses beyond establishing a strong lower bound on the maximum possible accuracy of unlexicalized models: an unlexicalized PCFG is (...) much more compact, easier to replicate, and easier to interpret than more complex lexical models, and the parsing algorithms are simpler, more widely understood, of lower asymptotic complexity, and easier to optimize. (shrink)

An innovative theory of consciousness, drawing on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and supported by brain-imaging, presented in the form of a hardboiled ..

& Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets from the (...) National fMRI Data Center are considered: particularly the structures of temporality. In a second Hazeltine et al., Neural activation during response competi- interpretive approach, artificial neural networks were used tion; Ishai et al., The representation of objects in the human to detect a more explicit prediction from phenomenology, occipital and temporal cortex; Mechelli et al., The effects of namely, that present experience contains and is inflected by presentation rate during word and pseudoword reading; and past states of awareness and anticipated events. In all of 21 Postle et al., Activity in human frontal cortex associated with subjects in this analysis, nets were successfully trained to spatial working memory and saccadic behavior. The study of extract aspects of relative past and future brain states, in consciousness also draws from multiple disciplines. In this comparison with statistically similar controls. This exploratory article, the philosophical subdiscipline of phenomenology study thus concludes that the proposed methods for provides initial characterization of phenomenal structures ‘‘neurophenomenology’’ warrant further application, includ- conceptually necessary for an analysis of consciousness. These ing the exploration of individual differences, multivariate structures include phenomenal intentionality, phenomenal differences between cognitive task conditions, and explora- superposition, and experienced temporality.. (shrink)

On the relevance-theoretic approach outlined in this paper, linguistic metaphors are not a natural kind, and ―metaphor‖ is not a theoretically important notion in the study of verbal communication. Metaphorical interpretations are arrived at in exactly the same way as literal, loose and hyperbolic interpretations: there is no mechanism specific to metaphors, and no interesting generalisation that applies only to them. In this paper, we defend this approach in detail by showing how the same inferential procedure applies to utterances at (...) both ends of the literal-loose-metaphorical continuum, and how both literal and metaphorical utterances may create poetic effects. (shrink)

In two experiments, we investigated whether 13-month-old infants expect agents to behave in a way consistent with information to which they have been exposed. Infants watched animations in which an animal was either provided information or prevented from gathering information about the actual location of an object. The animal then searched successfully or failed to retrieve it. Infants’ looking times suggest that they expected searches to be effective when—and only when—the agent had had access to the relevant information. This result (...) supports the view that infants’ possess an incipient metarepresentational ability that permits them to attribute beliefs to agents. We discuss the viability of more conservative explanations and the relationship between this early ability and later forms of ‘theory of mind’ that appear only after children have become experienced verbal communicators. (shrink)

This book argues that political libertarianism can be grounded in widely shared, everyday moral beliefs--particularly in strictures against shifting our burdens onto others. It also seeks to connect these philosophical arguments with related work in economics, history, and politics for a wide-ranging discussion of political economy.

Humans are expert users of metarepresentations. How has this human metarepresentational capacity evolved? In order to contribute to the ongoing debate on this question, the chapter focuses on three more specific issues: i. How do humans metarepresent representations? ii. What came first: language, or metarepresentations? iii. Do humans have more than one metarepresentational ability?

What is the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics? Is phenomeno- logy metaphysical neutral, is it without metaphysical bearings, is it a kind of propaedeutics to metaphysics, or is phenomenology on the contrary a form of metaphysics, perhaps even the culmination of a particular kind of metaphysics (of presence)? What should be made clear from the outset is that there is no easy and straightforward answer to the question concerning the relation between phenome- nology and metaphysics. The term ‘metaphysics’ is simply (...) too ambiguous. Even among phenomenologists the term is used and understood in quite different ways, and the answer to the question has consequently varied accordingly. Let me brief- ly illustrate this with a few examples. (shrink)

My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences.

Through an investigation of Husserl's concept of horizontal intentionality, the article basically argues that the horizon is intrinsically intersubjective, and that it entails an implicit reference to the intentions of possible Others. Against this background it is argued that our perceptual experience of an embodied Other, our factual encounter with the Other, is not the most basic and fundamental type of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, it presupposes a type of intersubjectivity which belongs a priori to the structure of constituting subjectivity.

Modern reflection about the good life and the good society has been dominated by a spirit of liberal optimism, according to which people typically know what’s good for them and make prudent choices in pursuit of their interests. As a result, people tend to do best, and pretty well at that, when given the greatest possible freedom to live as they wish. This appealing doctrine rests on a bold assumption about human psychology: namely, that people have a high degree of (...) aptitude for securing their well-being given arbitrarily high levels of “option freedom.” Yet a large body of empirical research suggests that people are systematically prone to make a variety of serious errors in the pursuit of happiness. These errors are probably serious enough to place liberal optimism’s psychological assumptions in doubt. If people do tend to fare best in the option-rich environments traditionally favored by liberal moderns, notably classical economists, this may not be mainly through the prudent exercise of choice. Or perhaps human beings actually benefit from certain constraints or burdens on choice. (shrink)

This the tenth volume in the Vancouver Studies in Cogntive Science series. It concerns metarepresentation: the construction and use of representations that represent other representations. Metarepresentations are ubiquitous among human beings, whenever we think or talk about mental states or linguistic acts, or theorize about the mind or language. It is crucial to the unconscious process we use to divine the mental states of others, and ultimately to any workable theory of the mind. This volume collects previously unpublished studies on (...) the subject by an interdisciplinary group of contributors, including: Daniel Dennett, Alvin Goldman, Keith Lehrer, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology, and offers a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are (...) interested in the state of phenomenology today. The essays explore a diverse range of topics, including intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought. (shrink)

In recent years more and more people have started talking about the necessity ofreconciliating phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalipossible to naturalize phenomenology? In their long introduction to the book NaturalizingPhenomenology published by Stanford University Press in 1999, the four coPetitot, Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud might be seen as a kind of manifesto for this new approach. An examination of this introduction is consequently a good starting point for (...) a discussion of the issue. (shrink)

In her editorial introduction to the special issue 10 years of Viewing from Within: the Legacy of Francisco Varela as well as in her co-authored contribution 'The validity of first-person descriptions as authenticity and coherence' , Claire Petitmengin expresses some reservations about the way I have been characterizing reflection in some of my earlier writings. In replying to the criticism, I will use the occasion to amplify some of my previous remarks, pinpoint what I take to be some ambiguities in (...) Petitmengin and Bitbol's own positive proposal, make some additional points that relate directly to the important questions that they raise in their joint paper, and finish off with a few remarks regarding one of the central claims made by Vermersch in his contribution to the special issue. (shrink)

Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,1 and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its 'gaze' at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) Frank has also (...) more generally criticized every attempt to conceive original self-awareness as a relation, be it a relation between two acts or a relation between the act and itself.2 Every relation entails a distinction between two (or more) relata and, according to Frank, it would be impossible to account for the immediacy and infallibility of selfawareness (particularly its so-called immunity to the error of misidentification), if it were in any way a mediated process. Thus, self-awareness cannot come about as the result of a self-identification, a reflection, an inner vision or introspection, nor should it be conceived as a type of intentionality or as a conceptually mediated propositional attitude, all of which entails the distinction between two or more relata. The pre-reflective self-awareness of an experience is not mediated by foreign elements such as concepts and classificatory criteria, nor by any internal difference or distance. It is an immediate and direct self- acquaintance which is characterized by being completely and absolutely irrelational (and consequently best described as a purely immanent self-presence).3 Frank's approach is unusually broad, since he draws on the resources of several different philosophical traditions, including German Idealism, analytical philosophy of mind, and phenomenology. When it comes to the latter, it is particularly in Sartre that Frank has found important insights, whereas he has criticized Husserl's position persistently in most of his writings on self-awareness.. (shrink)

We first want to express our thanks to the commentators for their close and critical readings of The Phenomenological Mind. We would like to treat their comments and challenging questions as a productive opportunity to clarify and to make our positions more precise. Before we address the specific points raised by our colleagues, we do want to say that the intersection between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences is a rich one, and growing richer as collaboration and research continues. Our book (...) was meant to be an introduction to this area rather than a complete map of ongoing research. For that reason we were not able to cover every interesting issue, many of which are raised in the set of commentaries. (shrink)

From an evolutionary point of view, the function of moral behaviour may be to secure a good reputation as a co-operator. The best way to do so may be to obey genuine moral motivations. Still, one's moral reputation maybe something too important to be entrusted just to one's moral sense. A robust concern for one's reputation is likely to have evolved too. Here we explore some of the complex relationships between morality and reputation both from an evolutionary and a cognitive (...) point of view. (shrink)

I present an account of mental representation based upon the ‘SINBAD’ theory of the cerebral cortex. If the SINBAD theory is correct, then networks of pyramidal cells in the cerebral cortex are appropriately described as representing, or more specifically, as modelling the world. I propose that SINBAD representation reveals the nature of the kind of mental representation found in human and animal minds, since the cortex is heavily implicated in these kinds of minds. Finally, I show how SINBAD neurosemantics can (...) provide accounts of misrepresentation, equivocal representation, twin cases, and Frege cases. (shrink)

This chapter determines a major empirical hurdle for any future discipline of memetics. It mainly shows that one can find very similar copies of some cultural item, link these copies through a causal chain of events which faithfully reproduced those items, and nevertheless not have an example of memetic inheritance. In addition, the stability of cultural patterns is proof that fidelity in copying is high despite individual variations. It is also believed that what is offered as an explanation is precisely (...) what needs to be explained; what is offered as a solution is in fact the very problem to be solved. Moreover, the issue is whether the relative stability observed in cultural transmission is proof of replication. The example of the acquisition of language is briefly addressed. The Darwinian model of selection is informative, and in various ways, for thinking about culture. Imitation is of course well worth investigating. On the other hand, the grand project of memetics is misled. (shrink)