Interpersonal relationships represent an essential aspect of mental wellbeing and social functioning. If all the symptoms contain a relational meaning, shame represents the relational affect par excellence both in terms of its origin and its purpose. This paper aims to highlight the role of shame as an affect inherent in the rhythmic nature of the encounter with the other, as well as the pathological elements of this aspect in both its conscious and unconscious dimensions. There is a heterogeneous quantitative and (...) qualitative declination of shame, or of the defenses against this affect, among the various pathologies. We consider the fundamental needs of belonging and acceptance and the parallel abandonment anguish from various psychoanalytic and philosophical theoretical perspectives and then analyze the link between their dissatisfaction and the origin of shame. We also touch on the different interpretaions of shame based on eastern and western cultural norms. These hypotheses are closely intertwined with the beliefs of classical psychopathology. The role of the body in the encounter with the other and in the experience of shame is also examined. In particular, we study the role of this affect in schizophrenia, depression, eating disorders, and personality disorders. (shrink)

The foundations of psychoanalysis in the German idealist concepts of the reflexive human self have been the subject of detailed investigations devoted to the intertwined processes of introspection,...

Theoretically, this essay is a psycho-social reflection on the patrimonial character of Philippine political democracy. Many scholars attest that Philippine politics is marred by oligarchic rule composed of elite families, knitted by blood and marriage, who use state resources to perpetuate themselves into public office. These officials control and exploit the economic and political landscape to rule and govern the lives of the Filipino people. Hence, I argue that the patrimonial culture is a social pathology and has imbibed (...) other names such as patron-client democracy, cacique democracy, predatory oligarchic state, and bossism. This type of social malady highlights the coercive forms of control in the Philippine political arena and, thus, expanding oligarchic power relations over and above the interest of the people. Money and power are the main causes why this social malady persists. However, more than that, I want to add that the persistence of patrimonial culture in the Philippines lies probably in what Freud calls the introjected father image, which unconsciously becomes the standard of authority. Further, I contend that, like the Oedipus rivalry, fear is a primordial element in the introjection of this authority figure which began at the nascent of the Spanish rule. Particularly, the abuses and atrocities of the colonizers over the natives created a deep-seated traumatic experience that would later fortify the immanence of a patrimonial power structure in the Philippines. Hence, a psycho-social approach could perhaps unearth these 'events' that perpetuate a patrimonial culture in our country. I believe that excavating our collective experiences could probably help us in our search for leaders who could usher us towards real liberation. (shrink)

Just as sadness is not always a symptom of mood disorder, irrational beliefs are not always symptoms of illness. Pathological irrational beliefs are distinguished from non-pathological ones by considering whether their existence is best explained by assuming some underlying dysfunctions. The features from which to infer the pathological nature of irrational beliefs are: un-understandability of their progression; uniqueness; coexistence with other psycho-physiological disturbances and/or concurrent decreased levels of functioning; bizarreness of content; preceding organic diseases known to be associated with (...) irrational beliefs; treatment response to medical intervention, etc. Severe irrationality is sometimes caused by normal human motivation rather than by mental or physical dysfunction. Pure forms of self-deception may satisfy the diagnostic criteria of delusional disorder, but there may be no evidence that suggests that they are caused by illness. Although those with pathological delusions do not recognize their delusions as symptomatic of illness, differentiating pathological beliefs from normal irrational beliefs is vitally important: If a belief is pathological, psychiatrists must seriously consider treating the patient against her will. If it is not pathological, conversely, involuntary treatments are prohibited because they offend her basic autonomy. (shrink)

The magical number three has provided the template for this comparative study of Freudian psycho-analysis and Husserlian phenomenology. "Three" should be considered the number of dialectics; the method in the study to let three distinct thematisations succeed each other should find its legitimation in dialectics. The relationship between psycho-analysis and phenomenology as that between two dialectic theories might well call for a dialectic interpretation. It should be difficult from a straightforward and unambiguous interpretation to give full credit to (...) the rich and equivocal meaning of psycho-analysis and phenomenology. I hope to have shown in the presentation above, that it is possible by accentuating different sides of the two scientific disciplines to reach different conclusions regarding their relationship. For a full account of this relationship these different conclusions should be placed together and viewed in their internal coherence as a dialectical unity. Thus none of the three sections of the text should be considered apart from the others. In the first section of the paper, the first thematisation, I tried to spell out the discrepancies between Freud and Husserl as clearly as possible. The point of departure here was the Freudian notion of the "psychical apparatus," and Husserl's doctrine of "intentional consciousness." The models built around these central notions can be shown to have a paradigmatic meaning for the development of Freud's and Husserl's psychological projects. Conceiving the subject as psychical apparatus, Freud thought it possible to make psychology a natural science. The subject could be treated like a mechanical apparatus, that is a machine admitting the general laws of motion. - In contrast, Husserl thought psychology should depart from natural science in its scientific selfunderstanding, and join the humanities instead. Psychology's departure from natural science, Husserl found legitimized in the subject's essential character of intentional consciousness. According to Husserl, man as a conscious being could not be reduced to a thing in the natural world. On the contrary, the aprioric basis for the world should be found in intentional consciousness, which constitutes the "world" as a meaningful coherence related to the subject. Freud's and Husserl's conceptions of psychology were traced to historical roots in respectively positivism, naturalism and mechanical materialism on the one hand, and rationalism, humanism and idealism on the other. In this first interpretation the relationship between psycho-analysis and phenomenology seemed to be antithetical, the two theoretical projects representing opposite poles with regard to cartesian dualism. Although in some ways caricaturing the theories in this one-sided interpretation, I tried to show, that such interpretation is possible with bases in the texts of Freud and Husserl. The decided one-sidedness of the first thematisation should, however, be balanced by the competing interpretation in the second section of the paper. In the second thematisation, I tried to show, that both psycho-analysis and phenomenology in their concrete psychological projects went beyond their points of departure. Although Freud as a scientist of the 19th century naturally found his theoretical language in the successful natural sciences, from which his scientific career started, he decisively broke with this frame of reference in his descriptions of the pathological problems from his clinical praxis. In contrast to the abstract metapsychology of the psychical apparatus, Freud in his clinical psychology departed from mechanism in his attempts to interpret the meaning of the patient's neurotic symptom. The clinical attitude of Freud might resemble phenomenologists' openness towards the meaning of the phenomena, and the case-histories of Freud often read like clinical analyses stemming from existential- phenomenological psychiatrists. - Correspondingly, although Husserl started from the tradition of German philosophy of consciousness, also he can be seen to go beyond the premises of his wellsprings. Starting with a notion of intentionality as consciousness's active positing meaningful objects, Husserl later was led to consider a deeper level of intentionality, a "functioning intentionality," that would situate the subject in a "world" prior to any thematic perceptual act. With the notion of functional intentionality and its further development in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the "body-subject," phenomenology seems to have come close to the Freudian doctrine of the unconscious. From this second interpretation it seemed to follow, that a meeting between psycho-analysis and phenomenology should be possible, by cutting off the mechanistic parts from psychoanalysis and the idealistic parts from phenomenology. The hindrance for such meeting should apparently be found in the divergent theoretical prejudices stemming from the ideological climates in which the theories were hatched. None of these two apparently contradictory interpretations, that of the first and second thematisation, should, however, rule out the other. To the question which interpretation is the right one, we should answer "both... and," or perhaps better "Neither... nor." Freud and Husserl in fact held contradictory views in their explicit scientific self-understanding. On the other hand, much of the controversy was caused by theoretical prejudices not essential to the central enterprise of psycho-analysis and phenomenology. And yet, the theoretical work of Freud and Husserl should be considered in its entirety, not omitting parts that do not fit the interpretative context. Freud's mechanistic theories must be read in connection with his clinical/phenomenological psychology, Husserl's doctrine of transcendental consciousness together with his concrete analyses of the world and the body. Freud sticked to his mechanistic metaphors throughout his life, not just because mechanic materialism was his scientific point of departure, but also because he found the models of the psychical apparatus useful to picture the subject-matter of psycho-analysis, the unconscious as it is discovered by the analytic method. Correspondingly, Husserl found in transcendental idealism a metaphysical horizon apparently suited for his main theoretical project, to un-cover by phenomenological reflexion man in his free and conscious being. In this way Freud's materialism and Husserl's idealism might find their limited justification, not in the absolutistic sense set forth in the first section, but in relation to their weighting different aspects of the subject/object dialectic of man. This point of view I tried to explicate in the third section of this paper. In the subject/object dialectic Freud seems to underline man's existence as object, his being ruled by the mechanic, the irrational, the infantile, the unconscious. In contrast, Husserl underlines man's existence as subject, his free and conscious openness towards the world and the future. This difference I characterized with the notions of Ricoeur as respectively an "archeology" and a "teleology" of the subject. And yet the difference between Freud and Husserl is that of a weighting different sides of the subject/object dialectic, not of an exclusive thematisation of man as either subject or object. Freudian archaeology is supplemented by an implicit teleology, Husserlian teleology by an implicit archeology. On the background of such interpretation the relationship between psycho-analysis and phenomenology should be seen neither as the polarity of the first thematisation, nor as the synthesis of the second. Psycho-analysis and phenomenology both contradict and imply each other in a relationship that should be termed dialectical. With this third interpretation the paper ended. At last I noted that the problems raised by the controversy on the subject/object dialectic of man should not easily be solved. Instead, the question "what is man" should have to be answered continuously in a concrete historical reflextion or dialogue. Yet I think it safe to conclude, that any psychological consideration has to take into consideration, both man's archeological and his teleological features, thus not allowing the one perspective completely to rule out the other. (shrink)

The article begins with an integrative theory of neurosis and with the notion of the “patriarchal mind,” which I conceive as the psycho-social foundation of what we call “civilisation” and proceed to characterize as a despotic and repressive activity of the father on the mother and on the child in the family, and also of an analogous relation between the intellect on the emotional and on the instinctual sub-selves in the individual mind. Next, I propose that patriarchy entails four (...) interrelated problems: violent authority; the eclipse of caring; the repression of instinct; and the invalidation of intuition; and point out that since these are evident in our well-recognized social problems, these may be traced down to the “patriarchal complex” that in turn defines patriarchal society. Finally, I develop the idea that not only is the patriarchal mind is embodied in each of the known interpersonal or character pathologies, but that each of these pathologies contributes to the systemic and cultural presence of the patriarchal mind. The corollary of this analysis is that the healing of both our interpersonal and social pathologies will depend on the healing of the patriarchal mind, which is conceivably possible to bring about through a specially designed education oriented to the balanced development of “three-brained beings,” in whom a balance has been achieved between the intellectual, emotional, and instinctive sub-selves that constitute our mind. (shrink)

This article aims to present some of the main results of contemporary French psychodynamics of work. The writings of Christophe Dejours constitute the central references in this area. His psychoanalytical approach, which is initially concerned with the impact of contemporary work practices on individual health, has implications that go well beyond the narrow psycho-pathological interest. The most significant theoretical development to have come out of Dejours's research is that of Yves Clot, whose writings will constitute the second reference point (...) in this article. The article attempts to demonstrate that the thick definition of work that Dejours and Clot operate with, as a result of their focus on its psychological function, speaks directly, in substantial and critical ways, to all disciplines with an interest in work, to philosophers, social theorists and social scientists, including economic theorists. (shrink)

This article aims to present some of the main results of contemporary French psychodynamics of work. The writings of Christophe Dejours constitute the central references in this area. His psychoanalytical approach, which is initially concerned with the impact of contemporary work practices on individual health, has implications that go well beyond the narrow psycho-pathological interest. The most significant theoretical development to have come out of Dejours's research is that of Yves Clot, whose writings will constitute the second reference point (...) in this article. The article attempts to demonstrate that the thick definition of work that Dejours and Clot operate with, as a result of their focus on its psychological function, speaks directly, in substantial and critical ways, to all disciplines with an interest in work, to philosophers, social theorists and social scientists, including economic theorists. (shrink)

Understanding Eating Disorders is an original contribution to the field of healthcare ethics. It develops a new theory concerning the moral basis of eating disorders, and places such disorders for the first time at the centre of philosophical discourse. The book explores the relationship that people have with food and their own body by looking at genetics and neuro-physiology, sociology and family studies, clinical psychology and psychiatry, and frames abnormal eating at the extreme of a spectrum of normal behaviours, directed (...) by moral values. Giordano argues that abnormal eating is not a psycho-pathological phenomenon, but the coherent implementation of ordinary moral values with a long tradition in Western culture. The book also contains a detailed analysis of UK legislation, accompanied by a timely critique of the law on treatment of mental disorders in general and of eating disorders in particular. (shrink)

Hubris among CEOs is generally considered to be undesirable: researchers in finance and in management have documented its unwelcome effects and the media ascribe many corporate failings to CEO hubris. However, the literature fails to provide a precise definition of CEO hubris and is mostly silent on how to prevent it. We use work on hubris in the fields of mythology, psychology, and ethics to develop a framework defining CEO hubris. Our framework describes a set of beliefs and behaviors, both (...) psycho-pathological and unethical in nature, which characterize the problematic relationship of the hubris-infected CEO towards his or her own self, others and the world at large. We then demonstrate how the development of authentic leadership may contribute to preventing or attenuating hubris by addressing its psycho-pathological nature through the true self and meaningful relationships with others. In addition to its psycho-pathological dimension, CEO hubris also contains an ethical dimension. We therefore propose that the development of the virtue of reverence might contribute to the prevention or attenuation of CEO hubris, because reverence makes the individual aware of his or her place in the world order and membership of the community of humans. (shrink)

Arguing for the theoretical importance of the concept of “subject” or “self” on behalf of the “psychiatric/psycho-pathological thinking” is justified in so far as, as Costa, Bezerra Jr., and Gama say, “this is still an indispensable concept for understanding the conditions for the gestation and functioning of psychological life.” In what sense are these concepts “indispensable?”All the hints suggest them as necessary complements for neurobiological investigations to become useful for clinical employment. So, if we consider that it is possible (...) to approach mental phenomena connecting in some way their two sides to favor clinical use, the neurobiological and the psychological, we might as well suppose that any... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003) 361-367 [Access article in PDF] Psychopathology and Two Kinds of Narrative Account of the Self Tim Thornton Keywords self, narrative, reductionism, embodiment, Dennett, Strawson, McDowell The self plays an important role in psycho pathology. Conditions such as dementia raise the question of how much loss of memory and awareness there can be before there is, if ever, also a loss of (...) the self. Syndromes such as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) or Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) raise the possibility of a fragmentation of one self into a number of selves. Depersonalization disorder suggests a kind of diminution both of the sense of self and the reality of the world. Symptoms such as thought insertion suggest a different kind of fragmentation of the coherence of thought within a self.At the same time there is something prima facie paradoxical about the very idea of the fragmentation or loss of self. It seems to be one thing for a self to suffer loss, quite another to think of the self as being lost. Although the experiences or beliefs had or entertained by a self might be disordered or chaotic, how can a self be anything other than whole and seem real and whole to itself?The narrative approach to the self looks like a tool purpose built to shed light on some aspects of psychopathology. The papers in this issue have examined its application to four revealing case histories and questioned its effectiveness in accounting for features of psychopathology. But in this short note I wish to stand back from the particular cases discussed in previous papers and to shed light on the general approach by setting out two contrasting versions of it. Crudely put, the first forges a connection between the concepts of self and personality; the second between the concepts of self and person. I will use the contrast between these two to draw some general lessons for the philosophy of psychopathology. Dennett's Austere Narrative Account I will start with Dennett's influential version of a narrative account of the self. His central idea is that the very idea of a self should be understood as dependent on a particular kind of interpretative strategy. Roughly, this contrasts with the idea that it is a more basic datum calling out for notice prior to adopting a specific theoretical perspective.Dennett suggests an analogy with centers of gravity both to outline the consequences of this view for the reality of selves, and the connection between the self and the interpretative strategy involved. [End Page 361] A center of gravity is just an abstractum. It's just a fictional object. But when I say it's a fictional object, I do not mean to disparage it; it's a wonderful fictional object, and it has a perfectly legitimate place within serious, sober, echt physical science. (Dennett 1992) The concept of a center of gravity is deployed within a branch of physics to describe and predict the behavior of physical systems acting under physical forces. It is the theoretical context that determines the nature of centers of gravity; at the same time, they contribute to that broader context. Dennett stresses that they are abstract or calculation-bound theoretical objects to contrast with objects that are also theoretically posited but causally interactive, such as microphysical particles (Dennett 1987, 53).Dennett has also used the analogy with abstracta to account for mental states such as beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes, which he suggests are ascribed using a particular interpretative strategy: the "Intentional Stance" (Dennett 1987, 13-42). The suggestion is that by showing the necessity of adopting that stance to make sense of human behavior he can defend a form of objectivity about mental states even while rejecting the industrial-strength realism that requires identifying mental states with physical, and thus causally interactive, internal states.Selves are given similar treatment. Like centers of gravity or mental states, they are theoretical, even fictional, entities articulated within an interpretative theoretical stance: A self is also an abstract object, a theorist's fiction... (shrink)

The challenge of understanding psychotic phenomena is one of the enduring problems in the philosophy of psychiatry. The first to formulate the problem in its philosophical dimension was Karl Jaspers in General Psycho-pathology. Jasper’s solution was rather pessimistic, for he argued that we cannot extend empathic understanding to certain phenomena, such as primary delusions. His work was followed by a long period of philosophical silence on the issue, and it was only three decades ago that philosophy began to (...) engage once again with the problem of understanding. Today there is a rich literature that explores this problem: from philosophy of language to European phenomenology, and from theories... (shrink)

It is a Pleasure to comment on Somogy Varga’s intriguing paper, which offers welcome insight into the historical sources, changing uses, and underlying assumptions pertaining to the concept of ‘melancholia,’ especially in relationship to ‘depression.’ We found Varga’s discussion of the relationship between affect and cognition in past discussions of melancholia and depression to be illuminating, especially given the emphasis on cognitive distortions in contemporary psycho-pathology. His explanation of the gradual evolution of the depression concept from melancholia sheds (...) interesting light on current notions. All in all, we find Varga’s arguments persuasive, and are inclined to agree with him (and others whom he .. (shrink)

ArgumentTwo medical delegations, one from Palestine and one from the United States, were sent to detainment camps in Cyprus in the summer of 1947. The British Mandatory government had set up these camps in the summer of 1946 to stem the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine after World War II. The purpose of the medical delegations was to screen the camps' inhabitants and to propose a mental-health program for their life in Palestine. We examine the activities of these two (...) delegations within the context of their scientific interest in the psycho-pathology of displaced persons after World War II and as part of a broader project of mental hygiene. According to the delegations, the detainees would be a potential source of strength for building a new society if they adapted to life in Palestine. However, they would become a burden if they failed to be absorbed. At the same time, the medical delegations also saw the detainee camps as a potential “living laboratory” for scientific exploration. The case of the two medical delegations in Cyprus is also a story about constructing and transgressing medical borders. Apart from the obvious fact that this case study deals with movement of people, refugees as well as health-care workers, it is also about the transmission of knowledge and professions across the ocean. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 91-92 [Access article in PDF] Jaspers and Defining Phenomenology John McMillan IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH a number of positions that you might take on the importance of phenomenology for the study of the mind. The strongest position is to think that phenomenology is sufficient for understanding the mind. This is a position that would be very hard to defend and it is (...) unlikely that Gupta and Kay want to endorse such a view. It is clear that Jaspers did not believe this; although he thought that first-person experience was undervalued, his project was an attempt to make sense of different kinds of explanation, all of which contribute to our understanding of the mind.A second position is to deny that phenomenology gives us anything that is of use in understanding the mind and psychopathology. Philosophers have developed a number of such positions, from the eliminativism of Churchland (1981) to the heterophenomenology of Daniel Dennett (1989, 1991).A third position is to hold that phenomenology is one of the methods that are useful for understanding the mind and psychopathology. Along with neuroscience and other more behavioral approaches to behavior, phenomenology is an important component of an adequate understanding of the mind. This position appears to be that endorsed by Jaspers, Gupta, Kay, and the authors they discuss. It is also the position that Grant Gillett and I defend in Consciousness and Intentionality (2001). Gupta and Kay's paper presents an argument about where the boundaries between phenomenology and other approaches to the mind and psychopathology ought to be drawn. Gupta and Kay, following Jaspers, think that the boundaries of the phenomenological ought to be drawn around those approaches that employ empathy and the presuppositionless stance and do not include objective phenomena.Given that the paper is primarily about what phenomenology means and that it endorses the way that Jaspers used the term, it is fairly important that we have a definition from Jaspers. Gupta and Kay give a description of some of Jaspers's methods for getting at subjective phenomena, but do not give an account of what Jaspers thinks the aim of phenomenology is. In other words, one way to classify something as phenomenological is its methods and another is by what the point of the exercise is. In General Psychopathology, Jaspers (1997) says that phenomenology is an empirical method for investigating "individual psychic experience" (p. 55). We can think of this as a claim about the objective of phenomenology and then consider the merits of different phenomenological methodologies in terms of their success in achieving this objective. This opens up the possibility that a theory may be genuinely phenomenological because it has a plausible method for getting at psychic lived experience but does not use all of the methods advocated by Jaspers.Gupta and Kay are correct that Jaspers does stress the importance of the presuppositionless [End Page 91] stance, the importance of empathy and the importance of not simply relying on objective phenomena. However, it is not obvious why an approach to understanding the mind or psycho- pathology must satisfy these conditions to be phenomenological. Imagine the following kind of situation: when I am observed to hit my big toe against a brick and give a yelp, it is possible to infer something about my psychic lived experience. There is not much is room for doubt about my first-person experience and, although you might ask me questions about my pain, they are unlikely to add much to what you can simply read from my behavior. This example may appear a little crude because the first-person experience in this case is not especially complex and is not that interesting as a entrance to the inner workings of an individual's mental life. It is not hard to come up with other examples where we can read the first-person experience from behavior in a fairly accurate and informative way. A father gazing at his young child while she is sleeping in his arms may be having a number of thoughts that we would not know about... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a comparison between the mystical feeling, as it is defined by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, and the psycho-pathological state of melancholy, posed in relation with mourning by Sigmund Freud. The comparison will depart from the radical dissatisfaction that seems to be a distinctive characteristic of both phenomena. According to Wittgenstein in fact the drive to mystical feeling rises from the deep dissatisfaction regarding the explanations given by science, which is (...) incapable of producing any answer to the «problem of life». In a similar way, Slavoj Žižek underlines that melancholy is a form of «disappointment at all positive, observable objects, none of which can satisfy our desire». In this perspective, I will check the similarities and differences between mystical feeling and melancholy and I will put in relation the double profile of this latter with the Wittgensteinian theme of aspect seeing. (shrink)

Abstract:In this paper, I suggest that the moral incompetence in narcissism is associated with a particular type of emotional incompetence, namely the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty, or love. I then move on to discussing the ethical ramifications of this incompetence, primarily from the point of view of sentimentalist ethics, and conclude that emotional incompetence does not in fact reduce the moral responsibility of a narcissist person, whether diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder or not. (...) My argument is based on the three criteria of moral responsibility proposed by Philip Pettit, namely those of value relevance, value judgment, and value sensitivity. I suggest that a sentimentalist ethical perspective entails that the satisfaction of two of the mentioned criteria (awareness of the social meaning of one’s choices and sufficient control of one’s actions) constitutes a moral obligation for the agent to satisfy the third criterion, namely to develop the appropriate moral sensibility and competence to actually choose morally correctly. This type of structure of obligation elucidates why narcissism is at the same time a moral failure and a psychopathology. At the same time, my argument portrays narcissism as a particular type of personality disturbance that almost uniquely reaffirms the role of moral re-education as the psychotherapeutic approach. This conclusion points to a potential revival of some of the precepts of Pinel’s affective psycho-pathology, dating back to the very beginnings of the psychotherapeutic clinic. (shrink)

RESUMEN La psicopatologia contemporánea sufre de una brecha descriptiva respecto de la experiencia patológica, y la tradición de la psicopatologia contiene un capital descriptivo acumulado que debe ser explotado para la necesaria superación de este déficit. Se argumenta examinando el caso particular de la psicopatologia cognitiva de la esquizofrenia y del contenido de la experiencia del delirio de control, mostrando cómo la teoría de Henri Ey, así como la del automatismo mental del siglo xix en la cual tiene sus raíces, (...) contienen herramientas descriptivas importantes para establecer que la experiencia de un delirio de control es esencialmente diferente de la experiencia de una simple ilusión de control. ABSTRACT This article defends the general view that contemporary psychopathology suffers from a descriptive gap with respect to pathological experience and that the psycho-pathological tradition has accumulated a descriptive capital that should be used in the necessary effort to overcome this gap. This general thesis is argued for by examining the specific case of the cognitive psychopathology of schizophrenia and the experience of the delusion of control, showing how Henri Ey's theory and the 19th century theory of mental automatism in which the former is rooted contain important descriptive tools for establishing that the experience of a delusion of control is fundamentally different from that of a sheer illusion of control. (shrink)

Spirituality and spiritual care have long been kept separate from patient care in mental health, primarily because it has been associated with psycho-pathology. Nursing has provided limited spiritual care competency training for staff in mental health due to fears that psychoses may be activated or exacerbated if religion and spirituality are addressed. However, spirituality is broader than simply religion, including more existential issues such as providing non-judgmental presence, attentive listening, respect, and kindness. Unfortunately, healthcare personnel working in mental (...) health institutions are not well prepared to address spiritual concerns or resources of their patients. Therefore, a mixed-method pilot study was conducted using a self-assessment survey tool to examine spiritual care competencies of mental health staff in Norway and to understand the perspectives of mental health staff in the Scandinavian context. Five questions and comments related to survey items provided rich qualitative data. While only a small pilot with 24 participants, this study revealed a need for spiritual care educational materials targeted specifically for those who work in mental health, materials that address the approach of improving attitudes, enhancing skills, and increasing knowledge related to spirituality and spiritual care of patients. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se abordará, desde una perspectiva fenomenológica, el problema que llevó a Sigmund Freud a transitar desde la fisiología a la psicopatología, terreno en el cual va a dar origen al psicoanálisis. Este problema consiste en la constitución “patológica” de la experiencia del cuerpo. En esta línea se argumentará a favor del papel principal que este asunto juega en el origen del psicoanálisis y se expondrá la manera en que el mismo tema puede ser abordado desde una (...) perspectiva fenomenológica, que trasciende la alternancia entre las aproximaciones fisiológicas y psicológicas. From a phenomenological perspective, this article will try to deal with the problematic issue that forced Sigmund Freud to move from the field of physiology to the field of the psycho-pathology, which gave birth to the discipline known as psychoanalysis. These range of problems, deal with the constitution of a “pathologic” experience of the body. On this issue, it will be argued on the essential role it has in the origin of psychoanalysis and it will be shown how this same issue can be understood from a phenomenological perspective, which will transcend the dichotomy between a physiological and psychological approach. (shrink)

La contribution qui suit vise à repérer et analyser dans le quotidien du tissu sportif un mode organisationnel et structurel de rapport au temps, puis d’en caractériser les éventuels effets psychologiques chez les pratiquants de haut niveau. Une scansion volontariste du temps, étayée sur le primat des processus physiologiques, s’accompagne d’effets psychologiques multiples et complexes, parmi lesquels nous envisageons :– un rendement et une efficacité dans la gestion de l’effort qui génère chez le sportif, dans le grand public, mais aussi (...) dans le monde de l’entreprise, une impression de réalisation parfaite. De fait cette gestion constitue le temps en allié, en outil de progrès et de perfection,– la genèse fréquente de troubles anxieux et d’épisodes dépressifs chez les pratiquants, sans cesse en alerte pour coller aux assignations et impératifs du temps prescrit,– un décalage potentiel entre cette saisie du temps objectif et les rythmes de l’élaboration psychologique, par exemple lors des ratés, contre-performances, mais aussi des réussites soudaines. Une désynchronisation potentielle entre le temps vécu, subjectif et coloré par les affects d’une part, le temps planifié et maîtrisé d’autre part, induit un risque de déstabilisation de l’économie temporelle individuelle. (shrink)

"This work is designed to be an introduction to abnormal psychology. The problems considered, however, belong equally to normal psychology. The present volume consists of selected lectures (with the exception of four) from courses on abnormal psychology delivered at the Tufts College Medical School (1908-10) and later at the University of California (1910). These again were based on a series of papers on the Unconscious published in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology (1908-9) of which they are elaborations. Since the lectures (...) were delivered a large amount of new material has been incorporated and the subject matter considered in more detail and more exhaustively than was practical before student bodies. The four additional lectures (X, XI, XII and XIII) appeared in abbreviated form in the same Journal (Oct., Nov., 1912) under the title "The Meaning of Ideas as Determined by Unconscious Settings." As the subconscious and its processes are fundamentals both in the structure of personality and in the many mechanisms through which personality, normal and abnormal, finds expression, the first eight lectures are devoted to its exposition. Indeed, the subconscious is not only the most important problem of psychology, it is the problem. The study of its phenomena must be preliminary to that of the functioning mechanisms of both the normal mind and of those special pathological conditions--the psycho-neuroses--which modern investigators are tracing to its perversions. It ought to be possible to construct the theory of the subconscious by inductive methods on the basis of facts of observation just as any theory of the physical sciences is constructed. This task I have set before myself as well as that of giving precision to our conception of the theory and taking it out of the domain of philosophical concepts. With this purpose in view I have endeavored to apply the method of science and construct the theory by induction from the data of observation and experiment. I have divided the subconscious into two classes, namely (1) the unconscious, or neural dispositions and processes, and (2) the coconscious, or actual subconscious ideas which do not enter the content of conscious awareness. In these lectures I have also endeavored (Lectures XIV-XVI) to develop the phenomena of the emotional innate dispositions which I conceive play one of the most fundamental parts in human personality and in determining mental and physiological behavior. Experimental methods and the well-known clinical methods of investigation have been employed by me as far as possible. The data made use of have been derived for the most part from my own observations, though confirmatory observations of others have not been neglected. Although a large number and variety of subjects or cases have been studied, as they have presented themselves in private and hospital practice, the data have been to a large extent sought in intensive studies, on particular subjects, carried on in some cases over a period of many years. These subjects, because of the ease with which subconscious and emotional phenomena were either spontaneously manifested or could be experimentally evoked, were particularly suitable for such studies and fruitful in results. It is by such intensive studies on special subjects, rather than by casual observation of many cases, that I believe the deepest insight into mental processes and mechanisms can be obtained. The favorable reception which was given to the first edition of this work has tempted me in preparing a new edition at the request of the publishers to incorporate four additional chapters dealing with the general principles underlying the structure and dynamic elements of human personality (Lecture XVII) and a study of a special problem in personality in which these principles are involved, namely, the psychogenesis of multiple personality as illustrated by a study of the case known as B.C.A. (Lectures XVIII-XX)." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The New Testament, while rejecting any superficial connection between illness and sin, does not reject a possible connection between illness and a person's relationship with God. An example can be seen in the story of the young blind man who was healed. His blindness does not result from any fault he or his parents had committed but apparently from God's wish to reveal his own healing power. The inner blindness of the Pharisees is a different type of blindness far more (...) difficult to heal. The blind young man was actually healed, not only in body but also in soul. Such miraculous healings are rare nowadays. However, if one takes a closer look at modern genetics and psycho-neuro-immunological findings, one may come to a better understanding of how miracle healings are linked to man's inner life and therefore also to his religiousness. Many diseases have genetic backgrounds. Defective genes, however, do not necessarily lead to subsequent illness. Genes have to be switched on or off. Only activated genes trigger pathological change. The human brain and all of man's thinking and feeling are intimately connected with such activations. We may thus conclude that both inner life and religious outlook on life are relevant to the origin and development of diseases. (shrink)

Precision medicine and molecular systems medicine (MSM) are highly utilized and successful approaches to improve understanding, diagnosis, and treatment of many diseases from bench-to-bedside. Especially in the COVID-19 pandemic, molecular techniques and biotechnological innovation have proven to be of utmost importance for rapid developments in disease diagnostics and treatment, including DNA and RNA sequencing technology, treatment with drugs and natural products and vaccine development. The COVID-19 crisis, however, has also demonstrated the need for systemic thinking and transdisciplinarity and the limits (...) of MSM: the neglect of the bio-psycho-social systemic nature of humans and their context as the object of individual therapeutic and population-oriented interventions. COVID-19 illustrates how a medical problem requires a transdisciplinary approach in epidemiology, pathology, internal medicine, public health, environmental medicine, and socio-economic modeling. Regarding the need for conceptual integration of these different kinds of knowledge we suggest the application of general system theory (GST). This approach endorses an organism-centered view on health and disease, which according to Ludwig von Bertalanffy who was the founder of GST, we call Organismal Systems Medicine (OSM). We argue that systems science offers wider applications in the field of pathology and can contribute to an integrative systems medicine by (i) integration of evidence across functional and structural differentially scaled subsystems, (ii) conceptualization of complex multilevel systems, and (iii) suggesting mechanisms and non-linear relationships underlying the observed phenomena. We underline these points with a proposal on multi-level systems pathology including neurophysiology, endocrinology, immune system, genetics, and general metabolism. An integration of these areas is necessary to understand excess mortality rates and polypharmacological treatments. In the pandemic era this multi-level systems pathology is most important to assess potential vaccines, their effectiveness, short-, and long-time adverse effects. We further argue that these conceptual frameworks are not only valid in the COVID-19 era but also important to be integrated in a medicinal curriculum. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to develop what I call an ‘Analytic, Fārābian’ conception of Orientalism. The motivation for this conception is that it helps us with the task––identified by Wael B. Hallaq––of going beyond ‘rudimentary political slogans’ attached to the theory of Orientalism and instead to identifying Orientalism’s underlying ‘psycho-epistemic pathology’ (Hallaq 2018, 4). In order to do this properly, according to Hallaq, we need to find a methodological alternative to that which makes Orientalist discourse possible. Hallaq (...) identifies the underlying problem as a commitment to secular humanism, and the solution its abandonment. However, I think the problem is a deeper one, which can roughly be stated as follows: how can we accept the pervasiveness of ideological influence without abandoning the idea that our theories aim (and to some extent succeed) at representing objective reality—such that we can say that Orientalism is a real phenomenon, and not merely something we happen to believe is a phenomenon. Conceiving Orientalism from within a Fārābian epistemology and using analytic tools to understand it (which I argue constitutes a unique and distinctive kind of fallibilism) makes head-way here where other conceptions fail. (shrink)

Although the compound adjective ‘psychosocial’ was first used by academic psychologists in the 1890s, it was only in the interwar period that psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers began to develop detailed models of the psychosocial domain. These models marked a significant departure from earlier ideas of the relationship between society and human nature. Whereas Freudians and Darwinians had described an antagonistic relationship between biological instincts and social forces, interwar authors insisted that individual personality was made possible through collective organization. This (...) argument was advanced by dissenting psychoanalysts such as Ian Suttie and Karen Horney; biologists including Julian Huxley and Hans Selye; philosophers (e.g. Olaf Stapledon), anthropologists (e.g. Margaret Mead) and physicians (e.g John Ryle and James Halliday). This introduction and the essays that follow sketch out the emergence of the psycho-social by examining the methods, tools and concepts through which it was articulated. New statistical technologies and physiological theories allowed individual pathology to be read as an index of broader social problems and placed medical expertise at the centre of new political programmes. In these arguments the intangible structure of social relationships was made visible and provided a template for the development of healthy and effective forms of social organization. By examining the range of techniques deployed in the construction of the psychosocial (from surveys of civilian neurosis, techniques of family observation through to animal models of psychotic breakdown) a critical genealogy of the biopolitical basis of modern society is developed. (shrink)

From 1942 to 1952, a programme took place at Johns Hopkins to devise new methods of controlling Baltimore’s rat population. This article focuses on three individuals closely connected to this project at various stages of its development: psycho-biologist Curt Richter, animal ecologist David E. Davis, and ecologist and psychologist John B. Calhoun. For all three, the challenges of controlling rat numbers highlighted the significance of stress – a homeostatic mechanism critical to the survival of the animal. This was a (...) process that was analyzed and manipulated by (re)introducing the wild rat into the laboratory. Here the rat not only contributed to new methods of rodent control, but offered new possibilities for the control and improvement of humankind. Yet it was not just the animal, but the physical structure of the laboratory that came to model the world outside. Through examining the experimental systems of the three scientists, this article will trace a series of transgressions between laboratory and field, urban and wild, animal and human. The result was that while animals were used to model the behaviour and pathologies of human city dwellers, the laboratory spaces in which they existed came to model the urban environment. We shall also see how differing perspectives on the value and uses of animal models and environments encouraged and reinforced alternative visions as to the role of science in the service of the city. (shrink)

The first thesis of this article is that the concept of responsibility takes on an unprecedented meaning in the twentieth century resulting from the emergence of a new dimension of the other: to be responsible comes to mean not just to account for oneself in relation to the other, but also to take the other into account, to take care of the other—what I call responsibility towards (the other). The main reason for this change consists in the emergence of global (...) risks and the necessity, as underlined by Hans Jonas, to be responsible for the destiny of the world and future generations. The problem, as explored in the article’s second thesis, is that this implies the existence of a subject who is capable of responsibility. Jonas’s insights on this point are insufficient, since he only recognizes duty as the fundament for his ethics of responsibility and thus neglects the problem of motivation. This is a particularly crucial problem today as we are witnessing the presence of a pathological subject, characterized by a split in his faculties (between doing and imagining, knowing and feeling). To underline this fact, this article makes use of Günther Anders’s reflections, which provide a psycho-anthropological analysis of the subject, showing his pathologies and the necessity, from a moral perspective, to overcome his scission. Finally, this author suggests, as the article’s third thesis, that this overcoming is the necessary fundament for the perception of risk, which in turn reinstates the subject’s perception of his own vulnerability. Responsibility thus finds a motivation, which is neither altruistic nor duty-centred, in the awareness of our own vulnerability and the bond with the destiny of humankind as a whole. (shrink)

Purpose of the study is to shed light on the role of psychophysiology in the creative process, namely, the style corrections connected with pathological changes in the artist’s organism, deviating from empirical-descriptive methods. Theoretical basis of the study implies the interpretation of the notions style and disease not in their narrow professional limitation but from the standpoint of expanding the parameters of these concepts to philosophical dimensions. Based on the principle of analogy, the research findings prove that non-mimetic creative process (...) manifests itself exclusively in connection with a human from a bodily viewpoint through anthropological mimesis, which can program the propensity to certain capabilities of the individual organism. C. G. Jung was the first who pointed to the productivity of this method in his work "Theoretical Reflections on the Nature of the Psyche". The creativity phenomenon reflects not only "pure" psychology and the intellectual and spiritual component but also its relation to the artist as a physical being. It, outside its belonging to and being conditioned by transcendent factors, includes a quantitative aspect related to the moment of intensity. The disease acts to some extent as a stimulator of the production/change of aesthetic enzyme. In this context, the dialectic method is also effective because the subject of study cannot be comprehensively argued using naturalistic approaches only and requires a semantic explanation too. The essence of it is the logic of contradictions. In this case, the antinomy of matter-spirit plays a conceptual role in the projection on the plane of word-formation. Originality of the research findings is in the expansion of the causal relationship range of the creative process, namely the inclusion of the factor of psycho-physiological pathology into the system artist-work. This factor performs important stylistic functions. Conclusions. In contrast to scientific studies, where 1) style is analyzed separately and 2) the figure of the artist, this study argues the need to correlate these issues, taking them beyond descriptiveness to avoid schematics and one-dimensionality. (shrink)

The authors argue that Morenian-inspired existential psychodrama turns out to be a formidable lever for opening up existence as it allows schizophrenic patients to incorporate the experience of an “absolutely other” on which the foundation of any autonomous self is built. More precisely, by relying on their clinical experiences, the authors show how psycho-dramatic play goes along with an intense movement of original projection which carries psychotic patients externally in relation to themselves. Offset from their pathological world, these patients (...) feel more inclined to “wear someone else’s shoes,” for the duration of the game, and they do so in a manner that is both sensorial and pathic. This surprising and creative “journey,” which allows them to return to the world better attuned to others and to themselves, is merely an enactment of a “true” intersubjective encounter: the very essence of existential psychodrama. By applying phenomenology to this psychodramatic method, notably by relying on the hypothesis of psychosis being a disorder of what Bin Kimura calls the “ aida,” the authors hope to contribute to the advancement of psychosis’ psychotherapy. (shrink)

The image of dead person returning to life was the most ancient source of irrational fear appeared in culture. This conclusion is argued with empirical data from archeology and ethnography. Fear has been expressed in funeral rites, the tying of extremities, burning and dismemberment of dead bodies, and ritual cannibalism etc. At the same time, it was attended by effective care for helpless cripples, which seems to descend to the Lower Paleolithic as well. Dread of posthumous revenge played a decisive (...) regulative role at the earliest stage of anthropogenesis, as the disparity between artificial weapons and natural aggression-retention mechanisms became self-destructive. In the new conditions, individuals with normal animal mind were doomed to catastrophe. Those hominid groups proved viable, in which mystical fear, a product of unnaturally developed imagination, bounded lethal conflicts among kinsmen. The phobias corresponded to the psycho-nervous system's “strategic pathology”; that was a condition for early hominids’ self-preservation. As a result, a causal connection between instrumental potential, cultural regulation quality and social sustainability was formed, which has been a mechanism of social selection for all of human history and prehistory. (shrink)

This article evaluates the phenomenon of sexual reorientation therapy from the standpoint of Orthodox Christian theology. It is argued that homosexual desire is the product of the fall of mankind and cannot be considered “normal.” At the same time, however, reorientation therapies, whether secular or Christian, are inherently reductionistic and fail to address the underlying spiritual pathologies involved in homosexual desire. The purpose of therapeia in the Orthodox Church is the psycho-somatic transfiguration of the whole person into the image (...) of Christ, not merely the cessation of homosexual activity or the “reidentification” of one’s “lifestyle.”. (shrink)

Nicht zu Unrecht gilt die Behandlung von Angsterkrankungen als die Paradedisziplin der Verhaltenstherapie. Hier wie auch generell zeigt sich die VT dabei aber als zersplittert in eine Vielzahl von Einzelmethoden: Verschiedene Lernformen – Einsichtslernen, Konditionierungslernen und Habituationslernen - werden in ihrem Beitrag zu Angsterkrankungen isoliert voneinander konzipiert. Entsprechend stehen auch auf diesen Lernformen basierende Therapiemethoden für sich. Dadurch werden wichtige Synergiepotenziale verschenkt. Menschliches Lernen, auch und gerade das Lernen und Verlernen von pathologischer Angst, ist aber immer ein ganzheitlicher Prozess. Der (...) Artikel skizziert eine ganzheitliche Psycho-Logik der Eskalation und Chronifizierung pathologischer Angst unter integrierendem Einbezug der o.g. Lernformen. Hieraus leitet sich eine verfahrensintegrierende VT ab, die die etablierten Behandlungsmethoden so kombiniert, dass Synergiegewinne entstehen, was an einem Fallbeispiel verdeutlicht wird. Den theoretischen Hintergrund bildet die Theorie der Selbstorganisation komplexer Systeme, insbesondere die Synergetik – ein Feld, in dem wichtige Aspekte der Gestalttheorie aufgehoben sind. It is not without reason that the treatment of anxiety disorders is considered the showpiece of behavioral therapy. Here as well as in general, however, the BT shows itself fragmented into a multitude of individual methods: Different forms of learning - insight learning, conditioning learning and habituation learning - are designed in isolation from each other in their contribution to anxiety disorders. Correspondingly, treatment methods based on these forms of learning stand for themselves. This gives away important synergy potential. Human learning, also and especially learning and unlearning of pathological anxiety, is always a holistic process. The paper outlines a holistic psycho-logic of the escalation and chronification of pathological anxiety, integrating the above mentioned forms of learning. This leads to the derivation of a method-integrating BT, which combines the established treatment methods in such a way that synergy gains are achieved, as illustrated by a case study. The theoretical background is formed by the theory of the self-organization of complex systems, in particular synergetics - a field in which important aspects of gestalt theory are implied. (shrink)

As a science and practice of intervention and control, medicine is concerned with cure and care, the promotion and protection of health, and the prevention of maladies and human suffering. This wide-ranging task is accomplished through medical practice and medical research, though no sharp boundary between them can be drawn. A widespread misconception about medicine has it that medicine is concerned with illness and disease. However, the subject of medicine is the patient, i.e., Homo patiens, but not illness or disease, (...) with the ends being directed toward the relief, prevention of human suffering, and saving human life. Accordingly, medicine needs a theory of the patient first of all. Nosology and pathology as studies of illness and disease may be viewed as elements of such a theory of the Homo patiens. Seen from this perspective, clinical research and practice are to be based on the question: What is a patient? That is, what characteristics distinguish a patient from a non-patient? The present chapter is concerned with this question. The inquiry into what a patient, i.e., Homo patiens, is, intersects with anthropology that is concerned with the question of what is a human being? This is the fundamental philosophical question of medicine because, as an experimental and diagnostic-therapeutic discipline, it undertakes momentous interventions in human life. It therefore needs an image of the human being so as to ascertain whether medical interventions are in accord with, or contravene, that image. For example, it is a legitimate question to ask whether the transplantation of animal cells, tissues, and organs into humans, i.e., xenotransplantation, or whether the designing of offspring by genetic engineering, is morally permissible. Since anthropology is basically a philosophical endeavor, medicine at its foundations turns out to intersect with philosophy. We shall consider the patient as a bio-psycho-social agent who is suffering or whose life is threatened by some occurrences inside or outside of her body, usually called diseases, pathogenic environments, etc. Our aim is to understand what these occurrences may look like and how they may be conceptualized, systematized, recognized, causally analyzed, and controlled. Thus, our discussion consists of the following five sections: 7.1 The Suffering Individual; 7.2 The Bio-Psycho-Social Agent; 7.3 Health, Illness, and Disease; 7.4 Systems of Disease; 7.5 Etiology (= Science of Clinical Causation). (shrink)

This essay seeks to define and conceptualize cinematic quotation against scholarship that positions the auteur as the locus of meaning for a given film, especially with respect to any intertextual references. By troubling a reliance on frameworks of pathological, singular control and revealing their inability to define the specific characteristics of quotation - beyond merely thinking of it as one form of allusion or intertextuality - this essay argues that an ontological friction is inherent to instances of cinematic quotation. By (...) utilizing Jean-Luc Nancy's ontology, I am able to reveal the problematic nature of positing a singular, authorial voice in cinema or, more broadly, of assuming a singular subject at all. What is at stake in instances of cinematic quotation, as this essay shows, is the revelation that our being cannot be thought of in singular terms because we are always already both singular and plural, despite our attempts to escape such knowledge. (shrink)

With aging, incidence of severe stress‐related diseases increases. However, mechanisms, underlying individual vulnerability to stress and age‐related diseases are not clear. The goal of this review is to analyze finding from the recent literature on age‐related characteristics of the hypothalamic‐pituitary‐adrenal (HPA) axis associated with stress reactivity in animals that show behavioral signs of anxiety and depression under mild stress, and in human patients with anxiety disorders and depression with emphasis on the impact of the circadian rhythm and the negative feedback (...) mechanisms involved in the stress response. One can conclude that HPA axis reaction to psycho‐emotional stress, at least acute stress, increases in the aged individuals with anxiety and depression behavior. Elevated stress reactivity is associated with disruption of the circadian rhythm and the mineralocorticoid receptor‐mediated glucocorticoid negative feedback. The disordered function of the HPA axis in individuals with anxiety and depression behavior can contribute to aging‐related pathology. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo pretende investigar a maneira pela qual o filósofo francês Jean-Paul Sartre enquadra, em sua psicologia fenomenológica da imaginação, a problemática acerca do irreal normal e do irreal patológico. Estruturando psicofenomenologicamente a atividade da consciência imaginante, será possível ver que a imagem difere radicalmente da percepção, mas ambas permanecem, contudo, consciência intencional. Nessa toada, cabe a indagação: se toda consciência imaginante é consciência intencional, como enquadrar as experiências alucinatórias?: The aim of the present article is to investigate how (...) the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre understood, in his phenomenological psychology of the imagination, the problematic of the "normal unreal" and the "pathological unreal". By psycho-phenomenologically structuring the activity of the imaginative consciousness, we can see that the image differs radically from perception, but both remain intentional consciousness. In this context, it is necessary to ask the following question: if all imaginative consciousness is intentional consciousness, how can we frame hallucinatory experiences? (shrink)

The permanent struggle for optimisation can be seen as one of the most significant cultural principles of contemporary Western societies: the demand for improved performance and efficiency as well as the pursuit of self-improvement are con-sidered necessary in order to keep pace with an accelerated, competitive modern-ity. This affects not only work and education, but also family life, parent–child relationships and intimate relationships in respect to the body and the self, in regard to the public as well as the private (...) realm. Bringing together contributions from renowned scholars from the fields of sociology, psychology and psycho-analysis, this book explores the impacts of optimisation on culture and psyche, examining the contradictions and limitations of optimisation, in conjunction with the effects of social transformations on individuals and shifts in regard to the meaning of ‘pathology’ and ‘normality’. (shrink)

This work pretends to visualize the importance of the role that in the emergency, consolidation and expansion of the phenomenon of pathological view and over medication of the present childhood and adolescence seem to perform today certain types of criteria on which to base the undertaking of learning problems we are today faced with by children and teenagers in the classroom. To get this aim, we refer to re educated psycho educational practises, from which the cognitive-conductual views are questioned (...) where they supported on, and different interventionist typed are proposed from the clinical psycho pedagogical and psycho educational approach. With the aim of contribute to lectures from this area start to occupy a central place in the schedule developed on these subjects, considering that, frequently, they are postponed and relegated to the educational area, as if it had no connection with “the clinical” and the impact they have in the processes of establishing the subjectivity. (shrink)

Sante De Sanctis (1862—1935), a pioneer of psychology in Rome at the end of the 19th century, applied methods from the expanding field of experimental psychology to the study of dreams, which was considered one of the leading ways to gain an understanding of normal and pathological psychic life. Taking inspiration from several traditions, De Sanctis proposed a study that anticipated a scientific program that also differentiated between contemporary psychoanalytical interpretations according to which previous dream psychology was considered a 'dark (...) forest'. On the contrary, the multi-faceted methodology that he adopted for the study of an, until then, marginal phenomenon of the 'new' psychology, represented an element of originality that also included the elaboration of a psycho-physiological theory of dreams. Although the Italian psychologist's work on dreams was characterized by these important methodological changes, it disappeared from the references of those who contributed to the foundation of modern dreaming psychology after the Second World War. The present article places De Sanctis' psychology of dreams in its scientific context and singles out its originality while also analyzing the reasons for its marginalization. (shrink)

This essay highlights the root causes of the pervasive discomfort with Africanness common among a significant portion of the South African population. It claims that this collective national psyche manifests as a dysfunctional self-identity, and is therefore akin to a psychosocial malaise we propose to name “the Limpopo River Fever”. The root cause of this pathological psycho-political culture, we venture to demonstrate, is the historical process of a systematic self-orientation away from Africa, perceived as “Africa north of the Limpopo (...) River”. This psychosis as presently manifesting as what is distinctly an Afrophobia, and not mere xenophobia, I argue, has principally been nurtured since the 1950s by the ascendency of an anti-Africanist ideology within the national liberation movement, the African National Congress, which has subsequently been the governing party since the defeat of the apartheid regime in 1994. It is concluded that even historic efforts at redirecting the South African body-politic toward a pan-African consciousness which evolved around Thabo Mbeki during his presidency could not achieve the aspired re-Africanisation of South African society. Keywords: Afrophobia, South Africa, Xenophobia, Pan-Africanism, ANC. (shrink)

After an overview of the phenomenology of numinous experience in mysticism, conversion, and related states in psychosis, the intersection and distinction between contemporary transpersonal psychologies of spiritual development and psychodynamic/clinical perspectives on pathological states is addressed from cognitive&endash;developmental, psycho-physiological, personality, and socio-cultural perspectives. Debates about the nature of mystical and conversion experiences have a long history in the psychology of religious experience and raise fundamental methodological issues concerning the potential inclusiveness or narrowness of the human sciences. A genuine psychology (...) of numinous experience and its impact on life histories must find its way between the twin dangers of "over-belief" and false reductionism. (shrink)

Axel Honneth has been instrumental in advancing the work of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists, rebuilding their effort to combine radical social and political analysis with rigorous philosophical inquiry. These eleven essays published over the past five years reclaim the relevant themes of the Frankfurt School, which counted Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Jürgen Habermas, Franz Neumann, and Albrecht Wellmer as members. They also engage with Kant, Freud, Alexander Mitscherlich, and Michael Walzer, whose work on morality, history, (...) democracy, and individuality intersects with the Frankfurt School's core concerns. Collected here for the first time in English, Honneth's essays pursue the unifying themes and theses that support the methodologies and thematics of critical social theory, and they address the possibilities of continuing this tradition through radically changed theoretical and social conditions. According to Honneth, there is a unity that underlies critical theory's multiple approaches: the way in which reason is both distorted and furthered in contemporary capitalist society. And while much is dead in the social and psychological doctrines of critical social theory, its central inquiries remain vitally relevant. Is social progress still possible after the horrors of the twentieth century? Does capitalism deform reason and, if so, in what respects? Can we justify the relationship between law and violence in secular terms, or is it inextricably bound to divine justice? How can we be free when we're subject to socialization in a highly complex and in many respects unfree society? For Honneth, suffering and moral struggle are departure points for a new "reconstructive" form of social criticism, one that is based solidly in the empirically grounded, interdisciplinary approach of the Frankfurt School. (shrink)

The Pathology of Man is the first comprehensive study of the psychology and epistemology of human evil, long urged by leading psychiatrists and psychologists, including Freud, Jung, Menninger, Fromm, and Peck. The book breaks new ground by offering a clear, empirically based, and theoretically sound understanding of human evil as a widespread, real, non-metaphorical pathology. With deliberate and thorough scholarship the author proposes a new framework-relative theory of disease and justifies the provocative thesis that human evil should be (...) classified as a pathology which is not a deviation from an accepted norm, but rather is a normal state. This break with tradition provides the necessary psychological foundation for the familiar concept of the banality of human evil, a foundation which in the past it has lacked. (shrink)

Pathologizing ugliness refers to the use of disease language and medical processes to foster and support the claim that undesirable features are pathological conditions requiring medical or surgical intervention. Primarily situated in cosmetic surgery, the practice appeals to the concept of “aesthetic pathology”, which is a medical designation for features that deviate from some designated aesthetic norms. This article offers a two-pronged conceptual analysis of aesthetic pathology. First, I argue that three sets of claims, derived from normativist and (...) naturalistic accounts of disease, inform the framing of ugliness as a disease. These claims concern: (1) aesthetic harms, (2) aesthetic dysfunction, and (3) aesthetic deviation. Second, I introduce the notion of a hybridization loop in medicine, which merges the naturalist and normative understanding of the disease that potentially enables pathologizing practices. In the context of cosmetic surgery, the loop simultaneously promotes the framing of beauty ideals as normal biological attributes and the framing of normal appearance as an aesthetic ideal to legitimize the need for cosmetic interventions. The article thus offers an original discussion of the conceptual problems arising from a specific practice in cosmetic surgery that depicts ugliness as the disease. (shrink)

Axel Honneth has been instrumental in advancing the work of the Frankfurt School of critical theorists, rebuilding their effort to combine radical social and political analysis with rigorous philosophical inquiry. These eleven essays published over the past five years reclaim the relevant themes of the Frankfurt School, which counted Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin, Jürgen Habermas, Franz Neumann, and Albrecht Wellmer as members. They also engage with Kant, Freud, Alexander Mitscherlich, and Michael Walzer, whose work on morality, history, (...) democracy, and individuality intersects with the Frankfurt School's core concerns. Collected here for the first time in English, Honneth's essays pursue the unifying themes and theses that support the methodologies and thematics of critical social theory, and they address the possibilities of continuing this tradition through radically changed theoretical and social conditions. According to Honneth, there is a unity that underlies critical theory's multiple approaches: the way in which reason is both distorted and furthered in contemporary capitalist society. And while much is dead in the social and psychological doctrines of critical social theory, its central inquiries remain vitally relevant. Is social progress still possible after the horrors of the twentieth century? Does capitalism deform reason and, if so, in what respects? Can we justify the relationship between law and violence in secular terms, or is it inextricably bound to divine justice? How can we be free when we're subject to socialization in a highly complex and in many respects unfree society? For Honneth, suffering and moral struggle are departure points for a new "reconstructive" form of social criticism, one that is based solidly in the empirically grounded, interdisciplinary approach of the Frankfurt School. (shrink)