Results for 'Fallibilism, Falsifiability, Scientific Progress, Igbo people, Epistemology'

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  1.  20
    Fallibilism Theory and the Fate of Knowledge Progress in (Igbo) African Society: A Conversation with Amaechi Udefi.Gabriel Chukwuebuka Otegbulu & Winifred Chioma Ezeanya - 2022 - Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions 11 (2):13-26.
    The Igbo knowledge system articulated by Amaechi Udefi is insufficient to ensure knowledge progress as opposed to the system found in fallibilism theory. The reason is that there is a level of intellectual openness fallibilism theory guarantees that is not found in Udefi’s thought. This paper aims to do a comparative study of fallibilism theory and Udefi’s account of the Igbo knowledge system. The study also investigates to what extent each knowledge system can ensure knowledge growth and development. (...)
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  2.  6
    Fallibilism Theory and the Fate of Knowledge Progress in Indigenous Igbo Society.Gabriel Chukwuebuka Otegbulu & Winifred Chioma Ezeanya - 2022 - Filosofia Theoretica 11 (2):13-25.
    The Igbo knowledge system articulated by Amaechi Udefi is insufficient to ensure knowledge progress as opposed to the system found in fallibilism theory. The reason is that there is a level of intellectual openness fallibilism theory guarantees that is not found in Udefi’s thought. This paper aims to do a comparative study of fallibilism theory and Udefi’s account of the Igbo knowledge system. The study also investigates to what extent each knowledge system can ensure knowledge growth and development. (...)
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  3. Understanding and scientific progress: lessons from epistemology.Nicholas Emmerson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.
    Contemporary debate surrounding the nature of scientific progress has focused upon the precise role played by justification, with two realist accounts having dominated proceedings. Recently, however, a third realist account has been put forward, one which offers no role for justification at all. According to Finnur Dellsén’s (Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 56:72–83, 2016) noetic account, science progresses when understanding increases, that is, when scientists grasp how to correctly explain or predict more aspects of the world that they (...)
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  4. The Uncertainty of the Global Earth in the History of Progress. [REVIEW]Takaharu Oda - 2017 - Society and Politics 11:187–189.
    Is the shape of the Earth really a globe? Reading closely, the author of this voluminous paperback (first published as hardcover in 2015), historian David Wootton, does not take for granted the fact that the Earth is round or spherical. However, this does not mean that he is a relativist. And it is interesting to consider why he regards science as progress against any relativist view of the history of science. -/- On the whole, the book is an extraordinary contribution (...)
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  5.  62
    Scientific Progress and Collective Attitudes.Keith Raymond Harris - 2021 - Episteme:1-20.
    Psychological-epistemic accounts take scientific progress to consist in the development of some psychological-epistemic attitude. Disagreements over what the relevant attitude is – true belief, knowledge, or understanding – divide proponents of thesemantic,epistemic,andnoeticaccounts of scientific progress, respectively. Proponents of all such accounts face a common challenge. On the face of it, only individuals have psychological attitudes. However, as I argue in what follows, increases in individual true belief, knowledge, and understanding are neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific progress. (...)
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  6. Scientific Progress and Democratic Society through the Lens of Scientific Pluralism.Theptawee Chokvasin - 2023 - Suranaree Journal of Social Science 17 (2):Article ID e268392 (pp. 1-15).
    Background and Objectives: In this research article, the researcher addresses the issue of creating public understanding in a democratic society about the progress of science, with an emphasis on pluralism from philosophers of science. The idea that there is only one truth and that there are just natural laws awaiting discovery by scientists has historically made it difficult to explain scientific progress. This belief motivates science to develop theories that explain the unity of science, and it is thought that (...)
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  7.  4
    Scientific Progress and Collective Attitudes.Keith Raymond Harris - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):127-146.
    Psychological-epistemic accounts take scientific progress to consist in the development of some psychological-epistemic attitude. Disagreements over what the relevant attitude is – true belief, knowledge, or understanding – divide proponents of the semantic, epistemic, and noetic accounts of scientific progress, respectively. Proponents of all such accounts face a common challenge. On the face of it, only individuals have psychological attitudes. However, as I argue in what follows, increases in individual true belief, knowledge, and understanding are neither necessary nor (...)
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  8. Accuracy-First Epistemology and Scientific Progress.Peter J. Lewis, Don Fallis & Branden Fitelson - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.
    The accuracy-first program attempts to ground epistemology in the norm that one’s beliefs should be as accurate as possible, where accuracy is measured using a scoring rule. We argue that considerations of scientific progress suggest that such a monism about epistemic value is untenable. In particular, we argue that counterexamples to the standard scoring rules are ubiquitous in the history of science, and hence that these scoring rules cannot be regarded as a precisification of our intuitive concept of (...)
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  9. Scientific progress as increasing verisimilitude.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:73-77.
    According to the foundationalist picture, shared by many rationalists and positivist empiricists, science makes cognitive progress by accumulating justified truths. Fallibilists, who point out that complete certainty cannot be achieved in empirical science, can still argue that even successions of false theories may progress toward the truth. This proposal was supported by Karl Popper with his notion of truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Popper’s own technical definition failed, but the idea that scientific progress means increasing truthlikeness can be expressed by defining (...)
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  10. Genetic Epistemology and Piaget's Philosophy of Science: Piaget vs. Kuhn on Scientific Progress.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2006 - Theory and Psychology 16 (2):203-224.
    This paper concerns Jean Piaget's (1896–1980) philosophy of science and, in particular, the picture of scientific development suggested by his theory of genetic epistemology. The aims of the paper are threefold: (1) to examine genetic epistemology as a theory concerning the growth of knowledge both in the individual and in science; (2) to explicate Piaget's view of ‘scientific progress’, which is grounded in his theory of equilibration; and (3) to juxtapose Piaget's notion of progress with Thomas (...)
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  11. Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism.Hasok Chang - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61:1-20.
    Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general satisfaction.
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  12.  8
    Conceptualizing Scientific Progress.Tatiana D. Sokolova - 2023 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 60 (2):23-34.
    Overcoming disciplinary separation, organizing and conducting successful inter- and transdisciplinary research is a growing trend in contemporary scientific practices, which is viewed as a necessary condition for the progress of scientific knowledge, and therefore requires philosophical reflection. If it is the growing scientific specialization that has been considered as a constant identification of the progress of science since the 19th century, it is a disciplinary separation that has become an obstacle for the study of complex objects since (...)
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  13.  73
    Scientific progress and Peircean utopian realism.Robert Almeder - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (3):253 - 280.
    I argue that (1) if scientific progress, construed in revolutionary terms, were to continue indefinitely long, then any non-trivial question answerable by the use of the scientific method would in fact be answered in a way that would allow for further refinement without undermining the essential correctness of the answer; and (2) it is reasonable to believe that scientific progress will continue indefinitely long. The establishment of (1) and (2) entails that any non-trivial empirically answerable question will (...)
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  14. Optimistic realism about scientific progress.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3291-3309.
    Scientific realists use the “no miracle argument” to show that the empirical and pragmatic success of science is an indicator of the ability of scientific theories to give true or truthlike representations of unobservable reality. While antirealists define scientific progress in terms of empirical success or practical problem-solving, realists characterize progress by using some truth-related criteria. This paper defends the definition of scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Antirealists have tried to rebut realism with the (...)
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  15. The Noetic Account of Scientific Progress and the Factivity of Understanding.Fabio Sterpetti - 2018 - In David Danks & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), Building Theories: Heuristics and Hypotheses in Sciences. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
    There are three main accounts of scientific progress: 1) the epistemic account, according to which an episode in science constitutes progress when there is an increase in knowledge; 2) the semantic account, according to which progress is made when the number of truths increases; 3) the problem-solving account, according to which progress is made when the number of problems that we are able to solve increases. Each of these accounts has received several criticisms in the last decades. Nevertheless, some (...)
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  16.  10
    Scientific Progress, Rationality and Interdisciplinarity.Evgenii G. Tsurkan - 2023 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 60 (2):65-71.
    The critical remark within the framework of the panel discussion problematizes three provisions of the article proposed for discussion. The first is the dual nature of the concept of “scientific progress”, which is both descriptive and normative. The remark criticizes the descriptive understanding of scientific progress and argues for the adequacy of the description of this concept exclusively in a normative way. The second provision concerns the possibility of accepting “rationality” as a universal criterion for scientific progress. (...)
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  17. Scientific Conjectures and the Growth of Knowledge.Sanjit Chakraborty - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (1):83-101.
    A collective understanding that traces a debate between ‘what is science?’ and ‘what is a science about?’ has an extraction to the notion of scientific knowledge. The debate undertakes the pursuit of science that hardly extravagance the dogma of pseudo-science. Scientific conjectures invoke science as an intellectual activity poured by experiences and repetition of the objects that look independent of any idealist views (believes in the consensus of mind-dependence reality). The realistic machinery employs in an empiricist exposition of (...)
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  18. Scientific Conjectures and the Growth of Knowledge.Sanjit Chakraborty - 2021 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 38 (1):83-101.
    A collective understanding that traces a debate between 'what is science?’ and ‘what is a science about?’ has an extraction to the notion of scientific knowledge. The debate undertakes the pursuit of science that hardly extravagance the dogma of pseudo-science. Scientific conjectures invoke science as an intellectual activity poured by experiences and repetition of the objects that look independent of any idealist views (believes in the consensus of mind-dependence reality). The realistic machinery employs in an empiricist exposition of (...)
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  19.  26
    Epistemic Diversity and Epistemic Advantage: A Comparison of Two Causal Theories in Feminist Epistemology.Tay Jeong - 2024 - Hypatia 39 (1):97-117.
    Feminist epistemology aims to propose epistemic reasons for increasing the representation of women or socially subordinated people in science. This is typically done—albeit often only implicitly—by positing a causal mechanism through which the representation of sociodemographic minorities exerts a positive effect on scientific advancement. Two types of causal theories can be identified. The “epistemic diversity thesis” presents a causal path from sociodemographic diversity to scientific progress mediated by epistemic diversity. The “thesis of epistemic advantage” proposes a causal (...)
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  20.  64
    Is Popper's falsificationist heuristic a helpful resource for developing critical thinking?Chi-Ming Lam - 2007 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):432–448.
    Based on a rather simple thesis that we can learn from our mistakes, Karl Popper developed a falsificationist epistemology in which knowledge grows through falsifying, or criticizing, our theories. According to him, knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, progresses through conjectures that are controlled by criticism, or attempted refutations . As he puts it, ‘Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of the problem which we are trying to (...)
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  21. Objectivity, Scientificity, and the Dualist Epistemology of Medicine.Thomas V. Cunningham - 2015 - In P. Huneman (ed.), Classification, Disease, and Evidence. Springer Science + Business. pp. 01-17.
    This paper considers the view that medicine is both “science” and “art.” It is argued that on this view certain clinical knowledge – of patients’ histories, values, and preferences, and how to integrate them in decision-making – cannot be scientific knowledge. However, by drawing on recent work in philosophy of science it is argued that progress in gaining such knowledge has been achieved by the accumulation of what should be understood as “scientific” knowledge. I claim there are varying (...)
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  22.  21
    Conceptualizing Scientific Progress Needs a New Humanism.Ilya Т Kasavin - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
  23. Mathematics, indispensability and scientific progress.Alan Baker - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (1):85-116.
  24. Verisimilitude, Theory Change, and Scientific Progress.I. Niiniluoto - 1979 - In I. Niiniluoto & R. Tuomela (eds.), The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change. North-Holland Publishing Company. pp. 243--264.
     
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  25. A Pragmatist Reboot of William Whewell’s Theory of Scientific Progress.Ragnar van der Merwe - 2023 - Contemporary Pragmatism 20 (3):218-245.
    William Whewell’s philosophy of science is often overlooked as a relic of 19th century Whiggism. I argue however that his view – suitably modified – can contribute to contemporary philosophy of science, particularly to debates around scientific progress. The reason Whewell’s view needs modification is that he makes the following problematic claim: as science progresses, it reveals necessarily truths and thereby grants a glimpse of the mind of God. Modifying Whewell’s view will involve reinventing his notion of necessary truth (...)
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  26. Popper's explications of ad hocness: Circularity, empirical content, and scientific practice.Greg Bamford - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):335-355.
    Karl Popper defines an ad hoc hypothesis as one that is introduced to immunize a theory from some (or all) refutation but which cannot be tested independently. He has also attempted to explicate ad hocness in terms of certain other allegedly undesirable properties of hypotheses or of the explanations they would provide, but his account is confused and mistaken. The first such property is circularity, which is undesirable; the second such property is reduction in empirical content, which need not be. (...)
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  27. The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciled.James Ladyman - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):87-98.
    Abstractvan Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion (...)
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  28. Progress and procedures in scientific epistemology.Peter Godfrey-Smith - manuscript
    My title is intended to echo Hans Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951), and the phrase "scientific epistemology" is intended in two Reichenbachian senses. One involves the epistemology of science; the other involves epistemology undertaken with a scientific orientation. Talk of "progress and procedures" is intended in a similar dual sense. I start by looking back over the last century, at how a family of problems was tackled by scientifically oriented philosophers. These are (...)
     
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  29.  20
    The Evolutionary Dimension of Scientific Progress.Alexander Yu Antonovskiy & Raisa Ed Barash - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
  30.  47
    Realists Waiting for Godot? The Verisimilitudinarian and the Cumulative Approach to Scientific Progress.Andrea Roselli - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1071-1084.
    After a brief presentation of the Verisimilitudinarian approach to scientific progress, I argue that the notion of estimated verisimilitude is too weak for the purposes of scientific realism. Despite the realist-correspondist intuition that inspires the model—the idea that our theories get closer and closer to ‘the real way the world is’—, Bayesian estimations of truthlikeness are not objective enough to sustain a realist position. The main argument of the paper is that, since estimated verisimilitude is not connected to (...)
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  31.  20
    Progressing Bird’s account of scientific progress.Kevin McCain - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-6.
    One of the central claims of Alexander Bird’s book Knowing Science is that the concept of knowledge is central to understanding science. In light of this, it is unsurprising that Bird construes scientific progress solely in terms of the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Although his account of scientific progress is itself promising, there is an underlying tension between Bird’s support for the knowledge-centric account of scientific progress and his case against rival accounts of scientific progress. (...)
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  32.  76
    Experiment as the motor of scientific progress.Robert Ackermann - 1988 - Social Epistemology 2 (4):327 – 335.
  33.  5
    Is Popper's Falsificationist Heuristic a Helpful Resource for Developing Critical Thinking?Chi-Ming Lam - 2007 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):432-448.
    Based on a rather simple thesis that we can learn from our mistakes, Karl Popper developed a falsificationist epistemology in which knowledge grows through falsifying, or criticizing, our theories. According to him, knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, progresses through conjectures (i.e. tentative solutions to problems) that are controlled by criticism, or attempted refutations (including severely critical tests). As he puts it, ‘Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties (...)
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  34.  12
    On the Realist Theory of Scientific Progress.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1983 - der 16. Weltkongress Für Philosophie 2:938-945.
    This paper discusses the 'realist' theory of scientific progress which claims that science makes progress so far as it succeeds in gaining true or highly truthlike information about the reality. Some difficulties of this theory are pointed out by considering Peirce's view of truth as the limit of inquiry. A parallelism is suggested between various theories of physical probability and epistemological views about scientific knowledge.
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  35.  14
    Human nature and the feasibility of inclusivist moral progress.Andrés Segovia-Cuéllar - 2022 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
    The study of social, ethical, and political issues from a naturalistic perspective has been pervasive in social sciences and the humanities in the last decades. This articulation of empirical research with philosophical and normative reflection is increasingly getting attention in academic circles and the public spheres, given the prevalence of urgent needs and challenges that society is facing on a global scale. The contemporary world is full of challenges or what some philosophers have called ‘existential risks’ to humanity. Nuclear wars, (...)
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  36.  10
    On the Multidimensionality of Scientific Rationality and Scientific Progress.Vladimir N. Porus - 2023 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 60 (2):58-64.
    In the polemic with T.D. Sokolova’s article the issue is discussed addressing the question whether there is anything new that we can get from the methodology of interdisciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity for determination of scientific rationality and scientific progress. The solution of this question is connected with the intensions of a historical and social-cultural epistemologies. These intentions consist in a complex or “multidimensional” approach to the creation of conceptual designs that define the application of these concepts. None of the (...)
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  37.  6
    Science and empire in the nineteenth century: a journey of imperial conquest and scientific progress.Catherine Delmas, Christine Vandamme & Donna Spalding Andréolle (eds.) - 2010 - Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.
    The issue at stake in this volume is the role of science as a way to fulfil a quest for knowledge, a tool in the exploration of foreign lands, a central paradigm in the discourse on and representations of Otherness. The interweaving of scientific and ideological discourses is not limited to the geopolitical frame of the British empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but extends to the rise of the American empire as well. The fields of research (...)
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  38.  24
    Thinking globally, progressing locally: Harding and Goonatilake on scientific progress across cultures.Sharyn Clough - 2001 - Social Epistemology 15 (4):379-383.
  39. Craig Dilworth: Scientific progress. A study concerning the nature of the relation between successive scientific theories. Craig Dilworth: The metaphysics of science. An account of modern science in terms of principles, laws and theories. [REVIEW]Hanne Andersen - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (2):265-271.
  40.  27
    Progress, epistemology and human health and welfare: what nurses need to know and why.Clinton E. Betts - 2005 - Nursing Philosophy 6 (3):174-188.
    Human Progress is often understood to be a rather natural and obvious truth of human existence. That this is not necessarily so, is indicative of the pervasive social, psychological, and educational inculcation that sustains its ubiquitous acceptance. Moreover, the uncritical and ill‐informed understanding of Progress as an unquestioned expression of human beneficence has serious consequences for those concerned with the health and welfare of people. It is argued in this paper that, much of what we might consider deleterious in the (...)
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  41. Fallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory, view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved commonsense views. Some epistemologists have taken fallibilism to imply skepticism, according to which none of those claims or views are ever well justified or knowledge. In fact, though, it is (...)
     
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  42. Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge.Michael Hannon - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1119-1146.
    This paper defends the epistemological doctrine of fallibilism from recent objections. In “The Myth of Knowledge” Laurence BonJour argues that we should reject fallibilism for two main reasons: first, there is no adequate way to specify what level of justification is required for fallible knowledge; second, we cannot explain why any level of justification that is less than fully conclusive should have the significance that makes knowledge valuable. I will reply to these challenges in a way that allows me to (...)
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  43. When and why people think beliefs are “debunked” by scientific explanations of their origins.Dillon Plunkett, Lara Buchak & Tania Lombrozo - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):3-28.
    How do scientific explanations for beliefs affect people's confidence that those beliefs are true? For example, do people think neuroscience-based explanations for belief in God support or challenge God's existence? In five experiments, we find that people tend to think explanations for beliefs corroborate those beliefs if the explanations invoke normally-functioning mechanisms, but not if they invoke abnormal functioning (where “normality” is a matter of proper functioning). This emerges across a variety of kinds of scientific explanations and beliefs (...)
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  44.  5
    Consciousness Redux.Twenty Years Of-Progress - 1997 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 479.
  45.  77
    Falsificationism is not just ‘potential’ falsifiability, but requires ‘actual’ falsification: Social psychology, critical rationalism, and progress in science.Peter Holtz & Peter Monnerjahn - 2017 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 47 (3):348-362.
    Based on an analysis of ten popular introductions to social psychology, we will show that Karl Popper's philosophy of ‘critical rationalism’ so far has had little to no traceable influence on the epistemology and practice of social psychology. If Popper is quoted or mentioned in the textbooks at all, the guiding principle of ‘falsificationism’ is reduced to a mere ‘falsifiability’ and some central elements of critical rationalism are left out – those that are incompatible with positivism and inductivism. Echoing (...)
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  46. Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.
    This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori ; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the (...)
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  47. Randomness in Arithmetic.Scientific American - unknown
    What could be more certain than the fact that 2 plus 2 equals 4? Since the time of the ancient Greeks mathematicians have believed there is little---if anything---as unequivocal as a proved theorem. In fact, mathematical statements that can be proved true have often been regarded as a more solid foundation for a system of thought than any maxim about morals or even physical objects. The 17th-century German mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz even envisioned a ``calculus'' of reasoning such (...)
     
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  48.  16
    The Epistemological Objection to Divine Command Ethics.Glenn Peoples - 2011 - Philosophia Christi 13 (2):389-401.
    According to the epistemological objection to divine command ethics, if morality is grounded in God’s commands, then those who do not believe in God cannot have moral knowledge. This objection has been raised—and answered before. However, the objection persists, and I argue here that it has not been substantially improved upon and does not deserve a second hearing. Whether or not God’s commands provide the basis of moral facts does not imply that unbelievers cannot have moral knowledge, since the ability (...)
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  49.  39
    Is Evolutionary Epistemology of Science Compatible with Scientific Realism.Ivan Kuzin - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 46 (4):163-179.
    Classical, selectionist (adaptationist) evolutionary epistemology of science draws an analogy between development of science and natural selection. But natural selection immediately increases only the relative fitness of organisms with regard to specific and changing environment. Therefore evolutionary epistemology of science is exploited (by van Fraassen in particular) against scientific realism which presumes existence of absolute scientific progress as an approach to truth. In modern biology in order to explain absolute evolutionary progress nonadaptationist, nonselectionist models based on (...)
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  50. How Intellectual Communities Progress.Lewis D. Ross - 2021 - Episteme (4):738-756.
    Recent work takes both philosophical and scientific progress to consist in acquiring factive epistemic states such as knowledge. However, much of this work leaves unclear what entity is the subject of these epistemic states. Furthermore, by focusing only on states like knowledge, we overlook progress in intermediate cases between ignorance and knowledge—for example, many now celebrated theories were initially so controversial that they were not known. -/- This paper develops an improved framework for thinking about intellectual progress. Firstly, I (...)
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