It is commonly argued that the fact that our universe is fine-tuned for life favors both a design hypothesis as well as a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis. The claim that the fine-tuning of this universe supports a non-teleological multiverse hypothesis has been forcefully challenged however by Ian Hacking and Roger White. In this paper we take this challenge even further by arguing that if it succeeds, then not only does the fine-tuning of this universe fail to support a multiverse hypothesis, but (...) it tends to favor a single-universe hypothesis instead. (shrink)

Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of (...) the Past with a principle that does not generate this difficulty. I develop such an account and defend it from objections. I also explore some of the account's implications, including whether the account is consistent with presentism. (shrink)

This article is a collective writing experiment undertaken by philosophers of education affiliated with the PESGB (Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain). When asked to reflect on questions concerning the Philosophy of Education in a New Key in May 2020, it was unsurprising that the effects of the coronavirus pandemic on society and on education were foremost in our minds. We wanted to consider important philosophical and educational questions raised by the pandemic, while acknowledging that, first and foremost, it (...) is a human tragedy. With nearly a million deaths reported worldwide to date, and with everyone effected in one way or another by Covid-19, there is a degree of discomfort, and a responsibility to be sensitive, in reflecting and writing about it academically. Members of this ‘Covid Collective’ come from various countries, with perspectives from Great Britain and Ireland well represented, and we see academic practice as a globally connected enterprise, especially since the digital revolution in academic publishing. The concerns raised in this article relate to but move beyond Covid-19, reflecting the impact of neoliberalism [and other political developments] on geopolitics with educational concerns as central to our focus. (shrink)

Philip Pettit offers a new insight into moral psychology. He shows that attachments such as love, and certain virtues such as honesty, require their characteristic behaviours not only as things actually are, but also in cases where things are different from how they actually are. He explores the implications of this idea for key moral issues.

This paper has two goals: (1) to defend a particular response to the problem of resultant moral luck and (2) to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we could have avoided. Cases of overdetermination threaten to undermine the claim that we are only responsible for what we could have avoided. To deal with this issue, I will motivate a particular way of responding to the problem of resultant moral luck. I defend the view that one's degree (...) of responsibility is immune to moral luck but the scope of events for which one is responsible is subject to moral luck. I will then argue that this view allows us to explain away certain intuitions about responsibility and overdetermination (as well as similar intuitions regarding Frankfurt Cases). As a result, the claim that we are only responsible for what we could have avoided becomes significantly more plausible. (shrink)

The principle of alternative possibilities tells us that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases provide an extremely influential challenge to the PAP . And Frankfurt-style compatibilists are motivated to accept compatibilism about responsibility and determinism in part due to FSCs. But there is a significant tension between our judgments about responsibility in FSCs and our judgments about responsibility in certain omissions cases. This tension has thus far largely been treated (...) as an internal puzzle for defenders of FSCs to solve. My goal here is to regiment this tension into a clear argument which undermines the FSC based critique of PAP. I will also argue that there is an in principle reason to doubt that Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists will be able to successfully respond to my argument. (shrink)

Applied philosophy is experiencing its “golden days,” as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen says in his insightful introduction to A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Applied philosophy seems to be distinguished from its opposite, pure philosophy, usually understood as traditional philosophy, which deals with subjects such as free will, consciousness, or knowledge in philosophical subdisciplines like ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. To embrace applied philosophy could thus mean to advocate for a philosophy that deals with questions “relevant to ‘the important questions of everyday life,’” as (...) Leslie Stevenson puts it, as opposed to questions that arise from within the subdisciplines of pure philosophy. (shrink)

I explore several issues raised in John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will. First I discuss whether an approach to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge that appeals directly to the claim that God’s beliefs depend on the future is importantly different from Ockhamism. I suggest that this dependence approach has advantages over Ockhamism. I also argue that this approach gives us good reason to reject the claim that the past is fixed. Finally, I discuss Fischer’s (...) proposal regarding God’s knowledge of future contingents. I suggest that it may be able to secure comprehensive foreknowledge. (shrink)

Michael Snows »talking picture« »Rameau’s Nephew […]« (1974) entwickelt eine – laufend aus den Fugen geratende – Taxonomie audiovisueller Verhältnisse des Tonfilms. Der Beitrag durchstreift diesen Experimentalfilm, indem er drei Motive – Übersetzung, Fläche, Wasser – nachverfolgt, an denen Tonfilm erprobt, reflektiert und erfahrbar wird. Dabei kristallisiert sich in Umschlagsmomenten zwischen technischer Bild-Ton-Synchronisation und »Synchresis« (Michel Chion) – irreduzibel audiovisuelle Synthese der Wahrnehmung – ein kritischer Punkt des Mediums Tonfilm heraus. Synchronisation ist von solchen Momenten aus als Prozess zu verstehen, (...) in dem Potenziale von Homogenisierung und Heterogenisierung verteilt und aufeinander bezogen werden. (shrink)

Dmitri Mendeleev’s detailed prediction in 1871 of the properties of three as yet unknown elements earned him enormous prestige. Eleven other predictions, thrown off without elaboration, were less uniformly successful, thanks mainly his unbending adherence to the structure of his table and his failure to account for the lanthanides. At the end of his life he returned to his table without making the required changes, and added a theoretical discussion of elements lighter than hydrogen. The overall balance of success and (...) failure is nevertheless in his favour. There may now be a similar failure to understand the ultra-heavy elements because of adherence to the pattern of chemical groups. (shrink)

This essay rethinks the concept of biocommunism by rearticulating it via a sensitivity towards individual suffering rather than the human species as a whole. The essay is divided into three parts. The first part outlines Marx’s concept of alienation because of the central role that the fourth kind of alienation plays in Dyer-Witheford’s original conception of biocommunism. The second part briefly elaborates on the discussion of species in the Kyoto School. These two parts lead to the third part, where a (...) novel interpretation of biocommunism is outlined, focusing on individual suffering rather than the human species. (shrink)

A and B continue their conversation concerning the Identity of Indiscernibles. Both are aware of recent critiques of the principle that haven’t received replies; B summarizes those critiques, and A offers the replies that are due. B then raises a new worry.

Husserl introduces a phenomenological concept called “motivation” early in the First Investigation of his magnum opus, the Logical Investigations. The importance of this concept has been overlooked since Husserl passes over it rather quickly on his way to an analysis of the meaningful nature of expression. I argue, however, that motivation is essential to Husserl’s overall project, even if it is not essen- tial for defining expression in the First Investigation. For Husserl, motivation is a relation between mental acts whereby (...) the content of one act make some fur- ther meaningful content probable. I explicate the nature of this relation in terms of “evidentiary weight” and differentiate it from Husserl’s notion of Evidenz, often translated as “self-evidence”. I elucidate the importance of motivation in Husserl’s overall phenomenological project by focusing on his analyses of thing-perception and empathy. Through these examples, we can better understand the continuity between the Logical Investigations and Husserl’s later work. (shrink)

This collection of essays provides the first in-depth examination of camp as it relates to a wide variety of twentieth and twenty-first century music and musical performances. Located at the convergence of popular and queer musicology, the book provides new research into camp's presence, techniques, discourses, and potential meanings across a broad spectrum of musical genres, including: musical theatre, classical music, film music, opera, instrumental music, the Broadway musical, rock, pop, hip-hop, and Christmas carols. This significant contribution to the field (...) of camp studies investigates why and how music has served as an expressive and political vehicle for both the aesthetic characteristics and the receptive modes that have been associated with camp throughout twentieth and twenty-first-century culture. (shrink)

Biocommunism, while not a new concept, has yet to be the subject of considerable academic research. Wróbel has most recently taken it up. Beginning with Dyer-Witheford’s suggestion of a return to Marx’s concept of species-being, or Gattungswesen,4 this essay will elaborate on the influence of this term in the early Marx and the role which the notion of species held in the Kyoto School. The essay concludes with an allusion to Agamben and Butler that aims to provide a much-needed discussion (...) about the feasibility of the term biocommunism as an improved notion of communism more suitable for the current reality. (shrink)

McCullough and colleagues draw an historical line from the writings of Percival, who found himself resolving arguments (sometimes violent) between physicians, surgeons and apothecaries, to the concept of civility as a professional virtue and duty. The authors show that civility is a prerequisite to effective cooperation, which itself underpins patient safety and positive clinical outcomes—desirable endpoints of any discussion about healthcare. They exhort academic leaders to teach, role model and reward correct behaviours.1 Why then, as a clinician manager with a (...) deep interest in fostering civility and psychological safety, am I not satisfied? Three reasons: the paper does not adequately explore the reasons why, its focus is largely restricted to academic institutions, and it does not encompass the non-clinical workforce; as a result, its proposed solutions appear ungrounded. Why are ‘good people’, who were attracted to careers that demand altruism and empathy, uncivil in the workplace? What are the competing goals that result in curt, disrespectful or downright rude exchanges? This has been studied. Leape et al concluded that endogenous factors such as personality, insecurity, anxiety, depression, narcissism and responses to prior …. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Hintergrund Advance Care Planning (ACP) wird auch in Deutschland zunehmend praktiziert. Aus klinisch-ethischer Perspektive bietet ACP eine Möglichkeit, Vorausverfügungen zu konkretisieren und auf diese Weise die Entscheidungsfindung bei fehlender Selbstbestimmungsfähigkeit von Patient:innen zu unterstützen. Während es für Gesprächsangebote im Sinne des ACP in Pflegeeinrichtungen und Einrichtungen der Eingliederungshilfe seit 2015 Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten gibt und erste Studien zu Angeboten veröffentlich wurden, fehlt es in Deutschland bisher an publizierten Evaluationsstudien zu ACP-Angeboten im Krankenhaus. Intervention und Methoden Im vorliegenden Beitrag erfolgt die strukturierte (...) Darstellung von ACP als ein Element des klinisch-ethischen Unterstützungsangebotes am Universitätsklinikum Halle (Saale) (UKH). Es erfolgte eine quantitative Inhaltsanalyse der schriftlichen Dokumentation von durchgeführten ACP-Gesprächsprozessen für den Zeitraum der Pilotphase von 01/2020 bis 08/2021 (20 Monate). Ergebnisse Im Zeitraum wurden 93 ACP-Gespräche angefragt. Mit 79 Patient:innen konnten 110 Gespräche geführt werden. 46 % der Anfragen kamen von Palliative Care betreuten Patient:innen. Im Durchschnitt dauerten die Beratungen 45 min. Der Gesprächsprozess zur Erstellung einer Patientenverfügung benötigte durchschnittlich 122 min und 2,5 Gespräche. Bei 23 % der Patient:innen endete der ACP-Prozess nach dem Erstgespräch. Die Inhalte der ACP-Prozesse tangierten verschiedene Bereiche anderer Professionen im Krankenhaus, insbesondere die Entscheidungsfindung über aktuelle Diagnostik und Therapie zwischen Ärzt:innen und Patient:innen. Diskussion Die Einführung eines ACP-Angebotes im Krankenhaus zeigt neben einer Vielzahl an Chancen auch Herausforderungen auf, welche es im gemeinsamen Diskurs zu bewältigen gilt. Bei der Einbettung eines ACP-Angebots im Krankenhaus müssen die Besonderheiten der Klinik und insbesondere die Abgrenzung von ACP zu anderen Arbeitsfeldern der Ethikberatung, wie beispielsweise die Ethikfallberatung, bedacht werden. (shrink)

The s, p, d and f blocks of the elements, as delimited by Charles Janet in 1928, can be represented as parallel slices of a regular tetrahedron. They also fit neatly on to the surface of a sphere. The reasons for this are discussed and the possible objections examined. An attempt is made to see whether there are philosophical implications of this unexpected geometrical regularity. A new tetrahedral design in transparent plastic is presented.

Philip Pettit has drawn together here a series of interconnected essays on three subjects to which he has made notable contributions. The first part of the book discusses the rule-following character of thought. The second considers how choice can be responsive to different sorts of factors, while still being under the control of thought and the reasons that thought marshals. The third examines the implications of this view of choice and rationality for the normative regulation of social behaviour. Rules, (...) Reasons, and Norms makes original and illuminating connections across a large swathe of territory, from metaphysics to philosophical psychology to the theory of rational regulation. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement. After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic. A different account is proposed that is neutral on the explanatory role (...) of the first-person sense of embodiment, which leads to an emphasis on the transformative nature of empathy and a broadening of the scope of possible targets of empathic awareness. (shrink)

Bowers et al. counter deep neural networks (DNNs) as good models of human visual perception. From our color perspective we feel their view is based on three misconceptions: A misrepresentation of the state-of-the-art of color perception; the type of model required to move the field forward; and the attribution of shortcomings to DNN research that are already being resolved.

Holly Smith has recently argued that Subjective Deontological Moral Theories (SDM theories) cannot adequately account for agents’ duties to gather information. I defend SDM theories against this charge and argue that they can account for agents’ duties to inform themselves. Along the way, I develop some principles governing how SDM theories, and deontological moral theories in general, should assign ‘deontic value’ or ‘deontic weight’ to particular actions.

Mark Freeman's inspiring account of the burgeoning field of the psychological humanities presents a clear and compelling vision of what the discipline of psychology might become. Engaging and accessible, this bold, provocative book is destined to spark significant discussion and debate in audiences including advanced undergraduates, postgraduates, and professionals in the field of psychology with interests in theoretical and philosophical psychology.

According to a traditional view, humans are superior to their non-human terrestrial companions because they alone are “rational animals.” Although the traditional view is presupposed by our social and legal institutions, it has been called into question by modern science: Darwin himself claimed that humans differ in degree rather than in kind from animals, and recent discoveries in comparative animal cognition have seemed to confirm Darwin's assertion. Sustaining the traditional view in light of these discoveries calls out for a careful (...) comparison of the human mind with its precursors, the vertebrate mind and the mammalian mind. Psychological capacities shared across the animal kingdom are repurposed in humans, rendering humans uniquely capable of rationality. To be rational is to respond appropriately to value. Humans as such are not rational animals, but have the potential to become rational animals. This potential marks a morally relevant difference in kind between humans and non-human animals. (shrink)

Henriksen et al. use phenomenology as a tool to clarify the status of what they regard as the abnormal experiences of the condition called schizophrenia. This reveals phenomenology as a method of detailed scrutiny of these experiences to establish a theory about them in terms of the “dissolution of certain structures of self-consciousness” and “morbid objectification of inner speech”. Our commentary is in two parts. In the first, we set out a contrasting view of phenomenology, and its use in madness.1 (...) In the second, we exemplify this use of phenomenology and the meaningful nature of voices through evidence that links.. (shrink)

Philip Pettit; X*—Social Holism and Moral Theory: A Defence of Bradley's Thesis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages.

We show that the predicate “x is the power set of y” is ‐definable, if V = L[E] is an extender model constructed from a coherent sequences of extenders, provided that there is no inner model with a Woodin cardinal. Here is a predicate true of just the infinite cardinals. From this we conclude: the validities of second order logic are reducible to, the set of validities of the Härtig quantifier logic. Further we show that if no L[E] model has (...) a cardinal strong up to one of its ℵ‐fixed points, and, the Löwenheim number of this logic, is less than the least weakly inaccessible δ, then (i) is a limit of measurable cardinals of K, and (ii) the Weak Covering Lemma holds at δ. (shrink)

A cohesive overview of the philosophy of Heraclitus.

Curiosity and creativity are manifestations of novelty-seeking mechanisms, closely intertwined and interdependent. This principle aligns seamlessly with the foundational tenets of Langerian mindfulness, which places novelty seeking as a cornerstone. Creativity, curiosity, openness, and flexibility all harmoniously converge in this framework. Spanning over four decades, research in the realm of mindfulness has diligently delved into the intricate interplay among these constructs.

Are judgments of praise for moral behavior modulated by knowledge of an agent's past suffering at the hands of others, and if so, in what direction? Drawing on multiple lines of research in experimental social psychology, we identify three hypotheses about the psychology of praise — typecasting, handicapping, and non-historicism — each of which supports a different answer to the question above. Typecasting predicts that information about past suffering will augment perceived patiency and thereby diminish perceived agency, making altruistic actions (...) seem less praiseworthy; handicapping predicts that this information will make altruistic actions seem more effortful, and hence more praiseworthy; and non-historicism predicts that judgments of praise will be insensitive to information about an agent's experiential history. We report the results of two studies suggesting that altruistic behavior tends to attract more praise when the experiential history of the agent involves coping with adversity in childhood rather than enjoying prosperity (Study 1, N = 348, p = .03, d = 0.45; Study 2, N = 400, p = .02, d = 0.39), as well as the results of a third study suggesting that altruistic behavior tends to be evaluated more favorably when the experiential history of the agent includes coping with adversity than in the absence of information about the agent's past experience (N = 226, p = .002). This pattern of results, we argue, is more consistent with handicapping than typecasting or non-historicism. (shrink)

Recent research suggests that moral behavior attracts more praise, and immoral behavior less blame, when the agent has suffered in childhood. In this paper we report results from three studies in which a fictional character’s childhood was described in terms of either neglect and abuse (Adversity condition), love and care (Prosperity condition), or neutrally (Control condition). In Study 1 (N = 248), participants in the Adversity condition attributed more praise to a fictional character relative to other conditions. In Study 2 (...) (N = 275), participants in the Adversity condition attributed more praise and less blame relative to other conditions, with the effects mediated by self-expressivity. In Study 3 (N = 275), where the character was female rather than male, there was no effect of condition on praise, but there was an effect of condition on blame, and this effect was mediated by self-expressivity and social-emotional impairment. (shrink)

Several legal scholars have recently argued that U.S. tort law’s physical-emotional distinction commits tort to the objectionable position of mind-body dualism, but they have not considered the distinction’s role as an aid to judicial cognition and decision-making. Drawing primarily on the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress, this essay argues that tort’s physical-emotional distinction is not a relic of mind-body dualism but a heuristic that judges have used to structure and simplify the difficult but unavoidable task of drawing lines (...) between legally cognizable and non-cognizable harm. The analysis has at least three normative implications: (1) users of tort’s physical-emotional distinction should clarify that they neither endorse dualism nor depreciate emotional harm; (2) because judicial expertise may not extend to the task of drawing lines between legally cognizable and non-cognizable harm, judicial performance in this area may be more adequate than critics suggest; and (3) although it may not be possible to determine the optimal way of drawing lines between legally cognizable and non-cognizable emotional harm, moral-philosophical tools such as Rawlsian and Scanlonian contractualism may be able to identify partial or pro tanto considerations for choosing among different ways of doing so. (shrink)

Our global ecological crisis demands that we question the rationality of the culture that has caused it: western modernity's free market capitalism. Philip Goodchild develops arguments from Nietzsche, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marx, to suggest that our love of Western modernity is an expression of a piety in which capitalism becomes a global religion, in practice, if not always in belief. This book presents a philosophical alternative that demands attention from philosophers, critical theorists, philosophers of religion, theologians, and those in (...) ecological politics. (shrink)