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Perceptual Reports

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Berit Brogaard, Do 'Looks' Reports Reflect the Contents of Perception?
    Roderick Chisholm argued that ‘look’ can be used in three different ways: epistemically, comparatively and non-comparatively. Chisholm’s non-comparative sense of ‘look’ played an important role in Frank Jackson’s argument for the sense-datum theory. The question remains..
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  2. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings. Inquiry.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions Herman Cappelen argues that unlike what is commonly thought, contemporary analytic philosophers do not typically rely on intuitions as evidence. If they do indeed rely on intuitions, that should be evident from their written works, either explicitly in the form of ‘intuition’ talk or by means of other indicators. However, Cappelen argues, while philosophers do engage in ‘intuition’ talk, that is not a good indicator that they rely on intuitions, as ‘intuition’ and its cognates have many (...)
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  3. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Perceptual Reports. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual reports are utterances of sentences that contain a perceptual verb, such as ‘look’, ‘sound’, ‘feel’, ‘see’, and ‘perceive’. It is natural to suppose that at least in many cases, these types of reports reflect aspects of the phenomenal character and representational content of a subject’s perceptual experiences. For example, an utterance of ‘my chair looks red but it’s really white’ appears to reflect phenomenal properties of the speaker’s experience of a chair. Whether perceptual reports actually reflect these things is (...)
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  4. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case From Synesthesia and Visual Imagery. In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Neuroscience Series, Synthese Library.
    The paper argues that the English verb ‘to see’ can denote three different kinds of conscious states of seeing, involving visual experiences, visual seeming states and introspective seeming states, respectively. The case for the claim that there are three kinds of seeing comes from synesthesia and visual imagery. Synesthesia is a relatively rare neurological condition in which stimulation in one sensory or cognitive stream involuntarily leads to associated experiences in a second unstimulated stream. Visual synesthesia is often considered a case (...)
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  5. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'. Philosophy Compass.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories of perception. The article closes with (...)
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  6. Berit Brogaard (2013). It's Not What It Seems. A Semantic Account of 'Seems' and Seemings. Inquiry 56 (2-3):210-239.
    I start out by reviewing the semantics of ?seem?. As ?seem? is a subject-raising verb, ?it seems? can be treated as a sentential operator. I look at the semantic and logical properties of ?it seems?. I argue that ?it seems? is a hyperintensional and contextually flexible operator. The operator distributes over conjunction but not over disjunction, conditionals or semantic entailments. I further argue that ?it seems? does not commute with negation and does not agglomerate with conjunction. I then show that (...)
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  7. Berit Brogaard (2013). Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification. Oup Usa. 270.
  8. Berit Brogaard (2012). Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions. OUP USA.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
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  9. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1980). Reference, Reality and Perceptual Fields. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 53 (August):763-823.
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  10. Dan D. Crawford (1974). Propositional and Nonpropositional Perceiving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (December):201-210.
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  11. Gerald Doppelt (1979). The Austin-Malcolm Argument for the Incorrigibility of Perceptual Reports. Dialectica 33 (1):59-75.
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  12. Clement Dore (1965). Seeming to See. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (October):312-318.
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  13. Santiago Echeverri (2013). Is Perception a Source of Reasons? Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
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  14. Craig French (2012). Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge? Theoria 78 (2):115-127.
    In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is false since it is false that if S sees that p, then S knows that p. Turri argues that there are cases in which (A) S sees that p but (B) S does not know that p. In response I offer linguistic evidence to suppose that in propositional contexts (...)
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  15. Peter A. French (1975). Seeing' and 'Seeing That', 'Observing' and 'Observing That. American Philosophical Quarterly 9:89-97.
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  16. Russell B. Goodman (1976). An Analysis of Two Perceptual Predicates. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):35-53.
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  17. Benj Hellie (forthcoming). Love in the Time of Cholera. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford UP.
    We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the (...)
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  18. James T. Higginbotham (1999). Perceptual Reports Revisited. In K. Murasugi & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), Philosophy and Linguistics. Westview Press.
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  19. James T. Higginbotham (1983). The Logic of Perceptual Reports: An Extensional Alternative to Situation Semantics. Journal of Philosophy 80 (February):100-127.
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  20. Igal Kvart (1993). Seeing That and Seeing As. Noûs 27 (3):279-302.
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  21. Stephen Leeds (1975). Two Senses of 'Appears Red'. Philosophical Studies 28 (September):199-205.
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  22. Teresa Marques (2006). On an Argument of Segal's Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts. Disputatio 2 (26):19-37.
    This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his (...)
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  23. Michael G. F. Martin (2010). What's in a Look? In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
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  24. J. Barry Maund (1986). The Phenomenal and Other Uses of 'Looks'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (June):170-180.
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  25. John B. Mcclatchey (1972). Some Uses of 'Appearance'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):463-469.
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  26. Kumiko Murasugi & Robert Stainton (eds.) (1999). Philosophy and Linguistics. Westview Press.
    This edited volume offers ten new essays on semantics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of linguistics by top scholars in the field. Covering a wide range of topics, the collection is sure to be of interest to scholars in those areas as well as some philosophers of mind. Because of the diversity of topics and perspectives inherent in the collection, readers will find both exposition and debate among the contributors.
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  27. Reinhard Muskens (1993). Perception Verbs. In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press. 6--2999.
    The semantics of a sentence containing a perception verb such as see or hear depends to a high degree on the exact syntactic form of the perception verb’s complement. Let us compare sentence (1), where the complement is tenseless, with (2), where the complement is a tensed clause.
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  28. Richard H. Schlagel (1962). Language and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (December):192-204.
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  29. Richard H. Severens (1967). Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (December):213-221.
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  30. Frank N. Sibley (1955). Seeking, Scrutinizing and Seeing. Mind 64 (October):455-478.
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  31. Jonas F. Soltis (1966). Seeing, Knowing And Believing: A Study Of The Language Of Visual Perception. Addison-Wesley.
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  32. James E. Tomberlin (1996). Perception and Possibilia. Philosophical Issues 7:109-115.
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  33. Joyce Trebilcot (1970). Dr Kenny's Perceptions. Mind 79 (January):142-143.
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  34. Janyce M. Wiebe & William J. Rapaport (1988). A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative. In Proceedings of the 26th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. Association for Computational Linguistics.
    Narrative passages told from a character's perspective convey the character's thoughts and perceptions. We present a discourse process that recognizes characters'.
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  35. John O. Wisdom (1949). Perception-Statements. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49:47-64.
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