We reexamine some of the classic problems connected with the use of cardinal utility functions in decision theory, and discuss Patrick Suppes's contributions to this field in light of a reinterpretation we propose for these problems. We analytically decompose the doctrine of ordinalism, which only accepts ordinal utility functions, and distinguish between several doctrines of cardinalism, depending on what components of ordinalism they specifically reject. We identify Suppes's doctrine with the major deviation from ordinalism that conceives of utility functions as (...) representing preference differences, while being non- etheless empirically related to choices. We highlight the originality, promises and limits of this choice-based cardinalism. (shrink)

In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, a strategy (...) that the book by and large endorses, and even develops in an original way concerning the Ellsberg paradox. We argue that the BJ theory is too specific to fulfil Bradley’s foundational project and that the redefinition strategy fails in both the Allais and Ellsberg cases. Although we share Bradley’s conclusion that EU theories do not state universal rationality requirements, we reach it not by a comparison with BJ theory, but by a comparison with the non-EU theories that the paradoxes have heuristically suggested. (shrink)

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and (...) Bayes-compatible pooling are equivalent. Granting supra-Bayesianism its usual normative status, one upshot of our study is thus that, in a certain class of epistemic contexts, geometric pooling enjoys a normative advantage over linear pooling as a social learning mechanism. We discuss the philosophical ramifications of this advantage, which we show to be robust to variations in our statement of the Bayes-compatibility problem. (shrink)

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not only compatible with, but even comforted by, the current state of the field. I submit that all in all, (...) the most accurate philosophical assessment consists not in flatly rejecting this necessity claim, but in accepting it in a suitably revised form. (shrink)

The representational theory of measurement has long been the central paradigm in the philosophy of measurement. Such is not the case anymore, partly under the influence of the critique according to which RTM offers too poor descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. This can be called the metrological critique of RTM. I claim that the critique is partly irrelevant. This is because, in general, RTM is not in the business of describing measurement procedures, be it in idealized (...) form. To support this claim, I present various cases where RTM can be said to investigate measurement without providing any measurement procedure. Such limit cases lead to a better understanding of the RTM project. They also illustrate some of the questions which the philosophy of measurement can explore, when it is ready to go beyond the metrological viewpoint. (shrink)

This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...) of any complete solution to the problem of state-dependent utility. We also argue that this is the main conceptual lesson to draw from it. We show that this lesson is of interest to both economists and philosophers. (shrink)

The basic axioms or formal conditions of decision theory, especially the ordering condition put on preferences and the axioms underlying the expected utility formula, are subject to a number of counter-examples, some of which can be endowed with normative value and thus fall within the ambit of a philosophical reflection on practical rationality. Against such counter-examples, a defensive strategy has been developed which consists in redescribing the outcomes of the available options in such a way that the threatened axioms or (...) conditions continue to hold. We examine how this strategy performs in three major cases: Sen's counterexamples to the binariness property of preferences, the Allais paradox of EU theory under risk, and the Ellsberg paradox of EU theory under uncertainty. We find that the strategy typically proves to be lacking in several major respects, suffering from logical triviality, incompleteness, and theoretical insularity. To give the strategy more structure, philosophers have developed “principles of individuation”; but we observe that these do not address the aforementioned defects. Instead, we propose the method of checking whether the strategy can overcome its typical defects once it is given a proper theoretical expansion. We find that the strategy passes the test imperfectly in Sen's case and not at all in Allais's. In Ellsberg's case, however, it comes close to meeting our requirement. But even the analysis of this more promising application suggests that the strategy ought to address the decision problem as a whole, rather than just the outcomes, and that it should extend its revision process to the very statements it is meant to protect. Thus, by and large, the same cautionary tale against redescription practices runs through the analysis of all three cases. A more general lesson, simply put, is that there is no easy way out from the paradoxes of decision theory. (shrink)

State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various models of beliefs can be shown to be unequally exposed to the problem of (...) state-dependent utility. The problem can be argued to be solved even when the decision-maker has no influence over the resolution of uncertainty. The implications of such reappraisal for a philosophical appreciation of the revealed preference methodology are discussed. (shrink)

It is widely held that under ordinal utility, utility differences are ill-defined. Allegedly, for these to be well-defined (without turning to choice under risk or the like), one should adopt as a new kind of primitive quaternary relations, instead of the traditional binary relations underlying ordinal utility functions. Correlatively, it is also widely held that the key structural properties of quaternary relations are entirely arbitrary from an ordinal point of view. These properties would be, in a nutshell, the hallmark of (...) cardinal utility. While much is obviously true in these two tenets, this note explains why, as stated, they should be abandoned. Any ordinal utility function induces a rich quaternary relation. There is such a thing as ordinal utility differences. Furthermore, this induced quaternary relation respects, apart from completeness, the most standard structural properties of quaternary relations. These properties are, from an ordinal point of view, anything but arbitrary; from a quaternary perspective only completeness should be considered the hallmark—if any—of cardinal utility. These facts are explained to be especially relevant to the critical appreciation of the ordinalist methodology. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the decision-theoretic status of risk attitudes. I start by providing evidence showing that the risk attitude concepts do not play a major role in the axiomatic analysis of the classic models of decision-making under risk. This can be interpreted as reflecting the neutrality of these models between the possible risk attitudes. My central claim, however, is that such neutrality needs to be qualified and the axiomatic relevance of risk attitudes needs to be re-evaluated accordingly. Specifically, (...) I highlight the importance of the conditional variation and the strengthening of risk attitudes, and I explain why they establish the axiomatic significance of the risk attitude concepts. I also present several questions for future research regarding the strengthening of risk attitudes. (shrink)

We investigate risk attitudes when the underlying domain of payoffs is finite and the payoffs are, in general, not numerical. In such cases, the traditional notions of absolute risk attitudes, that are designed for convex domains of numerical payoffs, are not applicable. We introduce comparative notions of weak and strong risk attitudes that remain applicable. We examine how they are characterized within the rank-dependent utility model, thus including expected utility as a special case. In particular, we characterize strong comparative risk (...) aversion under rank-dependent utility. This is our main result. From this and other findings, we draw two novel conclusions. First, under expected utility, weak and strong comparative risk aversion are characterized by the same condition over finite domains. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Second, under expected utility, weak comparative risk aversion is characterized by the same condition when the utility functions have finite range and when they have convex range. By contrast, such is not the case under non-expected utility. Thus, considering comparative risk aversion over finite domains leads to a better understanding of the divide between expected and non-expected utility, more generally, the structural properties of the main models of decision-making under risk. (shrink)

Consider a subjective expected utility preference relation. It is usually held that the representations which this relation admits differ only in one respect, namely, the possible scales for the measurement of utility. In this paper, I discuss the fact that there are, metaphorically speaking, two additional dimensions along which infinitely many more admissible representations can be found. The first additional dimension is that of state-dependence. The second—and, in this context, much lesser-known—additional dimension is that of act-dependence. The simplest implication of (...) their usually neglected existence is that the standard axiomatizations of subjective expected utility fail to provide the measurement of subjective probability with satisfactory behavioral foundations. (shrink)

Cette note épistémologique porte sur le statut, en théorie de la décision, des concepts d’attitude par rapport au risque. A première vue, l’analyse axiomatique ne les exploite pas, ce qui reflète une certaine neutralité des modèles de décision au sujet de l’attitude par rapport au risque. Mais un examen plus poussé met en valeur la variation conditionnelle et le renforcement de l’attitude par rapport au risque, qui rattachent les concepts d’attitude par rapport au risque à l’analyse axiomatique.

An obituary of Philippe Mongin (1950-2020).

In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...) be no incompatibility between moral hazard and the Savage framework. This qualifies the incompatibility view, that is ubiquitous in decision theory. Second, in general, moral hazard is not sufficient to overcome the challenges posed by state-dependent utility to the behavioral identification of beliefs. This qualifies the sufficiency view, that is influential in decision theory. These two philosophical conclusions are the main contributions of my paper. (shrink)

This note considers the conceptual part of Sen’s «Internal Consistency of Choice». Amongst the various claims this paper features, two are singled out. A first, negative, claim is that no formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling without exception. A second, positive, claim, is that a formal condition of choice consistency is normatively compelling only under some assumptions involving preference. Here, the puzzling choices Sen puts forward are scrutinized and it is argued that such a scrutiny leads to question (...) the negative claim, but in a subtle way, so that the positive claim is comforted, even strengthened. -/- Cette note examine la partie conceptuelle d’un article de Sen, «Internal Consistency of Choice». Elle isole deux thèses parmi celles que Sen défend. Une première, négative, est qu’aucune condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable sans exception. Une seconde, positive, est qu’une condition formelle de cohérence du choix n’est normativement valable que sous des suppositions faisant intervenir la préférence. Nous procédons à une analyse détaillée des choix énigmatiques dont Sen prend argument et affirmons que cet examen mène à remettre en cause la thèse négative, mais d’une manière subtile qui confirme — même renforce — la thèse positive. (shrink)

A book review of Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers, by Cheryl Misak (OUP, 2020).

The possible and revelation -- The saturated phenomenon -- Metaphysics and phenomenology: a relief for theology -- "Christian philosophy": hermeneutic or heuristic? -- Sketch of a phenomenological concept of the gift -- What cannot be said: Apophasis and the discourse of love -- The banality of saturation -- Faith and reason.

This collection of writings by Jean-Luc Nancy, the renowned French critic and poet, delves into the history of philosophy to locate a fundamentally poetic modus operandi there. The book represents a daring mixture of Nancy’s philosophical essays, writings about artworks, and artwork of his own. With theoretical rigor, Nancy elaborates on the intrinsic multiplicity of art as a concept of “making,” and outlines the tensions inherent in the faire, the “making” that characterizes the very process of production and thereby (...) the structure of poetry in all its forms. Nancy shows that this multiplication that belongs to the notion of art makes every single work communicate with every other, all material in the artwork appeal to some other material, and art the singular plural of a praxis of the finite imparting of an infinity which is actually there in every utterance. In the collection, Nancy engages with the work of, among others, François Martin, Maurice Blanchot, and On Kawara. (shrink)

Le XXe siècle a été celui d'un éclatement sans précédent des formes traditionnelles de l'art, et donc aussi de son essence ou de son "idée". Est-ce à dire qu'un héritage entier de sens et de culture a été dilapidé en cet âge qu'on a dit être celui de la "fin de l'art"? Doit-on au contraire penser qu'héritage il y a bel et bien eu, sur un mode critique et selon des logiques qui ne firent peut-être pas sans raison? Loin d'être (...) dépourvus de sens, les signes contemporains de l'art - restes, bribes, traces, "symptômes" divers - sollicitent en fait plus que jamais les interprétations. C'est pourquoi nous avons estimé pouvoir, et même devoir, poser les questions suivantes : - Que fait donc l'art, de lui-même et de son histoire, à l'époque de son an-archie eidétique? - Que peuvent en dire aujourd'hui les théories esthétiques et philosophiques? - Sous quelle forme de fidélité critique à leur tradition respective le peuvent-elles? (shrink)

La philosophie consiste à donner un autre nom à ce qui a été longtemps cristallisé sous le nom de Dieu » : quel sort réserver à cet énoncé de Merleau-Ponty? Ces Leçons, qui se focalisent sur quelques désignations emblématiques de l’absolu dans la philosophie moderne, débutent avec le « non-autre » forgé par Nicolas de Cues dans le dernier de ses dialogues philosophiques. En interrogeant successivement la façon dont Descartes, Spinoza, Kant et Schelling ont redéfini l’absolu et les conséquences qu’ils (...) en ont tirées pour la formulation de la question de Dieu, il s’agit de problématiser la notion du « tout autre », décliné de différentes manières dans les Miettes philosophiques de Kierkegaard, la théologie dialectique de Karl Barth, la phénoménologie du sacré de Rudolf Otto et, plus près de nous, chez Heidegger et Derrida. En analysant quelques nœuds remarquables de l’arc historique qui relie ces deux désignations, il s’agit de mieux comprendre le projet de la théologie philosophique moderne et de donner une profondeur de champ historique aux débats contemporains relatifs à l’« onto-théologie », l’« idolâtrie conceptuelle » et les « théologies négatives ». (shrink)

On a l’habitude de lire dans Antigone l’histoire d’un conflit entre d’un côté l’expression des liens affectifs et de la piété, et de l’autre les prérogatives de l’État dont le but premier serait le maintien des institutions. D’un côté Antigone fidèle à son frère, de l’autre Créon attaché à sa Cité. D’un côté la morale de l’affectivité ou de la conviction (Gesinnungsethik), de l’autre la morale de la responsabilité (Verantwortungsethik), pour parler comme Max Weber. Cette lecture classique de la tragédie (...) demeure sans doute pertinente à bien des égards, mais traduit-elle l’essentiel? Et si l’intention du poète n’avait pas été d’en rester à cette confrontation mais de suggérer, par-delà l’affrontement ruineux, une troisième voie possible? Il n’y aurait plus alors deux termes seulement, le privé et le public que tout sépare, mais deux manières pour l’ordre public lui-même de se rapporter au privé, l’une conflictuelle et tyrannique, celle de Créon, l’autre conciliatrice et délibérative – démocratique en ce sens –, celle défendue par Hémon, par Tirésias, et finalement peut-être par Sophocle lui-même qui, par l’emploi d’un vocabulaire tiré de l’expérience politique athénienne, dénoue d’une main l’intrigue qu’il noue de l’autre. Éclairée entre autres par Aristote, une interprétation nouvelle de la pièce en découle, celle d’un poète qui surjoue les conflits pour mieux insinuer les moyens politiques de les résoudre ou de les atténuer. (shrink)

L’édition critique des œuvres de Moïse ben Sabbataï, philosophe juif actif (à Rome?) vers 1340, avait signalé, parmi d’autres sources latines lues dans les traductions en hébreu de son contemporain Juda de Rome, un exemplum présentant le sage athénien Solon sur son lit de mort en champion de la doctrine de l’élévation intellectuelle en vue de la vie éternelle. Cette note identifie comme sa source un chapitre d’Albert le Grand, De natura et origine animae II, 13, dont la traduction en (...) hébreu se trouve dans un ouvrage inédit de Juda de Rome, son Commentaire du Qaddīš et de la Qeduššāh. La traduction du chapitre est éditée, l’histoire de l’ exemplum reconstituée et son emploi par les trois auteurs, remis en contexte et interprété. (shrink)

If anything marks the image, it is a deep ambivalence. Denounced as superficial, illusory, and groundless, images are at the same time attributed with exorbitant power and assigned a privileged relation to truth. In this collection of writings on images and visual art, the author explores this through an extraordinary range of references.

Contractarianism in some form has been at the center of recent debates in moral and political philosophy. Jean Hampton was one of the most gifted philosophers involved in these debates and provided both important criticisms of prominent contractarian theories plus powerful defenses and applications of the core ideas of contractarianism. In these essays, she brought her distinctive approach, animated by concern for the intrinsic worth of persons, to bear on topics such as guilt, punishment, self-respect, family relations, and the (...) maintenance and justification of the state. Edited by Daniel Farnham, this collection is an essential contribution to understanding the problems and prospectus of contractarianism in moral, legal and political philosophy. (shrink)

One of the strongest strands in Nancy's philosophy is an attempt to rethink community and the very idea of the social in a way that does not ground these ideas in some individual subject or subjectivity. The fundamental argument of this book is that being is always 'being with', that 'I' is not prior to 'we', that existence is essentially co-existence. He thinks this being together, not as a comfortable enclosure in a pre-existing group, but as a mutual abandonment and (...) exposure to each other, one that would preserve the 'I' and its freedom in a mode of imagining community as neither a 'society of spectacle' nor via some form of 'authenticity'. (shrink)

Along with Husserl's Ideas and Heidegger's Being and Time, Being Given is one of the classic works of phenomenology in the twentieth century. Through readings of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and twentieth-century French phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry), it ventures a bold and decisive reappraisal of phenomenology and its possibilities. Its author's most original work to date, the book pushes phenomenology to its limits in an attempt to redefine and recover the phenomenological ideal, which the author argues has never (...) been realized in any of the historical phenomenologies. Against Husserl's reduction to consciousness and Heidegger's reduction to Dasein, the author proposes a third reduction to givenness, wherein phenomena appear unconditionally and show themselves from themselves at their own initiative. Being Given is the clearest, most systematic response to questions that have occupied its author for the better part of two decades. The book articulates a powerful set of concepts that should provoke new research in philosophy, religion, and art, as well as at the intersection of these disciplines. Some of the significant issues it treats include the phenomenological definition of the phenomenon, the redefinition of the gift in terms not of economy but of givenness, the nature of saturated phenomena, and the question “Who comes after the subject?” Throughout his consideration of these issues, the author carefully notes their significance for the increasingly popular fields of religious studies and philosophy of religion. Being Given is therefore indispensable reading for anyone interested in the question of the relation between the phenomenological and the theological in Marion and emergent French phenomenology. (shrink)

This major study of Hobbes's political philosophy draws on recent developments in game and decision theory to explore whether the thrust of the argument in Leviathan, that it is in the interests of the people to create a ruler with absolute power, can be shown to be cogent. Professor Hampton has written a book of vital importance to political philosophers, political and social scientists, and intellectual historians.

Jean Greisch a soixante ans. A l'occasion de cet anniversaire, trente de ses collègues et amis de divers continents ont souhaité unir leurs réflexions à ce que son œuvre, désormais considérable, inspire sur les différentes scènes de la pensée. La thématique générale, qui constitue l'intitulé du présent volume, est emblématique d'une production singulière : passage entre les deux langues de son Luxembourg natal, entre la phénoménologie et la philosophie de la religion, entre la métaphysique et la théologie, entre les (...) sciences humaines et l'herméneutique, entre la poésie et l'éthique. Enseignant, traducteur, conférencier international et auteur, il continue de frayer différents types de passages : dresser des ponts, ouvrir des brèches, risquer des percées, souffrir des traversées, ménager des transitions, inventer des tracés. (shrink)

Le comte Joseph de Maistre fut un ennemi radical des Lumières.

Dans les sociétés démocratiques contemporaines, les individus revendiquent le droit d'aimer librement. Ils sont attachés à la réussite de leur vie sentimentale et à l'épanouissement de leur sexualité. Mais le corps épris nous permet-il d'accéder à l'existence heureuse que nous désirons? Dans ce livre, Jean-Marie Frey met au jour les ressorts de l'inquiétude suscitée par l'amour charnel. Il montre comment la pudibonderie et le libertinage expriment, chacun à leur manière, une tentative pour se rassurer. Les prudes désireux de voiler (...) les femmes et les libertins exhibant un corps morcelé dans l'imagerie pornographique, n'éprouvent-ils pas les uns et les autres une crainte devant la chair désirable? L'auteur oppose les figures du pudibond et du libertin à celle d'un amant disposé à jouer le jeu d'une passion amoureuse à la fois inquiétante et joyeuse. (shrink)

In this book it explores science and technology, makes connections between these epistemic, cultural, and political trends, and develops profound insights into the nature of our postmodernity.

The last and most poignant of these essays is The Intruder, Nancys philosophical meditation on his heart transplant.

Ce recueil vise à interroger un versant moins connu, mais essentiel, de la pensée de Gadamer, sa méditation des philosophes grecs, des Présocratiques à Plotin, qui occupe un tiers de ses œuvres complètes.

"À la fin des années 1970, Michel Foucault a avancé le concept de « crise de gouvernementalité » pour approcher des phénomènes où la contestation de certains pouvoirs - religieux, politiques, disciplinaires... -, d'abord localisée, s'est élargie pour mettre en question un dispositif général de gouvernement, un ensemble de relations de pouvoir. Chaque fois s'y exprime quelque chose comme : « nous ne voulons plus être gouvernés ainsi ». C'est l'une des ambitions de cet essai que de montrer la fécondité (...) de ce concept pour éclairer des révoltes passées et présentes, pour compliquer et compléter les perspectives centrées sur la seule lutte des classes et celles qui se sont attachées à la construction de la démocratie, à la dynamique égalitaire et à l'institutionnalisation de ses formes. Il s'agit aussi de poser un diagnostic sur la crise actuelle de l'État néo-libéral, au sein duquel démocratie et libéralisme tendent à se dissocier et dont la vision de l'économie renvoie les dégâts sociaux et écologiques au rang d'externalités négatives. Il s'agit enfin et peut-être surtout de penser « un art de ne pas être trop gouverné » qui ne serve pas d'auxiliaire involontaire aux formes de dérégulation économique et de dévastation écologique, mais s'articule à un souci ici thématisé comme celui de « l'usufruit du monde »." -- [4ème de couv.]. (shrink)

While humanists have pondered the subject of love to the point of obsessiveness, philosophers have steadfastly ignored it. One might wonder whether the discipline of philosophy even recognizes love. The word philosophy means “love of wisdom,” but the absence of love from philosophical discourse is curiously glaring. So where did the love go? In The Erotic Phenomenon, Jean-Luc Marion asks this fundamental question of philosophy, while reviving inquiry into the concept of love itself. Marion begins his profound and personal (...) book with a critique of Descartes’ equation of the ego’s ability to doubt with the certainty that one exists—“I think, therefore I am”—arguing that this is worse than vain. We encounter being, he says, when we first experience love: I am loved, therefore I am; and this love is the reason I care whether I exist or not. This philosophical base allows Marion to probe several manifestations of love and its variations, including carnal excitement, self-hate, lying and perversion, fidelity, the generation of children, and the love of God. Throughout, Marion stresses that all erotic phenomena, including sentimentality, pornography, and even boasts about one’s sexual conquests, stem not from the ego as popularly understood but instead from love. A thoroughly enlightening and captivating philosophical investigation of a strangely neglected subject, The Erotic Phenomenon is certain to initiate feverish new dialogue about the philosophical meanings of that most desirable and mysterious of all concepts—love. (shrink)

The book is a critique of dominant views of language (Chomsky s research programme in linguistics, Habermas s philosophy of ). It rehearses the fragmentary Marxist tradition about language and proposes a series of concepts for a coherent philosophy of language within Marxism.".

Les textes reunis dans le present recueil ont ete publies, au cours des vingt-huit dernieres annees, dans differentes revues et divers ouvrages collectifs. Chacun peut etre lu independamment des autres. Mais ils s'inscrivent tous dans une meme perspective, qu'ils tentent d'ailleurs de rendre explicite a partir de leurs points de vue particuliers respectifs. Ce recueil se situe dans le prolongement d'un autre ensemble de textes, qui a pour titre Le temps du possible et dans lequel il est question de l'auto-comprehension (...) de la philosophie et de quelques themes relevant d'une perspective ontologique. Le dernier de ces textes a pour theme ce qui est indique dans le titre donne au recueil. Il evoque ce qui constitue l'horizon de ce recueil et ce qui lui donne son unite. Et il prepare la reflexion sur la raison qui est poursuivie dans le present recueil. (shrink)

Etablit les similitudes entre la pensée de Spinoza et celle de Heidegger, pas si éloignées qu'elles pourraient le sembler, car elles déconstruisent la métaphysique : Heidegger en dévoile la constitution onto-théologique, Spinoza l ...