This special issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien brings together a number of carefully selected and timely articles that explore the discussion of different facets of self-consciousness from multiple perspectives. The selected articles mainly focus on three topics of the current debate: (1) the relationship between conceptual and nonconceptual ways of self-representation; (2) the role of intersubjectivity for the development of self-consciousness; (3) the temporal structure of self-consciousness. A number of previously underexposed, yet important connections between different approaches are explored. The (...) articles not only represent the state of the art in their respective areas of research and make new insights available, but also provide an overview of different methodologies: ranging from philosophy of language and mind to phenomenology and cognitive science. The volume is of interest for philosophers, cognitive scientists and researchers in related disciplines who are concerned with investigating the nature and origin of self-consciousness. (shrink)

Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (including producers of artificial agents) and raises (...) the question of whether attributions of responsibility should remain entirely on the human side. While acknowledging a crucial difference between living human beings and artificial systems culminating in an asymmetric feature of human–machine interactions, this paper investigates the extent to which artificial agents may reasonably be attributed a share of moral responsibility. To elaborate on criteria that can justify a distribution of responsibility in certain human–machine interactions, the role of types of criteria (interaction-related criteria and criteria that can be deferred from socially constructed responsibility relationships) is examined. Thereby, the focus will lay on the evaluation of potential criteria referring to the fact that artificial agents surpass in some aspects the capacities of humans. This is contrasted with socially constructed responsibility relationships that do not take these criteria into account. In summary, situations are examined in which it seems plausible that moral responsibility can be distributed between artificial and human agents. (shrink)

Can large language models produce expert‐quality philosophical texts? To investigate this, we fine‐tuned GPT‐3 with the works of philosopher Daniel Dennett. To evaluate the model, we asked the real Dennett 10 philosophical questions and then posed the same questions to the language model, collecting four responses for each question without cherry‐picking. Experts on Dennett's work succeeded at distinguishing the Dennett‐generated and machine‐generated answers above chance but substantially short of our expectations. Philosophy blog readers performed similarly to the experts, while ordinary (...) research participants were near chance distinguishing GPT‐3's responses from those of an “actual human philosopher”. (shrink)

To answer the question of whether artificial systems may count as agents in a collective action, I will argue that a collective action is a special kind of an action and show that the sufficient conditions for playing an active part in a collective action differ from those required for being an individual intentional agent.

Can we build machines with which we can have interesting conversations? Observing the new optimism of AI regarding deep learning and new language models, we set ourselves an ambitious goal: We want to find out how far we can get in creating a digital replica of a philosopher. This project has two aims; one more technical, investigating of how the best model can be built. The other one, more philosophical, explores the limits and risks which are accompanied by the creation (...) of digital replicas. In cooperation with Daniel Dennett, we took his complete works to fine-tune a GPT-3. In this paper, we share our first results with some piloting models and discuss legal and ethical questions about creating and interacting with digital replicas. (shrink)

Although even very advanced artificial systems do not meet the demanding conditions which are required for humans to be a proper participant in a social interaction, we argue that not all human-machine interactions (HMIs) can appropriately be reduced to mere tool-use. By criticizing the far too demanding conditions of standard construals of intentional agency we suggest a minimal approach that ascribes minimal agency to some artificial systems resulting in the proposal of taking minimal joint actions as a case of a (...) social HMI. Analyzing such HMIs, we utilize Dennett’s stance epistemology, and argue that taking either an intentional stance or design stance can be misleading for several reasons, and instead propose to introduce a new stance that is able to capture social HMIs—the AI-stance. (shrink)

Standard notions in philosophy of mind have a tendency to characterize socio-cognitive abilities as if they were unique to sophisticated human beings. However, assuming that it is likely that we are soon going to share a large part of our social lives with various kinds of artificial agents, it is important to develop a conceptual framework providing notions that are able to account for various types of social agents. Recent minimal approaches to socio-cognitive abilities such as mindreading and commitment present (...) a promising starting point from which one can expand the field of application not only to infants and non-human animals but also to artificial agents. Developing a minimal approach to the socio-cognitive ability of acting jointly, I present a foundation for future discussions about the question of how our conception of sociality can be expanded to artificial agents. (shrink)

Natural language processing based on large language models (LLMs) is a booming field of AI research. After neural networks have proven to outperform humans in games and practical domains based on pattern recognition, we might stand now at a road junction where artificial entities might eventually enter the realm of human communication. However, this comes with serious risks. Due to the inherent limitations regarding the reliability of neural networks, overreliance on LLMs can have disruptive consequences. Since it will be increasingly (...) difficult to distinguish between human-written and machine-generated text, one is confronted with new ethical challenges. This begins with the no longer undoubtedly verifiable human authorship and continues with various types of fraud, such as a new form of plagiarism. This also concerns the violation of privacy rights, the possibility of circulating counterfeits of humans, and, last but not least, it makes a massive spread of misinformation possible. (shrink)

In many cases, the ascription of self-consciousness is uncontroversial. For example, the ability to use the first person pronoun ‘I’ in the right way is obviously related to self-consciousness, although this is not true in all cases. The ascription of self-consciousness to infants, to persons with psychopathological syndromes, or to animals is controversial. In this paper, I will focus on the question of how ascribing self-consciousness to infants can be justified. There are two main subjects relevant to this debate. Firstly, (...) the conceptual question: What notion of self-consciousness should be under discussion regarding infants? In other words: how minimal can a feasible notion of selfconsciousness be? Positions in this debate vary from presuming innate abilities such as the postulation of pre-reflexive self-consciousness (cp. Frank 1991) and the claim that language has to be developed and the right use of the personal pronoun ‘I’ has to be proven (cp. Castaneda 1966). Claiming that self-ascription abilities are an essential condition for all notions of self-consciousness, I begin by analyzing self-ascription abilities using the terminology of the sense of ownership, the sense of agency, and the sense of authorship. Equipped with this clarification, I suggest a minimal notion of self-consciousness that may serve as a foundation of a broader notion of self-consciousness. Secondly, the epistemological question: How can we know when ascribing self-consciousness is justified? This question is combined with an additional problem concerning the ascription of self-consciousness to infants. Infants show impressive behavior that seems to be tied to self-consciousness, but in some cases there are convincing alternative explanations for such behavior. Such alternatives do not refer to self-consciousness and still provide satisfying explanations. Finally, I will discuss several paradigmatic cases regarding the question of whether the ascription of self-consciousness is justified in such cases. (shrink)

Standard notions in philosophy of mind have a tendency to characterize socio-cognitive abilities as if they were unique to sophisticated human beings. However, assuming that it is likely that we are soon going to share a large part of our social lives with various kinds of artificial agents, it is important to develop a conceptual framework providing notions that are able to account for various types of social agents. Recent minimal approaches to socio-cognitive abilities such as mindreading and commitment present (...) a promising starting point from which one can expand the field of application not only to infants and non-human animals but also to artificial agents. Developing a minimal approach to the sociocognitive ability of acting jointly, I present a foundation for future discussions about the question of how our conception of sociality can be expanded to artificial agents. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit wird die Frage nach der Handlungsfähigkeit künstlicher Systeme im Schnittfeld von Philosophie und KI behandelt. Eine positive Antwort auf Seiten der Philosophie hat deren anthropozentrischer Handlungsbegriff verhindert. Daher wird unterhalb des philosophischen Handlungsbegriffes der Begriff einer Quasi-Handlung entwickelt, welcher die Möglichkeit bietet, zwischen verschiedenen Kategorien des Verhaltens künstlicher Systeme zu unterscheiden. Als wesentliches Kriterium werden hierzu Unterschiede in der Flexibilität des Informationensverarbeitungsprozesses zur Differenzierung verschiedener Verhaltensklassen vorgeschlagen. Dies führt auch zu einer Auseinandersetzung mit dem Begriff der Kognition (...) und den verschiedenen Arten des Lernens. (shrink)

Research in social cognition aims to illuminate how agents can understand, communicate, and interact with other agents. When defining socio-cognitive abilities, standard cognitivist approaches tend to require demanding representational information processing. Thereby, they describe rather ideal cases. However, interdisciplinary research indicates multiple forms of how socio-cognitive abilities can be realized. Recent minimal approaches offer notions accommodating different kinds of cognitive processing. Nevertheless, the introduction of minimal cases of cognition raises new questions of how to account for commonalities and differences with (...) respect to the standard concepts. It seems to be a widespread strategy to adapt ideas of a two-system approach in order to distinguish less demanding instances from more demanding cases. This paper critically explores such an interpretation of a two-system approach and argues that a dichotomous understanding fails to capture the actual diversity of cognitive processes. (shrink)

Human and non-human animals are social beings, both have social interactions. The ability to anticipate behavior of others is a fundamental requirement of social interactions. However, there are several ways of how agents can succeed in this. Two modes of anticipation, namely mindreading and behavior-reading, shape the animal mindreading debate. As a matter of fact, no position has yet convincingly ruled out the other. This paper suggests a strategy of how to argue for a mentalistic interpretation as opposed to a (...) behavioral interpretation. The first step suggests considering a pluralistic approach in order to allow for shortcomings such as not having a natural language. Second, a critical examination of the principle called Morgan’s Canon will show that this principle cannot be used as a final argument to rule out mentalistic approaches. Finally, the author argues that the setting of current experiments is responsible for the indistinguishability of mindreading versus behavior-reading and she suggests alternative experimental designs. (shrink)

Eine immer wiederkehrende Frage der Analytischen Philosophie lautet: Wie kann man sich mit Sprache auf die Welt beziehen? Um eine Antwort auf diese Frage zu bekommen, muss man untersuchen, was alles eine Rolle spielt, wenn man Bedeutungen von Äußerungen versteht. Zu diesem Zwecke wird in dieser Arbeit der programmatische Vorschlag einer Bedeutungstheorie von Donald Davidson vorgestellt. Dazu ist es notwendig, sich mit der Wahrheitstheorie Tarskis zu beschäftigen. Interessant ist nun, welche Erkenntnisse unabhängig von Tarski in dieser Bedeutungstheorie enthalten sind. Hier (...) kann man zum einen die These der Unerforschlichkeit der Referenz und zum anderen das Prinzip der Nachsicht nennen. Durch die Voraussetzung des Prinzips der Nachsicht, nämlich größtmögliche Übereinstimmung zwischen Interpret und Sprecher anzunehmen, ist es einem Interpreten möglich, in die Interdependenzbeziehung zwischen Überzeugung und Bedeutung einzudringen. So kann der radikale Interpret erste Interpretationshypothesen aufstellen, die er später mit einem bedeutungsholistischen Ansatz auf logische Konsistenz in bezug auf die faktische Menge aller seiner Interpretationshypothesen überprüfen kann. (shrink)

Can large language models be trained to produce philosophical texts that are difficult to distinguish from texts produced by human philosophers? To address this question, we fine-tuned OpenAI's GPT-3 with the works of philosopher Daniel C. Dennett as additional training data. To explore the Dennett model, we asked the real Dennett ten philosophical questions and then posed the same questions to the language model, collecting four responses for each question without cherry-picking. We recruited 425 participants to distinguish Dennett's answer from (...) the four machine-generated answers. Experts on Dennett's work (N = 25) succeeded 51% of the time, above the chance rate of 20% but short of our hypothesized rate of 80% correct. For two of the ten questions, the language model produced at least one answer that experts selected more frequently than Dennett's own answer. Philosophy blog readers (N = 302) performed similarly to the experts, while ordinary research participants (N = 98) were near chance distinguishing GPT-3's responses from those of an "actual human philosopher". (shrink)

Comparing knowledge with belief can go wrong in two dimensions: If the authors employ a wider notion of knowledge, then they do not compare like with like because they assume a narrow notion of belief. If they employ only a narrow notion of knowledge, then their claim is not supported by the evidence. Finally, we sketch a superior teleological view.

The intellectual origins of molecular biology are usually traced back to the 1930s. By contrast, molecular biology acquired a social reality only around 1960. To understand how it came to designate a community of researchers and a professional identity, I examine the creation of the first institutes of molecular biology, which took place around 1960, in four European countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland. This paper shows how the creation of these institutes was linked to the results of (...) post-war economic reconstruction. Then, it compares how the promoters of these different institutional projects delimited the goals of their discipline, reflected on its history, and suggested how research should be organised. I show how they carefully positioned their new discipline within the emerging national science policy discourse of the 1950s, and aligned it with the current vision of scientific modernity. In particular, I discuss how they articulated the meaning of molecular biology with respect to five common themes: the role of physics in the atomic age, the relations between fundamental research and medical applications, the ‘Americanisation’ of scientific research, the value of science in the reconstruction of national identities, and the drive towards interdisciplinary research. This paper thus demonstrates that beyond the local and national accounts there is a European history of molecular biology. (shrink)

In 1957, Francis Crick outlined a startling vision of life in which the great diversity of forms and shapes of macromolecules was encoded in the one-dimensional sequence of nucleic acids. This paper situates Crick's new vision in the debates of the 1950s about protein synthesis and gene action. After exploring the reception of Crick's ideas, it shows how they differed radically from a different model of protein synthesis which enjoyed wide currency in that decade. In this alternative model, advocated by (...) Linus Pauling and other luminaries, three-dimensional templates directed the folding of proteins. Even though it was always considered somewhat speculative, this theory was supported by a number of empirical results originating in different experimental systems. It was eventually replaced by a model in which the forms and shapes of macromolecules resulted solely from their amino acid sequence, dramatically simplifying the problem of protein synthesis which Crick was attempting to solve in 1957. (shrink)

Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between (...) objects as a contrast, the results ascertained the involvement of the precuneus, the temporal poles, and the medial prefrontal cortex in the processing of intentional representations. In contrast, the anterior superior temporal sulcus and the left temporo-parietal junction were implicated when processing representations that refer to the presence of persons in relational contexts in general. The right temporo-parietal junction, however, was specifically activated for persons entering spatial relations. The level of representational complexity, a previously unexplored factor, was also found to modulate the neural response in some brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction. These findings highlight the need to take into account the critical roles played by an extensive network of neural regions during mental state reasoning. (shrink)

Le 27 avril 1938, Edmund HUSSERL, l'initiateur et principal representant du courant phenomenologique dans la philosophie contemporaine, mourut a Fribourg en Brisgau, age de pres de quatre-vingts ans. Depuis la parution de ses Logische Untersuchungen en 190~ 1901, le monde philosophique international avait suivi, avec UD interet toujours croissant, les exposes successifs et de plus en plus approfondis, que le maUre fribourgeois publiait sur les prin~ cipes de sa methode, dite pMnomenologique, sur les applications concretes de celle-ci aux problemes philosophiques (...) les plus divers, ainsi que sur la phenomenologie comme systeme philo­ sophique autonome et pour ainsi dire "autarchique". Ces publi­ cations, relativement peu nombreuses, mais fort remarquees des leur parution, furent etudiees avec le plus grand soin par les representants les plus autorises des differents courants de la pensee contemporaine. Les critiques, il va sans dire, ne manquerent point. On attira l'attention sur le caractere plutöt programmatique de ces etudes, sur la terminologie fort neuve, quelque peu arbitraire, parfois meme deroutante, dont se servait l'auteur, sur son pen­ chant prononce pour des distinctions subtiles et pour des defini­ tions minutieuses a l'exces, sur la difficulte de son style et les complications parfois inutiles de son expose, enfin et surtout -­ au moins depuis 1913 - sur le caractere audacieux de sa theorie de la reduction, presentee par lui avec une insistance toute par­ ticuliere comme le fondement dernier et indispensable de toute phenomenologie presente ou future. (shrink)

This article is both an elaborated critique on the one-sided analysis of the misogynist nature of ballet as a cultural practice, and a contribution to a more embodied feminist theory. Based on empirical material, that was brought together by observing the body practices in ballet and listening to the life stories of dancers, the author explores the contradictions that the body in ballet provokes. In describing the embodied experiences ofprofessional ballet dancers she shows that ballet offers women the possibility to (...) transcend the discontinuity of body, mind and emotions. (shrink)

This book surveys research in quantification starting with the foundational work in the 1970s. It paints a vivid picture of generalized quantifiers and Boolean semantics. It explains how the discovery of diverse scope behavior in the 1990s transformed the view of quantification, and how the study of the internal composition of quantifiers has become central in recent years. It presents different approaches to the same problems, and links modern logic and formal semantics to advances in generative syntax. A unique feature (...) of the book is that it systematically brings cross-linguistic data to bear on the theoretical issues, discussing French, German, Dutch, Hungarian, Russian, Japanese, Telugu (Dravidian), and Shupamem (Grassfield Bantu), and pointing to formal semantic literature involving quantification in around thirty languages. -- -/- 1. What this book is about and how to use it; 2. Generalized quantifiers and their elements: operators and their scopes; 3. Generalized quantifiers in non-nominal domains; 4. Some empirically significant properties of quantifiers and determiners; 5. Potential challenges for generalized quantifiers; 6. Scope is not uniform and not a primitive; 7. Existential scope versus distributive scope; 8. Distributivity and scope; 9. Bare numeral indefinites; 10. Modified numerals; 11. Clause-internal scopal diversity; 12. Towards a compositional semantics of quantifier words. (shrink)

Do the new sciences of well-being provide knowledge that respects the nature of well-being? This book written from the perspective of philosophy of science articulates how this field can speak to well-being proper and can do so in a way that respects the demands of objectivity and measurement.

Julia Annas offers a new account of virtue and happiness as central ethical ideas. She argues that exercising a virtue involves practical reasoning of the kind we find in someone exercising an everyday practical skill, such as farming, building, or playing the piano. This helps us to see virtue as part of an agent's happiness or flourishing.

American healthcare -- Bioterror and bioart -- State of emergency -- Licensed to torture -- Hunger strikes -- War -- Cancer -- Drug dealing -- Toxic tinkering -- Abortion -- Culture of death -- Patient safety -- Global health -- Statue of security -- Pandemic fear -- Bioidentifiers -- Genetic genocide.

According to Johansson (2009: 22) an infinite regress is vicious just in case “what comes first [in the regress-order] is for its definition dependent on what comes afterwards.” Given a few qualifications (to be spelled out below (section 3)), I agree. Again according to Johansson (ibid.), one of the consequences of accepting this way of distinguishing vicious from benign regresses is that the so-called Russellian Resemblance Regress (RRR), if generated in a one-category trope-theoretical framework, is vicious and that, therefore, the (...) existence of tropes only makes sense if trope-theory is understood (minimally) as a two-category theory which accepts, besides the existence of tropes, also the existence of at least one universal: resemblance.1 I disagree. But how can that be? How can Johansson and I agree about what distinguishes a vicious from a benign regress, yet disagree about which regresses are vicious and which are benign? In this paper I attempt to answer that question by first setting out and defending the sense of viciousness which both Johansson and I accept, only to then argue that to be able to determine if a particular regress is vicious in this sense, more than features intrinsic to the regress itself must be taken into account. This is why, although the RRR as originally set out by Russell is vicious, the seemingly identical resemblance regress which ensues in a one-category (standard) trope-theoretical context is not (provided, that is, that we accept certain views about how the nature of tropes relates to the resemblance between tropes, and given that we set our theory in a truthmaker theoretical framework – all of which are standard assumptions for proponents of (the standard-version of) the trope-theory).2. (shrink)

The book provides a commentary on Plato's Republic which encourages the reader to be stimulated to philosophical thinking by Plato's wide-ranging discussions.

Collecting, comparing, and computing molecular sequences are among the most prevalent practices in contemporary biological research. They represent a specific way of producing knowledge. This paper explores the historical development of these practices, focusing on the work of Margaret O. Dayhoff, Richard V. Eck, and Robert S. Ledley, who produced the first computer-based collection of protein sequences, published in book format in 1965 as the Atlas of Protein Sequence and Structure. While these practices are generally associated with the rise of (...) molecular evolution in the 1960s, this paper shows that they grew out of research agendas from the previous decade, including the biochemical investigation of the relations between the structures and function of proteins and the theoretical attempt to decipher the genetic code. It also shows how computers became essential for the handling and analysis of sequence data. Finally, this paper reflects on the relationships between experimenting and collecting as two distinct “ways of knowing” that were essential for the transformation of the life sciences in the twentieth century. (shrink)

Edited by one of the most renowned scholars in the field, Voices of Ancient Philosophy: An Introductory Reader is a unique and accessible introduction to the richness of ancient philosophy. Featuring a topical--as opposed to chronological--organization, this text introduces students to the wide range of approaches and traditions in ancient philosophy. In each section Annas presents the ancient debates on a particular philosophical topic, drawing on a greater diversity of ancient sources than a chronological approach allows. The book is divided (...) into six sections: Fate and Freedom; Reason and Emotion; Knowledge, Belief, and Skepticism; Metaphysical Questions; How Should You Live?; and Society and the State. Annas includes a generous selection of the works of Plato and Aristotle, as well as those of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. She also includes selections from less familiar philosophers and from authors in whose works philosophical issues arise, such as poets, medical writers, historians, and Jewish and Christian writers. The volume features biographical sketches of the philosophers, a timeline, and short discussions of the major movements in ancient philosophy. An excellent text for courses in ancient philosophy and history of philosophy, Voices of Ancient Philosophy: An Introductory Reader will also be of interest to scholars and general readers. (shrink)

In this book I look at the tradition of eudaimonistic ethics which stems from Aristotle's treatment of ethics, and which takes distinct, though related forms in Epicurus, the Stoics and the Sceptics. I look at this tradition from different points of view: how is it related to human nature, how does it account for other-related virtue and action, and how much does it require in terms of revising previously held priorities. I discuss the methodology of discussing ancient texts in ways (...) that relate them to contemporary concerns, particularly the importance of respecting the texts and avoiding anachronism. (shrink)