In this paper, I compare various theories of perception in relation to the question of the epistemological and ontological status of the qualities that appear in perceptual experience. I group these theories into two main views: quality externalism and quality internalism, and I highlight their contrasting problems in accounting for phenomena such as perceptual relativity, illusions and hallucinations. Then, I propose an alternative view, which I call qualitative relationism and which conceives of the subject and the object of perceptual experience (...) as essentially related to one another in a process of co-constitution out of fundamental qualities. I lend support to this view by drawing on Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, which I complement with a form of neutral monism. I argue that the investigation of the temporal structure of perceptual experience leads us to find at its heart a qualitative process that is more fundamental than the two relata of perception and that gives rise to them. Then, I extend this account of perception into a general theory of intentionality and experience and I develop its implications into a neutral monist metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper explores the epistemology and moral psychology of “therapeutic trust,” in which one trusts with the aim of inspiring greater trust-responsiveness in the trusted. Theorists have appealed to alleged cases of rational therapeutic trust to show that trust can be adopted for broadly moral or practical reasons and to motivate accounts of trust that do not involve belief or confidence in someone’s trustworthiness. Some conclude from the cases that trust consists in having normative expectations and adopting vulnerabilities with respect (...) to the trusted; others that trust involves accepting that someone will prove trustworthy. Although there are, I argue, some genuine cases of rational therapeutic trust, some prominent examples confuse trusting with entrusting and are actually counterexamples to the adopted vulnerabilities and acceptance accounts they have been taken to support. An alternative account, which construes trust in terms of being confident enough to take salient risks on someone’s trustworthiness, makes better sense of therapeutic trust. (shrink)

While there has been considerable interest in the nature of faith and trust in recent philosophical literature, relatively little has been said about what it is for faith or trust to be psychologically stronger or weaker. Drawing on recent accounts of propositional faith by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Lara Buchak, I argue that the strength of one’s faith can vary in two distinct dimensions. The first primarily involves the extent to which one’s confidence motivates one to take risks. The second involves (...) the resilience of the first dimension of strength to possible counterevidence. (shrink)

Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer some reasons for drawing this three-fold distinction, and I consider its epistemological implications. Some philosophers have held that propositional seemings always confer prima facie justification, regardless of a particular seeming's relation to experience. I add to criticisms of this view in the literature by arguing that it fails to solve a version of the ‘problem of (...) the speckled hen’. A more promising view holds that propositional seemings confer justification only when appropriately related to experiences. I offer advice for developing such an account. (shrink)

A moral-pragmatic argument for a proposition is an argument intended to establish that believing the proposition would be morally beneficial. Since such arguments do not adduce epistemic reasons, i.e., reasons that support the truth of a proposition, they can seem at best to be irrelevant epistemically. At worst, believing on the basis of such reasoning can seem to involve wishful thinking and intellectual dishonesty of a sort that that precludes such beliefs from being epistemically unjustified. Inspired by an argument from (...) William James’ classic, “The Will to Believe”, I argue that there is a way of making sense of moral-pragmatic arguments such that they are epistemically relevant. I develop and argue for a theory of epistemic justification that I dub the “moral encroachment theory” (emphasizing its connection to recent pragmatic encroachment views). According to the theory, moral considerations can raise or lower epistemic standards from where they would be in morally neutral settings. The moral encroachment theory, I contend, denotes a normative property that is at once distinctively epistemic and valuable. The theory also allows a legitimate role for moral-pragmatic reasoning under certain conditions. The upshot is that moral-pragmatic reasoning can be epistemically as well as morally appropriate. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare the original version of the enactive view—autopoietic enactivism—with Husserl’s phenomenology, regarding the issue of the relationship between consciousness and nature. I refer to this issue as the “problem of naturalism.” I show how the idea of the co-determination of subject and object of cognition, which is at the heart of autopoietic enactivism, is close to the phenomenological form of correlationism. However, I argue that there is a tension between an epistemological reading of the subject-object correlation (...) that renounces to search for its metaphysical ground, and the enactivist focus on the biological basis of cognition, which seems to imply a view of nature as the metaphysical ground of the conscious mind. A similar problem arises in Husserl’s phenomenology in the contrast between the idea of the fundamental subject-object correlation, the concept of nature as a correlate of transcendental constitution, and the investigation of the corporeal and material grounding of consciousness. I find a way out of this problem by drawing on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology. I argue that the investigation of the temporality of experience in genetic phenomenology leads us to investigate the metaphysical ground of the subject-object correlation, understood dynamically as co-constitution and co-origination. Then I propose to complement phenomenology and enactivism with a form of neutral monism, which conceives of the co-constitution of subject and object as grounded in a flow of fundamental, pre-phenomenal qualities. (shrink)

I argue that it is possible to improve and methodologically enrich the pragmatic dimension of neurophenomenology by searching for points of contact and possibilities for integration between its phenomenological grounding and various first-person and embodied methodologies and practices, referring in particular to somatics, somaesthetics, and emersiology.

I examine Michel Bitbol’s proposal of a metaphysical counterpart of neurophenomenology, arguing that such a metaphysics should address the issue of the origin of consciousness. This can be accomplished through panqualityism, which conceives of the subject and object of experience as grounded in a flow of pre-phenomenal qualities. I conclude by framing this view in terms of a critical metaphysics that is consistent with the pragmatic and existential dimension of neurophenomenology.

This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the (...) "transparency of experience", a doctrine that has been the basis for the central argument in favor of intentionalism. (shrink)

The concept of quality points at a significant philosophical problem. The issue of the ontological status of the qualities of experience and reality leads us to discuss the issues of naturalism and reductionism in philosophy of mind. I argue that a transcendental version of the enactive approach is able to address these issues, thanks to its conception of the relation between subject and object as dependent co-origination. In this way, the enactive approach constitutes an alternative to both the internalism and (...) the externalism about qualities, constituting a process-oriented and relationist framework that can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of different ontological domains. In the conclusive section, I distinguish between an ontological and a metaphysical interpretation of this view, stressing the advantages of the former. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also (...) extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a comparison between the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have acknowledged the affinity between James’ early psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late development of James’ philosophy is often considered in opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-dual dimension of experience that precedes the functional division into subject and object, thus contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the dual structure (...) of intentionality. However, I argue that the later “genetic” development of phenomenology converges with some central aspects of James’ radical empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the subject-object duality and is at the base of the process of co-constitution of the subject and the object in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience as structured by formal conditions that depend on the concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this reason, I argue that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology can complement James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism. (shrink)

Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to (...) its antecedent the requirement that the subject have a recognitional capacity with respect to the given property. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism. At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposition by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of naturalism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known (...) as it is “in itself”, independently of the cognitive relationship. At the same time, I argue that the genetic development of phenomenology, through the investigation of the temporal structure of experiences, leads to an empirical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as the objective pole in a process of co-constitution of the subject and the object of experience. -/- Winner of the Philosophy Essay Prize “Vittorio Sainati” XIIth Edition. (shrink)

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines of (...) development of the phenomenological form of empirical realism as revealed in Parrini’s reflection, through a comparison of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model and the tradition of neutral monism. (shrink)

One of the central questions of the field of Religious Studies is "What is religion and how might we best understand it?". Sigmund Freud was surely a paradigmatic cartographer of this terrain. Among the first theorists to explore the unconscious fantasies, fears, and desires underlying religious ideas and practices, Freud can be considered a grandfather of the field. Yet Freud's legacy is deeply contested. His reputation is perhaps at its lowest point since he came to public attention a century ago, (...) and students often assume that Freud is sexist, dangerous, passe, and irrelevant to the study of religion. How can Freud be taught in this climate of critique and controversy? The fourteen contributors to this volume, all recognized scholars of religion and psychoanalysis, describe how they address Freud's contested legacy: they "teach the debates." They describe their courses on Freud and religion, their innovative pedagogical practices, and the creative ways they work with resistance. P I focuses on institutional and curricular contexts: contributors describe how they teach Freud at a Catholic and Jesuit undergraduate institution, a liberal seminary, and a large multicultural university. In Part II contributors describe courses structured around psychoanalytic interpretations of religious figures and phenomena: Ramakrishna, Jesus and Augustine, myth and mysticism. Part III focuses explicitly on courses structured around major debates over gender, Judaism, anti-semitism, religion and ritual. Part IV describes courses in which psychoanalysis is presented as a powerful pedagogy of transformation and insight. (shrink)

In its original context, the “problem of the speckled hen” was a challenge to classical foundationalists who held that introspective beliefs about experience enjoy infallible foundational justification. Ernest Sosa has led a revival of interest in the problem, using it to object to neo-classical foundationalists and to motivate his own reliabilist theory of introspective justification. His discussion has spawned replies from those who claim that there are viable non-reliabilist solutions to the problem. I argue that these alternative proposals in the (...) literature are unsuccessful. I end, though, with an objection to Sosa’s theory. Along the way I also consider what the speckled hen and related examples have to teach about the fineness of grain of experience. (shrink)

The contemporary world is characterised by the pervasive presence of digital technologies that play a part in almost every aspect of our life. An urgent and much-debated issue consists in evaluating the repercussions of these technologies on our human condition. In this paper, I tackle this issue from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology offers a contribution to our understanding of the implications of digital technologies, in the light of its analysis of the essential structures of human (...) experience, and especially of its corporeal grounding. In the light of this analysis, it is possible to investigate the ways in which these essential structures are affected by digital technologies. In particular, it is possible to highlight the ways in which some digital technologies involve a process of disembodiment or simply a superficial embodiment of experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the issue of the ontological status of qualitative properties. I discuss the prevalent approaches to the problem of qualia in philosophy of mind, in relation to the various attempts at naturalizing the mind and the various theories of perception. I compare these views with Husserl's phenomenology, highlighting the phenomenological distinction between phenomenal contents of mental states and sensory properties of the perceived objects. I present some open issues of this view, in order to show how (...) they can be addressed in the light of some developments of the phenomenological inquiry in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

Parlare del fallimento delle primavere arabe come di una sconfitta, che ha favorito, da un lato, la restaurazione di regimi autoritari e, dall’altro, il rafforzamento dei movimenti fondamentalisti, è riduttivo. L’articolo si propone di mostrare come i movimenti collettivi, che hanno animato le proteste nelle maggiori piazze delle capitali di molti Paesi arabi, hanno interpretato il bisogno di cambiamento politico ed economico che da troppi anni è stato ignorato o represso dai regimi al potere. Tali movimenti sono l’espressione di un (...) contro-movimento politico alternativo a quanti, in questi anni, inneggiando all’islam, hanno teorizzato e messo in pratica la lotta armata rivoluzionaria. La differenza fra questi due tipi di movimenti collettivi sta nella diversa posta in gioco che essi pongono al centro della loro azione. Per i movimenti di rivolta, la battaglia politica è per l’avvento della democrazia, per i movimenti fondamentalisti è, invece, in buona sostanza, la costituzione di un ferreo regime della verità religiosa, ancor più autoritario dei regimi politico-militari che si sono ripresi il potere dopo il 2012. (shrink)

There is a long-Standing tradition in philosophy that certain metaphysical theories of perceptual experience, if true, would lead to scepticism about the external world, whereas other theories, if true, would develop a non-sceptkal epistemology. I investigate these claims in the context of current metaphysical theories of sense-perception and argue that choice of perceptual ontology is of very limited help in developing a non-sceptical epistemology. Theorists who hold that perception is an intentional state have some advantage in explaining how perceptual experiences (...) serve as justifying reasons for empirical beliefs. Alston and others have argued that a successful defence of a contemporary version of naïve realism would secure further epistemological advantages. I argue that this is not the case. A complete explanation of experience's reason-giving power involves factors beyond the metaphysical nature of experience. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “The World of Screen Creatures” by Bin Liu. Abstract: I frame Liu’s “world of screen creatures” model (WSC) in terms of the idealism-realism opposition, by looking especially at the tradition of transcendental and phenomenological philosophy. I claim that the WSC model amounts to a form of subjective idealism and solipsism and that, for this reason, it is subject to what I call the “problem of alterity.”.

In this paper, I explore the fruitful relationship between science fiction and philosophy regarding the topic of artificial intelligence. I establish a connection between certain paradigms in the philosophy of mind and consciousness and the imagination of possible future scenarios in sci-fi, especially focusing on the different ways of conceiving the role of corporeality in constituting consciousness and cognition. Then, I establish a parallelism between these different conceptions of corporeality in the philosophy of mind and certain representations of AI in (...) sci-fi: from computers to robots and androids. I conclude by stressing the value of exchanging ideas between sci-fi and philosophy to foreshadow and evaluate some scenarios of high ethical relevance. (shrink)

A poco più di cinque anni dal Colloquio, vengono adesso pubblicati gli Atti. Questi 5 anni hanno segnato un'ulteriore cammino per la ‘questione’ di Santa Maria Antiqua e tra i fatti positivi segnalo subito il restauro della cappella dei Santi Medici, a maggior ragione perché è l'unico ambiente cui non ha rivolto l'attenzione nessuno dei saggi del libro che qui presentiamo. Anche la storiografia ha segnato ulteriori tappe, in primis con il saggio di Beat Brenk, apparso negli Atti spoletini del (...) 2003, con un approfondimento talora sostanziale di quanto esposto in prima battuta in questo volume, ma anche con il saggio di Maria Andaloro sulle icone romane dove offre un secondo caso di quanto la studiosa chiama «l'approfondimento delle individualità materiche e delle specificità esecutive» dei dipinti. (shrink)

In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” (...) implicano la forma debole di embodiment : la robotica di Brooks, l’enattivismo sensomotorio di Noë e O’Regan e l’enattivismo radicale di Hutto e Myin. In contrapposizione a queste prospettive, e basandomi sull’analisi fenomenologica della corporeità vivente e vissuta, difendo la forma forte di embodiment, secondo cui la mente si fonda essenzialmente sul corpo funzionale e senziente. Parole chiave: Fenomenologia; Embodiment; Coscienza fenomenica; Enattivismo; Qualità sensibili -/- Abstract (english) -/- Functional body and sentient body. The strong view on the embodied mind in phenomenology: In this paper, I draw a distinction between weak and strong versions of the “embodiment thesis”. The weak version claims that mental states are grounded in a body that moves and acts in the environment, i.e., a functional body. The strong version claims that mental states are grounded in a body that is not only functional but also sentient, i.e., a body that is the locus of sensibility or phenomenal consciousness. I argue that some approaches within the “new embodied cognitive science” – Brooks’ robotics, Noë’s and O’Regan’s sensorimotor enactivism, Hutto’s and Myin’s radical enactivism – imply a weak version of the embodiment thesis. In contrast, by drawing on a phenomenological analysis of living and lived corporeality, I argue for the strong version, which claims that the mind is essentially grounded in the functional and sentient body. Keywords: Phenomenology; Embodiment; Phenomenal Consciousness; Enactivism; Sensible Qualities. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Varela’s Radical Proposal: How to Embody and Open Up Cognitive Science” by Kristian Moltke Martiny. Upshot: I examine Varela’s relationship with Husserl’s phenomenology, highlighting Varela’s acknowledgment of the pragmatic dimension of its phenomenological reduction. I argue that Varela sees, in some developments of phenomenology, a deconstruction of the subject-object duality and an embodied view of the mind. I also highlight the existential dimension of Varela’s radical proposal, which contributes to further opening up and embodying (...) cognitive science. (shrink)

In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s philosophical view. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point at some lines of (...) development of phenomenology that are revealed by Parrini’s reflection, through the comparison between Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model, and the tradition of neutral monism. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare the debate on phenomenal intentionality in the philosophy of mind with Husserl's phenomenology. I make a survey of various theoretical options within the " phenomenal intentionality research program ", in order to show how these issues are present also in phenomenology. I focus my analysis on the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology, in relation to the issue of the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality and I argue that, in order to address this issue, (...) we must turn to the analysis of the temporal self-manifestation of subjectivity. (shrink)

The notion of quality constitutes the title of a pressing philosophical problem. The issue of the location of the qualities of experience and reality leads to thematize the “clash” between the scientific and the manifest image, which also lays at the heart of the issues of naturalism and reductionism in the philosophy of mind. I argue that a transcendental version of the enactive approach constitutes a fruitful way to address these issues, thanks to its conception of the relation between subject (...) and object as dependent co-origination. In this way, the enactive view constitutes an alternative to both the internalism and the externalism about qualities, constituting a processual and relationist framework that can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of different ontological domains. In the conclusive section, I distinguish between an ontological and a metaphysical interpretation of this view, stressing the advantages of the former. (shrink)

Despite the remarkable advances in behavioral and brain sciences over the last decades, the mind/body (brain) problem is still an open debate and one of the most intriguing questions for both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Traditional approaches have conceived this problem in terms of a contrast between physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism. However, since the late sixties, the landscape of philosophical views on the problem has become more varied and complex. The Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) claims that mental (...) properties can be (or are) realized, and mental processes can be (or are) implemented by neural correlates of different kinds. Thus, MRT challenges the psychoneural type-identity theory and the corresponding reductionism. Many philosophers have acknowledged the a priori plausibility of MRT. However, the existence of empirical evidence in favor of intraspecific, human multiple realizations of mental processes and properties is still controversial. Here we illustrate some cases that provide empirical evidence in support of MRT. Recently, it has been proposed that foveal agnosic vision, like peripheral vision, can be restored by increasing object parts’ spacing (Strappini et al., 2017a; Crutch and Warrington, 2007). Agnosic fovea and normal periphery are both limited by crowding, that impairs object recognition, and provides the signature of visual integration. Here we define a psychological property of restored object identification and we cross-reference the data of visually-impaired patients with different etiologies. In particular, we compare the data of two stroke patients, two patients with posterior cortical atrophy (PCA), six cases of strabismic amblyopia, and one case with restored sight. We also compare these patients with unimpaired subjects tested in the periphery. We show that integration (i.e. restored recognition) seems to describe quite accurately the visual performance in all these cases. While the patients have different etiologies and different neural correlates, the unimpaired subjects have no neural damage. Thus similarity in the psychological property given the differences in the neural substrate can be interpreted in relation to MRT and provide evidence in its support. Finally, we will frame our contribution within the current debate concerning MRT providing new and compelling empirical evidence. (shrink)

This paper explores gender differences in “make-up” and “suspicion” in a bargaining game in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for the company. “Make-up” is measured by how much the true value is overstated, “suspicion” by how much the price offer differs from the value message. We run different computerized treatments varying in information about the gender and in embeddedness of gender information. The asymmetry (...) of the game and of information allows for a robust assessment of gender effects. We report here the results from just one shot round decision since we expect such effects to be more pronounced for inexperienced participants. We mainly find an effect of gender constellation: when female sellers are aware to confront a female buyer, they overstate more, i.e. there is more “make-up”. However, we cannot confirm gender effects for suspicion. (shrink)

A partire dal XX secolo si è fatta strada l’idea che l’istituzione di tribunali penali internazionali sia un fondamentale e necessario contributo al processo di ricostruzione della pace in contesti post-bellici. Attraverso l’imparzialità nell’individuazione delle colpe e nella distribuzione delle pene, i tribunali penali internazionali sarebbero in grado, secondo questa linea interpretativa, di sopire odi e divisioni, di scoraggiare la commissione di ulteriori crimini e di porre così le basi per una nuova convivenza pacifica. Questa fiducia nella funzione pacificatrice (...) del diritto internazionale penale ne ha sostenuto lo sviluppo storico. Sulla base di questa funzione il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha motivato la creazione di tribunali penali internazionali negli anni Novanta. L’atteggiamento del Consiglio di Sicurezza nei confronti del rapporto tra giurisdizioni penali internazionali e pace non si è però mantenuto lineare nel tempo. Il Consiglio di Sicurezza ha infatti mostrato successivamente di nutrire scarsa fiducia nella funzione pacificatrice del diritto internazionale penale e talvolta di ritenere che i procedimenti penali internazionali possano ostacolare il processo di pace. Il saggio indaga questo complesso rapporto e le ambiguità dell'atteggiamento del Consiglio di Sicurezza rispetto ai tribunali penali internazionali. (shrink)

A speculative work of the widest range, systematically dealing with the issues that are fundamental in every philosophical study. There are, Mr. Weiss argues, four irreducible modes of being. Actuality, Existence, Possibility and God are independent realities, yet each needs the other in order fully to be. Together they are all that is, and all that could, must and should be. Only by acknowledging each separately and all of them together, Mr. Weiss claims, can we, without paradox, deal with the (...) things, natures, actions, and values there are. The book divides into critically constructive accounts of each of the modes of being, an investigation of attempts to deny their reality, and an explanation of their unity. Lucid, fast-paced throughout, the exposition of the general theory is supported by pertinent, revealing examples. Modes of Being is a work of first importance. On its assertions, a reader is forced to test and form his philosophical convictions.--I. C. L. (shrink)

This book deserves kudos. It presents one of the more novel versions of reliabilism to appear in recent years. The style is fast-paced and energetic, with no sacrifice in philosophical precision. It applies original interpretations of perceptual science to central issues in traditional epistemology, and should thereby earn itself a prominent place in the naturalistic epistemology literature. Finally, the book is more comprehensive than its title suggests. It illuminates a great many issues of traditional epistemology beyond perception, providing an up-to-date (...) and thorough-going basic epistemology. (shrink)

Like other science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields, ecological research needs ethics. Given the rapid pace of technological developments and social change, it is important for scientists to have the vocabulary and critical-thinking skills necessary to identify, analyze, and communicate the ethical issues generated by the research and practices within their fields of specialization. The goal of introducing ethics education for ecological researchers would be to promote a discipline in which scientists are willing and able to engage in ethical (...) questions and problem solving, even if they do so inadequately at first. Practicing ecologists ought to be able to identify and critically evaluate the ethical dimensions of their field studies because ecologists are at the forefront of important interfaces between humans and other-than-human organisms and natural systems. They are among the first to identify the impact of anthropogenic changes to the environments. Rapidly changing local and global environments mean that ecologists will be on the front line of any efforts to create a sustainable lifestyle for humans on this planet. (shrink)

In recent years, self-paced learning has attracted much attention due to its improvement to nonconvex optimization based machine learning algorithms. As a methodology introduced from human learning, SPL dynamically evaluates the learning difficulty of each sample and provides the weighted learning model against the negative effects from hard-learning samples. In this study, we proposed a cognitive driven SPL method, i.e., retrospective robust self-paced learning, which is inspired by the following two issues in human learning process: the misclassified samples are more (...) impressive in upcoming learning, and the model of the follow-up learning process based on large number of samples can be used to reduce the risk of poor generalization in initial learning phase. We simultaneously estimated the degrees of learning-difficulty and misclassified in each step of SPL and proposed a framework to construct multilevel SPL for improving the robustness of the initial learning phase of SPL. The proposed method can be viewed as a multilayer model and the output of the previous layer can guide constructing robust initialization model of the next layer. The experimental results show that the R2SPL outperforms the conventional self-paced learning models in classification task. (shrink)

Evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act are generally concerned with the pace of innovation or the transgressions to the independence of research. While these concerns are important, I propose here to expand the range of public values considered in assessing Bayh-Dole and formulating future reforms. To this end, I first examine the changes in the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate and the drift in its design. Neoliberal ideas have had a definitive influence on U.S. innovation policy for the last (...) thirty years, including legislation to strengthen patent protection. Moreover, the neoliberal policy agenda is articulated and justified in the interest of competitiveness. Rhetorically, this agenda equates competitiveness with economic growth and this with the public interest. Against that backdrop, I use Public Value Failure criteria to show that values such as political equality, transparency, and fairness in the distribution of the benefits of innovation, are worth considering to counter the policy drift of Bayh-Dole. (shrink)

The complexity of the physiological phenotype currently prevents us from identifying an integrative measure to assess how the internal state and environmental conditions modify life‐history strategies. In this article, it is proposed that shorter telomeres should lead to a faster pace‐of‐life where investment in self‐maintenance is decreased as a means of saving energy for reproduction, but at the cost of somatic durability. Inversely, longer telomeres would favor an increased investment in soma maintenance and thus a longer reproductive lifespan (i.e., (...) slower pace‐of‐life). Under this hypothesis, telomere dynamics could be such an integrative mediator, which will assemble the information about oxidative stress levels, inflammation status and stress reactivity, and relate this information to the potential lifespan of the organism and its pace‐of‐life strategy. The signaling function of telomere dynamics can also reach over generations, a phenomenon in which the telomere lengths of gametes would provide a channel through which offspring would receive information about their environment early in their development, hence increasing the possibilities for developmental plasticity. -/- . (shrink)

Luca Corchia esamina gli indirizzi normativi, la programmazione e il coordinamento delle strategie della Regione Toscana in merito alla promozione di una cultura di pace e nel quadro di un sistema integrato regionale che include altresì la promozione dell’attività di cooperazione e partenariato internazionale. Pace e cooperazione sono i due assi di una politica che assume come finalità il ripudio della guerra, la tutela dei diritti umani, la democrazia politica, la giustizia economica e la solidarietà sociale. Tutti i (...) documenti della Regione Toscana, per coerenza esterna “verticale” ed “orizzontale”, disciplinano in forma integrata i due settori tanto nei contenuti quanto nell’iter delle loro procedure. Un aspetto rilevante di tale orientamento concerne il processo partecipativo, esteso a Comuni, Province, Comunità montane, mondo della scuola e associazioni, con la costituzione di “Conferenze regionali”, “Forum territoriali della cooperazione e della pace”, “Tavoli di coordinamento di area geografica”; sedi di concertazione degli obiettivi generali, specifici e delle scelte di allocazione delle risorse dedicate agli “Interventi dei soggetti terzi” e ai “Progetti di Interesse Regionale” (PIR). La partecipazione come metodo decisionale ex ante ma anche come strumento di trasparenza, controllo e valutazione ex post. L’elemento fondante delle azioni regionali è il riconoscimento e la valorizzazione delle comunità locali quali promotrici della cultura della pace, anzitutto attraverso la comunità scolastica. La scuola, infatti, è presente in massima misura nell’articolato ventaglio di progetti di cui si fa menzione in questo scritto. (shrink)

Reading Nicolas of Cusa’s works on Islam reveals a sharp distinction between his De pace fidei with its tolerant attitude and his Cribratio Alkorani with its much less tolerant approach. Some eight years passed from the appearance of De pace fidei until the publication of Cribratio Alkorani. I argue that in the period between the appearances of these books, Cusanus changed his attitude to Islam, and the Turkish threat may have been the reason.Certain historians have pointed to Desiderius (...) Erasmus’ objection to the waging of crusades and to the term semichristiani, which Erasmus occasionally used in reference to Muslims. According to these historians, the term semichristiani echoed Cusanus’ optimistic view according to which the Turks were «half-Christian». However, I found that Cusanus never used this term in any of his writings, and that the term sits in Erasmus’ writings side by side with manifest contempt and degradation expressed toward the Turks. Thus, Erasmus’ rhetoric and hostile attitude toward the Turks and Islam was far from the moderation and toleration which Cusanus presented in his De pace fidei. In its attitude and spirit Erasmus’ De bello Turcico should be compared to Cusanus’ Cribratio Alkorani rather than to De pace fidei. (shrink)