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Summary It turns out that there are a number of further issues that arise, when considering content externalism and knowledge of one's own mind.
Key works Some papers in this category present lesser known incompatibilist arguments, as in Goldberg 2000 and Ebbs 2003. Others explore alternate ways that content externalism might preclude introspective knowledge of one's own mind. For instance, Bernecker 1996 argues that externalism limits such knowledge regarding the attitude (e.g., believing, hoping, wishing, etc.) one takes toward a content. Levine 2003 explores a problem in knowing introspectively about one's own qualia, under the assumption that qualia have anti-individualistic contents. Finally, Chase 2001 and Pritchard & Kallestrup 2004 argue that externalism precludes internalism about justification or knowledge, based on the perceived limits of the externalist's introspective self-knowledge. Brown 2007 is also an important discussion of this issue.
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  1. Derek Ball (2007). Twin-Earth Externalism and Concept Possession. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.
    It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access.
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  2. Jonathan Berg (1998). First-Person Authority, Externalism, and Wh-Knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44.
  3. Sven Bernecker (2004). Memory and Externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.
    Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
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  4. Sven Bernecker (1996). Externalism and the Attitudinal Component of Self-Knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.
  5. Jessica Brown (2001). Book Review. Knowing Our Own Minds Crispin Wright, Barry Smith, Cynthia MacDonald. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):586-588.
  6. Anthony L. Brueckner (1992). Semantic Answers to Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.
  7. Tyler Burge (2003). Some Reflections on Scepticism: Reply to Stroud. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press.
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  8. James Chase (2001). Is Externalism About Content Inconsistent with Internalism About Justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46.
    (2001). Is Externalism about Content Inconsistent with Internalism about Justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 79, No. 2, pp. 227-246.
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  9. Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
  10. Mario De Caro (ed.) (1999). Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Kluwer.
    In Interpretations and Causes, some of the leading contemporary analytic philosophers discuss Davidson's new ideas in a lively, relevant, useful, and not always ...
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  11. Gary Ebbs (2008). Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle About Doubt. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  12. Gary Ebbs (2003). A Puzzle About Doubt. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
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  13. J. Edwards (1998). The Simple Theory of Colour and the Transparency of Sense Experience. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the transparency of sense experience. The simple theory of colour (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. 371.
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  14. Jonathan Ellis (2007). Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access. Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject.
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  15. Katalin Farkas (2003). What is Externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.
    The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged (...)
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  16. N. Georgalis (1994). Asymmetry of Access to Intentional States. Erkenntnis 40 (2):185-211.
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  17. Mikkel Gerken (2007). A False Dilemma for Anti-Individualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):329-42.
    It is often presupposed that an anti-individualist about representational mental states must choose between two accounts of no-reference cases. One option is said to be an ‘illusion of thought’ version according to which the subject in a no-reference case fails to think a first-order thought but rather has the illusion of having one. The other is a ‘descriptive’ version according to which one thinks an empty thought via a description. While this presupposition is not uncommon, it rarely surfaces in an (...)
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  18. Brie Gertler (2007). Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37-56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  19. John Gibbons (2001). Externalism and Knowledge of the Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.
    Knowledge of your own propositional attitudes requires at least two things. You need to know the content of the relevant mental state, and you need to know what attitude you take towards that content. If it is possible to mistake a wish for a belief, this is a mistake about the attitude, not the content. One need not believe that we are generally infallible about our mental states to hold that, typically, when I sincerely say..
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  20. Sanford Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51 - 79.
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  21. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Belief and its Linguistic Expression: Toward a Belief Box Account of First-Person Authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.
    In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
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  22. Sanford C. Goldberg (2002). Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of Propositional Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.
    Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are.
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  23. Sanford C. Goldberg (2000). Externalism and Authoritative Knowledge of Content: A New Incompatibilist Strategy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.
    A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that (...)
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  24. Sanford C. Goldberg (1999). The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165-201.
    In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), (...)
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  25. John Greco (2004). Externalism and Skepticism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 53.
    Part 1 argues that, despite rhetorical appearances, McDowell accepts a standard version of epistemic externalism. Moreover, epistemic externalism plays an important role in McDowell’s response to skepticism. Part 2 argues that, contra McDowell, epistemic externalism is necessary for rejecting skepticism, and content externalism is not sufficient for rejecting skepticism.
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  26. Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha (2011). Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  27. Michael Hymers (2002). Ebbs's Participant Perspective on Self-Knowledge. Dialogue 41 (01):3-26.
    It is sometimes objected that anti-individualism, because of its assumption of the constitutive role of natural and social environments in the individuation of intentional attitudes, raises sceptical worries about first-person authority--that peculiar privilege each of us is thought to enjoy with respect to non-Socratic self-knowledge. Gary Ebbs believes that this sort of objection can be circumvented, if we give up metaphysical realism and scientific naturalism and adopt what he calls a “participant perspective” on our linguistic practices. Drawing on broadly Wittgensteinian (...)
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  28. Pierre Jacob (2004). Do We Know How We Know Our Own Minds Yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
  29. Jesper Kallestrup (2011). Semantic Externalism. Routledge.
    Descriptivism -- Referentialism -- From language to thought -- Varieties of narrow and wide content -- Self-knowledge -- Scepticism -- Mental causation.
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  30. Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
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  31. Bernard W. Kobes (2003). Mental Content and Hot Self-Knowledge. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Mit Press. 71-99.
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  32. Bernard W. Kobes (1996). Mental Content and Hot Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 24 (1):71-99.
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  33. Kirk Ludwig (1992). Brains in a Vat, Subjectivity, and the Causal Theory of Reference. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:313-345.
    This paper evaluates Putnam’s argument in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History, for the claim that we can know that we are not brains in a vat (of a certain sort). A widespread response to Putnam’s argument has been that if it were successful not only the world but the meanings of our words (and consequently our thoughts) would be beyond the pale of knowledge, because a causal theory of reference is not compatible with our having knowledge of (...)
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  34. Brian P. McLaughlin (2004). Of Ebbs's Puzzle. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  35. Olaf L. Müller, Consciousness Without Physical Basis. A Metaphysical Meditation on the Immortality of the Soul.
    Can we conceive of a mind without body? Does, for example, the idea of the soul's immortality make sense? Certain versions of materialism deny such questions; I shall try to prove that these versions of materialism cannot be right. They fail because they cannot account for the mental vocabulary from the language of brains in the vat. Envatted expressions such as "I think", "I believe", etc., do not have to be reinterpreted when we translate them to our language; they are (...)
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  36. T. Parent (2013). Externalism and Self-Knowledge. In Ed Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Entry on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. A summary of the literature on whether externalism about thought content precludes non-empirical knowledge of one's own thoughts.
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  37. Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.
    At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim.
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  38. Duncan Pritchard & Jesper Kallestrup (2004). An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.
    Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content (...)
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  39. Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.) (2013). Millikan and Her Critics. John Wiley & Sons.
    Millikan and Her Critics offers a unique critical discussion of Ruth Millikan's highly regarded, influential, and systematic contributions to philosophy of mind and language, philosophy of biology, epistemology, and metaphysics. These newly written contributions present discussion from some of the most important philosophers in the field today and include replies from Millikan herself.
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  40. Richard Schantz (ed.) (2004). The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    Thus the texts attempt to answer the fundamental questions - of whether there are meanings, and, if there are, of what they are and of the form a serious ...
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  41. Ted A. Warfield (1995). Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):525-545.
  42. C. J. G. Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (2000). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
  43. Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.) (1998). Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. This volume offers a powerful and comprehensive look at current work on this topic, featuring closely interlinked essays by leading figures in the field that examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist theories of psychological content, and knowledge of (...)
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