This article is a revised version of a lecture delivered at the Colloque ‘Histoire des Mentalités, Histoire des résistances, ou les Prisons de longue durée, Aix-La Baume, 20–21–22 septembre 1980.

There is a growing discourse on “new sincerity,” and related terms like “quirky” and “metamodernism,” as a movement or sensibility in contemporary cinema developing from the late 1990s onward, exemplified by the work of filmmakers such as Wes Anderson and Charlie Kaufman. However, what this new concept means in the context of cinema has so far remained under-defined and requires further philosophical analysis. This article provides such an analysis by offering a reconceptualization of Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist-phenomenological notions of good (...) faith and sincerity, which will be connected to developments in film and elaborated in relation to Frances Ha (Noah Baumbach, 2012). I propose, against Sartre's own preference for the problematic term “authenticity,” to understand sincerity as the reflective resumption of good faith's pre-reflective acceptance of human-reality. This conception of sincerity as reflective allows us to accurately understand the combination of self-awareness and affirmation that characterizes new sincerity cinema: its self-awareness does not serve the postmodernist strategy of endless self-ironization; instead, its portrayals affirm the meaningfulness of its filmic reality, while also being aware of film as a medium. An analysis of Frances Ha illustrates how this concept of sincerity might be seen to function both on the level of story world, characters and themes, and on that of narrative structure and audio-visual style, thereby showing how we can meaningfully speak of sincerity in and of film. (shrink)

Two recent publications investigate the nexus that ties together gender, cultural and postcolonial studies, Les féministes et le garçon arabe by Nacira Guénif Souilamas and Eric Macé, and a French translation of Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic : Modernity and Double Consciousness. Both contribute to refresh the Franco-French debate on immigration by linking issues of gender, class and race at work in today’s social conflicts.

The novels of David Foster Wallace, Dave Eggers and Jonathan Safran Foer are increasingly regarded as representing a new trend, an 'aesthetic sea change' in contemporary American fiction. 'Post-postmodernism' and 'New Sincerity' are just two of the labels that have been attached to this trend. But what do these labels mean? What characterizes and connects these novels? Dulk shows that the connection between these works lies in their shared philosophical dimension. On the one hand, they portray excessive self-reflection and endless (...) irony as the two main problems of contemporary Western life. On the other hand, the novels embody an attempt to overcome these problems: sincerity, reality-commitment and community are portrayed as the virtues needed to achieve a meaningful life. This shared philosophical dimension is analyzed by viewing the novels in light of the existentialist philosophies of Soren Kierkegaard, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Albert Camus. (shrink)

Que pourrait être, désormais, un discours théologique sur la ou " les religion ", sur l'"interreligieux "? A partir de quel lieu le penser? Comment pourrait-il advenir? La réponse offerte ici passe par un déplacement de la discussion vers l'éthique. Exode donc hors du lieu habituel pour aborder la question. Exode hors de la dogmatique ou de la théologie fondamentale car, là, il y va de connaissance, d'appartenance fidèle, de théologalité. Mais comment déthéologaliser la religion sans la déthéologiser? Comment la (...) penser autrement que comme une expérience humaine du divin, de l'Absolu ou de l'Ultime réel? Le déplacement proposé table moins sur les registres cognitifs ou affectifs investis par les recherches sur le phénomène religieux ou l'option herméneutique du pluralisme religieux que sur un registre de l'agir ou d'une posture éthique marquée d'actes et de paroles. Comment faire travailler la notion de religion en théologie autrement qu'à partir de l'identité, de la mémoire et plus à partir de l'estime de soi? Au moyen d'une lecture du traitement de la vertu de religio et des vices s'y opposant dans la Summa theologice de Thomas d'Aquin. A partir de ce travail de lecture, une structure formelle heuristique de la religion est reconstituée dans la différence et les rapports entre religio, superstitio et irreligiositas. Une catégorie lentement élaborée, " instance éthique advenant en posture subjective ", sous-tend cette diffraction heuristique : sur une " scène de la béatitude ", l'advenir de l'instance éthique se joue dans l'inscription désirée, choisie, réitérée et énoncée pour elle-même d'un mouvement en-vers Dieu. Pour produire ce chemin de réflexion, il aura fallu opérer et proposer une inscription contemporaine d'un discours thomasien dans le champ des discussions théologiques actuelles. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosopher F. H. Bradley, the most influential member of the nineteenth-century school of British Idealists. It offers a sustained interpretation of Bradley's Principles of Logic, explaining the problem of how it is possible for inferences to be both valid and yet have conclusions that contain new information. The author then describes how this solution provides a basis for Bradley's metaphysical view that reality is one interconnected experience and how this (...) gives rise to a new problem of truth. (shrink)

Considerable research evidence has accumulated indicating that there is an increased likelihood for illness and injury among employees working in long-hour schedules and schedules involving unconventional shift work. In addition, studies show that fatigue-related errors made by employees working in these kind of demanding schedules can have serious and adverse repercussions for public safety. As the result of these concerns, new protective legislation is being advocated in the United States, for instance, to restrict the hours of work among nurses and (...) other healthcare professionals. This article reviews the history of concerns about long working hours and the current scientific evidence regarding their effects on workers' health. The ethical implications of unconventional shift work and long work-hour schedules are considered. Relevant ethical considerations involve mandatory or unpaid overtime and the possibility of employer coercion, the political basis for government regulation of working hours, potential limits on voluntary assumption of risk, societal benefits accruing from the equitable distribution of available working hours, gender-based inequities related to working hours, and employer responsibilities for protecting individuals who are not employees from the spillover effects of demanding work schedules. (shrink)

A key argument of Dixon et al. in the target article is that prejudice reduction through intergroup contact and collective action work in opposite ways. We argue for a complementary approach focusing on extreme emotions to understand why people turn to non-normative collective action and to understand when and under what conditions extreme emotions may influence positive effects of contact on reconciliation.

Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about (...) a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

I apply Kooi and Tamminga's (2012) idea of correspondence analysis for many-valued logics to strong three-valued logic (K3). First, I characterize each possible single entry in the truth-table of a unary or a binary truth-functional operator that could be added to K3 by a basic inference scheme. Second, I define a class of natural deduction systems on the basis of these characterizing basic inference schemes and a natural deduction system for K3. Third, I show that each of the resulting natural (...) deduction systems is sound and complete with respect to its particular semantics. Among other things, I thus obtain a new proof system for Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic. (shrink)

Two issues are addressed in this commentary: the universality and the “psychological reality” of locus equations as cues to place of articulation. Preliminary data collected in our laboratory suggest that locus equations do not reliably distinguish place of articulation for fricatives. Additionally, perception studies show that listeners can identify place of articulation based on much less temporal information than that required for deriving locus equations.

If group members aim to fulfill a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfills the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members' individual actions, (...) and study how the public adoption of a plan changes the context in which individual agents make a decision about what to do. (shrink)

We develop a multi-agent deontic action logic to study the logical behaviour of two types of deontic conditionals: (1) conditional obligations, having the form "If group H were to perform action aH, then, in group F's interest, group G ought to perform action aG" and (2) conditional permissions, having the form "If group H were to perform action aH, then, in group F's interest, group G may perform action aG". First, we define a formal language for multi-agent deontic action logic (...) and a class of consequentialist models to interpret the formulas of the language. Second, we define a transformation that converts any strategic game into a consequentialist model. Third, we show that an outcome a* is a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game if and only if a conjunction of certain conditional permissions is true in the consequentialist model that results from the transformation of that strategic game. (shrink)

We are witnessing increasing use of the Internet, particular social media, to criticize (perceived or actual) moral failings and misdemeanors. This phenomenon of so-called ‘online public shaming’ could provide a powerful tool for reinforcing valuable social norms. But it also threatens unwarranted and severe punishments meted out by online mobs. This paper analyses the dangers associated with the informal enforcement of norms, drawing on Locke, but also highlights its promise, drawing on recent discussions of social norms. We then consider two (...) crucial conditions that online public shaming must meet in order to be justifiable: proportionality and accountability. We argue that these requirements are in fact frequently violated, rendering most cases of online public shaming unjustified. While the use of online public shaming against others’ vices has some apparent virtues, it is currently rarely justified, given its own vices. (shrink)

We use a deontic logic of collective agency to study reducibility questions about collective agency and collective obligations. The logic that is at the basis of our study is a multi-modal logic in the tradition of *stit* logics of agency. Our full formal language has constants for collective and individual deontic admissibility, modalities for collective and individual agency, and modalities for collective and individual obligations. We classify its twenty-seven sublanguages in terms of their expressive power. This classification enables us to (...) investigate reducibility relations between collective deontic admissibility, collective agency, and collective obligations, on the one hand, and individual deontic admissibility, individual agency, and individual obligations, on the other. (shrink)

How should we make choices when we know so little about our futures? L. A. Paul argues that we must view life decisions as choices to make discoveries about the nature of experience. Her account of transformative experience holds that part of the value of living authentically is to experience our lives and preferences in whatever ways they evolve.

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using (...) Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are *statements* within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as *properties* of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine. (shrink)

The power of some new entrants to the music industry derives from their position as brokers in computer-mediated environments. Brokers act instrumentally to exploit their position within a network which, in turn, depends on their ability to build and sustain links (and, in computer-mediated environments, hyperlinks). Bricolage in computer-mediated entrepreneurship refers to the intuitive manipulation of resources in order to achieve (perhaps tacit) goals. Without careful stewardship of the new intellectual wealth thus created, bricolage may profit neither the individual nor (...) the wider community. (shrink)

This paper presents two systems of natural deduction for the rejection of non-tautologies of classical propositional logic. The first system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all non-tautologies, the second system is sound and complete with respect to the body of all contradictions. The second system is a subsystem of the first. Starting with Jan Łukasiewicz's work, we describe the historical development of theories of rejection for classical propositional logic. Subsequently, we present the two systems of (...) natural deduction and prove them to be sound and complete. We conclude with a ‘Theorem of Inversion’. (shrink)

C.S. Peirce's and Isaac Levi's accounts of the belief-doubt-belief model are discussed and evaluated. It is argued that the contemporary study of belief change has metamorphosed into a branch of philosophical logic where empirical considerations have become obsolete. A case is made for reformulations of belief change systems that do allow for empirical tests. Last, a belief change system is presented that (1) uses finite representations of information, (2) can adequately deal with inconsistencies, (3) has finite operations of change, (4) (...) can do without extra-logical elements, and (5) only licenses consistent beliefs. (shrink)

Reasons and reasoning were central to the work of Paul Grice, one of the most influential and admired philosophers of the late twentieth century. In the John Locke Lectures that Grice delivered in Oxford at the end of the 1970s, he set out his fundamental thoughts about these topics; Aspects of Reason is the long-awaited publication of those lectures. This immensely rich work, powerfully evocative of the mind of its author, will refresh and illuminate discussions in many areas of (...) contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

We present a theory that copes with the dynamics of inconsistent information. A method is set forth to represent possibly inconsistent information by a finite state. Next, finite operations for expansion and contraction of finite states are given. No extra-logical element — a choice function or an ordering over (sets of) sentences — is presupposed in the definition of contraction. Moreover, expansion and contraction are each other's duals. AGM-style characterizations of these operations follow.

La 4e de couverture indique : "Comment se pratique la philosophie du droit en ce début de XXIe siècle à la suite des bouleversements politiques et théoriques observés lors du siècle précédent? Comment se pose la question du droit pour et dans la philosophie, et quelles sont les spécificités du rapport que les juristes nouent à la philosophie dans le déploiement de leur pratique juridique, ainsi que dans leur propre réflexion sur le droit? Les textes présents dans ce volume, rédigés (...) en l'honneur de Guy Haarscher par des amis et des collègues influencés par son travail, abordent ce questionnement en profitant, à sa suite, de la multiplicité des espaces de croisement entre les discours juridiques et philosophiques, qu'il s'agisse de la spécificité des droits de l'homme ou du droit constitutionnel dans le champ juridique, des choix moraux à l'oeuvre lors des conflits entre droits fondamentaux, de la place de la rhétorique ou de l'utilisation de la philosophie dans la procédure judiciaire, du statut réservé à la technique juridique dans la tradition philosophique occidentale, d'un légalisme commun au jusnaturalisme et au juspositivisme, d'une forme de moralité purement interne à la pratique du droit, de la question du tribunal de l'histoire ou encore du sens juridique de la laïcité.". (shrink)

"Actes du IIe Colloque international (1990) du Centre de recherche en philosophie politique et sociale de l'Universite d'Ottawa"--Cover p. 4.

This is a collection in translation of essays by Paul Ricoeur which presents a comprehensive view of his philosophical hermeneutics, its relation to the views of his predecessors in the tradition and its consequences for the social sciences. The volume has three parts. The studies in the first part examine the history of hermeneutics, its central themes and the outstanding issues it has to confront. In Part II, Ricoeur's own current, constructive position is developed. A concept of the text (...) is formulated as the implications of the theory are pursued into the domains of sociology, psychoanalysis and history. Many of the essays appear here in English for the first time; the editor's introduction brings out their background in Ricoeur's thought and the continuity of his concerns. The volume will be of great importance for those interested in hermeneutics and Ricoeur's contribution to it, and will demonstrate how much his approach offers to a number of disciplines. (shrink)

Two groups of agents, G1 and G2, face a *moral conflict* if G1 has a moral obligation and G2 has a moral obligation, such that these obligations cannot both be fulfilled. We study moral conflicts using a multi-agent deontic logic devised to represent reasoning about sentences like "In the interest of group F of agents, group G of agents ought to see to it that phi". We provide a formal language and a consequentialist semantics. An illustration of our semantics with (...) an analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma follows. Next, necessary and sufficient conditions are given for (1) the possibility that a single group of agents faces a moral conflict, for (2) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict within a single moral code, and for (3) the possibility that two groups of agents face a moral conflict. (shrink)

The ethical issues raised by cybersecurity practices and technologies are of critical importance. However, there is disagreement about what is the best ethical framework for understanding those issues. In this paper we seek to address this shortcoming through the introduction of a principlist ethical framework for cybersecurity that builds on existing work in adjacent fields of applied ethics, bioethics, and AI ethics. By redeploying the AI4People framework, we develop a domain-relevant specification of five ethical principles in cybersecurity: beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, (...) justice, and explicability. We then illustrate the advantages of this principlist framework by examining the ethical issues raised by four common cybersecurity contexts: penetration testing, distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), ransomware, and system administration. These case analyses demonstrate the utility of this principlist framework as a basis for understanding cybersecurity ethics and for cultivating the ethical expertise and ethical sensitivity of cybersecurity professionals and other stakeholders. (shrink)

Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the (...) world are similar to scientific methods used to make claims about the world, but that the subjects of metaphysics are not the subjects of science. Those who argue that metaphysics uses a problematic methodology to make claims about subjects better covered by natural science get the situation exactly the wrong way around: metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology. The questions metaphysicians address are different from those of scientists, but the methods employed to develop and select theories are similar. In the first section of the paper, I will describe the sort of subject matter that metaphysics tends to engage with. In the second section of the paper, I will show how metaphysical theories are classes of models and discuss the roles of experience, common sense and thought experiments in the construction and evaluation of such models. Finally, in the last section I will discuss the way these methodological points help us to understand the metaphysical project. Getting the right account of the metaphysical method allows us to better understand the relationship between science and metaphysics, to explain why doing metaphysics successfully involves having a range of different theories, to understand the role of thought experiments involving fictional worlds, and to situate metaphysical realism in a scientifically realist context. (shrink)

Taking our inspiration from modal correspondence theory, we present the idea of correspondence analysis for many-valued logics. As a benchmark case, we study truth-functional extensions of the Logic of Paradox (LP). First, we characterize each of the possible truth table entries for unary and binary operators that could be added to LP by an inference scheme. Second, we define a class of natural deduction systems on the basis of these characterizing inference schemes and a natural deduction system for LP. Third, (...) we show that each of the resulting natural deduction systems is sound and complete with respect to its particular semantics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.3 (2001) 245-259 [Access article in PDF] Virtue in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Metaphysical and Ethical Capacity Susan K. Allard-Nelson It has been argued that Aristotle's description of excellence (aretê) as a capacity (dynamis) in Rhetoric 1.9 is inconsistent with his treatment of excellence in Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, where he specifically argues that aretê is not a dynamis, but a hexis (i.e., a state or condition). (...) 1 Certainly, the word that Aristotle uses throughout the Nicomachean Ethics to both describe and categorize aretê is hexis, and he uses this word at Rhetoric 1.6.1362b13, where he says that several of the virtues, and all other such states (kai hai allai hai toiautai hexeis), are excellences of the soul. However, as part of his discussion of the ethical aspects of oratory, Aristotle states that aretê is "a capacity (dynamis) of providing and preserving good things, and a capacity of conferring many great benefits (euergetikê)" (Rh. 1.9.1366a36-1366b1). 2 This discussion is set in language similar to that used to discuss excellence and goodness in Rhetoric 1362b2-4 and 1361a28-30; this suggests that Aristotle intentionally identifies aretê with dynamis in this text, and, to some degree at least, with the dynamis to benefit others. In the former passage, Aristotle claims that "the excellences, too, must be a good thing, for those who possess them are in a good condition, and they are productive of good things and good actions" (Rh. 1.6.1362b2-4). In the latter passage, Aristotle states that honor (timê) can be paid, not only to those who have already done good, but also to those who have the capacity to do good (dynamenos euergetein) in the future. Indeed, in the Rhetoric 1.9.1366b3-7, Aristotle further unites the concepts of excellence, capacity, and beneficence by stating, "If excellence is the capacity of conferring benefits (dynamis euergetikê), then the greatest virtues must be those which are the most useful to others, and, for this reason, justice and courage are the most honored; for the latter is useful to others in war, and the former both in war and in peace" (1366b3-7). [End Page 245]Based on an understanding of this apparent inconsistency in terminology as intentional on Aristotle's part, I intend to argue here that Aristotle's identification of aretê with dynamis in Rhetoric can be understood within the highly specific context of rhetoric as an art as more appropriate, both metaphysically and ethically, than would have been an identification of aretê with hexis. I also intend to argue that, while certain tensions and difficulties are created by the classification of aretê as a dynamis in the Rhetoric and as a hexis in the Nicomachean Ethics, 3 Aristotle can be defended against the charge of inconsistency.To this end, then, I begin by examining the implications of defining rhetoric as an art (technê) that has persuasion (pistis) as its end (telos) and function (ergon). 1. Rhetoric is an art, and, as we know from EN 6.4, art is identical to a state of reasoned capacity to make, and all art is concerned with the coming into being of something that is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker (1140a1-23). Art is a rational capacity, or a potency that moves according to, and involves, a rational formula (kai ta men kata logon dynatai kinein kai hai dynameis auton meta logou), and, as such, it is capable of producing contrary effects (Met. 9.5.1047b31-1048a24). For this reason, and to negate the impossibility of contrary effects being produced simultaneously, Aristotle states that a rational capacity involves not only the elements of agent and patient, but also a desire or choice on the part of the agent that moves her 4 to act (Met. 9.5.1048a10). This necessary desire or choice, in fact, explains why an inference in the case of the arts (or of any rational capacity) can be made in one direction... (shrink)

In this chapter a new problem about rule-following is outlined, one that is distinct both from Kripke’s and Wright’s versions of the problem. This new problem cannot be correctly responsed to, as Kripke’s can, by invoking Wright’s Intentional Account of rule-following. The upshot might be called, following Kant, an antinomy of pure reason: we both must — and cannot — make sense of someone’s following a rule. The chapter explores various ways out of this antinomy without here endorsing any of (...) them. (shrink)

Foreword William Schweiker Paul Tillich, one of the great Protestant theologians of the twentieth century, addresses in Morality and Beyond a basic problem ...

A Christian ethicist discusses such problems as organ transplants, caring for the terminally ill, and defining death.

Feyerabrend argues that intellectual progress relies on the creativity of the scientist, against the authority of science.

This paper is concerned with a natural deduction system for First Degree Entailment (FDE). First, we exhibit a brief history of FDE and of combined systems whose underlying idea is used in developing the natural deduction system. Then, after presenting the language and a semantics of FDE, we develop a natural deduction system for FDE. We then prove soundness and completeness of the system with respect to the semantics. The system neatly represents the four-valued semantics for FDE.