This paper is meant to engage with philosophy teachers who are interested in creating a more inclusive environment by using small group discussion exercises. I begin this paper by describing the connections between the inclusive classroom and the collaborative classroom. I then articulate two learning goals that group discussion exercises can help students accomplish and define these learning goals as philosophical discovery and philosophical creation. Finally, I discuss a number of activities that encourage students (...) to accomplish these learning goals in small groups and describe how the incorporation of these exercises has affected the inclusivity of my own classes. (shrink)

This paper investigates the consequences for our understanding of physical theories as a result of the development of the renormalization group. Kadanoff's assessment of these consequences is discussed. What he called the ``extended singularity theorem'' poses serious difficulties for philosophical interpretation of theories. Several responses are discussed. The resolution demands a philosophical rethinking of the role of mathematics in physical theorizing.

While small group discussion is invaluable to the philosophy classroom, I think it can be improved. In this paper I present a method that I have developed to better facilitate active learning in the spirit of a philosopher within a Socratic community. My method is to form what I call a “philosophical think tank,” which takes the form of a small group that persists for the duration of the semester in order to overcome deficiencies that can (...) arise if groups are determined anew with each class meeting. After presenting the technique, I offer an overview of results, possible issues, and ideas for future development. (shrink)

This article is primarily a study of the group selection controversy, with special emphasis on the period from 1962 to the present, and the rise of inclusive fitness theory. Interest is focused on the relations between individual fitness theory and other fitness theories and on the methodological imperatives used in the controversy over the status of these theories. An appendix formalizes the notion of "assertive part" which is used in the informal discussion of the methodological imperatives elicited from (...) the controversy. (shrink)

A group of Soviet philosophers visited England from September 21 to October 4, 1968. There they participated in discussions on problems of the philosophy of morality. The trip was organized jointly by the Alliance of Friendship Societies and the Society of Friends in England. The British Society of Friends has long been conducting a diversified program of international cultural ties and personal contacts. The Quakers hold the latter to be particularly important in achieving mutual understanding among peoples. This was, (...) however, the first meeting of philosophers of our two countries. (shrink)

Background This study used a scenario- and discussion-based approach to teach preclinical medical students the socio-philosophical aspects of psychiatry and qualitatively evaluated the learning outcomes in a medical humanities course in Taiwan. Methods The seminar session focused on three hypothetical psychiatry cases. Students discussed the cases in groups and were guided by facilitators from multiple disciplines and professions. At the end of the semester, students submitted a narrative report comprising their reflections on the cases and discussions. The authors (...) utilized content analysis to categorize students’ narratives into three facets, namely, the philosophical, social and individual. Results In total 163 preclinical medical students participated in the class; 150 of them mentioned the scenario-based lesson in their reports; 33.3% of these reports discussed the case at the philosophical dimension (_n_ = 50), 45.3% at the social dimension (_n_ = 68), and 26.6% at the individual dimension (_n_ = 40). Four major themes emerged: (1) a psychiatric diagnosis has far-reaching consequences for an individual’s life, (2) the social structure affects how patients experience psychiatric disorders, (3) students related personal experience or those of friends and family to understand psychiatric disorders, and (4) medical humanities are of particular importance in psychiatric education. Conclusions This study demonstrated that the scenario-based discussions led by a multidisciplinary team of facilitators can benefit medical students with limited clinical experience to contemplate the socio-philosophical aspects of psychiatry. The authors suggest that this pedagogical model during preclinical education should be encouraged. (shrink)

Philosophical inquiry into pregnancy, childbirth, and mothering is a growing area of interest to academic philosophers. This volume brings together a diverse group of philosophers to speak about topics in this reemerging area of philosophical inquiry, taking up new themes, such as maternal aesthetics, and pursuing old ones in new ways, such as investigating stepmothering as it might inform and ground an ethics of care. The theoretical foci of the book include feminist, existential, ethical, aesthetic, phenomenological, social (...) and political theories. These perspectives are then employed to consider many dimensions of pregnancy, childbirth, and mothering, which are of central importance to human existence, but are only rarely discussed in philosophical cannons. Topics include pregnancy and embodiment, breast-feeding, representations – or the lack thereof – of pregnant and birthing women, adoption, and post-partum motherhood. (shrink)

This paper responds to the concern that many novice Philosophy for Children facilitators have about how to ensure that students’ discussion is philosophical. Two ways of addressing this concern are outlined, and the second of these is identified as the approach my method builds upon. In particular, I focus on those agenda-setting questions students pose that might be called ”psychological speculation” questions and offer a range of moves for proceeding from those into more centrally philosophical discussion. (...) The approach draws on familiarity with traditional areas of philosophy, and shows the practical everyday use for facilitators of such familiarity. Those who offer professional development in Philosophy for Children may find this approach a useful one to introduce in introductory or follow-up workshops, and novice facilitators will find enough guidance here to be able to apply these moves in their practice. A discussion of the distinction and the relationship between philosophical and empirical questions is undertaken, in passing, and a suggestion put forward for assisting novice P4C facilitators to discover their own abilities to find groups of related philosophical questions. Practical examples of the moves in my approach are provided, and a guide for building on them is offered. Finally, a connection is drawn between the questions that flow from traditional academic areas of philosophy and the idea of philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’. (shrink)

There have been many discussions recently from philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists about group polarization, with online and social media environments in particular receiving a lot of attention, both because of people's increasing reliance on such environments for receiving and exchanging information and because such environments often allow individuals to selectively interact with those who are like-minded. My goal here is to argue that the group epistemologist can facilitate understanding the kinds of factors that drive group polarization (...) in a way that has been overlooked by the existing research. Specifically, I argue that polarization can occur in part because of the ways that members of a group treat the group itself (as opposed to an individual member within that group) as a source of information, and in doing so makes their own position, as well as that of the group, more extreme. I refer to this as a structural factor in driving polarization, and argue that such factors can contribute to explanations of polarization that occurs specifically in an important subset of groups, namely online and social media groups in which little is known about other members within the group, what I refer to as anonymous, semi-anonymous and pseudonymous (ASAP) groups. (shrink)

Background This study used a scenario- and discussion-based approach to teach preclinical medical students the socio-philosophical aspects of psychiatry and qualitatively evaluated the learning outcomes in a medical humanities course in Taiwan. Methods The seminar session focused on three hypothetical psychiatry cases. Students discussed the cases in groups and were guided by facilitators from multiple disciplines and professions. At the end of the semester, students submitted a narrative report comprising their reflections on the cases and discussions. The authors (...) utilized content analysis to categorize students’ narratives into three facets, namely, the philosophical, social and individual. Results In total 163 preclinical medical students participated in the class; 150 of them mentioned the scenario-based lesson in their reports; 33.3% of these reports discussed the case at the philosophical dimension (n = 50), 45.3% at the social dimension (n = 68), and 26.6% at the individual dimension (n = 40). Four major themes emerged: (1) a psychiatric diagnosis has far-reaching consequences for an individual’s life, (2) the social structure affects how patients experience psychiatric disorders, (3) students related personal experience or those of friends and family to understand psychiatric disorders, and (4) medical humanities are of particular importance in psychiatric education. Conclusions This study demonstrated that the scenario-based discussions led by a multidisciplinary team of facilitators can benefit medical students with limited clinical experience to contemplate the socio-philosophical aspects of psychiatry. The authors suggest that this pedagogical model during preclinical education should be encouraged. (shrink)

Understanding how individual agency and group agency relate is of great importance for a range of philosophical and practical concerns, including responsibility ascription and institutional design. This article discusses the relation between corporate and individual responsibility in agency—in particular, the relation between corporate and individual control of actions. First, I criticize Christian List and Philip Pettit’s causal account of combined corporate and individual control. Second, I develop an alternative account in terms of structural control, and I show how (...) this gives a better grasp of the issue. Third, I argue for an act-dualism that complements my account of control and sheds further light on the relation between corporate and individual agency and responsibility. (shrink)

A group encompassed of three eighth grade respond to the etiquette of a classroom setting, the “fuzzy area” between adulthood and childhood, and basic accountability between the two categories through unbiased opinions in a philosophical environment.

The second meeting of British and Soviet philosophers, continuing the discussion of problems of ethics begun in the fall of 1968 in England, was held in Tbilisi in October 1969. This time the British philosophers journeyed to our country, by agreement between the Alliance of Friendship Societies and the Society of Friends . The group of five included philosophy teachers at a number of universities: David Bell , with whom we were well acquainted from our debates in East (...) Greenstead, Steven Lucas , Edward Honderik , Bernard Harrison , whom we had also met during our visit to Brighton, and the Secretary for European Affairs of the British Quaker organization, Alan Davis. On our side, the discussion was conducted by L. N. Mitrokhin and O. G. Drobnitskii , A. A. Ivin, N. Z. Chavchavadze, and A. F. Begiashvili. The Alliance of Friendship Societies was represented by the assistant chief of the Division of British Countries, F. I. Fedosov. (shrink)

The following pair of claims is standardly endorsed by philosophers working on group agency: (1) groups are capable of irreducible moral agency and, therefore, can be blameworthy; (2) groups are not capable of irreducible moral patiency, and, therefore, lack moral rights. This paper argues that the best case for (1) brings (2) into question. Section 2 paints the standard picture, on which groups’ blameworthiness derives from their functionalist or interpretivist moral agency, while their lack of moral rights derives from (...) their lack of sentience. In Section 3, I add support to a recent argument that this standard picture needs alteration: groups’ blameworthiness requires something akin to sentience, which groups acquire from members. Section 4 discusses rights: if groups acquire sentience from members, as Section 3 argues, then can groups have moral rights? I argue that they can, but that groups have only a limited range of moral rights, whose existence depends on (without being ontologically or justificatorily reducible to) the attitudes and actions of humans. (shrink)

An important thesis discussed in the literature on shared agency is that group identification motivates pre-school children to act together. This paper aims at further illuminating this thesis by clarifying what triggers the process of group identification in young children. It is argued that joint attention, among other functions in supporting joint actions, can reveal to the co-attenders that they share some preferences. Since sharing preferences has been established by the literature to be a reliable motivation of (...) class='Hi'>group identification and since joint attention has an early emergence in development, one can consider joint attention to be a putative trigger of group identification in pre-school children. If this is on the right track, group identification, joint attention, and preferences identify a cluster of minimal pre-conditions for joint actions. (shrink)

My dissertation focuses on problems that arise when a group makes decisions that are in reasonable ways connected to the beliefs and values of the group members. These situations are represented by models of decision-theoretic aggregation: Suppose a model of individual rationality in decision-making applies to each of a group of agents. Suppose this model also applies to the group as a whole, and that this group model is aggregated from the individual models. Two questions (...) arise. First, what sets of reasonable conditions can we consistently impose on the aggregation? Second, what can we learn from insights gained in such models, in particular for ethics and political philosophy? The dissertation has three parts, each using a different model of individual rationality. Each part contains essays addressing questions of either the first or the second kind with regard to its underlying model. Part I uses a social-choice-theoretic model, in which agents are only assumed to rank alternatives. Arrow's "Impossibility Theorem" shows that certain conditions that it would be natural to impose on all aggregation cannot be so imposed, on pain of contradiction. I discuss the impact of this result on the evaluation of majority rule and on democratic theory. I also discuss Sen's "Liberal Paradox", which addresses the possibility of incorporating rights into a social-choice theoretic model. Part II uses the von Neumann/Morgenstern theory of expected utility. A result under this model has been regarded as providing an argument for utilitarianism. I locate a place within utilitarianism where the theorem can do some work. To prepare the ground, I interpret the von Neumann/Morgenstern theory as part of a theory of deliberation. Thereby, this version of expected utility theory can be embedded into the philosophy of practical reasoning. The underlying model in Part III is Bayesian decision theory. Whereas the other two inquiries focus on the philosophical assessment of formal results, the third makes a formal contribution. One essay surveys the area, and a second explores a curious phenomenon that occurs in determining outcomes under one type of Bayesian aggregation. (shrink)

The Berlin Group for scientific philosophy was active between 1928 and 1933 and was closely related to the Vienna Circle. In 1930, the leaders of the two Groups, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap, launched the journal Erkenntnis. However, between the Berlin Group and the Vienna Circle, there was not only close relatedness but also significant difference. Above all, while the Berlin Group explored philosophical problems of the actual practice of science, the Vienna Circle, closely following Wittgenstein, (...) was more interested in problems of the language of science. The book includes first discussion ever (in three chapters) on Walter Dubislav’s logic and philosophy. Two chapters are devoted to another author scarcely explored in English, Kurt Grelling, and another one to Paul Oppenheim who became an important figure in the philosophy of science in the USA in the 1940s–1960s. Finally, the book discusses the precursor of the Nord-German tradition of scientific philosophy, Jacob Friedrich Fries. Mehr anzeigen Weniger anzeigen . (shrink)

A proven classic, this anthology stimulates readers' interest in philosophy through an innovative ldquo;sides of the argumentrdquo; presentation, representing positions on each of the fundamental philosophical principles. Each reading contains a biographical sketch of the author, with a group of further readings for those wishing to pursue issues in further depth. Using debate and argument as a vehicle, the eleventh edition ofClassic Philosophical Questionssimultaneously gives readers the fundamentals of philosophy while demonstrating that philosophy is a discourse that (...) has spanned centuries. Topics covered include knowledge, metaphysics, religion, ethics, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and the meaning of life. This anthology offers both classic and contemporary selections that challenge readers with the basic inquiries that philosophers have discussed throughout the ages. (shrink)

In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a (...) novel distinction between intersubjective and interobjective interpretations of probability. (shrink)

Ancient philosophical schools developed and discussed perspectives and practices on the emotion of anger useful in contemporary philosophical practice with clients, groups, and organizations. This paper argues the case for incorporating these insights from four main philosophical schools (Platonist, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic) sets out eight practices drawn from these schools, and discusses how these insights can be used by philosophical practitioners with clients.

Vulnerability is a broad concept widely addressed in recent scholarly literature. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people are among the vulnerable populations with significant disadvantages related to health and the social determinants of health. Medical ethics discourse tackles vulnerability from philosophical and political perspectives. LGBT people experience several disadvantages from both perspectives. This article aims to justify the right to health for LGBT people and their particular claims regarding healthcare because they belong to a vulnerable group. Rawls’ theory (...) of justice and Norman Daniels’ normal functioning approach will be discussed in this context. Despite the fact that the right to health can be justified by Daniels’ normal functioning approach, there is still a theoretical gap in justifying the right to health for particular vulnerable populations such as LGBT peopleand discussing society’s duty to compensate for these disadvantages. In search of solid theoretical grounds for the justification of the right to health for LGBT people, the present author takes the opportunity to utilize Daniels’ flexible definition of normal functioning to show that normal functioning not only varies by age but also by different states of human existence, including sexual orientation and gender identity, and to propose replacing the life span approach with normal states of human existence. (shrink)

It is common to ascribe agency to some organized collectives, such as corporations, courts, and states, and to treat them as loci of responsibility, over and above their individual members. But since responsibility is often assumed to require free will, should we also think that group agents have free will? Surprisingly, the literature contains very few in-depth discussions of this question. The most extensive defence of corporate free will that I am aware of (Hess [2014], “The Free Will of (...) Corporations (and Other Collectives)”, Philosophical Studies 168 (1): 241–260) rests on a compatibilist understanding which takes reasons-responsiveness and acting from one’s own ‘actional springs’ as key conditions for free will but says little about a condition that free-will libertarians emphasize: the possibility of doing otherwise. In this paper, I will argue that group agents can have free will not only in a (less demanding) compatibilist sense, but also in a recognizably libertarian sense, which includes the possibility of doing otherwise. In developing this account of corporate free will, I will bring together recent work on group agency and recent work on free will. (shrink)

We investigated teachers' and children's experiences of philosophy with children by analysing the content of interviews with primary school teachers and discussions with groups of primary school pupils. The results show that regular philosophy sessions with children can have an impact on teachers’ view of themselves as educators, their approach to teaching and their personal development. From the children’s point of view, the most important and meaningful aspect, aside from the content of philosophical discussion, was the opportunity to (...) think together in an open-ended way. A key component of the collective construction of meaning was uncertainty, which is an integral feature of philosophical discussion. These findings link with the idea of “citizen as agent” in a variety of ways. Philosophising with children leads to a more collaborative and democratic teaching style, giving children the space to bring their own interests and activities to the discussion. This aligns with pupils’ enjoyment of the openness and uncertainty of philosophical issues, their appreciation of the opportunity to engage with different ideas and viewpoints, and their willingness to rise to the challenge of revising their own positions and changing their thinking. (shrink)

Philosophical theology is aimed primarily at theoretical understanding of the nature and attributes of God and of God's relationship to the world and its inhabitants. During the twentieth century, much of the philosophical community had grave doubts about our ability to attain any such understanding. In recent years the analytic tradition in particular has moved beyond the biases that placed obstacles in the way of the pursuing questions located on the interface of philosophy and religion. The result has (...) been a rebirth of serious, widely-discussed work in philosophical theology. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology attempts both to familiarize readers with the directions in which this scholarship has gone and to pursue the discussion into hitherto under-examined areas. Written by some of the leading scholars in the field, the essays in the Handbook are grouped in five sections. In the first, articles focus on the authority of scripture and tradition, on the nature and mechanisms of divine revelation, on the relation between religion and science, and on theology and mystery. The next section focuses on philosophical problems connected with the central divine attributes: aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. In Section Three, essays explore theories of divine action and divine providence, questions about petitionary prayer, problems about divine authority and God's relationship to morality and moral standards, and various formulations of and responses to the problem of evil. The fourth section examines philosophical problems that arise in connection with such central Christian doctrines as the trinity, the incarnation, the atonement, original sin, resurrection, and the Eucharist. Finally, Section Five introduces readers to work that is being done in Jewish, Islamic, and Chinese philosophical theology. (shrink)

In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame (...) for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups, and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of... (shrink)

In this paper, we offer an analysis of ‘group intentions.’ On our proposal, group intentions should be understood as a state of equilibrium among the beliefs of the members of a group. Although the discussion in this paper is non-technical, the equilibrium concept is drawn from the formal theory of interactive epistemology due to Robert Aumann. The goal of this paper is to provide an analysis of group intentions that is informed by important work in (...) economics and formal epistemology. (shrink)

In this article we argue that philosophy can facilitate improvement in cross-disciplinary science. In particular, we discuss in detail the Toolbox Project, an effort in applied epistemology that deploys philosophical analysis for the purpose of enhancing collaborative, cross-disciplinary scientific research through improvements in cross-disciplinary communication. We begin by sketching the scientific context within which the Toolbox Project operates, a context that features a growing interest in and commitment to cross-disciplinary research (CDR). We then develop an argument for the leading (...) idea behind this effort, namely, that philosophical dialogue can improve cross-disciplinary science by effecting epistemic changes that lead to better group communication. On the heels of this argument, we describe our approach and its output; in particular, we emphasize the Toolbox instrument that generates philosophical dialogue and the Toolbox workshop in which that dialogue takes place. Together, these constitute a philosophical intervention into the life of CDR teams. We conclude by considering the philosophical implications of this intervention. (shrink)

The concept of group identification has been widely discussed in the fields of social psychology and social ontology. The debate has been somewhat unbalanced, however. The structure, nature, and experiential status of groups have been assessed widely and from several perspectives. Instead, the concept of identification as received considerably less attention. This is why the ongoing debate threatens to be misled by various conceptual ambiguities. These ambiguities concern first and foremost the target, structure, and temporal nature of identification. The (...) present article offers a philosophical analysis of the concept and clarifies the conceptual ambiguities haunting the debate. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept the idea that there are duties to promote or create just institutions. But are the addressees of such duties supposed to be individuals – the members of the citizenry? What does it mean for an individual to promote or create just institutions? According to the ‘Simple View’, the citizenry has a collective duty to create or promote just institutions, and each individual citizen has an individual duty to do their part in this collective project. The simple view (...) appears to work well with regard to – you guessed it – ‘simple’ scenarios but it is riddled with further questions and problems. In this chapter, we raise five problems for the Simple View: (a) We suggest that one cannot develop a view concerning the citizenry’s duty to promote just institutions in isolation from a conception of the ontological relationship between the state and its citizens; (b) We argue that it is not obvious that the citizenry is the right entity to be attributed duties in the first place; (c) We show that a plausible account of collective duties to promote just institutions must not remain silent on the complexities and difficulties amorphous, unorganized group face in vis-à-vis collective action; (d) We contend that without allocation principles for contributory duties amongst the citizenry, or – alternatively – a method for practical deliberation that is action-guiding in collective action contexts, the claim that the citizens have a collective duty to promote just institutions remains moot; and, finally, (e) We demonstrate that the problem of reasonable disagreement is a serious threat to a collective duty to promote or create just institutions – it potentially undermines such a duty altogether and allows for conflicting contributory duties amongst the citizenry. We hope that our discussion will ultimately help improve existing theories and conceptual frameworks with a view to better understanding citizens’ obligations to promote justice under non-ideal conditions. (shrink)

The lack of engagement of philosophy with decisions made under conditions of risk and uncertainty has lately received increasing attention. But philosophers have devoted little thought to the development of a conceptual framework for distinguishing different types of risks. This article begins by illustrating the need for a more nuanced conceptual framework. As the normative considerations risks give rise to are highly varied, ethicists need to distinguish between different types of risks. It then offers two ideas. First, it proposes that (...) we understand ‘risk’ as a multi-dimensional concept, i.e. a concept that can always be evaluated in different dimensions, e.g. a qualitative, a quantitative and an epistemic dimension. While this understanding of risk underlies the current practice of risk analysis, making it explicit is of value, in particular for the philosophical debate. It draws attention to the diversity of risks, helps to group them sensibly and sharpens existing arguments. Second, the article introduces a novel account of the notion ‘systemic risk’. Criticising existing accounts, it proposes we understand ‘systemic risk’ as referring to a risk that endangers the functioning of a system and originates in the system or its background noise, where a system is conceived of as a set of interdependent, interacting components that form a complex, functionally defined whole. The article identifies a number of structural features shared by systemic risks and evaluates the distinctive normative considerations they give rise to. It then argues that the notion ‘systemic risk’ is particularly suited to characterise some of the most pressing risks faced in an increasingly interconnected world. While the notion ‘systemic risk’ rests on the understanding of ‘risk’ as a multi-dimensional concept, it also complements it. Its necessity shows that in addressing risks, it is sometimes helpful to move beyond a characterisation based solely on their dimensions. (shrink)

In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus-based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a (...) novel distinction between intersubjective and interobjective interpretations of probability. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that group agency must be a social phenomenon because it involves interactions among many human beings. This assumption overlooks the real metaphysical nature of agency, which is both normative and voluntarist. Construed as a normative phenomenon, individual agency arises wherever there is a point of view from which deliberation and action proceed in accord with the requirements that define individual rationality. Such a point of view is never a metaphysical given, but is always a product (...) of rational activities that aim to satisfy the requirements that define individual rationality. When such a deliberative point of view is forged within a whole human life, there is a single agent of human size. But such points of view can also be forged within parts of human lives so as to constitute multiple agents within them; and they can also be achieved within groups of human lives so as to constitute group agents that literally deliberate and act as one. If such a group agent were a social phenomenon, then its agency would simultaneously be the agency of many even as it was also the agency of one. In that case, its deliberations and actions would have to proceed from many separate deliberative points of view, at the same time that they also proceeded from a single deliberative point of view. A correct account of rational agency shows that this is not necessarily so, and indeed, not typically so. Moreover, if it were so much as possible for this to be so, it would require special conditions of the sort that Rousseau identified in his account of the general will. But this special case is not a good model on which to understand the cases of group agency that are most often discussed in the philosophical literature. They are more appropriately viewed as cases in which the condition of individual agency is realized at the level of a group, than as cases of social agency per se. (shrink)

A substantial literature supports the attribution of intentional states such as beliefs and desires to groups. But within this literature, there is no substantial account of group concepts. Since on many views, one cannot have an intentional state without having concepts, such a gap undermines the cogency of accounts of group intentionality. In this paper I aim to provide an account of group concepts. First I argue that to fix the semantics of the sentences groups use to (...) make their decisions or express their beliefs, we need to appeal to a conventional semantics like that of Lewis. I then argue that the same reasons we have for taking group intentional states to be irreducible to the intentional states of their members apply also to the terms fixed by a conventional semantics. It follows that the meanings of terms in the sentences expressing a group's intentional states are also fixed by facts about the group, not its members. And recognizing this, I argue, amounts to attributing concepts to groups. Finally, I discuss a real-life example of a group concept—the meaning of ‘meter’ as fixed by the International Bureau of Weights and Measurements—and I discuss the upshot of these considerations for the question of social externalism about concepts. (shrink)

In this essay I discuss my early career as a failed philosophical practitioner when the field of philosophical counseling was still in its infancy. I describe setting up a private practice and discuss various details from my field notes with regards to some of the earliest clients I received. I further depict experimenting with philosophical group therapy in an inpatient psychiatric unit of a general hospital, which by all objective standards turned out to be a disaster. (...) Musings on how philosophy may be successfully applied in the consulting room is considered through a phenomenological-existential approach to therapy. (shrink)

There is proposed the analysis of conceptual foundations in researching of Poles’ national character on materials of Julian Leopold Ochorowicz (1850-1917) scientific heritage connected with philosophical and pedagogical implications of his ideas. Ochorowicz’s contribution to interdisciplinary approach on Poles’ national character is emphasizing. The heuristically potential of this approach is explicated using reconstruction and systemizing of his views, which had played a significant role in determining intentionality in discussions on the matter «What philosophy do Poles need?” for the successful (...) self-statement in their national being. Critically evaluating of this experience there is combined with verifying of his theoretical assumptions that should be actual also in Ukrainian social and cultural contexts. Ochorowicz belongs to the group of outstanding Polish scholars with wide scientific interests and original achievements. This article presents his research on history perceived as a collective psychological process. In Poland, Ochorowicz should be regarded as a precursor of psychohistory. An important role in his conception is played by the theory of the so-called residual symptoms, on the basis of which he developed the concept of Poles’ national character with its educational implications. The question about the rudiments of our national character sharpens in border situations, in which those traits, previously presented in a declarative form, are verified. The strength of a nation is encoded in the irreal sphere, i.e. in the sphere of values around which people group themselves. (shrink)

The author presents a review of research literature on the analysis of the sphere of informal philosophizing in Russia of the last thirty years. He discusses the genesis and content of the idea of non-institutional creative philosophizing in the works of famous modern Russian philosophers. He notes that philosophical self-identity in today’s Russia is characterized by uncertainty, uncertainty, and mobility. This is directly related to such phenomena as the rapid collapse of book culture, the change of mediums of communication, (...) a clear decrease in the abstracting-reflective component of thinking and the audiovisual turn. The author presents both the review generalized studies of intellectual life and non-institutional philosophizing in modern Russia, as well as works examining the features of theoretical platforms unformal philosophical groups. (shrink)

"monumental work" - The North American Spinoza Society Newsletter , February 1999 "The sheer volume of this anthology makes it an indispensable asset to any serious scholar of Spinozism. Certainly no academic library can do without it. The quality of the material gathered here is extremely impressive. To the professional scholar of early modern philosophy many of the criticisms it contains may well look superficial and outworn, but even the best-informed experts will find much in it that will surprise and (...) delight." - Wipe van Bunge Benedict Spinoza (1632-77), Dutch metaphysician, psychologist, moral philosopher and philosopher of religion, is one of the most important figures of seventeenth-century rationalism. He is among the illustrious group of hugely influential thinkers of that time who were mathematicians and scientists as well as philosophers, a group that included Descartes, Leibniz and Hobbes. His thought has been continually reinterpreted and he influenced such people as Goethe, Lessing, Nietzsche, Shelley, George Eliot, Wordsworth, Bertrand Russell, Freud and Einstein. This unprecedented collection brings together some 150 historically and philosophically important discussions of Spinoza published in English in the two centuries following his death. The authoritative bibliography - Boucher's Spinoza in English: A Bibliography from the Seventeenth Century to the Present - cites a total of only about 300 publications from this period. Thus this collection gathers half of all materials so far identified and represents by far the most significant and interesting contributions. Internally cross-referenced, with an introduction, notes and full subject and name index, this essential collection also features an index of citations to the Ethics, by the editor. This will be an extremely useful resource for Spinoza specialists, research libraries, intellectual historians, and graduate students in philosophy. --a compilation of c.150 important pamphlets, papers and book chapters discussing Spinoza --the first collection of its kind - none of this material has previously been collected --6 reset volumes in royal size --extremely comprehensive, including many rare items --internally cross-referenced and fully indexed for easy use. (shrink)

Much apprehension has been expressed by philosophers about the method of renormalisation in quantum field theory, as it apparently requires illegitimate procedure of infinite cancellation. This has lead to various speculations, in particular in Teller (1989). We examine Teller's discussion of perturbative renormalisation of quantum fields, and show why it is inadequate. To really approach the matter one needs to understand the ideas and results of the renormalisation group, so we give a simple but comprehensive account of this (...) topic. With this in hand, we explain how renormalisation can and should be understood. One thing that is revealed is that apparently very successful theories such as quantum electro-dynamics cannot be universally true; resolving the tension between success and falsity leads to a picture in which any theory may be viewed as irreducibly phenomenological. We explain how, and argue that the support for this view is tenuous at best. (shrink)

Philosophical theology is aimed primarily at theoretical understanding of the nature and attributes of God and of God's relationship to the world and its inhabitants. During the twentieth century, much of the philosophical community had grave doubts about our ability to attain any such understanding. In recent years the analytic tradition in particular has moved beyond the biases that placed obstacles in the way of the pursuing questions located on the interface of philosophy and religion. The result has (...) been a rebirth of serious, widely-discussed work in philosophical theology. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology attempts both to familiarize readers with the directions in which this scholarship has gone and to pursue the discussion into hitherto under-examined areas. Written by some of the leading scholars in the field, the essays in the Handbook are grouped in five sections. In the first, articles focus on the authority of scripture and tradition, on the nature and mechanisms of divine revelation, on the relation between religion and science, and on theology and mystery. The next section focuses on philosophical problems connected with the central divine attributes: aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. In Section Three, essays explore theories of divine action and divine providence, questions about petitionary prayer, problems about divine authority and God's relationship to morality and moral standards, and various formulations of and responses to the problem of evil. The fourth section examines philosophical problems that arise in connection with such central Christian doctrines as the trinity, the incarnation, the atonement, original sin, resurrection, and the Eucharist. Finally, Section Five introduces readers to work that is being done in Jewish, Islamic, and Chinese philosophical theology. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that our understanding of the issue of institutional group minds might be broadened if we consider alternative meta-metaphysical frameworks to those which are presently presupposed in the field. I argue that the two major camps in the contemporary philosophical debate about group beliefs, namely strong realism and eliminative reductionism, share a commitment to some form of meta-philosophical realism. Two alternative metaontological frameworks for the discussion of the issue (...) of group belief are outlined: fictionalism and deflationism. Fictionalism about group minds, although unpopular in the philosophical debate, is still a much-discussed option in legal theory and the theory of the firm in economics. I argue that, once formulated properly, the fictionalist position deserves serious consideration. The other alternative option is deflationism: I develop a sketch of the deflationary approach to group beliefs that is based on Thomasson’s approach to the existence of groups. The final parts of the paper are devoted to a discussion of the resulting four-element classification of the possible views on the reality of group minds: realism, eliminative reductionism, fictionalism, and deflationism. I offer some proposals with regard to the criteria that might be used to choose between these theories. (shrink)

Discussion on God's knowledge, awareness of God with people though are different, but still closely related. This article talks about God's knowledge, although knowledge of God and the people, but not for the medieval Shengboerna the so-called "secular knowledge" and "God of knowledge" distinction; this will only be God's own knowledge or wisdom, philosophical discussion. First, the paper will compare the start, mainly related to the so-called Fozhi Buddhism and Western philosophers such as Aristotle,圣多瑪斯, Hegel and others (...) about God, know God, absolute spirit of the discussion, especially圣多瑪斯discussion on knowledge of God, compare, and summarize them are focused on comprehensive and complete self-conscious, and of all things and the universal and the individual's knowledge. Then, this paper will further discuss whether it contains the narrative of God to know the ingredients, that is God for individuals and groups in the body of the story or may occur, actual and imagined the story of building awareness. In short, my book can only be regarded as restricted view up to see. Both for Glimpse, then it is limited, should be able to break the world's big pipe to significantly; both for the discussion, it should be deconstructed in order to display the infinite Creator. The discussion of "Scientia Dei " is very much related to, though still different from, the question "Quomodo Deus a nobis cognoscatur ." This paper deals with Scientia Dei, not in the sense it is distinguished from Scientia Mundi by St Bernard of Clairvaux, but in the sense it is related to all philosophical discourses on the wisdom of God Himself. The first step of this paper is a comparative study with "Buddha's Wisdom" taught by some major Mahayana Buddhist Schools, and the ideas of God, God's Knowledge and Absolute Spirit in Aristotle, St. Thomas and Hegel, in particular St. Thomas' discussion of "Scientia Dei." The result of this comparison is their common emphasis on God's total and complete transparent self-understanding, and His universal and concrete knowledge of all things. After this, we will move on to discuss the narrative component of Scientia Dei, to see whether in God's knowledge there is a place for the historical and imaginative stories of all social groups and individuals, of their inexhaustible possibilities, developments and constructions, both descriptive and imaginative. Anyhow, this essay is limited to a comparative and discursive study, without any ground in the author's religious experience with God's knowledge. Therefore it should be deconstructed once it is pronounced, erased once it is written. (shrink)

The contributions gathered in this volume present the state of the art in key areas of current social ontology. They focus on the role of collective intentional states in creating social facts, and on the nature of intentional properties of groups that allow characterizing them as responsible agents, or perhaps even as persons. Many of the essays are inspired by contemporary action theory, emotion theory, and theories of collective intentionality. Another group of essays revisits early phenomenological approaches to social (...) ontology and accounts of sociality that draw on the Hegelian idea of recognition. This volume is organized into three parts. First, the volume discusses themes highlighted in John Searle's work and addresses questions concerning the relation between intentions and the deontic powers of institutions, the role of disagreement, and the nature of collective intentionality. Next, the book focuses on joint and collective emotions and mutual recognition, and then goes on to explore the scope and limits of group agency, or group personhood, especially the capacity for responsible agency. The variety of philosophical traditions mirrored in this collection provides readers with a rich and multifaceted survey of present research in social ontology. It will help readers deepen their understanding of three interrelated and core topics in social ontology: the constitution and structure of institutions, the role of shared evaluative attitudes, and the nature and role of group agents. (shrink)

Cyber-bullying, and other issues related to violence being committed online in prosocial environments, are beginning to constitute an emergency worldwide. Institutions are particularly sensitive to the problem especially as far as teenagers are concerned inasmuch as, in cases of inter-teen episodes, the deterrent power of ordinary justice is not as effective as it is between adults. In order to develop the most suitable policies, institution should not be satisfied with statistics and sociological perspectives on the phenomenon, but rather seek a (...) deep ethical understanding—also referring to the biological and evolutionary past of human beings. The aim of this paper is to show a way to fill this theoretical gap, offering some answers that can illuminate future policy-oriented research and reflection. In order to do so, we will start by connecting our argument to evolutionary studies carried out in the past two decades, focusing on gossip as a tool for social assortment, thus endowed with a dual function: protect the group from free riders, intruders and bullies but also bully the deviant members. In the “Mediating gossip through social networks” section, we will see which aspects of gossip, vital for bullying, are co-opted by social network scenarios. A fundamental trait of human social life, that is the subdivision in smaller coalitions, or sub-groups, will be shown as missing in social networks dynamics—therefore constituting themselves as structurally violent. The “Why and how do social networks empower bullying?” section will deal with techno-ethical and epistemological concerns regarding how gossip, mediated by SN, manages to empower cyber-bullying. The “Self-gossip and self-mobbing in the light of the disruption of sub-moralities” section will characterize cyber-bullying as often sparked by self-gossip in a scenario where familiar sub-groups, which also mediate defense and mutual understanding, are disrupted. The “Discussion and conclusion” section will consist of a philosophical summary, divided in two parts: a pars destruens analyzing whether SN, in their actual configurations, are fit for being used by humans-like-us, and a pars construens examining the broad potential consequences of highly enforced regulation aimed at contrasting cyber-bullying. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to establish connections between the pragmatist philosophical tradition and the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. I argue that among these connections is the affinity between John Dewey’s account of the development of group morality as articulated in his early work and Wittgenstein’s admittedly vague concept, ‘form of life.’ I argue that this affinity is evident in that both are dependent on inter-subjective experience. Moreover, both Dewey’s account of the development of group morality (...) and Wittgenstein’s concept of form of life suggests an intimate relationship between the individual and the community. I argue further that both Dewey’s account of group morality and Wittgenstein’s form of life concept hold that there is a significant influence of inherited norms, conventions, traditions, etc., on the development of the individual and her conduct in a variety of social interactions. I go on to raise and address potential and anticipated criticisms. In this section I take what I consider to be the most penetrating of the potential criticisms of the arguments presented in this paper: that Dewey and Wittgenstein direct their analyses at different issues (the former directs his analysis toward group moral development and social issues, while the latter directs his toward linguistic activity and its grounding social context), that Dewey focuses much of his attention on moral agency, whereas Wittgenstein is more concerned with what might be called epistemological issues, and finally that my treatment of the form of life concept is incomplete in that I spend a roughly proportionate amount of time discussing related concepts: language games, meaning as use, and, to a lesser extent, rule- following. I respond to these criticisms in turn by arguing that a careful reading of these aspects of each philosopher’s work circumvents such criticisms. The goal of this paper is to contribute to the growing literature on connections between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the Pragmatist tradition. The subject matter might also be a contribution to the history of philosophy and possibly have implications for epistemology. There is also the hope that in establishing commonalities between the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Dewey one can provide an interpretation of some of the more vague concepts in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, prompting further discussion on these concepts. Finally, this research might pave the way for further research into connections among different aspects of Dewey’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies. This paper is a first step toward a study of a much larger scope and should not be taken as conclusive. (shrink)

The introduction introduces the history of the concept of human rights and its philosophical genealogy. It raises questions of the nature of human rights, the grounds of human rights, difference between proposed and actual human rights, and scepticism surrounding the very idea of human rights. In the course of this discussion, it concludes that the diversity of positions on human rights is a sign of the intellectual, cultural, and political fertility of the notion of human rights. The chapter (...) concludes with an overview of the chapters present in the volume. (shrink)

Public access cable channels, remnants of competitive cable franchise battles, are often in the center of heated controversy over allowance of utterances that are at sharp odds with community values. This article reiterates that broad public discussion is both a legal and a philosophical mandate in this country, concluding that more harm than good emerges from preventing groups from airing their opinions. The opportunity is always available for countering messages that have been aired.

My dissertation philosophically analyzes experiments in evolutionary biology, an area of science where experimental approaches have tended to supplement, rather than supercede more traditional approaches, such as field observations. I conduct the analysis on the basis of three case studies of famous episodes in the history of selection experiments: H. B. D. Kettlewell's investigations of industrial melanism in the Peppered Moth, Biston betularia; two of Th. Dobzhansky's studies of adaptive radiation in the fruit fly, Drosophila pseudoobscura; and M. Wade's studies (...) of group selection in the flour beetle, Tribolium castaneum. The case studies analyze the arguments and evidence these investigators used to identify the respective roles of experiments and other forms of inquiry in their investigations. I discuss three philosophical issues. ;First, the analysis considers whether these selection experiments fit models of experimentation developed in the context of micro-and high energy physics by Allan Franklin and Peter Galison . My analysis documents that the methods used in the case studies can be accommodated on both Franklin and Galison's views. I conclude the case studies do not support claims regarding the relative autonomy of biology. ;Second, the analysis documents a number of important roles for life history data acquired by strictly observational means in the process of experimentation, from identification of research problems and development of experimental designs to interpretation of results. Divorced from this context experiments in biology make no sense. Thus, in principle, experimental approaches cannot replace more traditional methods. ;Third, the analysis examines a superficial tension between the use of experiments, which I characterize by the presence of artificial intervention, and the stated goal of most investigations in evolutionary biology, that of understanding how systems behave in the absence of intervention. Experiments involve trade-offs between the control one has over the circumstances of the study and how informative the study is with regard to questions of interest to biologists regarding specific, actual systems in nature. Experimental simulations of natural phenomena in other historical sciences involve similar trade-offs, but there are reasons for believing this tension is more prominent in biology. (shrink)

This is how A. John Simmons sets the scene for his discussion of political obligation in his book Moral Principles and Political Obligations, one of the best known contemporary philosophical treatments of the subject.

In recent decades there has been a great expansion in the number, size and influence of International Non-Governmental Organisations involved in international relief and development. These changes have led to increased scrutiny of such organisations, and this scrutiny, together with increasing reflection by INGOs themselves and their staff on their own practice, has helped to highlight a number of pressing ethical questions such organisations face, such as: should INGOs attempt to provide emergency assistance even when doing so risks helping to (...) fuel further conflict? How should INGOs manage any differences between their values and those of the people they seek to benefit? How open and honest should INGOs be about their own uncertainties and failures? This book consists of sustained reflections on such questions. It derives from a workshop held at Melbourne University in July 2007 that brought together a group of people – for the most part, reflective practitioners and moral and political philosophers – to discuss such questions. It explores honestly some of the current challenges and dilemmas that INGOs face, and also suggests some new ideas for meeting these challenges. Our hope is that the kind of explicit reflection on the ethical issues INGOs face exemplified in this publication will help to promote a wider debate about these issues, a debate that in turn will help INGO managers and others to make better, wiser, more ethically informed decisions. (shrink)

Today, any credible philosophical attempt to discuss personhood must take some position on the proper relation between the philosophical analysis of topics like action, intention, emotion, normative and evaluate judgment, desire and mood --which are grouped together under the heading of `moral psychology'-- and the usually quite different approaches to ostensibly the same phenomena in contemporary theoretical psychology and psychoanalytic practice. The gulf between these two domains is so deep that influential work in each takes no direct account (...) of developments in the other. I believe that there is much to be learned about dominant and often hidden assumptions in contemporary approaches to personhood by comparisons between these fields, but at the outset I want to distinguish this intuition from another one in vogue among philosophers working to bridge the gap between philosophical and psychological disciplines today. This is the somewhat positivist sense that philsophical investigation must take its starting-points and limits from well-established psychological findings, and that philosophical accounts at odds with these are for that reason unrealistic, or obviously trading on outmoded and scientifically discredited `folk metaphysics.' For example, this sense that philosophy must acknowledge its secondary position relative to empirical psychology is implicit throughout Bernard Williams's work on motivation and morality, and it is the explicit basis of Owen Flanagan's recent attempt to limit ethical theory by `psychological realism' and argue for a form of relativism by "[a]ttention to psychological facts." Because all modern conceptions of morality are committed to making "our motivational structure, our personal possibilities, relevant in setting their moral sights," they cannot be developed without. (shrink)